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J. 333305-MONO State
Galley
136
UNCORRECTED GALLEY PROOF
Executive Secretariat Files
Briefing Book Paper
AMERICAN POLICY TOWARD SPHERES OF INFLUENCE
SUMMARY
Much of the underlying paper is a record of the background facts
concerning what we know of the spheres of influence arrangement
between the British and Soviet Governments in their relations as
regards Rumania, Bulgaria, Greece, and Yugoslavia. It is supposed
to have become effective in the early summer of 1944, and, as a result
of American objections, to have been limited to a three-month period,
which would have expired in September, though in some respects at
least it appears still to be operative.
Our position (pp 2-3) is that while we acknowledge the usefulness
of arrangements for the conduct of the war, we cannot give our ap-
proval to such plans as would extend beyond the military field and
retard the processes of broader international cooperation. The paper
refers also to the argumentation of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (annex to
the paper) setting forth the importance from the point of view of
American national interest of preventing if possible a contest for power
between the British and Soviet Governments.
AMERICAN POLICY TOWARD SPHERES OF INFLUENCE
The American attitude toward spheres of influence took definite
and public form as a result of the Moscow Conference. In Mr. Hull's
report to the Joint Session of Congress on November 18, 1943 he said:
1 Department of State Bulletin, November 20, 1943, vol. IX, pp. 341-345.
"As the provisions of the Four Nation Declaration are carried into
effect there will no longer be need for spheres of influence, for alliances,
for balance of power or any other of the separate alliances [special
arrangements], through which, in the unhappy past, the nations strove
to safeguard their security or to promote their interests."
In the late spring of 1944 the Department was informed of a con-
templated arrangement between the USSR and Great Britain whereby
Rumanian affairs should be the "main concern" of the Soviet Govern-
ment and Greek affairs should be the "main concern" of the British
Government.2 Subsequently, the arrangement was extended to in-
2 Relevant communications of Churchill, Roosevelt, and Stalin are printed in
Churchill, pp. 73-81.
clude Bulgaria as a Soviet concern, with the British receiving roughly
an equal position with the Russians in Yugoslavia. The term
"spheres of influence" was sedulously avoided, or disclaimed, in all the
correspondence; the term "taking the lead" was occasionally used.
In subsequent reports, from London and from Ankara, there was some
talk of the arrangement having crystallized to the degree that the
distribution of influence was to be on a basis of 80-20 percent (Russian
vs. British) in Rumania and Bulgaria, and 50-50 in Yugoslavia,
though the Russians thought it should be 60-40. In the message
from Ankara the British share was described as "Anglo-American."
The question has since arisen in connection with the Soviet and
British interest in the political situation, and with somewhat more
precision, in a proposed arrangement between the Soviet and British
Governments for ne-rearmament of Yugoslavia.
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"ocrText": "J. 333305-MONO State\nGalley\n136\nUNCORRECTED GALLEY PROOF\nExecutive Secretariat Files\nBriefing Book Paper\nAMERICAN POLICY TOWARD SPHERES OF INFLUENCE\nSUMMARY\nMuch of the underlying paper is a record of the background facts\nconcerning what we know of the spheres of influence arrangement\nbetween the British and Soviet Governments in their relations as\nregards Rumania, Bulgaria, Greece, and Yugoslavia. It is supposed\nto have become effective in the early summer of 1944, and, as a result\nof American objections, to have been limited to a three-month period,\nwhich would have expired in September, though in some respects at\nleast it appears still to be operative.\nOur position (pp 2-3) is that while we acknowledge the usefulness\nof arrangements for the conduct of the war, we cannot give our ap-\nproval to such plans as would extend beyond the military field and\nretard the processes of broader international cooperation. The paper\nrefers also to the argumentation of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (annex to\nthe paper) setting forth the importance from the point of view of\nAmerican national interest of preventing if possible a contest for power\nbetween the British and Soviet Governments.\nAMERICAN POLICY TOWARD SPHERES OF INFLUENCE\nThe American attitude toward spheres of influence took definite\nand public form as a result of the Moscow Conference. In Mr. Hull's\nreport to the Joint Session of Congress on November 18, 1943 he said:\n1 Department of State Bulletin, November 20, 1943, vol. IX, pp. 341-345.\n\"As the provisions of the Four Nation Declaration are carried into\neffect there will no longer be need for spheres of influence, for alliances,\nfor balance of power or any other of the separate alliances [special\narrangements], through which, in the unhappy past, the nations strove\nto safeguard their security or to promote their interests.\"\nIn the late spring of 1944 the Department was informed of a con-\ntemplated arrangement between the USSR and Great Britain whereby\nRumanian affairs should be the \"main concern\" of the Soviet Govern-\nment and Greek affairs should be the \"main concern\" of the British\nGovernment.2 Subsequently, the arrangement was extended to in-\n2 Relevant communications of Churchill, Roosevelt, and Stalin are printed in\nChurchill, pp. 73-81.\nclude Bulgaria as a Soviet concern, with the British receiving roughly\nan equal position with the Russians in Yugoslavia. The term\n\"spheres of influence\" was sedulously avoided, or disclaimed, in all the\ncorrespondence; the term \"taking the lead\" was occasionally used.\nIn subsequent reports, from London and from Ankara, there was some\ntalk of the arrangement having crystallized to the degree that the\ndistribution of influence was to be on a basis of 80-20 percent (Russian\nvs. British) in Rumania and Bulgaria, and 50-50 in Yugoslavia,\nthough the Russians thought it should be 60-40. In the message\nfrom Ankara the British share was described as \"Anglo-American.\"\nThe question has since arisen in connection with the Soviet and\nBritish interest in the political situation, and with somewhat more\nprecision, in a proposed arrangement between the Soviet and British\nGovernments for ne-rearmament of Yugoslavia."
}