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the Soviet regime vill become convinced of the falsity
of its assumptions and that the pre-conditions for work-
able agreements can be created. By practically demon-
strating the integrity and vitality of our system the
free world videns the ares of possible agreement and
thus can hope gradually to bring about a Soviet ackaovl-
edgement of realities which in sum vill eventually
constitute a frustration of the Soviet design. Short of
this, hovever, it might be possible to create a situation
which vill induce the Soviet Uaion to accommodate itself,
with or without the conscious abandonment of its design,
to coexistence on tolerable terms vith the non-Soviet
world. Such a develogment would be a triumph for the
idea of freedom and democracy, It must be an immediate
objective of United States policy.
Thore is no reason, in the event of war, for us to
alter our over-all objectives. They do not include
unconditional surrender, the subjugation of the Russiem
peoples or a Russia shorn of its economic potential.
Such a course vould irrovocably unite the Russian people
behind the regime which enslaves them. Rather these ob-
jectives contemplate Soviet acceptance of the specific
and limited conditions requisite to an international
environment in which free institutions can flourish, and
in which the Russian peoples vill have a now chance to
vork out their ova destiny. If we can make the Russien
people our allies in this enterprise we will obviously
have made our task easier and victory more certain.
The objectives outlined in NSC 20/4 (November 23,
1948) and quoted in Chapter X, are fully consistent
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with
ARCHIVES NATIONAL RECORDA AND
.
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- 750374
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"ocrText": "-7-\nTOP-SECRET\nthe Soviet regime vill become convinced of the falsity\nof its assumptions and that the pre-conditions for work-\nable agreements can be created. By practically demon-\nstrating the integrity and vitality of our system the\nfree world videns the ares of possible agreement and\nthus can hope gradually to bring about a Soviet ackaovl-\nedgement of realities which in sum vill eventually\nconstitute a frustration of the Soviet design. Short of\nthis, hovever, it might be possible to create a situation\nwhich vill induce the Soviet Uaion to accommodate itself,\nwith or without the conscious abandonment of its design,\nto coexistence on tolerable terms vith the non-Soviet\nworld. Such a develogment would be a triumph for the\nidea of freedom and democracy, It must be an immediate\nobjective of United States policy.\nThore is no reason, in the event of war, for us to\nalter our over-all objectives. They do not include\nunconditional surrender, the subjugation of the Russiem\npeoples or a Russia shorn of its economic potential.\nSuch a course vould irrovocably unite the Russian people\nbehind the regime which enslaves them. Rather these ob-\njectives contemplate Soviet acceptance of the specific\nand limited conditions requisite to an international\nenvironment in which free institutions can flourish, and\nin which the Russian peoples vill have a now chance to\nvork out their ova destiny. If we can make the Russien\npeople our allies in this enterprise we will obviously\nhave made our task easier and victory more certain.\nThe objectives outlined in NSC 20/4 (November 23,\n1948) and quoted in Chapter X, are fully consistent\nTOP SECRET\nwith\nARCHIVES NATIONAL RECORDA AND\n."
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