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J. 333305-MONO-State
Galley
466
UNCORRECTED GALLEY PROOF
to capture additional islands in the Ryukyus either to the north or
south of Okinawa.
In general, future operations in the Pacific were designed to avoid
full-scale land battles against Japanese forces, involving heavy casual-
ties and slowing up the conduct of the campaign.
With regard to operations in the Philippines it was not visualized
that major United States forces would be used in mopping-up opera-
tions nor that the island of Mindanao and others to the south would
be assaulted by United States forces. Rather, it was hoped that
with U.S troops holding certain key positions, the rearmed Philippine
Army and guerillas would be able to carry out the necessary mopping-
up operations.
In view of the above considerations it was hoped to avoid an assault
on Formosa and to isolate and bomb Japanese forces in the island
from positions in the Ryukyus and Luzon.
The dates on which any of the possible alternative operations could
be undertaken and the choice of such operations was dependent on
the results of present operations in Luzon and on the date of the
termination of the war in Europe. It was unlikely that both Hainan
and North Borneo could be undertaken.
The importance of adequate bases and staging points was stressed.
A fleet base was being developed on the southeast tip of Samar and it
was estimated that three months' work could be achieved on this
base before any work could be done to render Manila available to the
fleet. It might, in fact, be decided not to recondition the Manila base
at all. A base had also been developed in Ulithi 9 which was some
1100 miles to the westward of Eniwetok 10 which had previously been
used as a base and staging point.
9 Ulithi or Mackenzie Islands, in approximately 10°6' north latitude and 139°50'
east longitude, a large coral atoll with a cluster of low, sandy islands surrounding
a central lagoon, toward the western extremity of the Caroline Islands in the
western Pacific Ocean. Occupied by United States forces on September 20-21,
1944, Ulithi was subsequently developed into a base for the United States fleet
operating against Japan.
10 A large, nearly circular, coral atoll consisting of about thirty islets of varying
size surrounding a lagoon, at the northwest end of the Marshall Islands, in approxi-
mately 11°21' north latitude and 162°20' east longitude. Seized by United States
forces in February 1944 and converted into an air and naval base, Eniwetok has
been used by the United States since 1948 as a testing ground for atomic
experiments.
The difficulties of developing the northern sea route to Russia were
emphasized. The two divisions which had been earmarked for an
assault on the Kuriles had now been diverted to Europe and it was
unlikely that further forces would be available for this operation.
Further, the sea lane to Russian ports was rendered difficult and in
certain instances impossible during the winter months due to ice
conditions.
The Russians had asked for some 85 additional ships to enable them
to stock up their eastern armies. The provision of such ships would
of course affect the course of operations elsewhere. In order to make
a sea route safe and effective it would be necessary to seize an island
in the Kuriles from which air cover could provide safe passage either
to the north or south of it. Unless such an operational base was
seized by the first of July its value would be lost due to ice conditions
preventing the passage of ships. At present ships flying the Russian
flag were convoying "civilian-type" supplies to the Maritime Provinces.
To sum up, it was unlikely that the operation against Kyushu
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"ocrText": "J. 333305-MONO-State\nGalley\n466\nUNCORRECTED GALLEY PROOF\nto capture additional islands in the Ryukyus either to the north or\nsouth of Okinawa.\nIn general, future operations in the Pacific were designed to avoid\nfull-scale land battles against Japanese forces, involving heavy casual-\nties and slowing up the conduct of the campaign.\nWith regard to operations in the Philippines it was not visualized\nthat major United States forces would be used in mopping-up opera-\ntions nor that the island of Mindanao and others to the south would\nbe assaulted by United States forces. Rather, it was hoped that\nwith U.S troops holding certain key positions, the rearmed Philippine\nArmy and guerillas would be able to carry out the necessary mopping-\nup operations.\nIn view of the above considerations it was hoped to avoid an assault\non Formosa and to isolate and bomb Japanese forces in the island\nfrom positions in the Ryukyus and Luzon.\nThe dates on which any of the possible alternative operations could\nbe undertaken and the choice of such operations was dependent on\nthe results of present operations in Luzon and on the date of the\ntermination of the war in Europe. It was unlikely that both Hainan\nand North Borneo could be undertaken.\nThe importance of adequate bases and staging points was stressed.\nA fleet base was being developed on the southeast tip of Samar and it\nwas estimated that three months' work could be achieved on this\nbase before any work could be done to render Manila available to the\nfleet. It might, in fact, be decided not to recondition the Manila base\nat all. A base had also been developed in Ulithi 9 which was some\n1100 miles to the westward of Eniwetok 10 which had previously been\nused as a base and staging point.\n9 Ulithi or Mackenzie Islands, in approximately 10°6' north latitude and 139°50'\neast longitude, a large coral atoll with a cluster of low, sandy islands surrounding\na central lagoon, toward the western extremity of the Caroline Islands in the\nwestern Pacific Ocean. Occupied by United States forces on September 20-21,\n1944, Ulithi was subsequently developed into a base for the United States fleet\noperating against Japan.\n10 A large, nearly circular, coral atoll consisting of about thirty islets of varying\nsize surrounding a lagoon, at the northwest end of the Marshall Islands, in approxi-\nmately 11°21' north latitude and 162°20' east longitude. Seized by United States\nforces in February 1944 and converted into an air and naval base, Eniwetok has\nbeen used by the United States since 1948 as a testing ground for atomic\nexperiments.\nThe difficulties of developing the northern sea route to Russia were\nemphasized. The two divisions which had been earmarked for an\nassault on the Kuriles had now been diverted to Europe and it was\nunlikely that further forces would be available for this operation.\nFurther, the sea lane to Russian ports was rendered difficult and in\ncertain instances impossible during the winter months due to ice\nconditions.\nThe Russians had asked for some 85 additional ships to enable them\nto stock up their eastern armies. The provision of such ships would\nof course affect the course of operations elsewhere. In order to make\na sea route safe and effective it would be necessary to seize an island\nin the Kuriles from which air cover could provide safe passage either\nto the north or south of it. Unless such an operational base was\nseized by the first of July its value would be lost due to ice conditions\npreventing the passage of ships. At present ships flying the Russian\nflag were convoying \"civilian-type\" supplies to the Maritime Provinces.\nTo sum up, it was unlikely that the operation against Kyushu"
}