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offensive air operatione against vitel elements of the
Soviet war~making capacity.
The scale of the operations listed in the preceding
paragraph is limited by the effective forcés and matericl
in being of the United States and its allies vis=8=vis the
Soviet Union. Consistent with the aggressive threat
fecing us and in consonance with overall strategic plans,
the United States must provide to its allies on a continu=
ing basis as large amounts of military assistance as possi-
ble without serious detriment to United States operational
requirements.
If the potential military capabilities of the United
States and its allies were rapidly and effectively
developed, sufficient forces could be produced probably
to deter war, or if the Soviet Union chooses war, to with-
stand the initial Soviet attacks, to stabilize supporting
attacks, and to retaliate in turn with even greater impact
en the Soviet capabilities. From the military point of
view alone, however, this would require not only the
generation of the necessary military forces but also the
development and stockpiling of improved weapons of all
types.
Under existing peacetime conditions, a period of from
two to three years is required to produce a material
increase in military power. Such increased power could
be provided in a somewhat shorter period in a declared
An
: the
period of emergency or in wartime through a full=out
and
national effort. Any increase in military power in peação
time, however, should be related both to its probable
military
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"ocrText": "TOP SECRET\n-20-\noffensive air operatione against vitel elements of the\nSoviet war~making capacity.\nThe scale of the operations listed in the preceding\nparagraph is limited by the effective forcés and matericl\nin being of the United States and its allies vis=8=vis the\nSoviet Union. Consistent with the aggressive threat\nfecing us and in consonance with overall strategic plans,\nthe United States must provide to its allies on a continu=\ning basis as large amounts of military assistance as possi-\nble without serious detriment to United States operational\nrequirements.\nIf the potential military capabilities of the United\nStates and its allies were rapidly and effectively\ndeveloped, sufficient forces could be produced probably\nto deter war, or if the Soviet Union chooses war, to with-\nstand the initial Soviet attacks, to stabilize supporting\nattacks, and to retaliate in turn with even greater impact\nen the Soviet capabilities. From the military point of\nview alone, however, this would require not only the\ngeneration of the necessary military forces but also the\ndevelopment and stockpiling of improved weapons of all\ntypes.\nUnder existing peacetime conditions, a period of from\ntwo to three years is required to produce a material\nincrease in military power. Such increased power could\nbe provided in a somewhat shorter period in a declared\nAn\n: the\nperiod of emergency or in wartime through a full=out\nand\nnational effort. Any increase in military power in peação\ntime, however, should be related both to its probable\nmilitary\nTOP SECRET"
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