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TOP<SECRET
-16
B.
The Second Course- Isolation.
Continuation of present trends, it has been shown
abovs, will lead progressively to the withdrawal of the
United States from most of its present commitments in
Europe and Asia and to our isolation in the Western
Hemisphere and its approaches. This would result not
from a conscious decision but from a failure to take the
actions necessary to bring our capabilities into line
with our commitments and thus to a withdrawal under
pressure. This pressurs might como from our present
Allies, who will tend to seek other "solutions" unless
they have confidence in our determination to accelerate
our efforts to build a successfully functioning political
and economic system in the free world.
There are some who advocate a deliberate.docision
to isolate ourselves Superficially, this has some
attractiveness as a course of action, for it appears to
bring our commitments and capabilities into harmony by
reducing the former and by concentrating our present,
or perhaps even reduced, military expenditures on the
defense of the United States.
This argument overlooks the relativity of
capabilities. With the United States in an isolated
position, we would have to face the probability that
the Soviet Union would quickly dominate most of Eurasia,
probably without meeting armed resistance. It would
thus acquire a potential far superior to our own,
and would promptly proceed to develop this potential
with the purpose of eliminating our powers, which
s.
would,
AND
RECORDS
:
FOP SECRET
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"ocrText": "TOP<SECRET\n-16\nB.\nThe Second Course- Isolation.\nContinuation of present trends, it has been shown\nabovs, will lead progressively to the withdrawal of the\nUnited States from most of its present commitments in\nEurope and Asia and to our isolation in the Western\nHemisphere and its approaches. This would result not\nfrom a conscious decision but from a failure to take the\nactions necessary to bring our capabilities into line\nwith our commitments and thus to a withdrawal under\npressure. This pressurs might como from our present\nAllies, who will tend to seek other \"solutions\" unless\nthey have confidence in our determination to accelerate\nour efforts to build a successfully functioning political\nand economic system in the free world.\nThere are some who advocate a deliberate.docision\nto isolate ourselves Superficially, this has some\nattractiveness as a course of action, for it appears to\nbring our commitments and capabilities into harmony by\nreducing the former and by concentrating our present,\nor perhaps even reduced, military expenditures on the\ndefense of the United States.\nThis argument overlooks the relativity of\ncapabilities. With the United States in an isolated\nposition, we would have to face the probability that\nthe Soviet Union would quickly dominate most of Eurasia,\nprobably without meeting armed resistance. It would\nthus acquire a potential far superior to our own,\nand would promptly proceed to develop this potential\nwith the purpose of eliminating our powers, which\ns.\nwould,\nAND\nRECORDS\n:\nFOP SECRET"
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