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to this and other purposes. Even Western Europe could
afford to assign a substantially larger proportion of its
resources to defense, if the necessary foundation in
public understanding and will could be laid, and if the
assistance needed to meet its dollar deficit were pro-
vided.
A few statistics will help to clarify this point.
Percentage of Gross Available Resources
Allocated to Investment, National Defense,
and Consumption in East & West, 1949.
(in percent of total)
GROSS
COUNTRY
INVESTMENT
DEFENSE
CONSUMPTION
U.S.S.R.
25.4
13.8
60.8
Soviet Orbit
22.0 de
4.0 b/
74.0 a
U.S.
13.6
6.5
79.9
European NAP countries
20.4
4.8
74.8
a
Crude estimate.
b/
Includes Soviet Zone of Germany; otherwise 5 percent.
The Soviet Union is now allocating nearly 40 percent
of its gross available resources to military purposes and
investment, much of which is in war=supporting industries.
It is estimated that even in an emergency the Soviet Union
could not increase this proportion to much more than
to
50 percent, or by one-fourth. The United states, on the
other hand, is allocating only about 20 percent of its
resources to defense and investment (or 22 percent includ-
ing foreign assistance), and little of its investment
outlays are directed to war-supporting industries. In an
emergency the United States could allocate more than
50 percent
to
the
TOP SECRET
CT RECOKOR GERVICE"
Ec
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"ocrText": "TOP SECRET\ngo\nto this and other purposes. Even Western Europe could\nafford to assign a substantially larger proportion of its\nresources to defense, if the necessary foundation in\npublic understanding and will could be laid, and if the\nassistance needed to meet its dollar deficit were pro-\nvided.\nA few statistics will help to clarify this point.\nPercentage of Gross Available Resources\nAllocated to Investment, National Defense,\nand Consumption in East & West, 1949.\n(in percent of total)\nGROSS\nCOUNTRY\nINVESTMENT\nDEFENSE\nCONSUMPTION\nU.S.S.R.\n25.4\n13.8\n60.8\nSoviet Orbit\n22.0 de\n4.0 b/\n74.0 a\nU.S.\n13.6\n6.5\n79.9\nEuropean NAP countries\n20.4\n4.8\n74.8\na\nCrude estimate.\nb/\nIncludes Soviet Zone of Germany; otherwise 5 percent.\nThe Soviet Union is now allocating nearly 40 percent\nof its gross available resources to military purposes and\ninvestment, much of which is in war=supporting industries.\nIt is estimated that even in an emergency the Soviet Union\ncould not increase this proportion to much more than\nto\n50 percent, or by one-fourth. The United states, on the\nother hand, is allocating only about 20 percent of its\nresources to defense and investment (or 22 percent includ-\ning foreign assistance), and little of its investment\noutlays are directed to war-supporting industries. In an\nemergency the United States could allocate more than\n50 percent\nto\nthe\nTOP SECRET\nCT RECOKOR GERVICE\"\nEc"
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