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J. 333305-MONO-State
Galley 186
UNCORRECTED GALLEY PROOF
British policy envisages the retention, during the occupation
period, of as large a part of the existing organization and structure
of the German economy as is compatible with the destruction of the
Nazi regime. The main elements of the present machinery of economic
control would, so far as conditions permit, be held together after
eliminating their discriminatory, Nazi feature; the existing executive
and managerial personnel of private industry would continue in
their positions, after removal of active Nazis who had held govern-
mental or party posts. The aims of this policy are to prevent eco-
nomic breakdown and to preserve a situation in which control over
the economy can be exercised.
One important British objective in controlling the German eco-
nomy is to limit German competition with British exports. In relation
to this objective Britain's interest as a reparation claimant is distinctly
secondary. Britain's program for accomplishing this objective is,
however, moderate and restrained, relying primarily upon controls
rather than upon basic economic impairment of Germany. There
have been no proposals, even from the "hard peace" group, for elimina-
tion of German heavy industry, since Britain would necessarily have
to bear the chief onus for enforcement of such a policy. Apart from
specialized facilities for the manufacture of land and naval armament
and all types of aircraft, the British are apparently considering dis-
mantling of productive facilities in only a few other industries, such
as synthetic oil and rubber. Destruction of a few such industries would
neither significantly weaken the German economy nor lengthen
appreciably the time required for war preparation if enforcement of
disarmament broke down. Such destruction would, however, restore
the German market for important British products. Britain is also
prepared to support a program of restitution and of reparation in
kind, confined to a specified list of export commodities, but is justi-
fiably interested in preventing Germany from getting a head start,
through reparation, in export markets of crucial importance to the
British.
Britain appears to envisage a continuation of certain indirect con-
trols over the German economy, primarily through exports and
imports, beyond the period of military government. Such controls,
although proposed partly as a means of enforcing disarmament, are
also desired as a method of regulating German competition. A leading
British industrialist has suggested that in the long run this problem
of restraining German competition might best be handled through
cartel-type arrangements with German industry on terms which would
assure British goods a larger share of common markets than before
the war but would still leave Germany sufficient export opportunities
to meet her essential requirements.
Russian policy seems to envisage removal from positions of control
of most industrialists and large landowners. The legal basis for such
action is provided in the Russian declaration that Germans who
employed Russian labor are war criminals. This will open the way
for designation of new managers to operate under direction of the
occupation authority. While the British look to the retention of
much of the existing organization and personnel as a means
of
exercising control over the German economy, the Soviet Union
intends to effect its control by selection of new German personnel for
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"ocrText": "J. 333305-MONO-State\nGalley 186\nUNCORRECTED GALLEY PROOF\nBritish policy envisages the retention, during the occupation\nperiod, of as large a part of the existing organization and structure\nof the German economy as is compatible with the destruction of the\nNazi regime. The main elements of the present machinery of economic\ncontrol would, so far as conditions permit, be held together after\neliminating their discriminatory, Nazi feature; the existing executive\nand managerial personnel of private industry would continue in\ntheir positions, after removal of active Nazis who had held govern-\nmental or party posts. The aims of this policy are to prevent eco-\nnomic breakdown and to preserve a situation in which control over\nthe economy can be exercised.\nOne important British objective in controlling the German eco-\nnomy is to limit German competition with British exports. In relation\nto this objective Britain's interest as a reparation claimant is distinctly\nsecondary. Britain's program for accomplishing this objective is,\nhowever, moderate and restrained, relying primarily upon controls\nrather than upon basic economic impairment of Germany. There\nhave been no proposals, even from the \"hard peace\" group, for elimina-\ntion of German heavy industry, since Britain would necessarily have\nto bear the chief onus for enforcement of such a policy. Apart from\nspecialized facilities for the manufacture of land and naval armament\nand all types of aircraft, the British are apparently considering dis-\nmantling of productive facilities in only a few other industries, such\nas synthetic oil and rubber. Destruction of a few such industries would\nneither significantly weaken the German economy nor lengthen\nappreciably the time required for war preparation if enforcement of\ndisarmament broke down. Such destruction would, however, restore\nthe German market for important British products. Britain is also\nprepared to support a program of restitution and of reparation in\nkind, confined to a specified list of export commodities, but is justi-\nfiably interested in preventing Germany from getting a head start,\nthrough reparation, in export markets of crucial importance to the\nBritish.\nBritain appears to envisage a continuation of certain indirect con-\ntrols over the German economy, primarily through exports and\nimports, beyond the period of military government. Such controls,\nalthough proposed partly as a means of enforcing disarmament, are\nalso desired as a method of regulating German competition. A leading\nBritish industrialist has suggested that in the long run this problem\nof restraining German competition might best be handled through\ncartel-type arrangements with German industry on terms which would\nassure British goods a larger share of common markets than before\nthe war but would still leave Germany sufficient export opportunities\nto meet her essential requirements.\nRussian policy seems to envisage removal from positions of control\nof most industrialists and large landowners. The legal basis for such\naction is provided in the Russian declaration that Germans who\nemployed Russian labor are war criminals. This will open the way\nfor designation of new managers to operate under direction of the\noccupation authority. While the British look to the retention of\nmuch of the existing organization and personnel as a means\nof\nexercising control over the German economy, the Soviet Union\nintends to effect its control by selection of new German personnel for"
}