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J. 333305MONO-State Galley 365 UNCORRECTED GALLEY PROOF Japan; to conduct, in conjunction with U. S. strategic air forces based in Siberia, intensive air operations against Japan proper; and to interdict lines of communication between Japan and the mainland of Asia. (b) In furtherance of these principles, we should deliver the maxi- mum possible supplies without detriment to our own war effort. (c) We should enter into immediate negotiations with Russia to determine the feasibility, practicability, desirability and necessity for undertaking any or all of the following courses of action: (i) To establish air and naval forces in Kamchatka, including the naval base at Petropavlovsk. (ii) To base U. S. strategic air forces in Eastern Siberia. (iii) To develop an air transport route from Kamchatka to Eastern Siberia. (iv) To open a North Pacific line of communication to Siberia. (v) To permit Russian submarines and light naval craft to operate from our bases in the Aleutians. (2) Indicate to the Russians that any operations by us to open sea routes to Sea of Okhotsk-Amur River ports will be extremely costly and at the expense of our own efforts toward Japan from the south; that because of limitation of means, the probability of amphibious operations in the North Pacific in 1945 is remote. (3) Emphasize that if we are to conduct a difficult campaign to open a sea route of only limited capacity the U. S. and U. S. S. R. should insure that the use made of the route will be that which will bring about earliest defeat of Japan. (4) Indicate clearly that if a supply route is opened and maintained by the diversion of U. S. forces and resources, in order to gain full advantage of this effort, we expect Russian agreement to the basing of U. S. strategic air forces in eastern Siberia. c. The points discussed above have to do with U. S.-U. S. S. R. matters essentially, and should be taken up if possible in U. S.- U. S. S. R. meetings; details should be worked out between U. S. and U. S. S. R. staff representatives. If taken up at the tripartite meetings they should be covered only in the broadest terms. (A proposed message to General Deane is attached as Appendix "B"; its purpose is to set before the Russians the points we propose to discuss bilaterally and to give them opportunity to make additions or amend- ments to these subjects.)' RECOMMENDATIONS 7. It is recommended that the Joint Chiefs of Staff a. Present to the President the memorandum in Appendix "A." b. Dispatch to General Deane the message in Appendix "B." c. Approve the conclusions in paragraph 6 above and note the summary of important statements in Appendix "C." For the text of appendix A, see the memorandum from the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the President, January 23, 1945, post, p. - Appendix "B" DRAFT MESSAGE FROM THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF TO COMMANDING GENERAL U. S. MILITARY MISSION TO U. S. S. R. In WAR U.S. proposals for the agenda for the U. S.-British- U.S.S. R. tripartite military conference were furnished to you. The United States Chiefs of Staff propose the following subjects for dis-

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    "ocrText": "J. 333305MONO-State\nGalley 365\nUNCORRECTED GALLEY PROOF\nJapan; to conduct, in conjunction with U. S. strategic air forces\nbased in Siberia, intensive air operations against Japan proper;\nand to interdict lines of communication between Japan and the\nmainland of Asia.\n(b) In furtherance of these principles, we should deliver the maxi-\nmum possible supplies without detriment to our own war effort.\n(c) We should enter into immediate negotiations with Russia to\ndetermine the feasibility, practicability, desirability and necessity for\nundertaking any or all of the following courses of action:\n(i) To establish air and naval forces in Kamchatka, including\nthe naval base at Petropavlovsk.\n(ii) To base U. S. strategic air forces in Eastern Siberia.\n(iii) To develop an air transport route from Kamchatka to\nEastern Siberia.\n(iv) To open a North Pacific line of communication to Siberia.\n(v) To permit Russian submarines and light naval craft to\noperate from our bases in the Aleutians.\n(2) Indicate to the Russians that any operations by us to open sea\nroutes to Sea of Okhotsk-Amur River ports will be extremely costly\nand at the expense of our own efforts toward Japan from the south;\nthat because of limitation of means, the probability of amphibious\noperations in the North Pacific in 1945 is remote.\n(3) Emphasize that if we are to conduct a difficult campaign to\nopen a sea route of only limited capacity the U. S. and U. S. S. R.\nshould insure that the use made of the route will be that which will\nbring about earliest defeat of Japan.\n(4) Indicate clearly that if a supply route is opened and maintained\nby the diversion of U. S. forces and resources, in order to gain full\nadvantage of this effort, we expect Russian agreement to the basing\nof U. S. strategic air forces in eastern Siberia.\nc. The points discussed above have to do with U. S.-U. S. S. R.\nmatters essentially, and should be taken up if possible in U. S.-\nU. S. S. R. meetings; details should be worked out between U. S.\nand U. S. S. R. staff representatives. If taken up at the tripartite\nmeetings they should be covered only in the broadest terms. (A\nproposed message to General Deane is attached as Appendix \"B\"; its\npurpose is to set before the Russians the points we propose to discuss\nbilaterally and to give them opportunity to make additions or amend-\nments to these subjects.)'\nRECOMMENDATIONS\n7. It is recommended that the Joint Chiefs of Staff\na. Present to the President the memorandum in Appendix \"A.\"\nb. Dispatch to General Deane the message in Appendix \"B.\"\nc. Approve the conclusions in paragraph 6 above and note the\nsummary of important statements in Appendix \"C.\"\nFor the text of appendix A, see the memorandum from the Joint Chiefs of\nStaff to the President, January 23, 1945, post, p. -\nAppendix \"B\"\nDRAFT\nMESSAGE FROM THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF TO COMMANDING GENERAL\nU. S. MILITARY MISSION TO U. S. S. R.\nIn WAR\nU.S. proposals for the agenda for the U. S.-British-\nU.S.S. R. tripartite military conference were furnished to you. The\nUnited States Chiefs of Staff propose the following subjects for dis-"
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