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The problem of succession to Stalin is also a Kremlin
vulnerability. In a system there supreme power is acquired
and held through violence and intimidation, the transfer of
that power may well produce a period of instability.
In a very real sense, the Kremlin is a victim of its
own dynamism. This dynamism can become a weakness if it is
frustrated, if in its forward thrusts it encounters a superior
force which halts the expansion and exerts a superior counter=
pressure. Yet the Kromlin cannot relax the condition of
crisis and mobilization, for to do so would be to lose its
dynamism, whereat the seeds of decay within the Soviet sys-
tem would begin to flourish and fructify.
The Kremlin is, of course, aware of these weaknesses.
It must know that in the present VID rld situation they are of
secondary significance. So long as the Kremlin retains the
initiative, so long as it can keep on the offensive unchal-
lenged by clearly superior counter-force--spiritual as well
as materiale-its vulnerabilities are largely inoperative and
even concealed by its successes. The Kremlin has not yet
been given real reason to fear and be diverted by the rot
vi thin its system.
B. Economic
The Kremlin has no economic intentions unrelated to its
overall policies. Economics in the Soviet wordd is not an
end in itself. The Kremlin's policy, in so far as it has to
do with economics, is to utilize economic processes to con-
tribute to the overall strength, particularly the war=making
capacity
THOUGHT
TOP SECRET
"
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"ocrText": "-6-\n-TOP-SECRET\nThe problem of succession to Stalin is also a Kremlin\nvulnerability. In a system there supreme power is acquired\nand held through violence and intimidation, the transfer of\nthat power may well produce a period of instability.\nIn a very real sense, the Kremlin is a victim of its\nown dynamism. This dynamism can become a weakness if it is\nfrustrated, if in its forward thrusts it encounters a superior\nforce which halts the expansion and exerts a superior counter=\npressure. Yet the Kromlin cannot relax the condition of\ncrisis and mobilization, for to do so would be to lose its\ndynamism, whereat the seeds of decay within the Soviet sys-\ntem would begin to flourish and fructify.\nThe Kremlin is, of course, aware of these weaknesses.\nIt must know that in the present VID rld situation they are of\nsecondary significance. So long as the Kremlin retains the\ninitiative, so long as it can keep on the offensive unchal-\nlenged by clearly superior counter-force--spiritual as well\nas materiale-its vulnerabilities are largely inoperative and\neven concealed by its successes. The Kremlin has not yet\nbeen given real reason to fear and be diverted by the rot\nvi thin its system.\nB. Economic\nThe Kremlin has no economic intentions unrelated to its\noverall policies. Economics in the Soviet wordd is not an\nend in itself. The Kremlin's policy, in so far as it has to\ndo with economics, is to utilize economic processes to con-\ntribute to the overall strength, particularly the war=making\ncapacity\nTHOUGHT\nTOP SECRET\n\""
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