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-5-
forces from, and commitments to, Europe and Japan.
Depending on its evaluation of its own strengths and
weaknesses as against the West's (particularly the ability
and will of the West to sustain its efforts), it will or
will not be prepared to make important concessions to
achieve these major objectives. It is unlikely that the
Kremlin's evaluation is such that it would now be prepared
to make significant concessions.
The objectives of the United States and other free
opportunity
our,
countries in negotiations with the Soviet Union (apart from
are:
1-To
the ideological objectives discussed dove) are to record, in
gat
a formal fashion which will facilitate the consolidation
hoors
things
and further advance of our position, the process of Soviet
Genoge
accommodation to the new political, psychological, and
economic conditions in the world which will result from
your
etc
adoption of the fourth course of action and which will be
etc
supported by the increasing military strength developed as
an integral part of that course of action. In short, our
objectives are to record, where desirable, the gradual with-
drawal of the Soviet Union and to facilitate that process by
making more
negotiation, if possible, always expedient than lundear
resort to force.
It must be presmed that for some time the Kremlin will
the
accept agreements only if it is convinced that by a cting in
but faith
bad faith whenever and wherever there is an opportunity to
clause Dis
invellinent,
the
do so with impunity) it can derive greater advantage from
USSR would
the agreements than the free world. For this reason, we
also accept tact
must take care that any. agreements are enforceable or that
aga information f beto ussk2
They
is
it
'NATIONAL
ARCHIVES AND
RECORDS
st
BERVICE"
TOP SECRET
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"ocrText": "TOP SECRET\n-5-\nforces from, and commitments to, Europe and Japan.\nDepending on its evaluation of its own strengths and\nweaknesses as against the West's (particularly the ability\nand will of the West to sustain its efforts), it will or\nwill not be prepared to make important concessions to\nachieve these major objectives. It is unlikely that the\nKremlin's evaluation is such that it would now be prepared\nto make significant concessions.\nThe objectives of the United States and other free\nopportunity\nour,\ncountries in negotiations with the Soviet Union (apart from\nare:\n1-To\nthe ideological objectives discussed dove) are to record, in\ngat\na formal fashion which will facilitate the consolidation\nhoors\nthings\nand further advance of our position, the process of Soviet\nGenoge\naccommodation to the new political, psychological, and\neconomic conditions in the world which will result from\nyour\netc\nadoption of the fourth course of action and which will be\netc\nsupported by the increasing military strength developed as\nan integral part of that course of action. In short, our\nobjectives are to record, where desirable, the gradual with-\ndrawal of the Soviet Union and to facilitate that process by\nmaking more\nnegotiation, if possible, always expedient than lundear\nresort to force.\nIt must be presmed that for some time the Kremlin will\nthe\naccept agreements only if it is convinced that by a cting in\nbut faith\nbad faith whenever and wherever there is an opportunity to\nclause Dis\ninvellinent,\nthe\ndo so with impunity) it can derive greater advantage from\nUSSR would\nthe agreements than the free world. For this reason, we\nalso accept tact\nmust take care that any. agreements are enforceable or that\naga information f beto ussk2\nThey\nis\nit\n'NATIONAL\nARCHIVES AND\nRECORDS\nst\nBERVICE\"\nTOP SECRET"
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