Ask the Scholar
Page 115 of 118
I can add historical knowledge about this page.
Page image
OCR
TOP SECRET
-7-
be used. The only sure victory lies in the Prustration
of the Kremlin design by the steady development of the
moral and material strength of the free world and its
projection into the Soviet world in such a way as to
bring about an internal change in the Soviet system.
Such a positive progran--harmonious with our fundamental
national purpose and our necessary 11 ve
are to regain and retain the initiative and to vin and
hold the necessary popular support and cooperation in
the United States and the rest of the free world.
This program should include a plan for negotiation
with the Soviet Union, developed and agreed with our
Allies and which is consonant with our objectives. The
United States and its allies, particularly the United
Kingdom and France, should always be ready to negotiate
with the Soviet Union on terms consistent with our objec-
tives. The present world situation, however, is one
which militates against successful negotiations vith
the Kremlin-"for the terms of agreements on important
pending issues vould reflect present realities and vould
therefore be unacceptable, if not disastrous, to the
United States and the rest of the free vorld. After a
decision and a start on building up the strength of the
free world has been made, it might then be desirable for
the United States to take an initiative in seeking nego-
tiations in the hope that it might facilitate the process
of accommodation by the Kremlin to the new situation.
Failing that, the unwillingness of the Kremlin to accept
equitable
TOP-SECRET
:
Page data
- Page
- 115
- Source index
- 0
- Type
- photo
- Media ID
- a1e4e8f827bb08d3
- Size
- unknown
Document data
- ID
- 750374
- Core
- doc
- Type
- document
DTO data
{
"id": "750374",
"sourceUrl": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/750374",
"contentType": "document",
"title": "Foreign Affairs File, 1940-1953: Russia: U.S. Relations with",
"citationUrl": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/750374",
"collections": [
"President's Secretary's Files (Truman Administration)",
"Subject Files"
],
"iiifBase": "https://s3.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/lz/presidential-libraries/truman/hst-psf/602191/750374/750374-01-001.jpg",
"thumbnailUrl": "https://s3.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/lz/presidential-libraries/truman/hst-psf/602191/750374/750374-01-001.jpg",
"largeImageUrl": "https://s3.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/lz/presidential-libraries/truman/hst-psf/602191/750374/750374-01-001.jpg",
"imageCount": 118,
"hasImages": true,
"source": "import",
"hasTranscription": false
}
Context sent to Scholar
Document identity
{
"localId": "750374",
"label": "Foreign Affairs File, 1940-1953: Russia: U.S. Relations with",
"core": "doc",
"dtoType": "document",
"citationUrl": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/750374"
}
Document source metadata
{
"id": "750374",
"sourceUrl": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/750374",
"contentType": "document",
"title": "Foreign Affairs File, 1940-1953: Russia: U.S. Relations with",
"citationUrl": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/750374",
"collections": [
"President's Secretary's Files (Truman Administration)",
"Subject Files"
],
"iiifBase": "https://s3.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/lz/presidential-libraries/truman/hst-psf/602191/750374/750374-01-001.jpg",
"thumbnailUrl": "https://s3.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/lz/presidential-libraries/truman/hst-psf/602191/750374/750374-01-001.jpg",
"largeImageUrl": "https://s3.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/lz/presidential-libraries/truman/hst-psf/602191/750374/750374-01-001.jpg",
"imageCount": 118,
"hasImages": true,
"source": "import",
"hasTranscription": false
}
Document source extras
{
"url": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/750374",
"naId": 750374,
"levelOfDescription": "fileUnit",
"recordType": "description",
"ocrSource": "nara-archive"
}
Page context
{
"seq": 115,
"pageIndex": 0,
"type": "photo",
"url": "https://s3.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/lz/presidential-libraries/truman/hst-psf/602191/750374/750374-01-115.jpg",
"mediaId": "a1e4e8f827bb08d3",
"ocrText": "TOP SECRET\n-7-\nbe used. The only sure victory lies in the Prustration\nof the Kremlin design by the steady development of the\nmoral and material strength of the free world and its\nprojection into the Soviet world in such a way as to\nbring about an internal change in the Soviet system.\nSuch a positive progran--harmonious with our fundamental\nnational purpose and our necessary 11 ve\nare to regain and retain the initiative and to vin and\nhold the necessary popular support and cooperation in\nthe United States and the rest of the free world.\nThis program should include a plan for negotiation\nwith the Soviet Union, developed and agreed with our\nAllies and which is consonant with our objectives. The\nUnited States and its allies, particularly the United\nKingdom and France, should always be ready to negotiate\nwith the Soviet Union on terms consistent with our objec-\ntives. The present world situation, however, is one\nwhich militates against successful negotiations vith\nthe Kremlin-\"for the terms of agreements on important\npending issues vould reflect present realities and vould\ntherefore be unacceptable, if not disastrous, to the\nUnited States and the rest of the free vorld. After a\ndecision and a start on building up the strength of the\nfree world has been made, it might then be desirable for\nthe United States to take an initiative in seeking nego-\ntiations in the hope that it might facilitate the process\nof accommodation by the Kremlin to the new situation.\nFailing that, the unwillingness of the Kremlin to accept\nequitable\nTOP-SECRET\n:"
}