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That relationship is characterized by universal sus-
picion, fear and denunciation. It is a relationship in which
the Kremlin relies, not only for its power but its very sure
vival, on intricately devised mechanisms of coercion. The
Soviet monolith is hold together by the iron curtain around
it and the iron bars vi thin it, not by any force of natural
cohesion. These artifical mechanisms of unity have never
been intelligently challenged by a strong outside force.
The full measure of their vulnerability is therefore not yet
evident.
The Kromlin's relations with its satellites and their
peoples is likewise a vulnerability. Nationalism still re-
mains the most potent emotional-political force. The well-
known ills of colonialism are compounded, however, by the
excessive demands of the Kremlin that its satellites accept
not only the imperial authority of Moscow but that they believe
in and proclaim the ideological primacy and infallibility of
the Kromlin. These excessive requirements can be made good
only through extreme coercion. The result is that if a
satellite feels able to effect its independence of the Krem-
lin, as Tito was able to do, it is likely to break away.
In short, Soviet ideas and practices run counter to the
best and potentially the strongest instincts of men, and
deny their most fundamental aspirations. Against an adver
sary which effectively affirmed the constructive and hopeful
instincts of men and was capable of fulfilling their funda-
mental aspirations, the Soviet system might prove to be
fatally weak.
The
6.8.
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"ocrText": "-5a\nTOP SECRET\nThat relationship is characterized by universal sus-\npicion, fear and denunciation. It is a relationship in which\nthe Kremlin relies, not only for its power but its very sure\nvival, on intricately devised mechanisms of coercion. The\nSoviet monolith is hold together by the iron curtain around\nit and the iron bars vi thin it, not by any force of natural\ncohesion. These artifical mechanisms of unity have never\nbeen intelligently challenged by a strong outside force.\nThe full measure of their vulnerability is therefore not yet\nevident.\nThe Kromlin's relations with its satellites and their\npeoples is likewise a vulnerability. Nationalism still re-\nmains the most potent emotional-political force. The well-\nknown ills of colonialism are compounded, however, by the\nexcessive demands of the Kremlin that its satellites accept\nnot only the imperial authority of Moscow but that they believe\nin and proclaim the ideological primacy and infallibility of\nthe Kromlin. These excessive requirements can be made good\nonly through extreme coercion. The result is that if a\nsatellite feels able to effect its independence of the Krem-\nlin, as Tito was able to do, it is likely to break away.\nIn short, Soviet ideas and practices run counter to the\nbest and potentially the strongest instincts of men, and\ndeny their most fundamental aspirations. Against an adver\nsary which effectively affirmed the constructive and hopeful\ninstincts of men and was capable of fulfilling their funda-\nmental aspirations, the Soviet system might prove to be\nfatally weak.\nThe\n6.8.\nTOP SECRET"
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