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SIGNIFICANCE OF TURKEY TO
THE U. S. S. R.
Turkey remains of primary importance to the U.S.S. R.
cluded. This, in turn, certainly would enhance the Soviet
even though she is no longer an immediate target for
position on the Mediterranean, particularly if the Soviets
Soviet aggressive action. The Soviet Union is now em-
acquired Dodecanese and Aegean island bases at the same
ploying more subtle methods to secure: (1) relaxation of
time. From the standpoint of Soviet defense, the im-
Turkey's resistant foreign policy ; (2) bases on the Bos-
portance of bases on the Straits has been nullified by air-
porus or the Dardanelles; and (3) possession of the Kars
power and by Soviet control of the adjoining Black Sea
area.32 These objectives are vital to the larger Soviet plans
coastline, a condition- which casts considerable doubt on
regarding conversion of Turkey into a satellite State and
the Soviet Union's claim that such bases are needed for
attainment of a dominant position on the eastern Mediter-
security reasons,
ranean.
Unlike the Straits claim, the Soviet demand for the
Kars area is partially defensive in character. The north-
Historical Background
eastern Turkish province of Kars flanks the vital Caucasus
region with its important oil fields at Baku. West of
The key to Russo-Turkish relations has been, and is
Kars is the province of Erzurum (an area unofficially
today, the control of the Straits-Bosporus and Darda-
claimed by the Georgians and Armenians in the U. S.
nelles. In the past, Turkish rule of the Balkan countries
S. R.), which contains the only major land routes from
provided an additional cause of friction Balkan Slav
Turkey into Georgia, Armenia, and northern Iran. Soviet
peoples were bound by racial ties to Czarist Russia. The
control of Kars and Erzurum would protect the Soviet
Czars, beginning with Peter the Great, saw in the Osmanli
flank in case of any Soviet advance toward the Persian
Empire 33 a barrier to successful Russian expansion into
Gulf. It thus would represent a valuable addition to the
the Mediterranean littoral and southern Europe. The
chain of defensive buffer areas built up around U. S. S. R.
progressive weakening of the Sultan's government en-
frontiers.
couraged Russian ambitions, but these ambitions were
From a broader standpoint, should Turkey be reduced
tempered by the fear that other Powers also might capital-
to a Soviet satellite, her proximity to Greece, Syria, Irag,
ize on the importance of the Turks to satisfy imperialistic
and Iran would be advantageous in establishing Soviet
aims. This fear led Russia into occasional reversals of
hegemony over the Near and Middle East. Turkey's long
her policy to split up the Osmanli Empire. A typical ex-
coastline faces the Black, Mediterranean, and Aegean Seas
ample was the stand taken by the newly formed Soviet
and contains at least three ports-Istanbul, Izmir, and
government from 1919 to 1922. At that time the Straits
Iskenderun-capable of becoming major naval bases.
were temporarily in the hands of the western European
Powers.
Turkey's Government Blocks Soviet Aims
Turkey's Strategic Significance to the
The fact that Turkey has forced the U. S. S. R. to
abandon her high-handed pressure, even temporarily, is
Turkey's significance to the Soviet Union has been de-
due almost entirely to the determined resistance by the
termined almost entirely by her geographic position at
Turkish Government, whose foreign policy is supported
the gateway from the Black Sea to the Mediterranean.
unequivocally by all groups and classes in Turkey. The
The Soviets' demands for bases on the Straits may be
Turks have made it clear that they intend to fight rather
considered, with their naval expansion program, as re-
than give up any territory, and threatening Soviet troop
lated steps in an effort to achieve dominance in the Mediter-
movements on Turkish borders have served only to in-
ranean. Soviet bases on the Dardanelles would mean the
crease their determination. Apparently, the Soviet
virtual conversion of the Black Sea into a Soviet lake, with
Union has no desire to enter any armed conflict, especially
the possibility that all but Soviet shipping would be ex-
one which might result in a third world war.
32 See map on page 53.
This unusual display of national unity in a Middle East-
33 Popularly known as the Ottoman Empire.
ern country is due mainly to Turkey's emergence after
52
RESTRIOTED
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"ocrText": "SIGNIFICANCE OF TURKEY TO\nTHE U. S. S. R.\nTurkey remains of primary importance to the U.S.S. R.\ncluded. This, in turn, certainly would enhance the Soviet\neven though she is no longer an immediate target for\nposition on the Mediterranean, particularly if the Soviets\nSoviet aggressive action. The Soviet Union is now em-\nacquired Dodecanese and Aegean island bases at the same\nploying more subtle methods to secure: (1) relaxation of\ntime. From the standpoint of Soviet defense, the im-\nTurkey's resistant foreign policy ; (2) bases on the Bos-\nportance of bases on the Straits has been nullified by air-\nporus or the Dardanelles; and (3) possession of the Kars\npower and by Soviet control of the adjoining Black Sea\narea.32 These objectives are vital to the larger Soviet plans\ncoastline, a condition- which casts considerable doubt on\nregarding conversion of Turkey into a satellite State and\nthe Soviet Union's claim that such bases are needed for\nattainment of a dominant position on the eastern Mediter-\nsecurity reasons,\nranean.\nUnlike the Straits claim, the Soviet demand for the\nKars area is partially defensive in character. The north-\nHistorical Background\neastern Turkish province of Kars flanks the vital Caucasus\nregion with its important oil fields at Baku. West of\nThe key to Russo-Turkish relations has been, and is\nKars is the province of Erzurum (an area unofficially\ntoday, the control of the Straits-Bosporus and Darda-\nclaimed by the Georgians and Armenians in the U. S.\nnelles. In the past, Turkish rule of the Balkan countries\nS. R.), which contains the only major land routes from\nprovided an additional cause of friction Balkan Slav\nTurkey into Georgia, Armenia, and northern Iran. Soviet\npeoples were bound by racial ties to Czarist Russia. The\ncontrol of Kars and Erzurum would protect the Soviet\nCzars, beginning with Peter the Great, saw in the Osmanli\nflank in case of any Soviet advance toward the Persian\nEmpire 33 a barrier to successful Russian expansion into\nGulf. It thus would represent a valuable addition to the\nthe Mediterranean littoral and southern Europe. The\nchain of defensive buffer areas built up around U. S. S. R.\nprogressive weakening of the Sultan's government en-\nfrontiers.\ncouraged Russian ambitions, but these ambitions were\nFrom a broader standpoint, should Turkey be reduced\ntempered by the fear that other Powers also might capital-\nto a Soviet satellite, her proximity to Greece, Syria, Irag,\nize on the importance of the Turks to satisfy imperialistic\nand Iran would be advantageous in establishing Soviet\naims. This fear led Russia into occasional reversals of\nhegemony over the Near and Middle East. Turkey's long\nher policy to split up the Osmanli Empire. A typical ex-\ncoastline faces the Black, Mediterranean, and Aegean Seas\nample was the stand taken by the newly formed Soviet\nand contains at least three ports-Istanbul, Izmir, and\ngovernment from 1919 to 1922. At that time the Straits\nIskenderun-capable of becoming major naval bases.\nwere temporarily in the hands of the western European\nPowers.\nTurkey's Government Blocks Soviet Aims\nTurkey's Strategic Significance to the\nThe fact that Turkey has forced the U. S. S. R. to\nabandon her high-handed pressure, even temporarily, is\nTurkey's significance to the Soviet Union has been de-\ndue almost entirely to the determined resistance by the\ntermined almost entirely by her geographic position at\nTurkish Government, whose foreign policy is supported\nthe gateway from the Black Sea to the Mediterranean.\nunequivocally by all groups and classes in Turkey. The\nThe Soviets' demands for bases on the Straits may be\nTurks have made it clear that they intend to fight rather\nconsidered, with their naval expansion program, as re-\nthan give up any territory, and threatening Soviet troop\nlated steps in an effort to achieve dominance in the Mediter-\nmovements on Turkish borders have served only to in-\nranean. Soviet bases on the Dardanelles would mean the\ncrease their determination. Apparently, the Soviet\nvirtual conversion of the Black Sea into a Soviet lake, with\nUnion has no desire to enter any armed conflict, especially\nthe possibility that all but Soviet shipping would be ex-\none which might result in a third world war.\n32 See map on page 53.\nThis unusual display of national unity in a Middle East-\n33 Popularly known as the Ottoman Empire.\nern country is due mainly to Turkey's emergence after\n52\nRESTRIOTED"
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