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if there is to be a reasonable prospect of such effective
elimination of atomic weapons are discussed in Chapter IX.
In the absence of such elimination and the securing of these
objectives, it would appear that we have no alternative but to
increase our atomic capability as rapidly as other consider8-
tions make appropriate. In either case, it appears to be impera-
tive to increase as rapidly as possible our general air, ground
and sea strength and that of our allies to a point where we are
militarily not so heavily dependent on atomic weapons.
very
vague
2. As is indicated in Chapter IV, it is important that the
United States employ military force only if the necessity for its
use is clear and compelling and commends itself to the overwhelm-
ing majority of our people. The United States cannot therefore
engage in war except as a reaction to aggression of so elear and
compelling a nature as to bring the overwhelming majority of our
people to accept the use of military force. In the event war
comes, our use of force must be to compel the acceptance of our
objectives and must be congruent to the range of tasks which we
may encounter.
In the event of a general war with the U.S.S.R. is must be
anticipated that atomic weapons will be used by each side in the
manner it deems best suited to accomplish its objectives. In view
of our vulnerability to Soviet atomic attack, it has been argued
that we might wish to hold our atomic weapons only for retalia-
tion against prior use by the U.S.S.R. To be able to do so and
söll have hope of achieving our objectives, the non-atomic military
capabilities of ourselves and our allies would have to be
fully developed and the political weaknesses of the Soviet
Union fully exploited. In the event of war, however, we could
not be sure that we could move toward the attainment of these
objectives without the U.S.S.R.'s resorting sooner or later to
ARCHIVES AMD
the use of its atomic weapons. Only if we had overwhelming
RECORDS
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atomic
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"ocrText": "TOP SECRET\nif there is to be a reasonable prospect of such effective\nelimination of atomic weapons are discussed in Chapter IX.\nIn the absence of such elimination and the securing of these\nobjectives, it would appear that we have no alternative but to\nincrease our atomic capability as rapidly as other consider8-\ntions make appropriate. In either case, it appears to be impera-\ntive to increase as rapidly as possible our general air, ground\nand sea strength and that of our allies to a point where we are\nmilitarily not so heavily dependent on atomic weapons.\nvery\nvague\n2. As is indicated in Chapter IV, it is important that the\nUnited States employ military force only if the necessity for its\nuse is clear and compelling and commends itself to the overwhelm-\ning majority of our people. The United States cannot therefore\nengage in war except as a reaction to aggression of so elear and\ncompelling a nature as to bring the overwhelming majority of our\npeople to accept the use of military force. In the event war\ncomes, our use of force must be to compel the acceptance of our\nobjectives and must be congruent to the range of tasks which we\nmay encounter.\nIn the event of a general war with the U.S.S.R. is must be\nanticipated that atomic weapons will be used by each side in the\nmanner it deems best suited to accomplish its objectives. In view\nof our vulnerability to Soviet atomic attack, it has been argued\nthat we might wish to hold our atomic weapons only for retalia-\ntion against prior use by the U.S.S.R. To be able to do so and\nsöll have hope of achieving our objectives, the non-atomic military\ncapabilities of ourselves and our allies would have to be\nfully developed and the political weaknesses of the Soviet\nUnion fully exploited. In the event of war, however, we could\nnot be sure that we could move toward the attainment of these\nobjectives without the U.S.S.R.'s resorting sooner or later to\nARCHIVES AMD\nthe use of its atomic weapons. Only if we had overwhelming\nRECORDS\nSERVICA\nTOP SECRET\natomic"
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