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THE SOVIET UNION
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of labor unions or of established and unimpeachable liberal
Conclusions
or progressive organizations of every type. The second
tactic used so successfully by national Communist Parties
The apparatus through which the Soviet leaders hope to
to further Soviet policies has been the creation of organ-
achieve their objectives is very complex. The Marxist
izations with innocuous or mass appeal names, pursuing
doctrine, however, provides a remarkable method for cen-
ostensibly liberal purposes and sponsored by a potpourri
tralizing power and insuring discipline. Further, it also
of earnest-intentioned citizens with vaguely progressive
possesses a cohesive force, the sinews of which have been
ideas. Such a front organization is then used as a sound-
traced from the Kremlin to the lowliest party member.
ing board for the propagation of ideas and policies which,
Marxist ideology also supplies to the apparatus dynamic
however noble and ideal in purpose, usually, upon analysis,
drive, mass appeal, and convenient justification for a
are found to agree with the current Soviet line.
complete disregard of the established practices and social
The Soviet Embassies and Consulates provide an appa-
and moral standards of Western society.
ratus for hiding a subversive espionage network abroad.
Consequently, any categorical classification of the many
The Canadian Royal Commission's report on the espionage
devices used by the Soviets is, necessarily, artificial. Both
network discovered in Canada is one of the most illumi-
legitimate and illegitimate devices are used in unusual
nating documents on the existence and general functions of
ways, or in combinations strange and repugnant to West-
the Soviet espionage system. Although the Royal Commis-
ern practice. They are used solely on the basis of the
sion was able to trace, in detail, only the military espionage
judgment of the Soviet leaders as to their utility in secur-
network in Canada, it disclosed the unquestioned exist-
ing desired results.
ence of parallel NKVD (or, as it is now called, MVD)
The Soviet system must be rated as an effective instru-
and Comintern systems in Canada and of similar espio-
ment of power, although it has definite limitations, par-
nage networks in other countries. The three systems were
ticularly in its internal economic sphere. In support of
operated, respectively, by the Military Attaché of the
the second Soviet objective-weakening the power of other
Embassy; a Second Secretary, who was an MVD func-
States-international Communism has been able to mul-
tionary and a Second Secretary, who was a Party func-
tiply its real strength in other countries by techniques of
tionary. Each separately reported to, and received in-
confusion and by the exploitation of ignorance and discon-
structions from, his representative headquarters in Mos-
tent. This points to a clear guide for action by democratic
cow. The report of the Royal Commission exonerated the
peoples who do not desire a Soviet system in their coun-
Soviet Ambassador from complicity in these activities of
tries: namely, confusion can be overcome by disclosure;
his subordinates. Nor did the evidence show that he had
ignorance, by education: and discontent, by removal of its
direct knowledge of them.
causes.
58
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"ocrText": "THE SOVIET UNION\n RESTRICTED\nof labor unions or of established and unimpeachable liberal\nConclusions\nor progressive organizations of every type. The second\ntactic used so successfully by national Communist Parties\nThe apparatus through which the Soviet leaders hope to\nto further Soviet policies has been the creation of organ-\nachieve their objectives is very complex. The Marxist\nizations with innocuous or mass appeal names, pursuing\ndoctrine, however, provides a remarkable method for cen-\nostensibly liberal purposes and sponsored by a potpourri\ntralizing power and insuring discipline. Further, it also\nof earnest-intentioned citizens with vaguely progressive\npossesses a cohesive force, the sinews of which have been\nideas. Such a front organization is then used as a sound-\ntraced from the Kremlin to the lowliest party member.\ning board for the propagation of ideas and policies which,\nMarxist ideology also supplies to the apparatus dynamic\nhowever noble and ideal in purpose, usually, upon analysis,\ndrive, mass appeal, and convenient justification for a\nare found to agree with the current Soviet line.\ncomplete disregard of the established practices and social\nThe Soviet Embassies and Consulates provide an appa-\nand moral standards of Western society.\nratus for hiding a subversive espionage network abroad.\nConsequently, any categorical classification of the many\nThe Canadian Royal Commission's report on the espionage\ndevices used by the Soviets is, necessarily, artificial. Both\nnetwork discovered in Canada is one of the most illumi-\nlegitimate and illegitimate devices are used in unusual\nnating documents on the existence and general functions of\nways, or in combinations strange and repugnant to West-\nthe Soviet espionage system. Although the Royal Commis-\nern practice. They are used solely on the basis of the\nsion was able to trace, in detail, only the military espionage\njudgment of the Soviet leaders as to their utility in secur-\nnetwork in Canada, it disclosed the unquestioned exist-\ning desired results.\nence of parallel NKVD (or, as it is now called, MVD)\nThe Soviet system must be rated as an effective instru-\nand Comintern systems in Canada and of similar espio-\nment of power, although it has definite limitations, par-\nnage networks in other countries. The three systems were\nticularly in its internal economic sphere. In support of\noperated, respectively, by the Military Attaché of the\nthe second Soviet objective-weakening the power of other\nEmbassy; a Second Secretary, who was an MVD func-\nStates-international Communism has been able to mul-\ntionary and a Second Secretary, who was a Party func-\ntiply its real strength in other countries by techniques of\ntionary. Each separately reported to, and received in-\nconfusion and by the exploitation of ignorance and discon-\nstructions from, his representative headquarters in Mos-\ntent. This points to a clear guide for action by democratic\ncow. The report of the Royal Commission exonerated the\npeoples who do not desire a Soviet system in their coun-\nSoviet Ambassador from complicity in these activities of\ntries: namely, confusion can be overcome by disclosure;\nhis subordinates. Nor did the evidence show that he had\nignorance, by education: and discontent, by removal of its\ndirect knowledge of them.\ncauses.\n58\nRESTRICTED"
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