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{
    "localId": "750433",
    "label": "Foreign Affairs File, 1940-1953: \"Conferences at Malta and Yalta, 1945\" (galley proofs, Part I)",
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    "id": "750433",
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    "contentType": "document",
    "title": "Foreign Affairs File, 1940-1953: \"Conferences at Malta and Yalta, 1945\" (galley proofs, Part I)",
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{
    "seq": 364,
    "pageIndex": 0,
    "type": "photo",
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    "ocrText": "J. 333305-MONO-State\nGalley 363\nUNCORRECTED GALLEY PROOF\nb. Paragraph 33 states:\n\"33. In furtherance of these principles we should adopt the follow-\ning courses of action to assist the Russians in preparations for war:\n\"a. Deliver maximum possible supplies to Russia.\n\"b. Provide full assistance to the creation and training of a\nRussian strategic air force and the provision and preparation of\nadequate bases for strategic air forces in eastern Siberia and\nKamchatka.'\nc. Paragraph 34 states:\n\"34. We should enter into immediate negotiations with Russia to\ndetermine the feasibility, practicability, desirability and necessity for\nundertaking any or all of the following courses of action:\n\"a. To establish air and naval forces in Kamchatka, including\nthe naval base at Petropavlovsk.\n\"b. To base U. S. Strategic Air Forces in Kamchatka and the\nMaritime Provinces.\n\"c. To develop an air transport route from Kamchatka to\neastern Siberia.\n\"d. To seize one or more positions in the Kurile Islands.\n\"e. To permit Russian submarines and light naval craft to\noperate from our bases in the Aleutians.\"\n4. The special planning group headed by General Roberts has gone\nto Moscow under arrangements to meet with a corresponding special\nplanning group from the Red General Staff. However, no meeting\nhas yet been scheduled by the Russians. This group should obtain\nmuch needed information as to Russian intentions and capabilities\nso that realistic planning can go forward rapidly. A U.S. party will\nleave shortly to make a technical survey of southern Kamchatka.\n5. Previous staff studies have developed the following factors in\nregard to any operations on our part in the northwestern Pacific.\na. Any Russian act of war or suspicion thereof by the Japanese or\nany operations of ours to occupy Kamchatka or seize positions in the\nKuriles would cause the Japanese to prohibit the free access of Lend-\nLease or MILEPOST cargoes to Siberian ports. Thus any operations\non our part in the above areas should not be undertaken until Russia's\nentry is imminent.\nb. The routes to Sea of Okhotsk-Amur River ports are probably the\nonly ones which will be available for continued use after hostilities\nbegin. Any shipping to the Sea of Okhotsk is possible only during\nthe months of June through October due to ice conditions. The\namount of post-hostility shipping required over such routes cannot\nat present be estimated. It depends on Russian needs beyond the\ncapacity of the trans-Siberian routes and also as to whether or not\nthe United States is to operate air forces from eastern Siberia.\nc. In regard to the latter the Russians have recently taken the\nstand, contrary to previous statements, that their own requirements\npreclude basing any United States air or naval forces in the Maritime\nProvinces. However, efforts should continue towards securing\nRussian agreement to the principle of eventual U.S. strategic air\noperations from eastern Siberia, following which detailed discussions\nshould be undertaken.\nd. In order to open a sea route to the Sea of Okhotsk it is necessary\nto secure control of one of the northern Kurile straits. In spite of\nstrong Japanese forces in Paramushiro-Shimushu it may be that this\ncontrol can be achieved from air and naval forces based on Kamchatka\nwithout the necessity of undertaking the difficult and costly amphibi-\nous operations incident to the seizure of key points in the Kuriles.\nShould the results of current studies including the report of the Kam-\nchatka survey party, indicate that Kamchatka alone will not secure"
}