Ask the Scholar
Page 76 of 118
I can add historical knowledge about this page.
Page image
OCR
TOP SECRET
-11-
The above considerations make it clear that at least
a
major change in the relative power positions of the
United States and the Soviet Union would' have to take
place before an effective system of international control
could be negotiated. The Soviet Union would have had to
have moved a substantial distance down the path of accon-
modation and compromise before such an arrangement would
be conceávable. This conclusion is supported by the Third
Report of the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission to
the Security Council, May 17, 1948, in which it is stated
that #
the majority of the Commission has been unable
to secure their acceptance of the nature and extent ef
participation in the world community required of all nations
in thi's field
As a result, the Commission has been
forced to recognize that agreement on effective measures
for the control of atomie energy is itself dependent on
cooperation in broader fields of policy.
In short, 1t is impossible to hope that an effective
plan for international control can be negotiated unless
and until the Kremlin design has been frustrated to a point
at which a genuine and drastic change in Soviet policies
has taken place.
FOP SECRET
Customer
DATIONAL
ARCHIVES AND
RECORDS
:
SERVICE
Page data
- Page
- 76
- Source index
- 0
- Type
- photo
- Media ID
- 151d9776538eaccc
- Size
- unknown
Document data
- ID
- 750374
- Core
- doc
- Type
- document
DTO data
{
"id": "750374",
"sourceUrl": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/750374",
"contentType": "document",
"title": "Foreign Affairs File, 1940-1953: Russia: U.S. Relations with",
"citationUrl": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/750374",
"collections": [
"President's Secretary's Files (Truman Administration)",
"Subject Files"
],
"iiifBase": "https://s3.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/lz/presidential-libraries/truman/hst-psf/602191/750374/750374-01-001.jpg",
"thumbnailUrl": "https://s3.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/lz/presidential-libraries/truman/hst-psf/602191/750374/750374-01-001.jpg",
"largeImageUrl": "https://s3.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/lz/presidential-libraries/truman/hst-psf/602191/750374/750374-01-001.jpg",
"imageCount": 118,
"hasImages": true,
"source": "import",
"hasTranscription": false
}
Context sent to Scholar
Document identity
{
"localId": "750374",
"label": "Foreign Affairs File, 1940-1953: Russia: U.S. Relations with",
"core": "doc",
"dtoType": "document",
"citationUrl": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/750374"
}
Document source metadata
{
"id": "750374",
"sourceUrl": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/750374",
"contentType": "document",
"title": "Foreign Affairs File, 1940-1953: Russia: U.S. Relations with",
"citationUrl": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/750374",
"collections": [
"President's Secretary's Files (Truman Administration)",
"Subject Files"
],
"iiifBase": "https://s3.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/lz/presidential-libraries/truman/hst-psf/602191/750374/750374-01-001.jpg",
"thumbnailUrl": "https://s3.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/lz/presidential-libraries/truman/hst-psf/602191/750374/750374-01-001.jpg",
"largeImageUrl": "https://s3.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/lz/presidential-libraries/truman/hst-psf/602191/750374/750374-01-001.jpg",
"imageCount": 118,
"hasImages": true,
"source": "import",
"hasTranscription": false
}
Document source extras
{
"url": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/750374",
"naId": 750374,
"levelOfDescription": "fileUnit",
"recordType": "description",
"ocrSource": "nara-archive"
}
Page context
{
"seq": 76,
"pageIndex": 0,
"type": "photo",
"url": "https://s3.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/lz/presidential-libraries/truman/hst-psf/602191/750374/750374-01-076.jpg",
"mediaId": "151d9776538eaccc",
"ocrText": "TOP SECRET\n-11-\nThe above considerations make it clear that at least\na\nmajor change in the relative power positions of the\nUnited States and the Soviet Union would' have to take\nplace before an effective system of international control\ncould be negotiated. The Soviet Union would have had to\nhave moved a substantial distance down the path of accon-\nmodation and compromise before such an arrangement would\nbe conceávable. This conclusion is supported by the Third\nReport of the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission to\nthe Security Council, May 17, 1948, in which it is stated\nthat #\nthe majority of the Commission has been unable\nto secure their acceptance of the nature and extent ef\nparticipation in the world community required of all nations\nin thi's field\nAs a result, the Commission has been\nforced to recognize that agreement on effective measures\nfor the control of atomie energy is itself dependent on\ncooperation in broader fields of policy.\nIn short, 1t is impossible to hope that an effective\nplan for international control can be negotiated unless\nand until the Kremlin design has been frustrated to a point\nat which a genuine and drastic change in Soviet policies\nhas taken place.\nFOP SECRET\nCustomer\nDATIONAL\nARCHIVES AND\nRECORDS\n:\nSERVICE"
}