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{
    "localId": "750434",
    "label": "Foreign Affairs File, 1940-1953: \"Conferences at Malta and Yalta, 1945\" (galley proofs, Part II)",
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    "id": "750434",
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    "title": "Foreign Affairs File, 1940-1953: \"Conferences at Malta and Yalta, 1945\" (galley proofs, Part II)",
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{
    "seq": 210,
    "pageIndex": 0,
    "type": "photo",
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    "ocrText": "J. 333305-MONO-State\nGalley\n638\nUNCORRECTED GALLEY PROOF\nrequest for concessions. Ahi's reply had been most favorable.\nKavtaradze had then proceeded to Iran to negotiate. In his first\nconversation with Foreign Minister Saed, the Foreign Minister had\ntaken a favorable position. This was only natural since the granting\nof concessions was not only to the interests of the Soviet Union, but\nalso to Iran. It was also in compliance with the Declaration of\nTehran, since the granting of concessions would assist Iranian econ-\nomy. This was the first stage of the controversy.\nDuring the second stage the situation changed. The Iranians then\nstated that it would not be appropriate to carry on the negotiations.\nThereupon, the Medjlis had adopted a decision to the effect that there\nshould be no concessions during the war. Subsequently, many\nIranians had stated that this decision had been adopted in too great\na hurry and that it was unwise.\nWhy could there not be a third stage? Since the Iranians had\nchanged their minds in one direction the Soviets saw no reason why\nthey should not change it back to the first stage. The Soviet Govern-\nment had endeavored to persuade them to do so. Kavtaradze had\nreturned and the strong-armed methods he had used have subsided.\nHe said that no negotiations were being carried on at the present\ntime and that he did not believe it advisable to pay any special\nattention to this question now. He suggested that the matter be\nleft alone-that it take its own course. The situation was not acute\nat the present time.\nMR. STETTINIUS pointed out that the United States had no wartime\ntreaty with the Iranian Government. American firms had carried\non negotiations for oil concessions but these had been dropped follow-\ning the Medjlis decision. The firms were consequently in the same\nposition as the Soviets. With respect to the withdrawal of troops\nfrom Iran he wished to point out that the American troops there were\nserving the interests of the Soviet Union in moving Lend-Lease\nsupplies from the Persian Gulf. The United States Government was\ncontent to leave the question of oil negotiations until the end of the\nwar. He wished fully to support Mr. Eden's proposals regarding the\nwithdrawal of the Allied troops.\nMR. EDEN remarked that the British Government had no opposition\nto the granting of oil concessions to the Soviet Government.\nMR. STETTINIUS stated that the United States Government took\nthe same position.\nMR. EDEN pointed out that the British had also carried on negotia-\ntions with the Iranians, even before the Soviet negotiations had\nstarted. As a result of the present attitude of the Iranian Govern-\nment all of these negotiations were now held in abeyance. He said\nthat if some statement were released, as suggested by him, it might\nreassure the Iranians and facilitate the recommencement of oil\nnegotiations. With respect to the renewal of Allied troops, there was\nno need to amend the Iranian treaty which stated that Allied troops\nwould be withdrawn not later than six months after the termination\nof hostilities. He felt that it would be wise to withdraw these troops\nas soon as the supply route was no longer necessary.\nMR. MOLOTOV stated that he believed it might be advisable to\nlimit the matter to an exchange of views on the subject. He offered\nto summon Kavtaradze to the conference to make a report on the\nIranian situation."
}