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in history. The party, the police and the conspicuous
might of the Soviet militery machine together tend to
create en overell impression of irresistible Soviet
power among many peoples of the free vorld.
The ideological pretensions of the Kremlin- are another
greet source of strength. Its identification of the Soviet
system with communism, its peace campaigns and its champion-
ing of colonial peoples may be viewed with epathy, if not
cynicism, by the oppressed totalitariat of the Soviet world,
but in the free world these ideas find favorable responses
in vulnerable segments of society. They have found a
particulerly receptive audience in Asia, especially as the
Asiatics have been impressed by that has been plausibly
portrayed to them as the rapid advance of the U.S.S.R. from
B backwerd society to a cosition of great world power. Thus,
in its pretensions to being (e) the source of a new universal
frith end (b) the model "scientific" society, the Kremlin
cynicelly identifies itself with the genuine espirations of
lerge numbers of people, and places itself at the head of
en international crusade with all of the benefits which
derive therefrom.
Finelly, there is a category of capabilities, strictly
speaking neither institutional nor ideological, which should
be taken into consideretion. The extraordinary flexibility
of Soviet tactics is certainly a strength. It derives from
the utterly emoral and opportunistic conduct of 'oviet
policy. Combining this cuality with the elements of secrecy,
the Kremlin possesses a formidable capscity to act with the
videst tactical latitude, with stealth and vith speed.
The greatest vulnerability of the Kremlin lies in
the basic nature its with the Soviet people.
TOP SECRET
That
ARCNIVES "NATIONAL RECORDS AMD
a
.
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"ocrText": "-4m\nTOP-SECRET\nin history. The party, the police and the conspicuous\nmight of the Soviet militery machine together tend to\ncreate en overell impression of irresistible Soviet\npower among many peoples of the free vorld.\nThe ideological pretensions of the Kremlin- are another\ngreet source of strength. Its identification of the Soviet\nsystem with communism, its peace campaigns and its champion-\ning of colonial peoples may be viewed with epathy, if not\ncynicism, by the oppressed totalitariat of the Soviet world,\nbut in the free world these ideas find favorable responses\nin vulnerable segments of society. They have found a\nparticulerly receptive audience in Asia, especially as the\nAsiatics have been impressed by that has been plausibly\nportrayed to them as the rapid advance of the U.S.S.R. from\nB backwerd society to a cosition of great world power. Thus,\nin its pretensions to being (e) the source of a new universal\nfrith end (b) the model \"scientific\" society, the Kremlin\ncynicelly identifies itself with the genuine espirations of\nlerge numbers of people, and places itself at the head of\nen international crusade with all of the benefits which\nderive therefrom.\nFinelly, there is a category of capabilities, strictly\nspeaking neither institutional nor ideological, which should\nbe taken into consideretion. The extraordinary flexibility\nof Soviet tactics is certainly a strength. It derives from\nthe utterly emoral and opportunistic conduct of 'oviet\npolicy. Combining this cuality with the elements of secrecy,\nthe Kremlin possesses a formidable capscity to act with the\nvidest tactical latitude, with stealth and vith speed.\nThe greatest vulnerability of the Kremlin lies in\nthe basic nature its with the Soviet people.\nTOP SECRET\nThat\nARCNIVES \"NATIONAL RECORDS AMD\na\n."
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