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J. 333305-MONO-State
Galley 447
UNCORRECTED GALLEY PROOF
GENERAL MARSHALL said that C. C.S. 774, upon which action had
been deferred at the C. C.S. 183d Meeting, was the U.S. proposal for
the directive to Air Marshal Bottomley and General Spaatz for the
disruption of the German U-boat program. In C. C. S. 774/1 the
British have presented a paper on the U-boat threat during 1945.
ADMIRAL KING was of the opinion that the Combined Chiefs of
Staff would be obliged to accept the directive proposed in C. C.S. 774
in the light of the British paper which implied that immediate action
was necessary. He suggested that the British paper should be noted
by the Combined Chiefs of Staff.
GENERAL MARSHALL drew attention to the fact that the British
paper would provoke serious complications in the allotment of tonnage
being considered in current shipping studies and would provide the
British with arguments for the increase of the figure of 8 percent
which had been set for estimated shipping deficiencies. He was
merely examining this aspect of the problem in order to formulate
some reply to the British if the point were raised.
ADMIRAL KING felt that the British paper might be accepted if the
acceptance was without prejudice to the shipping deficiencies estab-
lished in the current studies. He advised against any attempt to
revise the percentage figure of assumed losses at this time.
ADMIRAL COOKE suggested that it might be preferable to note the
paper and review the deficiencies in sailings at some future date.
THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF:-
Agreed to recommend that the Combined Chiefs of Staff take note
of C. C.S S. 774/1 and review the percentage of deficiencies in sailings
on 1 April 1945.
7. STRATEGY IN NORTHWEST EUROPE
In closed session,
THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF:-
Agreed to recommend that the Combined Chiefs of Staff accept
SCAF 180 (Enclosure "B" to C. C. S. 761/3) as amended by SCAF
194, and take note of SCAEF's dispatch No. S-77211 of 31 January
1945.¹ 13
13 SCAF 180 was Eisenhower's appreciation and plan of operations for the
winter and spring of 1945; SCAF 194 contained General Smith's rewording of
certain paragraphs of the plan. In Message No. S-77211 Eisenhower agreed
to
the changed text. SCAF 180 and SCAF 194 are summarized in the report by
the Combined Chiefs of Staff to the President and the Prime Minister at Yalta,
o
post, pp. -
Annex
MESSAGE BY GENERAL KUTER TO GENERAL ARNOLD DATED
1 FEBRUARY 1945
"The following letter received this date:
"My dear Kuter. Since the British Chiefs of Staff issued CCS 691 14
about British participation in the very long range bombing of Japan
and the United States Chiefs of Staff replied in CCS 691/1,14 we have
14 Not printed.
made considerable progress in the development of our VLR bombing
potential.
"The bombing of the "Tirpitz" proved that it is possible to increase
the all up weight of the Lancaster beyond our expectations, and we
now hope to achieve an effective radius of action of some 1,500 miles
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"ocrText": "J. 333305-MONO-State\nGalley 447\nUNCORRECTED GALLEY PROOF\nGENERAL MARSHALL said that C. C.S. 774, upon which action had\nbeen deferred at the C. C.S. 183d Meeting, was the U.S. proposal for\nthe directive to Air Marshal Bottomley and General Spaatz for the\ndisruption of the German U-boat program. In C. C. S. 774/1 the\nBritish have presented a paper on the U-boat threat during 1945.\nADMIRAL KING was of the opinion that the Combined Chiefs of\nStaff would be obliged to accept the directive proposed in C. C.S. 774\nin the light of the British paper which implied that immediate action\nwas necessary. He suggested that the British paper should be noted\nby the Combined Chiefs of Staff.\nGENERAL MARSHALL drew attention to the fact that the British\npaper would provoke serious complications in the allotment of tonnage\nbeing considered in current shipping studies and would provide the\nBritish with arguments for the increase of the figure of 8 percent\nwhich had been set for estimated shipping deficiencies. He was\nmerely examining this aspect of the problem in order to formulate\nsome reply to the British if the point were raised.\nADMIRAL KING felt that the British paper might be accepted if the\nacceptance was without prejudice to the shipping deficiencies estab-\nlished in the current studies. He advised against any attempt to\nrevise the percentage figure of assumed losses at this time.\nADMIRAL COOKE suggested that it might be preferable to note the\npaper and review the deficiencies in sailings at some future date.\nTHE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF:-\nAgreed to recommend that the Combined Chiefs of Staff take note\nof C. C.S S. 774/1 and review the percentage of deficiencies in sailings\non 1 April 1945.\n7. STRATEGY IN NORTHWEST EUROPE\nIn closed session,\nTHE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF:-\nAgreed to recommend that the Combined Chiefs of Staff accept\nSCAF 180 (Enclosure \"B\" to C. C. S. 761/3) as amended by SCAF\n194, and take note of SCAEF's dispatch No. S-77211 of 31 January\n1945.¹ 13\n13 SCAF 180 was Eisenhower's appreciation and plan of operations for the\nwinter and spring of 1945; SCAF 194 contained General Smith's rewording of\ncertain paragraphs of the plan. In Message No. S-77211 Eisenhower agreed\nto\nthe changed text. SCAF 180 and SCAF 194 are summarized in the report by\nthe Combined Chiefs of Staff to the President and the Prime Minister at Yalta,\no\npost, pp. -\nAnnex\nMESSAGE BY GENERAL KUTER TO GENERAL ARNOLD DATED\n1 FEBRUARY 1945\n\"The following letter received this date:\n\"My dear Kuter. Since the British Chiefs of Staff issued CCS 691 14\nabout British participation in the very long range bombing of Japan\nand the United States Chiefs of Staff replied in CCS 691/1,14 we have\n14 Not printed.\nmade considerable progress in the development of our VLR bombing\npotential.\n\"The bombing of the \"Tirpitz\" proved that it is possible to increase\nthe all up weight of the Lancaster beyond our expectations, and we\nnow hope to achieve an effective radius of action of some 1,500 miles"
}