Ask the Scholar
Page 73 of 118
I can add historical knowledge about this page.
Page image
OCR
TOP SECRET
-8-
4.
The certainty of notice of violation also
deponds upon a number of factors. In the absence of
good faith, it is to be doubted whether any system oan
be designed which will give certainty of notice of
violation. International ownership of raw materials
and fissionable materials and internationsl ownership and
operation of dangerous facilities, coupled with inspection
based on continuous unlimited freedom of access to all
parts of the Soviet Union (as well as to all parts of the
territory of other signatorics to the control agreement)
appear to be necessary to give the requisite degree of
assurance against secret violations. As the Soviet stock-
pile of fissionable materials grows, the amount which the
U.S.S.R. might secretly withhold and not declare to the
inspection ageney grows. In this sense, the earlier an
agreement le consummated the creater the security it
would offer. The possibility of successful secret pro-
duction operations also increases with developments which
may reduce the size and power consumption of individual
reactors. The development of a thermonuclear bomb would
increase many fold the damage a given amount of fission-
able material could do and would, therefore, vastly in-
crease the danger that a decisive advantage could be gained
through secret operations.
5. The relative sacrifices which would be involved in
international control need also to be considered. If it were
possible to negotiate an effective system of international con-
trol the United States would presumably sacrifice a much larger
stockpile of atomic weapons and a nuch larger production capacity
than would the U.S.S.R. The opening up of national territor:
to international
8.
TOP SECRET
a
to
Page data
- Page
- 73
- Source index
- 0
- Type
- photo
- Media ID
- 6f49c0be9d5f779f
- Size
- unknown
Document data
- ID
- 750374
- Core
- doc
- Type
- document
DTO data
{
"id": "750374",
"sourceUrl": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/750374",
"contentType": "document",
"title": "Foreign Affairs File, 1940-1953: Russia: U.S. Relations with",
"citationUrl": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/750374",
"collections": [
"President's Secretary's Files (Truman Administration)",
"Subject Files"
],
"iiifBase": "https://s3.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/lz/presidential-libraries/truman/hst-psf/602191/750374/750374-01-001.jpg",
"thumbnailUrl": "https://s3.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/lz/presidential-libraries/truman/hst-psf/602191/750374/750374-01-001.jpg",
"largeImageUrl": "https://s3.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/lz/presidential-libraries/truman/hst-psf/602191/750374/750374-01-001.jpg",
"imageCount": 118,
"hasImages": true,
"source": "import",
"hasTranscription": false
}
Context sent to Scholar
Document identity
{
"localId": "750374",
"label": "Foreign Affairs File, 1940-1953: Russia: U.S. Relations with",
"core": "doc",
"dtoType": "document",
"citationUrl": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/750374"
}
Document source metadata
{
"id": "750374",
"sourceUrl": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/750374",
"contentType": "document",
"title": "Foreign Affairs File, 1940-1953: Russia: U.S. Relations with",
"citationUrl": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/750374",
"collections": [
"President's Secretary's Files (Truman Administration)",
"Subject Files"
],
"iiifBase": "https://s3.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/lz/presidential-libraries/truman/hst-psf/602191/750374/750374-01-001.jpg",
"thumbnailUrl": "https://s3.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/lz/presidential-libraries/truman/hst-psf/602191/750374/750374-01-001.jpg",
"largeImageUrl": "https://s3.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/lz/presidential-libraries/truman/hst-psf/602191/750374/750374-01-001.jpg",
"imageCount": 118,
"hasImages": true,
"source": "import",
"hasTranscription": false
}
Document source extras
{
"url": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/750374",
"naId": 750374,
"levelOfDescription": "fileUnit",
"recordType": "description",
"ocrSource": "nara-archive"
}
Page context
{
"seq": 73,
"pageIndex": 0,
"type": "photo",
"url": "https://s3.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/lz/presidential-libraries/truman/hst-psf/602191/750374/750374-01-073.jpg",
"mediaId": "6f49c0be9d5f779f",
"ocrText": "TOP SECRET\n-8-\n4.\nThe certainty of notice of violation also\ndeponds upon a number of factors. In the absence of\ngood faith, it is to be doubted whether any system oan\nbe designed which will give certainty of notice of\nviolation. International ownership of raw materials\nand fissionable materials and internationsl ownership and\noperation of dangerous facilities, coupled with inspection\nbased on continuous unlimited freedom of access to all\nparts of the Soviet Union (as well as to all parts of the\nterritory of other signatorics to the control agreement)\nappear to be necessary to give the requisite degree of\nassurance against secret violations. As the Soviet stock-\npile of fissionable materials grows, the amount which the\nU.S.S.R. might secretly withhold and not declare to the\ninspection ageney grows. In this sense, the earlier an\nagreement le consummated the creater the security it\nwould offer. The possibility of successful secret pro-\nduction operations also increases with developments which\nmay reduce the size and power consumption of individual\nreactors. The development of a thermonuclear bomb would\nincrease many fold the damage a given amount of fission-\nable material could do and would, therefore, vastly in-\ncrease the danger that a decisive advantage could be gained\nthrough secret operations.\n5. The relative sacrifices which would be involved in\ninternational control need also to be considered. If it were\npossible to negotiate an effective system of international con-\ntrol the United States would presumably sacrifice a much larger\nstockpile of atomic weapons and a nuch larger production capacity\nthan would the U.S.S.R. The opening up of national territor:\nto international\n8.\nTOP SECRET\na\nto"
}