Ask the Scholar
Page 430 of 436
I can add historical knowledge about this page.
Page image
OCR
J. 333305-MONO-State
Galley 429
UNCORRECTED GALLEY PROOF
GENERAL SMITH gave the proposed general deployment of divisions.
He said that while 36 would be available for the northern thrust they
would not all be in the line at the same time. There would also be a
strategic reserve of about ten divisions which would permit rotation.
About 12 divisions would be used in the secondary attack and the
remainder would be holding relatively quiet sectors of the line, where
tired divisions could be rotated for rest and refit.
Turning to the employment of French divisions, GENERAL SMITH
said that every effort was being made to arm the new divisions as
quickly as possible. Equipment for the first three of the new divisions
was already moving, and they would be ready for action together with
their corps troops by the latter part of April. The French had certain
odd brigades and other units available at present and these, with the
new French divisions, might be used to contain or reduce St. Nazaire
and Bordeaux.
SIR ALAN BROOKE said that the British Chiefs of Staff had not en-
tirely agreed with the Supreme Commander's plan as set out in SCAF
180. This however had taken on a different complexion in the light
of General Smith's explanations. The British Chiefs of Staff were
loath therefore to approve SCAF 180, as at present drafted, as had
been suggested by the United States Chiefs of Staff in C. C. S. 761/4.
SIR CHARLES PORTAL drew attention to paragraph 20 of SCAF 180
which appeared out of keeping with General Smith's explanation.
GENERAL SMITH said that as he understood it, it had never been
General Eisenhower's intention to sweep the whole area west of the
Rhine clear of Germans before effecting crossings.
GENERAL BULL confirmed this view and said that such action had
not been intended if heavy fighting and consequent delay was thereby
entailed. However, closing up to the Rhine on its whole length was
obviously desirable if it could be achieved without delay.
GENERAL SMITH said that if the Germans resisted our attack in the
North with their full strength it was likely that they would only have
Volksgrenadier divisions available to hold the ground west of the Rhine
to the south.
Srr ALAN BROOKE pointed out that the final sentence of paragraph 9
of SCAF 180 also implied equally important lines of advance.
ADMIRAL KING drew attention to paragraph 22 which he felt clarified
the position.
In reply to a question by Sir Alan Brooke, GENERAL SMITH said
that the southern thrust was likely to start from some position
between the Siegfried Line and the Rhine. He felt that about 12
divisions could successfully achieve this thrust if the Germans con-
centrated to oppose the main effort and the Siegfried Line would not
impose an insuperable obstacle. In general he felt that the Siegfried
Line could be "nibbled through" by two or three good divisions in
15 days in almost any position.
SIR ALAN BROOKE said that he felt that rather than approve SCAF
180 at the present time, he would prefer that the Combined Chiefs of
Staff should take note of it and should examine the record of General
Smith's explanation at their meeting on the following day.
THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:-
Deferred action on the above subject pending further consideration
by the British Chiefs of Staff.
Page data
- Page
- 430
- Source index
- 0
- Type
- photo
- Media ID
- ca55be007f6149d5
- Size
- unknown
Document data
- ID
- 750433
- Core
- doc
- Type
- document
DTO data
{
"id": "750433",
"sourceUrl": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/750433",
"contentType": "document",
"title": "Foreign Affairs File, 1940-1953: \"Conferences at Malta and Yalta, 1945\" (galley proofs, Part I)",
"citationUrl": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/750433",
"collections": [
"President's Secretary's Files (Truman Administration)",
"Subject Files"
],
"iiifBase": "https://s3.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/lz/presidential-libraries/truman/hst-psf/602191/750433/750433-01-001.jpg",
"thumbnailUrl": "https://s3.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/lz/presidential-libraries/truman/hst-psf/602191/750433/750433-01-001.jpg",
"largeImageUrl": "https://s3.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/lz/presidential-libraries/truman/hst-psf/602191/750433/750433-01-001.jpg",
"imageCount": 436,
"hasImages": true,
"source": "import",
"hasTranscription": false
}
Context sent to Scholar
Document identity
{
"localId": "750433",
"label": "Foreign Affairs File, 1940-1953: \"Conferences at Malta and Yalta, 1945\" (galley proofs, Part I)",
"core": "doc",
"dtoType": "document",
"citationUrl": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/750433"
}
Document source metadata
{
"id": "750433",
"sourceUrl": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/750433",
"contentType": "document",
"title": "Foreign Affairs File, 1940-1953: \"Conferences at Malta and Yalta, 1945\" (galley proofs, Part I)",
"citationUrl": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/750433",
"collections": [
"President's Secretary's Files (Truman Administration)",
"Subject Files"
],
"iiifBase": "https://s3.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/lz/presidential-libraries/truman/hst-psf/602191/750433/750433-01-001.jpg",
"thumbnailUrl": "https://s3.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/lz/presidential-libraries/truman/hst-psf/602191/750433/750433-01-001.jpg",
"largeImageUrl": "https://s3.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/lz/presidential-libraries/truman/hst-psf/602191/750433/750433-01-001.jpg",
"imageCount": 436,
"hasImages": true,
"source": "import",
"hasTranscription": false
}
Document source extras
{
"url": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/750433",
"naId": 750433,
"levelOfDescription": "fileUnit",
"recordType": "description",
"ocrSource": "nara-archive"
}
Page context
{
"seq": 430,
"pageIndex": 0,
"type": "photo",
"url": "https://s3.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/lz/presidential-libraries/truman/hst-psf/602191/750433/750433-01-430.jpg",
"mediaId": "ca55be007f6149d5",
"ocrText": "J. 333305-MONO-State\nGalley 429\nUNCORRECTED GALLEY PROOF\nGENERAL SMITH gave the proposed general deployment of divisions.\nHe said that while 36 would be available for the northern thrust they\nwould not all be in the line at the same time. There would also be a\nstrategic reserve of about ten divisions which would permit rotation.\nAbout 12 divisions would be used in the secondary attack and the\nremainder would be holding relatively quiet sectors of the line, where\ntired divisions could be rotated for rest and refit.\nTurning to the employment of French divisions, GENERAL SMITH\nsaid that every effort was being made to arm the new divisions as\nquickly as possible. Equipment for the first three of the new divisions\nwas already moving, and they would be ready for action together with\ntheir corps troops by the latter part of April. The French had certain\nodd brigades and other units available at present and these, with the\nnew French divisions, might be used to contain or reduce St. Nazaire\nand Bordeaux.\nSIR ALAN BROOKE said that the British Chiefs of Staff had not en-\ntirely agreed with the Supreme Commander's plan as set out in SCAF\n180. This however had taken on a different complexion in the light\nof General Smith's explanations. The British Chiefs of Staff were\nloath therefore to approve SCAF 180, as at present drafted, as had\nbeen suggested by the United States Chiefs of Staff in C. C. S. 761/4.\nSIR CHARLES PORTAL drew attention to paragraph 20 of SCAF 180\nwhich appeared out of keeping with General Smith's explanation.\nGENERAL SMITH said that as he understood it, it had never been\nGeneral Eisenhower's intention to sweep the whole area west of the\nRhine clear of Germans before effecting crossings.\nGENERAL BULL confirmed this view and said that such action had\nnot been intended if heavy fighting and consequent delay was thereby\nentailed. However, closing up to the Rhine on its whole length was\nobviously desirable if it could be achieved without delay.\nGENERAL SMITH said that if the Germans resisted our attack in the\nNorth with their full strength it was likely that they would only have\nVolksgrenadier divisions available to hold the ground west of the Rhine\nto the south.\nSrr ALAN BROOKE pointed out that the final sentence of paragraph 9\nof SCAF 180 also implied equally important lines of advance.\nADMIRAL KING drew attention to paragraph 22 which he felt clarified\nthe position.\nIn reply to a question by Sir Alan Brooke, GENERAL SMITH said\nthat the southern thrust was likely to start from some position\nbetween the Siegfried Line and the Rhine. He felt that about 12\ndivisions could successfully achieve this thrust if the Germans con-\ncentrated to oppose the main effort and the Siegfried Line would not\nimpose an insuperable obstacle. In general he felt that the Siegfried\nLine could be \"nibbled through\" by two or three good divisions in\n15 days in almost any position.\nSIR ALAN BROOKE said that he felt that rather than approve SCAF\n180 at the present time, he would prefer that the Combined Chiefs of\nStaff should take note of it and should examine the record of General\nSmith's explanation at their meeting on the following day.\nTHE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:-\nDeferred action on the above subject pending further consideration\nby the British Chiefs of Staff."
}