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J. 333305-MONO-State
Galley 355
UNCORRECTED GALLEY PROOF
The central islands have the further strategic value of constituting
stepping stones from the southern to the northern group.
The northern group, comprising three principal islands, Para-
mushiro, Shimushu and Araito, is important both for its fisheries and
for its air and naval bases. The value of the fisheries and of other
marine products in and around the northern group amounted in 1938
to $7,000,000 of the total $9,000,000 for all of the Kuriles. Geograph-
ically, the group represents a continuation of Kamchatka, the strait
separating Shimushu from Kamchatka being only seven miles wide.
Important factors which may affect the decision as to the disposi-
tion of the Kuriles are (1) the desire of the American Navy that a
United Nations base or bases should be established on some of the
islands, (2) possible pressure from the Soviet Government, whether
or not it enters the war against Japan, for the acquisition of the north-
ern and central groups and possibly of all the Kuriles, and (3) the
desirability of extending the principle of international control to all of
the islands detached from the Japanese Empire as a result of the war.
B. Claims and Possible Solutions
1. Japan
Japan has a strong claim to the southern group of the Kuriles on the
basis of nationality, self-determination, geographic propinquity, eco-
nomic need and historic possession.
Japan's claim to the central islands is based almost solely on the
ground of possession. If, as it may be assumed, the southern and
central islands should be demilitarized and subject, for such a period
as may appear adequate, to a system of military inspection by an
international agency, their retention by Japan would appear not to
constitute a threat to other states.
To the northern group Japan's claim is based primarily on its need
to retain the fishing industry centered on those islands. Ownership
of the islands would be more satisfactory to Japan than a grant
of
fishing rights in territory under control of one or more other powers.
However, whatever disposition may be made of the Kuriles, Japan
might be permitted to continue to carry on its fishing industry
throughout the islands.
2. The Soviet Union
The Soviet Union has a substantial claim to the northern group,
Shimushu, Paramushiro and Araito, on the grounds of propinquity
and the consequent desirability of controlling these islands to prevent
them from becoming a military menace if in the possession of a hostile
power.
The Soviet Government may ask not only for the northern islands,
but also for the central and possibly even for the southern group.
Possession of the northern and central islands would give the Soviet
Union control of passages into the Okhotsk Sea which are practically
ice-free throughout the year There would seem, however, to be
few factors which would justify a Soviet claim to the southern
islands; this transfer to the Soviet Union would create a situation
which a future Japan would find difficult to accept as a permanent
solution. It would deprive Japan of islands which are historically
and ethnically Japanese and of waters which are valuable for fishing.
If the southern islands should be fortified they would be a continuing
menace to Japan.
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"ocrText": "J. 333305-MONO-State\nGalley 355\nUNCORRECTED GALLEY PROOF\nThe central islands have the further strategic value of constituting\nstepping stones from the southern to the northern group.\nThe northern group, comprising three principal islands, Para-\nmushiro, Shimushu and Araito, is important both for its fisheries and\nfor its air and naval bases. The value of the fisheries and of other\nmarine products in and around the northern group amounted in 1938\nto $7,000,000 of the total $9,000,000 for all of the Kuriles. Geograph-\nically, the group represents a continuation of Kamchatka, the strait\nseparating Shimushu from Kamchatka being only seven miles wide.\nImportant factors which may affect the decision as to the disposi-\ntion of the Kuriles are (1) the desire of the American Navy that a\nUnited Nations base or bases should be established on some of the\nislands, (2) possible pressure from the Soviet Government, whether\nor not it enters the war against Japan, for the acquisition of the north-\nern and central groups and possibly of all the Kuriles, and (3) the\ndesirability of extending the principle of international control to all of\nthe islands detached from the Japanese Empire as a result of the war.\nB. Claims and Possible Solutions\n1. Japan\nJapan has a strong claim to the southern group of the Kuriles on the\nbasis of nationality, self-determination, geographic propinquity, eco-\nnomic need and historic possession.\nJapan's claim to the central islands is based almost solely on the\nground of possession. If, as it may be assumed, the southern and\ncentral islands should be demilitarized and subject, for such a period\nas may appear adequate, to a system of military inspection by an\ninternational agency, their retention by Japan would appear not to\nconstitute a threat to other states.\nTo the northern group Japan's claim is based primarily on its need\nto retain the fishing industry centered on those islands. Ownership\nof the islands would be more satisfactory to Japan than a grant\nof\nfishing rights in territory under control of one or more other powers.\nHowever, whatever disposition may be made of the Kuriles, Japan\nmight be permitted to continue to carry on its fishing industry\nthroughout the islands.\n2. The Soviet Union\nThe Soviet Union has a substantial claim to the northern group,\nShimushu, Paramushiro and Araito, on the grounds of propinquity\nand the consequent desirability of controlling these islands to prevent\nthem from becoming a military menace if in the possession of a hostile\npower.\nThe Soviet Government may ask not only for the northern islands,\nbut also for the central and possibly even for the southern group.\nPossession of the northern and central islands would give the Soviet\nUnion control of passages into the Okhotsk Sea which are practically\nice-free throughout the year There would seem, however, to be\nfew factors which would justify a Soviet claim to the southern\nislands; this transfer to the Soviet Union would create a situation\nwhich a future Japan would find difficult to accept as a permanent\nsolution. It would deprive Japan of islands which are historically\nand ethnically Japanese and of waters which are valuable for fishing.\nIf the southern islands should be fortified they would be a continuing\nmenace to Japan."
}