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J. 333305MONO-State
Galley 359
UNCORRECTED GALLEY PROOF
logical reasons for its retention by Japan, but political factors may
make such a solution impossible.
Sovereignty over Sakhalin has long been a cause of friction between
Russia and Japan. In 1875 Japan gave up all claims to Sakhalin in
exchange for full title to the Kuriles, but by the Treaty of Portsmouth
(1905)2 Japan was granted that portion of Sakhalin south of the 50
2 Treaty of Peace between Japan and Russia signed at Portsmouth, New
Hampshire, September 5, 1905. For the text, see Foreign Relations, 1905, pp.
824-828.
degree parallel, known as Japanese Karafuto. The Treaty also pro-
vided that both Russia and Japan engaged not to take any military
measures which might impede the free navigation of the Straits of
La Perouse and Tartary. Since that time Japan has been active in
the colonization and exploitation of Japanese Karafuto. After
November 1942 Japanese Karafuto ceased to be considered as a colony
and was placed under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Home Affairs.
Japanese interest in Sakhalin in recent times has not been restricted
to
the southern portion of the island. In 1920, Japan occupied Rus-
sian Sakhalin and held it until 1925. By the convention signed at
Peking on January 20, 1925,3 Japan agreed to withdraw from Russian
3 Convention of Friendship and Economic Cooperation between Japan and
the Soviet Union. For the text in English translation, see British and Foreign
State Papers, vol. CXXII, pp. 894-905.
Sakhalin in return for Soviet recognition of the validity of the Ports-
mouth Treaty and for the right to limited oil and coal concessions in
that area. Japanese fishing rights, originally provided for in an annex
to the Portsmouth Treaty, were clearly defined in 1928.4 On March
4 By the Fisheries Convention between the Soviet Union and Japan signed at
Moscow January 23, 1928. For the English official text, see League of Nations
Treaty Series, vol. LXXX, pp. 341-399.
30, 1944, however, Japan and the Soviet Union signed a pact 5 whereby
5 For the text in English translation, see Andrew Rothstein, Soviet Foreign
Policy During the Patriotic War (London, etc., 1945-1946), vol. II, pp. 59-61.
Japanese operations of its concessions in northern Sakhalin ceased and
Japanese fishing rights were restricted.
The population of Japanese Karafuto totalled 415,000 in 1940 and
was almost exclusively Japanese (99.4 percent). This total, while
substantial, equals less than one percent of the population of Japan
proper. The area of Japanese Karafuto of nearly 14,000 square
miles is equal to 9 percent of the homeland.
Economically, Japanese Karafuto is closely integrated with Japan
and practically all trade is with the homeland. By 1937 coal produc-
tion amounted to seven percent and pulp and paper accounted for 16
percent of the total Japanese production, and the output of timber
reached 14 percent of that of the main islands of Japan. About ten
percent of the arable land in Japanese Karafuto has been under culti-
vation, but if the remaining portion were developed, it might sustain
an increased population of nearly half a million persons.
From the point of view of the future security of the Soviet Union,
Japanese Karafuto is of strategic importance. It lies athwart the
most direct airline to Shanghai and Singapore from San Francisco via
Dutch Harbor, Petropavlovsk and Vladivostok. It commands the
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"ocrText": "J. 333305MONO-State\nGalley 359\nUNCORRECTED GALLEY PROOF\nlogical reasons for its retention by Japan, but political factors may\nmake such a solution impossible.\nSovereignty over Sakhalin has long been a cause of friction between\nRussia and Japan. In 1875 Japan gave up all claims to Sakhalin in\nexchange for full title to the Kuriles, but by the Treaty of Portsmouth\n(1905)2 Japan was granted that portion of Sakhalin south of the 50\n2 Treaty of Peace between Japan and Russia signed at Portsmouth, New\nHampshire, September 5, 1905. For the text, see Foreign Relations, 1905, pp.\n824-828.\ndegree parallel, known as Japanese Karafuto. The Treaty also pro-\nvided that both Russia and Japan engaged not to take any military\nmeasures which might impede the free navigation of the Straits of\nLa Perouse and Tartary. Since that time Japan has been active in\nthe colonization and exploitation of Japanese Karafuto. After\nNovember 1942 Japanese Karafuto ceased to be considered as a colony\nand was placed under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Home Affairs.\nJapanese interest in Sakhalin in recent times has not been restricted\nto\nthe southern portion of the island. In 1920, Japan occupied Rus-\nsian Sakhalin and held it until 1925. By the convention signed at\nPeking on January 20, 1925,3 Japan agreed to withdraw from Russian\n3 Convention of Friendship and Economic Cooperation between Japan and\nthe Soviet Union. For the text in English translation, see British and Foreign\nState Papers, vol. CXXII, pp. 894-905.\nSakhalin in return for Soviet recognition of the validity of the Ports-\nmouth Treaty and for the right to limited oil and coal concessions in\nthat area. Japanese fishing rights, originally provided for in an annex\nto the Portsmouth Treaty, were clearly defined in 1928.4 On March\n4 By the Fisheries Convention between the Soviet Union and Japan signed at\nMoscow January 23, 1928. For the English official text, see League of Nations\nTreaty Series, vol. LXXX, pp. 341-399.\n30, 1944, however, Japan and the Soviet Union signed a pact 5 whereby\n5 For the text in English translation, see Andrew Rothstein, Soviet Foreign\nPolicy During the Patriotic War (London, etc., 1945-1946), vol. II, pp. 59-61.\nJapanese operations of its concessions in northern Sakhalin ceased and\nJapanese fishing rights were restricted.\nThe population of Japanese Karafuto totalled 415,000 in 1940 and\nwas almost exclusively Japanese (99.4 percent). This total, while\nsubstantial, equals less than one percent of the population of Japan\nproper. The area of Japanese Karafuto of nearly 14,000 square\nmiles is equal to 9 percent of the homeland.\nEconomically, Japanese Karafuto is closely integrated with Japan\nand practically all trade is with the homeland. By 1937 coal produc-\ntion amounted to seven percent and pulp and paper accounted for 16\npercent of the total Japanese production, and the output of timber\nreached 14 percent of that of the main islands of Japan. About ten\npercent of the arable land in Japanese Karafuto has been under culti-\nvation, but if the remaining portion were developed, it might sustain\nan increased population of nearly half a million persons.\nFrom the point of view of the future security of the Soviet Union,\nJapanese Karafuto is of strategic importance. It lies athwart the\nmost direct airline to Shanghai and Singapore from San Francisco via\nDutch Harbor, Petropavlovsk and Vladivostok. It commands the"
}