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J. 333305MONO-State
Galley 434
UNCORRECTED GALLEY PROOF
offensive could then be launched in the latter part of April or early
May, with the object of isolating the Ruhr and advancing deep
into Germany.
6. The result of these two offensives, if successful, should bring the
end of organised German resistance by the end of June.
THE UNFAVOURABLE CASE
7. Eastern Front. In this case, we assume that the Russian advance
is stopped short of Upper Silesia. Thereafter, if all factors are un-
favourable, the combination of German resistance and Russian
logistic difficulties may prevent a further major Russian offensive
from being launched until the late summer.
8. Western Front. The Allied offensive in the spring may fail to
achieve any decisive result. This might be caused by too great a
dispersion of effort along the whole front, together with the qualitative
superiority of the German heavy tanks and jet-propelled aircraft.
It would then be necessary to re-group with a view to launching
another offensive. This offensive could be launched in the summer,
but it might well suffer in weight and momentum as the result of a
successful U-boat campaign of which the effects are likely to be felt
in the third quarter of the year.
9. In these circumstances we consider that the results of these two
offensives, particularly the Russian, should bring about the end of
German organised resistance by the beginning of November.
CONCLUSION
10. There is a possibility that, as a result of the present Russian
offensive, Germany may be defeated by the middle of April. This,
however, should be regarded as a bonus and should not influence our
production or manpower planning.
For planning purposes, we consider that:-
a. The earliest date on which the war is likely to end is the 30th
June, 1945.
b. The date beyond which the war is unlikely to continue is the 1st
November, 1945.
HARRIMAN-CHURCHILL DINNER MEETING, JANUARY 30, 1945, EVE-
NING, ON BOARD H. M. S. "ORION" IN GRAND HARBOR
PRESENT
UNITED STATES
UNITED KINGDOM
Mr. Harriman
Prime Minister Churchill
Lieutenant General Schreiber
Editorial Note
No record of the substance of this meeting has been found. Churchill
had his quarters in H. M. S. Orion in Grand Harbor, Malta. The
information given here as to the meeting and the participants
is
taken from Churchill, p. 343.
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"ocrText": "J. 333305MONO-State\nGalley 434\nUNCORRECTED GALLEY PROOF\noffensive could then be launched in the latter part of April or early\nMay, with the object of isolating the Ruhr and advancing deep\ninto Germany.\n6. The result of these two offensives, if successful, should bring the\nend of organised German resistance by the end of June.\nTHE UNFAVOURABLE CASE\n7. Eastern Front. In this case, we assume that the Russian advance\nis stopped short of Upper Silesia. Thereafter, if all factors are un-\nfavourable, the combination of German resistance and Russian\nlogistic difficulties may prevent a further major Russian offensive\nfrom being launched until the late summer.\n8. Western Front. The Allied offensive in the spring may fail to\nachieve any decisive result. This might be caused by too great a\ndispersion of effort along the whole front, together with the qualitative\nsuperiority of the German heavy tanks and jet-propelled aircraft.\nIt would then be necessary to re-group with a view to launching\nanother offensive. This offensive could be launched in the summer,\nbut it might well suffer in weight and momentum as the result of a\nsuccessful U-boat campaign of which the effects are likely to be felt\nin the third quarter of the year.\n9. In these circumstances we consider that the results of these two\noffensives, particularly the Russian, should bring about the end of\nGerman organised resistance by the beginning of November.\nCONCLUSION\n10. There is a possibility that, as a result of the present Russian\noffensive, Germany may be defeated by the middle of April. This,\nhowever, should be regarded as a bonus and should not influence our\nproduction or manpower planning.\nFor planning purposes, we consider that:-\na. The earliest date on which the war is likely to end is the 30th\nJune, 1945.\nb. The date beyond which the war is unlikely to continue is the 1st\nNovember, 1945.\nHARRIMAN-CHURCHILL DINNER MEETING, JANUARY 30, 1945, EVE-\nNING, ON BOARD H. M. S. \"ORION\" IN GRAND HARBOR\nPRESENT\nUNITED STATES\nUNITED KINGDOM\nMr. Harriman\nPrime Minister Churchill\nLieutenant General Schreiber\nEditorial Note\nNo record of the substance of this meeting has been found. Churchill\nhad his quarters in H. M. S. Orion in Grand Harbor, Malta. The\ninformation given here as to the meeting and the participants\nis\ntaken from Churchill, p. 343."
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