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J. 333305-MONO-State
Galley 343
UNCORRECTED GALLEY PROOF
and the Chief of Staff of the Soviet Far East Forces on the Soviet side
and the Ambassador and I on the American side.
The meeting opened with Field Marshal Brooke presenting a résumé
of the European situation and the situation in Italy. It was a very
fair presentation and presented a good picture of British and American
collaboration.
With regard to the situation in France Marshal Stalin suggested
the possibility of an invasion through Switzerland in order to outflank
the Siegfried Line. In connection with the Italian campaign Marshal
Stalin said that Soviet forces did not intend to advance westward
through Yugoslavia and indicated he thought we might join up
eventually in the vicinity of Vienna.
The Prime Minister then gave a complete résumé of British partici-
pation in the war indicating that they had the equivalent of 90
divisions involved including of course all the home forces and separate
and foreign garrisons.
Field Marshal Brooke then explained the Burma campaign tieing
it in closely with our operations over the hump and the ground and
air operations in China. Again he made a very fair presentation.
I was then called upon to discuss the Pacific campaign. My
summary was along the following lines. First a brief description of
the period of Japanese aggression the strategy which has been con-
sistently approved by the Combined Chiefs of Staff, the turn of the
tide at Coral Sea and Midway and the operations in the Aleutians,
and a description of the southern approach through the Solomons and
New Guinea and the central Pacific approach thus bringing the
situation up to date.
I then gave them the information about proposed operations which
you sent to me in your last telegram. In this connection I empha-
3 Dated October 12, 1944; not printed.
sized that with regard to the "invasion of Japan phase" our Chiefs of
Staff thought it was important that the plan to be selected and applied
should be concerted with plans for operations against Japan from the
north.
I then gave them the stragetic objectives which you authorized
me to suggest to them as coming from you. This of course included
the part they might play in securing the lines of communications
across the north Pacific. I told them that the United States was
prepared to assist the Soviet Union to the extent consistent with our
commitments in the war against Germany by supplying munitions
and particularly B-24 aircraft for building up of a Soviet air force. I
stated that from the military point of view our Chiefs of Staff were
hopeful that the Soviet Union would enter the war against Japan as
soon as possible after the defeat of Germany. However that in the
meantime you considered it to be of urgent importance that combined
planning be started at once and that whatever preparatory measures
were practicable should be started now suggesting what some of the
preparatory measures might be.
I concluded by stating that the Chiefs of Staff were most concerned
in the answers to the following questions:
(1) How soon after the defeat of Germany may we expect Japanese-
Russian Hostilities to begin?
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"ocrText": "J. 333305-MONO-State\nGalley 343\nUNCORRECTED GALLEY PROOF\nand the Chief of Staff of the Soviet Far East Forces on the Soviet side\nand the Ambassador and I on the American side.\nThe meeting opened with Field Marshal Brooke presenting a résumé\nof the European situation and the situation in Italy. It was a very\nfair presentation and presented a good picture of British and American\ncollaboration.\nWith regard to the situation in France Marshal Stalin suggested\nthe possibility of an invasion through Switzerland in order to outflank\nthe Siegfried Line. In connection with the Italian campaign Marshal\nStalin said that Soviet forces did not intend to advance westward\nthrough Yugoslavia and indicated he thought we might join up\neventually in the vicinity of Vienna.\nThe Prime Minister then gave a complete résumé of British partici-\npation in the war indicating that they had the equivalent of 90\ndivisions involved including of course all the home forces and separate\nand foreign garrisons.\nField Marshal Brooke then explained the Burma campaign tieing\nit in closely with our operations over the hump and the ground and\nair operations in China. Again he made a very fair presentation.\nI was then called upon to discuss the Pacific campaign. My\nsummary was along the following lines. First a brief description of\nthe period of Japanese aggression the strategy which has been con-\nsistently approved by the Combined Chiefs of Staff, the turn of the\ntide at Coral Sea and Midway and the operations in the Aleutians,\nand a description of the southern approach through the Solomons and\nNew Guinea and the central Pacific approach thus bringing the\nsituation up to date.\nI then gave them the information about proposed operations which\nyou sent to me in your last telegram. In this connection I empha-\n3 Dated October 12, 1944; not printed.\nsized that with regard to the \"invasion of Japan phase\" our Chiefs of\nStaff thought it was important that the plan to be selected and applied\nshould be concerted with plans for operations against Japan from the\nnorth.\nI then gave them the stragetic objectives which you authorized\nme to suggest to them as coming from you. This of course included\nthe part they might play in securing the lines of communications\nacross the north Pacific. I told them that the United States was\nprepared to assist the Soviet Union to the extent consistent with our\ncommitments in the war against Germany by supplying munitions\nand particularly B-24 aircraft for building up of a Soviet air force. I\nstated that from the military point of view our Chiefs of Staff were\nhopeful that the Soviet Union would enter the war against Japan as\nsoon as possible after the defeat of Germany. However that in the\nmeantime you considered it to be of urgent importance that combined\nplanning be started at once and that whatever preparatory measures\nwere practicable should be started now suggesting what some of the\npreparatory measures might be.\nI concluded by stating that the Chiefs of Staff were most concerned\nin the answers to the following questions:\n(1) How soon after the defeat of Germany may we expect Japanese-\nRussian Hostilities to begin?"
}