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J. 333305-M o N 0-State
Galley
367
UNCORRECTED GALLEY PROOF
Asiatic mainland. Emphasize that operations of U. S. Strategic Air
Forces from eastern Siberia would assist in denying munitions to the
Jap Manchurian Army and consequently directly support the Russians
on that front.
e. Because detailed plans for the employment of U. S. Air Forces in
eastern Siberia, such as the one you propose have not been fully
examined, particularly as to logistics, you will not submit any such
plans to the Russians at this time, or propose the basing in Russia or
a U. S. Air Force of definite composition.
Finally therefore you should endeavor to secure agreement in
principle by the Russians to the eventual employment of U. S. Air
Forces from eastern Siberian bases in the event future developments
indicate this employment to be both practicable and advantageous.
J.O.I S. Files
Memorandum by the United States Chiefs of Staff 1
1 Quoted by W. Averell Harriman in statement submitted to a Joint Senate
Committee, August 17, 1951; printed in Department of State Bulletin, September
3, 1951, vol. XXV, p. 373.
TOP SECRET
[WASHINGTON,] 22 January 1945.
OPERATIONS FOR THE DEFEAT OF JAPAN
C.C.S. 417/11
1. The agreed over-all objective in the war against Japan has been
expressed as follows (C. C. S. 417/9²):
This document (not printed herein) came from the Quebec Conference of 1944.
To force the unconditional surrender of Japan by:
(1) Lowering Japanese ability and will to resist by establishing sea
and air blockades, conducting intensive air bombardment, and
destroying Japanese air and naval strength.
(2) Invading and seizing objectives in the industrial heart of Japan.
2. The United States Chiefs of Staff have adopted the following as
a basis for planning in the war against Japan:
The concept of operations for the main effort in the Pacific is
(C. C. 417/10):
a. Following the Okinawa operation to seize additional positions to
intensify the blockade and air bombardment of Japan in order to
create a situation favorable to:
b. An assault on Kyushu for the purpose of further reducing
Japanese capabilities by containing and destroying major enemy forces
and further intensifying the blockade and air bombardment in order
to establish a tactical condition favorable to:
c. The decisive invasion of the industrial heart of Japan through the
Tokyo Plain.
3. The following sequence and timing of operations have been
directed by the United States Chiefs of Staff and plans prepared by
theater commanders:-
Objectives
Target Date
Continuation of operations in the
-
Philippines (Luzon, Mindoro,
Leyte)
Iwo Jima
19 February 1945
Okinawa and extension therefrom in
1 April-August 1945
the Ryukyus
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"ocrText": "J. 333305-M o N 0-State\nGalley\n367\nUNCORRECTED GALLEY PROOF\nAsiatic mainland. Emphasize that operations of U. S. Strategic Air\nForces from eastern Siberia would assist in denying munitions to the\nJap Manchurian Army and consequently directly support the Russians\non that front.\ne. Because detailed plans for the employment of U. S. Air Forces in\neastern Siberia, such as the one you propose have not been fully\nexamined, particularly as to logistics, you will not submit any such\nplans to the Russians at this time, or propose the basing in Russia or\na U. S. Air Force of definite composition.\nFinally therefore you should endeavor to secure agreement in\nprinciple by the Russians to the eventual employment of U. S. Air\nForces from eastern Siberian bases in the event future developments\nindicate this employment to be both practicable and advantageous.\nJ.O.I S. Files\nMemorandum by the United States Chiefs of Staff 1\n1 Quoted by W. Averell Harriman in statement submitted to a Joint Senate\nCommittee, August 17, 1951; printed in Department of State Bulletin, September\n3, 1951, vol. XXV, p. 373.\nTOP SECRET\n[WASHINGTON,] 22 January 1945.\nOPERATIONS FOR THE DEFEAT OF JAPAN\nC.C.S. 417/11\n1. The agreed over-all objective in the war against Japan has been\nexpressed as follows (C. C. S. 417/9²):\nThis document (not printed herein) came from the Quebec Conference of 1944.\nTo force the unconditional surrender of Japan by:\n(1) Lowering Japanese ability and will to resist by establishing sea\nand air blockades, conducting intensive air bombardment, and\ndestroying Japanese air and naval strength.\n(2) Invading and seizing objectives in the industrial heart of Japan.\n2. The United States Chiefs of Staff have adopted the following as\na basis for planning in the war against Japan:\nThe concept of operations for the main effort in the Pacific is\n(C. C. 417/10):\na. Following the Okinawa operation to seize additional positions to\nintensify the blockade and air bombardment of Japan in order to\ncreate a situation favorable to:\nb. An assault on Kyushu for the purpose of further reducing\nJapanese capabilities by containing and destroying major enemy forces\nand further intensifying the blockade and air bombardment in order\nto establish a tactical condition favorable to:\nc. The decisive invasion of the industrial heart of Japan through the\nTokyo Plain.\n3. The following sequence and timing of operations have been\ndirected by the United States Chiefs of Staff and plans prepared by\ntheater commanders:-\nObjectives\nTarget Date\nContinuation of operations in the\n-\nPhilippines (Luzon, Mindoro,\nLeyte)\nIwo Jima\n19 February 1945\nOkinawa and extension therefrom in\n1 April-August 1945\nthe Ryukyus"
}