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FOP SECRET
on it should have a high priority. However, unless
such an economic program is matched and supplemented by
an equally far-sighted and vigorous political and mili- das
tary program, ve will not be successful in checking and
rolling back the Kremlin's drive.
4. Negotiation. In short, by continuing along its
present course the free world will not succeed in making
effective use of its vastly superior political, economic,
and military potential to build a tolerable state of
order among nations. On the contrary, the political,
not
economic, and military situation of the free world is
proren
in
already unsatisfactory and will become less favorable
this doc
unless we act to reverse present trends.
This situation is one which militates against
successful negotiations with the Kremlin--for the terms
of agreements on important pending issues would reflect
present realities and would therefore be unacceptable,
if not disastrous, to the United States and the rest of
the free world. Unless a decision had been made and
action undertaken to build up the strength, in the broad-
est sense, of the United States and the free world, an
attempt to negotiate a general settlement on terms
acceptable to us would be ineffective and probably long
drawn out, and might thereby seriously delay the necessary
measures to build up our strength.
This is true despite the fact that the United
States now has the capability of delivering a poverful
blow against the Soviet Union in the event of war, for
one of
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"ocrText": "FOP SECRET\non it should have a high priority. However, unless\nsuch an economic program is matched and supplemented by\nan equally far-sighted and vigorous political and mili- das\ntary program, ve will not be successful in checking and\nrolling back the Kremlin's drive.\n4. Negotiation. In short, by continuing along its\npresent course the free world will not succeed in making\neffective use of its vastly superior political, economic,\nand military potential to build a tolerable state of\norder among nations. On the contrary, the political,\nnot\neconomic, and military situation of the free world is\nproren\nin\nalready unsatisfactory and will become less favorable\nthis doc\nunless we act to reverse present trends.\nThis situation is one which militates against\nsuccessful negotiations with the Kremlin--for the terms\nof agreements on important pending issues would reflect\npresent realities and would therefore be unacceptable,\nif not disastrous, to the United States and the rest of\nthe free world. Unless a decision had been made and\naction undertaken to build up the strength, in the broad-\nest sense, of the United States and the free world, an\nattempt to negotiate a general settlement on terms\nacceptable to us would be ineffective and probably long\ndrawn out, and might thereby seriously delay the necessary\nmeasures to build up our strength.\nThis is true despite the fact that the United\nStates now has the capability of delivering a poverful\nblow against the Soviet Union in the event of war, for\none of\nTOP SECRET"
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