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J. 333305MONO-State
Galley
427
UNCORRECTED GALLEY PROOF
serious threat to Strasbourg and there was a good chance of clearing
up the Colmar pocket quickly, thus releasing four divisions. In view
of the present diminution of German offensive capabilities in the West,
it was essential to get to the Rhine in the North as soon as possible and
it was hoped that Field Marshal Montgomery's attack would start on
8 February.
Turning to the question of the distribution of forces, GENERAL
SMITH explained that initially the Staff of 21st Army Group had said
that only about 21 divisions could be maintained in the northern
thrust; this strength was obviously too small a proportion to use in the
main thrust out of a total of some 85 divisions available. The Supreme
Commander, however, had directed that logistic arrangements be made
to support initially 30 divisions in the main effort and later a total of
36 divisions. These arrangements were under way. Grave thought
had been given to the area in which the secondary effort should be
staged. The neighborhood of Cologne presented certain advantages
in that there could be no question of an Allied dispersal of forces. On
the other hand this area was so close to the area of the main effort that
the Germans could quickly reinforce between these two threatened
areas and little diversion of enemy strength would be achieved. To
sum up, in General Eisenhower's view the thrust in the North was
absolutely essential, that in the South necessary and desirable and to
be undertaken if at all possible.
In reply to a question, GENERAL SMITH explained that it was
obviously desirable to close the Rhine throughout its whole length but
that the Supreme Commander did not intend to do this if resistance
was such that the operation would delay the main attack until mid-
summer or would militate against an opportunity to seize a bridgehead
and effect a crossing in strength on the northern front. A discussion
then ensued as to the effect of the spring thaws on the possibilities of
crossing the Rhine. GENERAL SMITH and GENERAL BULL explained
that the lower Rhine could, it was believed, be crossed at any date
after the first of March, though certain risks were entailed. The
spring thaws affected the upper Rhine but had no effect on the lower
Rhine.
SIR ALAN BROOKE explained that the British Chiefs of Staff felt that
there was not sufficient strength available for two major operations,
and that therefore it would be necessary to decide on one of those
proposed. Of the two, the northern appeared the most promising.
The base port of Antwerp was nearer, the armies were already closer
to the Rhine in that area, and the advance into Germany immediately
threatened the vital Ruhr area whose importance had been even fur-
ther increased by the fall of Silesia to the advancing Russian Army.
In the South, though the actual crossings might prove easier, our
armies had further to go before being in a position to cross the Rhine
and, after crossing, the country was less favorable for operations and
our forces would be further from the Ruhr or the lines of communica-
tions thereto. It was therefore felt that the plan should be based on
the whole effort being made in the North if this was to be certain of
succeeding and that every other operation must be regarded as sub-
sidiary to this main thrust. There was, it was felt, a danger of putting
too much into the southern effort and thereby weakening the main
northern attack.
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"ocrText": "J. 333305MONO-State\nGalley\n427\nUNCORRECTED GALLEY PROOF\nserious threat to Strasbourg and there was a good chance of clearing\nup the Colmar pocket quickly, thus releasing four divisions. In view\nof the present diminution of German offensive capabilities in the West,\nit was essential to get to the Rhine in the North as soon as possible and\nit was hoped that Field Marshal Montgomery's attack would start on\n8 February.\nTurning to the question of the distribution of forces, GENERAL\nSMITH explained that initially the Staff of 21st Army Group had said\nthat only about 21 divisions could be maintained in the northern\nthrust; this strength was obviously too small a proportion to use in the\nmain thrust out of a total of some 85 divisions available. The Supreme\nCommander, however, had directed that logistic arrangements be made\nto support initially 30 divisions in the main effort and later a total of\n36 divisions. These arrangements were under way. Grave thought\nhad been given to the area in which the secondary effort should be\nstaged. The neighborhood of Cologne presented certain advantages\nin that there could be no question of an Allied dispersal of forces. On\nthe other hand this area was so close to the area of the main effort that\nthe Germans could quickly reinforce between these two threatened\nareas and little diversion of enemy strength would be achieved. To\nsum up, in General Eisenhower's view the thrust in the North was\nabsolutely essential, that in the South necessary and desirable and to\nbe undertaken if at all possible.\nIn reply to a question, GENERAL SMITH explained that it was\nobviously desirable to close the Rhine throughout its whole length but\nthat the Supreme Commander did not intend to do this if resistance\nwas such that the operation would delay the main attack until mid-\nsummer or would militate against an opportunity to seize a bridgehead\nand effect a crossing in strength on the northern front. A discussion\nthen ensued as to the effect of the spring thaws on the possibilities of\ncrossing the Rhine. GENERAL SMITH and GENERAL BULL explained\nthat the lower Rhine could, it was believed, be crossed at any date\nafter the first of March, though certain risks were entailed. The\nspring thaws affected the upper Rhine but had no effect on the lower\nRhine.\nSIR ALAN BROOKE explained that the British Chiefs of Staff felt that\nthere was not sufficient strength available for two major operations,\nand that therefore it would be necessary to decide on one of those\nproposed. Of the two, the northern appeared the most promising.\nThe base port of Antwerp was nearer, the armies were already closer\nto the Rhine in that area, and the advance into Germany immediately\nthreatened the vital Ruhr area whose importance had been even fur-\nther increased by the fall of Silesia to the advancing Russian Army.\nIn the South, though the actual crossings might prove easier, our\narmies had further to go before being in a position to cross the Rhine\nand, after crossing, the country was less favorable for operations and\nour forces would be further from the Ruhr or the lines of communica-\ntions thereto. It was therefore felt that the plan should be based on\nthe whole effort being made in the North if this was to be certain of\nsucceeding and that every other operation must be regarded as sub-\nsidiary to this main thrust. There was, it was felt, a danger of putting\ntoo much into the southern effort and thereby weakening the main\nnorthern attack."
}