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J. 333305-MONO-State
Galley
160
UNCORRECTED GALLEY PROOF
Other matters that are before the European Advisory Commission
I hope I will have an opportunity to discuss with you after your
meeting at ARGONAUT. Harry Hopkins told me, while in London,
that you were arranging for my meeting you before your return
to
the United States.
Control machinery was worked out within the Commission with
the understanding that in the first phase of occupation after uncon-
ditional surrender there would be military control in Germany. It
was understood that the commanding general of each of the three
forces would both serve as a member of the Control Council and be
in command of his own zone with, of course, authority to delegate
such powers as he saw fit. If the French, who have been admitted
to the European Commission, are to sign the Unconditional Surrender
Instrument and be admitted to the Control Council and be given a
zone of occupation, you would then have quadripartite instead of
tripartite participation. The British have conceded this; neither
the Russian representative nor myself has as yet been authorized to
state a position on the French proposal.
The theory on which we have proceeded is that broad overall
policies in matters affecting Germany as a whole would be arrived
at
by agreement between the participating Powers, either in the form
of general orders or directives, and that the residue of powers would
remain with the commanders in the zones. These general authorities
affecting Germany as a whole would be agreed between the Govern-
ments in broad terms, leaving all detailing to the Control Council.
The necessity for governmental agreement is due to the fact that
neither the Russians nor the British are willing to delegate political
authority to generals in the field. You can do this because you are
not only the Chief of State but also, under the Constitution,
Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces of the United States.
Stalin might do so but does not choose to do so. An illustration
of
this is the authority given by him to Vyshinsky in supervising the
execution of the armistice terms in Rumania. This fact has also
been made very clear to me by Gousev in the European Advisory
Commission.
The converse of this is that agreements by the generals, even in the
Control Council, would be subject to interference by the Govern-
ments. It is true, the generals could ask for governmental agreement,
but our experience in dealing with the Russians has shown that it is
easier to get agreement prior to occupation than after occupation.
If the position stated by the British and Russian Governments in
the European Advisory Commission is in any way a criterion of the
position of their respective Governments, they mean to force the
central German government agencies, after stripping them of Nazi
political leadership, to carry out their will in Germany. The question
of an orderly decentralization of political Germany can come later.
Both the Russian and British concept is to prevent disorder and
disease, for the protection of Allied occupying forces, by making full
use of German administrative functionaries. This has nothing to do
with a "hard" or "soft" policy that may be adopted toward Germany.
The suggestion in the overall Civil Affairs Directive
3 which
3
Not printed. The paper to which Winant refers was prepared by the State-
War-Navy Coordinating Committee for tripartite negotiation in the European
Advisory Commission.
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"ocrText": "J. 333305-MONO-State\nGalley\n160\nUNCORRECTED GALLEY PROOF\nOther matters that are before the European Advisory Commission\nI hope I will have an opportunity to discuss with you after your\nmeeting at ARGONAUT. Harry Hopkins told me, while in London,\nthat you were arranging for my meeting you before your return\nto\nthe United States.\nControl machinery was worked out within the Commission with\nthe understanding that in the first phase of occupation after uncon-\nditional surrender there would be military control in Germany. It\nwas understood that the commanding general of each of the three\nforces would both serve as a member of the Control Council and be\nin command of his own zone with, of course, authority to delegate\nsuch powers as he saw fit. If the French, who have been admitted\nto the European Commission, are to sign the Unconditional Surrender\nInstrument and be admitted to the Control Council and be given a\nzone of occupation, you would then have quadripartite instead of\ntripartite participation. The British have conceded this; neither\nthe Russian representative nor myself has as yet been authorized to\nstate a position on the French proposal.\nThe theory on which we have proceeded is that broad overall\npolicies in matters affecting Germany as a whole would be arrived\nat\nby agreement between the participating Powers, either in the form\nof general orders or directives, and that the residue of powers would\nremain with the commanders in the zones. These general authorities\naffecting Germany as a whole would be agreed between the Govern-\nments in broad terms, leaving all detailing to the Control Council.\nThe necessity for governmental agreement is due to the fact that\nneither the Russians nor the British are willing to delegate political\nauthority to generals in the field. You can do this because you are\nnot only the Chief of State but also, under the Constitution,\nCommander-in-Chief of the armed forces of the United States.\nStalin might do so but does not choose to do so. An illustration\nof\nthis is the authority given by him to Vyshinsky in supervising the\nexecution of the armistice terms in Rumania. This fact has also\nbeen made very clear to me by Gousev in the European Advisory\nCommission.\nThe converse of this is that agreements by the generals, even in the\nControl Council, would be subject to interference by the Govern-\nments. It is true, the generals could ask for governmental agreement,\nbut our experience in dealing with the Russians has shown that it is\neasier to get agreement prior to occupation than after occupation.\nIf the position stated by the British and Russian Governments in\nthe European Advisory Commission is in any way a criterion of the\nposition of their respective Governments, they mean to force the\ncentral German government agencies, after stripping them of Nazi\npolitical leadership, to carry out their will in Germany. The question\nof an orderly decentralization of political Germany can come later.\nBoth the Russian and British concept is to prevent disorder and\ndisease, for the protection of Allied occupying forces, by making full\nuse of German administrative functionaries. This has nothing to do\nwith a \"hard\" or \"soft\" policy that may be adopted toward Germany.\nThe suggestion in the overall Civil Affairs Directive\n3 which\n3\nNot printed. The paper to which Winant refers was prepared by the State-\nWar-Navy Coordinating Committee for tripartite negotiation in the European\nAdvisory Commission."
}