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J. 333305MONO-State
Galley
236
UNCORRECTED GALLEY PROOF
tive a new cabinet which Mikolajczyk might form would be. On the
other hand, much evidence has been received indicating that the so-
called provisional government at Lublin is having considerable
difficulty establishing itself and gaining real prestige in the liberated
areas in Poland. It would appear that what prestige it may have is
based, to a considerable extent, on that of the Red Army and the
NKVD, the Soviet secret police.
Given the fact that less than half of Poland has already been
liberated, and that consequently the majority of Poles are not in a
position to express an opinion, it would be against our announced
policies to recognize the provisional government of Lublin at least
until more conclusive evidence is received that it does in fact represent
the basic wishes of the Polish people.
Because of the activities of diverse groups, interim regimes of
various sorts are springing up in liberated countries. These regimes
may well crystallize into permanent governments through the power
they may wield during the period of bewilderment after liberation. It
would appear highly desirable, therefore, if the influence of the United
States is to be felt and if the types of truly democratic governments
the American people hope to see established in Europe are to be set
up, for the United States Government now to take an active part in
seeing that in each liberated country liberal democratic groups are
given a full opportunity to participate in the activities of their interim
regimes. If we do not use our influence to this end, it may not be
possible later to establish permanent democratic regimes based on the
four freedoms.
It is for this reason that in regard to Poland we should use our
influence in an effort to see that the Polish Peasant Party, the largest
in the country, and its head, Mikolajczyk are given an opportunity
to take a leading role in any interim arrangements which may be made
pending the full liberation of the country and the election of a truly
representative government.
Moreover, in order to assure, in conformity with our announced
policies, that the Polish people shall be permitted eventually to ex-
press their preference as to the permanent government they desire and
in actual fact regulate their own internal affairs, we should continue
during the interim period to exert our influence to assure that the
Polish people have the full possibility at a later date freely to express
their will in the choice of their government and that they have the
right to establish a truly democratic government which would foster
and maintain freedom of expression, freedom of the press and infor-
mation, and personal liberty. In order to assist in the attainment of
this end, we should sponsor United Nations arrangements for this
supervision of elections in liberated countries.
Frontier Question
Although the frontier question has figured prominently in the dis-
cussion of the Polish-Soviet dispute, it is felt that this matter is defi-
nitely secondary to the major problem, the establishment of a viable
and truly independent Polish Government.
In this regard it is felt that the United States Government should
use its influence to obtain a solution of this problem which would
minimize future points of friction, possible Irredentism and minimize
the number of minority groups which would have to be transferred as
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"ocrText": "J. 333305MONO-State\nGalley\n236\nUNCORRECTED GALLEY PROOF\ntive a new cabinet which Mikolajczyk might form would be. On the\nother hand, much evidence has been received indicating that the so-\ncalled provisional government at Lublin is having considerable\ndifficulty establishing itself and gaining real prestige in the liberated\nareas in Poland. It would appear that what prestige it may have is\nbased, to a considerable extent, on that of the Red Army and the\nNKVD, the Soviet secret police.\nGiven the fact that less than half of Poland has already been\nliberated, and that consequently the majority of Poles are not in a\nposition to express an opinion, it would be against our announced\npolicies to recognize the provisional government of Lublin at least\nuntil more conclusive evidence is received that it does in fact represent\nthe basic wishes of the Polish people.\nBecause of the activities of diverse groups, interim regimes of\nvarious sorts are springing up in liberated countries. These regimes\nmay well crystallize into permanent governments through the power\nthey may wield during the period of bewilderment after liberation. It\nwould appear highly desirable, therefore, if the influence of the United\nStates is to be felt and if the types of truly democratic governments\nthe American people hope to see established in Europe are to be set\nup, for the United States Government now to take an active part in\nseeing that in each liberated country liberal democratic groups are\ngiven a full opportunity to participate in the activities of their interim\nregimes. If we do not use our influence to this end, it may not be\npossible later to establish permanent democratic regimes based on the\nfour freedoms.\nIt is for this reason that in regard to Poland we should use our\ninfluence in an effort to see that the Polish Peasant Party, the largest\nin the country, and its head, Mikolajczyk are given an opportunity\nto take a leading role in any interim arrangements which may be made\npending the full liberation of the country and the election of a truly\nrepresentative government.\nMoreover, in order to assure, in conformity with our announced\npolicies, that the Polish people shall be permitted eventually to ex-\npress their preference as to the permanent government they desire and\nin actual fact regulate their own internal affairs, we should continue\nduring the interim period to exert our influence to assure that the\nPolish people have the full possibility at a later date freely to express\ntheir will in the choice of their government and that they have the\nright to establish a truly democratic government which would foster\nand maintain freedom of expression, freedom of the press and infor-\nmation, and personal liberty. In order to assist in the attainment of\nthis end, we should sponsor United Nations arrangements for this\nsupervision of elections in liberated countries.\nFrontier Question\nAlthough the frontier question has figured prominently in the dis-\ncussion of the Polish-Soviet dispute, it is felt that this matter is defi-\nnitely secondary to the major problem, the establishment of a viable\nand truly independent Polish Government.\nIn this regard it is felt that the United States Government should\nuse its influence to obtain a solution of this problem which would\nminimize future points of friction, possible Irredentism and minimize\nthe number of minority groups which would have to be transferred as"
}