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J. . 333305-MONO-State
Galley 327
UNCORRECTED GALLEY PROOF
been accepted by the Communists if offered at the time Chou En-lai
was here. The G|eneraljissimo's position was that while he would be
willing to give representation and recognition as a political party
to
the Communists he would be adverse to a coalition government.
1 Bracketed insertions in message indicate text as sent, according to microfilmed
copy of message in Embassy files (893.00/1-1049).
,
Copy in Roosevelt Papers bears following handwritten notations:
'Hold for President-per Adm[iral] Leahy['s] instructions."
"Extracts sent to Genleral] Marshall by Adm. Leahy."
3
Not printed.
Quoted in United States Relations with China, Department of State Publication
3573 (Washington, 1949), pp. 74-75.
&
Ibid, p. 75.
He explained to me that he would not like a situation created similar
to that existing in Yugoslavia and Poland. On December 8th Chou
En-lai advised me that he was unable to return to Chungking as the
National Government had rejected the Communist Party's five point
proposal. I urged him to reconsider but on December 16th he replied
6
that since the Kuomintang authorities appeared to lack sincerity in
the negotiations he would not return to Chungking. Upon my
further persuasion for resumption of negotiations, Mao Tse-tung
telegraphed on December 22nd that Chou En-lai was preparing for
an important conference and could not come to Chungking and that
he would suggest a conference with the government representatives
to be held at Yenan and would like Colonel Barrett, our military
representative at Yenan, to be present at the conference. I sent
Barrett to Yenan. He returned December 28 with a letter from Chou
En-lai6 claiming that the telegram of December 22 was inaccurate due
to "mistakes in paraphrasing" and that in effect he did not want to
suggest that the government representatives come to Yenan or that
Barrett could [should] be present at the conference. In this letter he
stated that before further negotiations could take place between the
Communist Party and the Nationalist Government, the government
should first voluntarily carry out four additional points. At that time
I
was unable to account for the drastic change in position of the
Communists. I subsequently discovered that the cause was within
our own ranks which is explained later in this report.
e
Not printed.
I consulted the G[eneral]issimo on the situation and on January
7 I wrote Mao Tse-tung and Chou En-lai requesting [regretting] that in
addition to their previous five-point proposal they should ask the
government first to voluntarily carry out four new points. I stated
that since General Chou could not come to Chungking, I wished to
suggest to them, with the approval of the government, that Doctor
Soong, Acting President of the Executive Yuan, Doctor Wang Shih-
chieh, Minister of Information, General Chang Tse-chung, Director of
Political Board of Military Affairs Council, and myself would visit
Yenan to discuss a settlement and that if an agreement was reached in
principle Mao Tse-tung and Chou En-lai should come to Chungking
to conclude the agreement.
For your information, the Government was prepared to offer at the
proposed Yenan Conference the following:
1. Formation of a War Cabinet with inclusion of Communists and
other non-Kuomintang men. [a This would be in fact but not in name
recognition [a coalition] war cabinet.[]]
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"ocrText": "J. . 333305-MONO-State\nGalley 327\nUNCORRECTED GALLEY PROOF\nbeen accepted by the Communists if offered at the time Chou En-lai\nwas here. The G|eneraljissimo's position was that while he would be\nwilling to give representation and recognition as a political party\nto\nthe Communists he would be adverse to a coalition government.\n1 Bracketed insertions in message indicate text as sent, according to microfilmed\ncopy of message in Embassy files (893.00/1-1049).\n,\nCopy in Roosevelt Papers bears following handwritten notations:\n'Hold for President-per Adm[iral] Leahy['s] instructions.\"\n\"Extracts sent to Genleral] Marshall by Adm. Leahy.\"\n3\nNot printed.\nQuoted in United States Relations with China, Department of State Publication\n3573 (Washington, 1949), pp. 74-75.\n&\nIbid, p. 75.\nHe explained to me that he would not like a situation created similar\nto that existing in Yugoslavia and Poland. On December 8th Chou\nEn-lai advised me that he was unable to return to Chungking as the\nNational Government had rejected the Communist Party's five point\nproposal. I urged him to reconsider but on December 16th he replied\n6\nthat since the Kuomintang authorities appeared to lack sincerity in\nthe negotiations he would not return to Chungking. Upon my\nfurther persuasion for resumption of negotiations, Mao Tse-tung\ntelegraphed on December 22nd that Chou En-lai was preparing for\nan important conference and could not come to Chungking and that\nhe would suggest a conference with the government representatives\nto be held at Yenan and would like Colonel Barrett, our military\nrepresentative at Yenan, to be present at the conference. I sent\nBarrett to Yenan. He returned December 28 with a letter from Chou\nEn-lai6 claiming that the telegram of December 22 was inaccurate due\nto \"mistakes in paraphrasing\" and that in effect he did not want to\nsuggest that the government representatives come to Yenan or that\nBarrett could [should] be present at the conference. In this letter he\nstated that before further negotiations could take place between the\nCommunist Party and the Nationalist Government, the government\nshould first voluntarily carry out four additional points. At that time\nI\nwas unable to account for the drastic change in position of the\nCommunists. I subsequently discovered that the cause was within\nour own ranks which is explained later in this report.\ne\nNot printed.\nI consulted the G[eneral]issimo on the situation and on January\n7 I wrote Mao Tse-tung and Chou En-lai requesting [regretting] that in\naddition to their previous five-point proposal they should ask the\ngovernment first to voluntarily carry out four new points. I stated\nthat since General Chou could not come to Chungking, I wished to\nsuggest to them, with the approval of the government, that Doctor\nSoong, Acting President of the Executive Yuan, Doctor Wang Shih-\nchieh, Minister of Information, General Chang Tse-chung, Director of\nPolitical Board of Military Affairs Council, and myself would visit\nYenan to discuss a settlement and that if an agreement was reached in\nprinciple Mao Tse-tung and Chou En-lai should come to Chungking\nto conclude the agreement.\nFor your information, the Government was prepared to offer at the\nproposed Yenan Conference the following:\n1. Formation of a War Cabinet with inclusion of Communists and\nother non-Kuomintang men. [a This would be in fact but not in name\nrecognition [a coalition] war cabinet.[]]"
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