Ask the Scholar
Page 136 of 436
I can add historical knowledge about this page.
Page image
OCR
J. 33305-MONO-State
Galley 135
UNCORRECTED GALLEY PROOF
that the Soviet Government suspects that Great Britain desires to see
installed wherever possible right-wing governments which from the
Soviet point of view would be hostile to the Soviet Union. On the
other hand, the British view with apprehension the possibility that
the Soviet Government will endeavor in its turn to install and support
left-wing totalitarian governments as far west as possible in Europe.
In actual fact these mutual suspicions appear to be unjustified in
that it is not a fixed and calculated British policy to support right-wing
elements in Europe, nor on the basis of existing evidence can it be said
that the Soviet Government is determined to install Communist
regimes throughout Europe. However, these interacting mutual
suspicions tend to push British policy, in action, farther to the right
and Soviet policy farther to the left. Recent events in Greece will
undoubtedly be widely interpreted in Moscow as confirmation of their
suspicions of Great Britain's intentions, and the recent events in
Poland with the formation of the Lublin Committee into a provisional
government will likewise confirm British fears in regard to Soviet
policy.
If the situation is to be saved it is essential for the three principal
Allies to examine carefully the present political forces at work in the
liberated countries in Europe in order to ascertain if there are not
political groups and parties which would be mutually acceptable and
to which all three countries could give whole-hearted support. It
would be necessary to start by excluding either a right-wing govern-
ment in which "reactionary" elements regarded by the Soviet Govern-
ment as intrinsically hostile would predominate, or a single party
Communist totalitarian state. Between these two extremes, however,
lies the bulk of the political sentiment of the peoples of Europe.
Judging from present indications the general mood of the people of
Europe is to the left and strongly in favor of far-reaching economic and
social reforms, but not, however, in favor of a left-wing totalitarian
regime to achieve these reforms. Until such time as it is possible to
hold genuine elections in the liberated areas, in certain countries at
least, such as Greece and Poland, it will probably be necessary for the
principal Allies, and for this purpose France should be included in that
category, to accept and support interim governments. The character
and composition of these governments is precisely the place where the
Allies must have an agreed political program. These governments
must be sufficiently to the left to satisfy the prevailing mood in Europe
and to allay Soviet suspicions. Conversely, they should be suffi-
ciently representative of the center and petit bourgeois elements of the
population so that they would not be regarded as mere preludes to a
Communist dictatorship.
In so far as the United States is concerned, the following two criteria
could be applied to any proposed interim government: (1) that
it
should be dedicated to the preservation of civil liberties; (2) that it
should favor social and economic reforms.
In order to work out with its Allies for the interim period an agreed,
mutually acceptable political basis for coordinated policies, the United
States Government should be prepared, when the internal condition
of a liberated country so demands, to participate in inter-Allied com-
missions to act as observers and to insure that at the proper time the
people of that country will be given a genuine opportunity to elect
their future government.
Page data
- Page
- 136
- Source index
- 0
- Type
- photo
- Media ID
- c111dc50c1dd3f43
- Size
- unknown
Document data
- ID
- 750433
- Core
- doc
- Type
- document
DTO data
{
"id": "750433",
"sourceUrl": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/750433",
"contentType": "document",
"title": "Foreign Affairs File, 1940-1953: \"Conferences at Malta and Yalta, 1945\" (galley proofs, Part I)",
"citationUrl": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/750433",
"collections": [
"President's Secretary's Files (Truman Administration)",
"Subject Files"
],
"iiifBase": "https://s3.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/lz/presidential-libraries/truman/hst-psf/602191/750433/750433-01-001.jpg",
"thumbnailUrl": "https://s3.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/lz/presidential-libraries/truman/hst-psf/602191/750433/750433-01-001.jpg",
"largeImageUrl": "https://s3.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/lz/presidential-libraries/truman/hst-psf/602191/750433/750433-01-001.jpg",
"imageCount": 436,
"hasImages": true,
"source": "import",
"hasTranscription": false
}
Context sent to Scholar
Document identity
{
"localId": "750433",
"label": "Foreign Affairs File, 1940-1953: \"Conferences at Malta and Yalta, 1945\" (galley proofs, Part I)",
"core": "doc",
"dtoType": "document",
"citationUrl": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/750433"
}
Document source metadata
{
"id": "750433",
"sourceUrl": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/750433",
"contentType": "document",
"title": "Foreign Affairs File, 1940-1953: \"Conferences at Malta and Yalta, 1945\" (galley proofs, Part I)",
"citationUrl": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/750433",
"collections": [
"President's Secretary's Files (Truman Administration)",
"Subject Files"
],
"iiifBase": "https://s3.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/lz/presidential-libraries/truman/hst-psf/602191/750433/750433-01-001.jpg",
"thumbnailUrl": "https://s3.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/lz/presidential-libraries/truman/hst-psf/602191/750433/750433-01-001.jpg",
"largeImageUrl": "https://s3.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/lz/presidential-libraries/truman/hst-psf/602191/750433/750433-01-001.jpg",
"imageCount": 436,
"hasImages": true,
"source": "import",
"hasTranscription": false
}
Document source extras
{
"url": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/750433",
"naId": 750433,
"levelOfDescription": "fileUnit",
"recordType": "description",
"ocrSource": "nara-archive"
}
Page context
{
"seq": 136,
"pageIndex": 0,
"type": "photo",
"url": "https://s3.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/lz/presidential-libraries/truman/hst-psf/602191/750433/750433-01-136.jpg",
"mediaId": "c111dc50c1dd3f43",
"ocrText": "J. 33305-MONO-State\nGalley 135\nUNCORRECTED GALLEY PROOF\nthat the Soviet Government suspects that Great Britain desires to see\ninstalled wherever possible right-wing governments which from the\nSoviet point of view would be hostile to the Soviet Union. On the\nother hand, the British view with apprehension the possibility that\nthe Soviet Government will endeavor in its turn to install and support\nleft-wing totalitarian governments as far west as possible in Europe.\nIn actual fact these mutual suspicions appear to be unjustified in\nthat it is not a fixed and calculated British policy to support right-wing\nelements in Europe, nor on the basis of existing evidence can it be said\nthat the Soviet Government is determined to install Communist\nregimes throughout Europe. However, these interacting mutual\nsuspicions tend to push British policy, in action, farther to the right\nand Soviet policy farther to the left. Recent events in Greece will\nundoubtedly be widely interpreted in Moscow as confirmation of their\nsuspicions of Great Britain's intentions, and the recent events in\nPoland with the formation of the Lublin Committee into a provisional\ngovernment will likewise confirm British fears in regard to Soviet\npolicy.\nIf the situation is to be saved it is essential for the three principal\nAllies to examine carefully the present political forces at work in the\nliberated countries in Europe in order to ascertain if there are not\npolitical groups and parties which would be mutually acceptable and\nto which all three countries could give whole-hearted support. It\nwould be necessary to start by excluding either a right-wing govern-\nment in which \"reactionary\" elements regarded by the Soviet Govern-\nment as intrinsically hostile would predominate, or a single party\nCommunist totalitarian state. Between these two extremes, however,\nlies the bulk of the political sentiment of the peoples of Europe.\nJudging from present indications the general mood of the people of\nEurope is to the left and strongly in favor of far-reaching economic and\nsocial reforms, but not, however, in favor of a left-wing totalitarian\nregime to achieve these reforms. Until such time as it is possible to\nhold genuine elections in the liberated areas, in certain countries at\nleast, such as Greece and Poland, it will probably be necessary for the\nprincipal Allies, and for this purpose France should be included in that\ncategory, to accept and support interim governments. The character\nand composition of these governments is precisely the place where the\nAllies must have an agreed political program. These governments\nmust be sufficiently to the left to satisfy the prevailing mood in Europe\nand to allay Soviet suspicions. Conversely, they should be suffi-\nciently representative of the center and petit bourgeois elements of the\npopulation so that they would not be regarded as mere preludes to a\nCommunist dictatorship.\nIn so far as the United States is concerned, the following two criteria\ncould be applied to any proposed interim government: (1) that\nit\nshould be dedicated to the preservation of civil liberties; (2) that it\nshould favor social and economic reforms.\nIn order to work out with its Allies for the interim period an agreed,\nmutually acceptable political basis for coordinated policies, the United\nStates Government should be prepared, when the internal condition\nof a liberated country so demands, to participate in inter-Allied com-\nmissions to act as observers and to insure that at the proper time the\npeople of that country will be given a genuine opportunity to elect\ntheir future government."
}