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J. 333305MONO-State Galley 279 UNCORRECTED GALLEY PROOF lease, as it would be for post-war and not during the war operations. Doc Matthews will give you any further details on this question. JAMES CLEMENT DUNN Roosevelt Papers: Telegram Prime Minister Churchill to President Roosevelt 1 1 Sent by the United States Military Attaché, London, via Army channels. TOP SECRET LONDON, 16 November 1944. Prime Minister to President Roosevelt. Personal and Top Secret. Number 822.² 2 Paragraph 2 of this telegram is printed ante, p. 3. Thank you for your kind wishes about the Paris-De Gaulle trip.³ I certainly had a wonderful reception from about half a million 3 The reference is to Roosevelt's No. 648, of November 14, 1944, ante, p.- French in the Champs Élysées and also from the party opposition centre at the Hôtel de Ville. I reestablished friendly private relations with De Gaulle, who is better since he has lost a large part of his inferiority complex. 4. I see statements being put out in the French press and other quarters that all sorts of things were decided by us in Paris. You may be sure that our discussions on important things took place solely on an ad referendum basis to the three great powers, and of course especially to you who have by far the largest forces in France. Eden and I had a two-hours talk with De Gaulle and two or three of his people after luncheon on the 11th. De Gaulle asked a number of questions which made me feel how very little they were informed about anything that had been decided or was taking place. He is of course anxious to obtain full modern equipment for eight more divi- sions which can only be supplied by you. SHAEF reasonably con- tends that these will not be ready for the defeat of Germany in the field and that shipping must be devoted to the upkeep of the actual forces that will win the battles of the winter and spring. I reinforced this argument. 5. At the same time I sympathize with the French wish to take over more line, to have the best share they can in the fighting or what is left of it, and there may be plenty, and not to have to go into Ger- many as a so-called conqueror who has not fought. I remarked that this was a sentimental point which ought never the less to receive consideration. The important thing for France was to have an army prepared for the task which it would actually have to discharge, namely their obligation first to maintain a peaceful and orderly France behind the front of our armies, and secondly to assist in the holding down of parts of Germany later on. 6. On this second point the French pressed very strongly to have a share in the occupation of Germany not merely as subparticipation under British or American command but as a French command. I

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    "ocrText": "J. 333305MONO-State\nGalley 279\nUNCORRECTED GALLEY PROOF\nlease, as it would be for post-war and not during the war operations.\nDoc Matthews will give you any further details on this question.\nJAMES CLEMENT DUNN\nRoosevelt Papers: Telegram\nPrime Minister Churchill to President Roosevelt 1\n1 Sent by the United States Military Attaché, London, via Army channels.\nTOP SECRET\nLONDON, 16 November 1944.\nPrime Minister to President Roosevelt. Personal and Top Secret.\nNumber 822.²\n2\nParagraph 2 of this telegram is printed ante, p.\n3. Thank you for your kind wishes about the Paris-De Gaulle\ntrip.³ I certainly had a wonderful reception from about half a million\n3 The reference is to Roosevelt's No. 648, of November 14, 1944, ante, p.-\nFrench in the Champs Élysées and also from the party opposition\ncentre at the Hôtel de Ville. I reestablished friendly private relations\nwith De Gaulle, who is better since he has lost a large part of his\ninferiority complex.\n4. I see statements being put out in the French press and other\nquarters that all sorts of things were decided by us in Paris. You\nmay be sure that our discussions on important things took place solely\non an ad referendum basis to the three great powers, and of course\nespecially to you who have by far the largest forces in France. Eden\nand I had a two-hours talk with De Gaulle and two or three of his\npeople after luncheon on the 11th. De Gaulle asked a number of\nquestions which made me feel how very little they were informed\nabout anything that had been decided or was taking place. He is\nof\ncourse anxious to obtain full modern equipment for eight more divi-\nsions which can only be supplied by you. SHAEF reasonably con-\ntends that these will not be ready for the defeat of Germany in the\nfield and that shipping must be devoted to the upkeep of the actual\nforces that will win the battles of the winter and spring. I reinforced\nthis argument.\n5. At the same time I sympathize with the French wish to take\nover more line, to have the best share they can in the fighting or what\nis left of it, and there may be plenty, and not to have to go into Ger-\nmany as a so-called conqueror who has not fought. I remarked that\nthis was a sentimental point which ought never the less to receive\nconsideration. The important thing for France was to have an army\nprepared for the task which it would actually have to discharge,\nnamely their obligation first to maintain a peaceful and orderly France\nbehind the front of our armies, and secondly to assist in the holding\ndown of parts of Germany later on.\n6. On this second point the French pressed very strongly to have a\nshare in the occupation of Germany not merely as subparticipation\nunder British or American command but as a French command.\nI"
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