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NATIONAL DEFENSE POLICY
OF THE U.S.S.R.
The openly stated national defense policy of the U.S.
a gradual, cautious and uneasy rapprochement. In the
S. R. is to insure the impregnability of the country. This
war-weary late 1920's, no country was likely or, in practi-
is to be accomplished through : (1) the development of
cal terms of its own preoccupations, able to fight a major
large armed forces supported by a powerful economy: (2)
war with the Soviets. Fortunately for them, therefore,
the creation of a periphery of friendly or dominated
they enjoyed a period of relative security for which their
States; and (3) the exploitation, in countries lying be-
560,000-man army-without modern weapons-was ade-
yond the sphere of influence of the U. S. S. R., of social
quate. Stalin consolidated his position. By 1928 he was
weaknesses by local Communists. If the tenets of Marx-
strong enough, and the country had recovered sufficiently,
ism and Leninism continue to be the lodestone of Soviet
for the first Five-Year Plan for the intensive development
policy, the successful development of such a military in-
of the Soviet economy to be launched. This was the first
strument will provide military means for supporting the
positive step, envisaged some years previously by Lenin,
spread of socialism abroad.
toward meeting the fundamental requirements of national
The immediate policy of the Soviet Union now, as in
defense-the building of a powerful economy that could
the aftermath of World War I, is to secure a period of
support a large, modern army. There were concurrent
peace for the healing of her wounds and the achievement
internal social goals.
of the economic strength without which the other elements
of her security are imperfectly founded. The consequences
The Quest for Security
of the two wars differ greatly, and in many regions today
the peace is an uneasy par sovietica, but the fundamental
Before the first Five-Year Plan was completed in 1932,
factors are similar. Bewilderment and exhaustion in most
international events had vindicated the effort it entailed.
of Europe and the ferment of nationalism in Asia off er
Nazism in Germany, the expansion of Japan in Asia, and
great temptations to the Soviets; however, the basic goal
the deepening world-wide economic depression all por-
of security for the present outweighs any immediate ex-
tended a future which might jeopardize world peace.
pansionist aims.
As the Soviet Union's heavy industry grew, quantities of
matériel were produced to equip the army, and the army
Developments Up to the First Five-Year Plan
itself grew in numbers and effectiveness. At the same
time, the Soviets tried to strengthen their isolated political
For the first two decades of its existence, the Soviet
and economic position through diplomatic negotiations.
regime pursued a policy of security which took various
As early as 1922 they had concluded the Treaty of Rapallo
forms. After the October Revolution and in the Civil War
with defeated Germany, which provided mutual economic
intervention period, the policy (which was directed to the
benefits and laid the ground for limited military coopera-
immediate preservation of the regime) involved absolute
tion. The Soviet Union was a signatory of the Kellogg-
priority to the army, ruthless consumption of dwindling
Briand Pact in 1928. In 1932, Foreign Commissar Lit-
reserves of all sorts, and abandonment of outlying areas.
vinov set forth an unsuccessful disarmament proposal at
Defense of the principal centers of Russia was coupled
Geneva, as much perhaps for propaganda effect as for
with an effort to counterattack the interventionist Powers
an actual basis for disarmament. Other exchanges were
through revolution abroad. The defense succeeded ; revo-
followed by the Soviet's entry into the League of Nations
lution failed.
in 1934, and by mutual assistance treaties with France and
For five years after the Civil War the Soviet Union was
Czechoslovakia in 1935.
so exhausted that she could not be considered a real threat
At that time it was certainly advantageous to the Soviet
abroad, either as a military Power or as a center of world
Union to join with the democratic West in an effort to
revolution. A sort of truce took place-within the U. S.
contain Fascism, which was an immediate threat to both
S. R. in the form of the New Economic Policy, a relaxa-
the West and the Soviets. Mutual suspicions, however,
tion of socialist stringency which gave respite to the
were not overcome. The Soviets' bungling of their aid to
people; and between Soviets and the outside world as
the Republicans in Spain in 1936-37 did more harm than
68
RESTRICTED
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"ocrText": "NATIONAL DEFENSE POLICY\nOF THE U.S.S.R.\nThe openly stated national defense policy of the U.S.\na gradual, cautious and uneasy rapprochement. In the\nS. R. is to insure the impregnability of the country. This\nwar-weary late 1920's, no country was likely or, in practi-\nis to be accomplished through : (1) the development of\ncal terms of its own preoccupations, able to fight a major\nlarge armed forces supported by a powerful economy: (2)\nwar with the Soviets. Fortunately for them, therefore,\nthe creation of a periphery of friendly or dominated\nthey enjoyed a period of relative security for which their\nStates; and (3) the exploitation, in countries lying be-\n560,000-man army-without modern weapons-was ade-\nyond the sphere of influence of the U. S. S. R., of social\nquate. Stalin consolidated his position. By 1928 he was\nweaknesses by local Communists. If the tenets of Marx-\nstrong enough, and the country had recovered sufficiently,\nism and Leninism continue to be the lodestone of Soviet\nfor the first Five-Year Plan for the intensive development\npolicy, the successful development of such a military in-\nof the Soviet economy to be launched. This was the first\nstrument will provide military means for supporting the\npositive step, envisaged some years previously by Lenin,\nspread of socialism abroad.\ntoward meeting the fundamental requirements of national\nThe immediate policy of the Soviet Union now, as in\ndefense-the building of a powerful economy that could\nthe aftermath of World War I, is to secure a period of\nsupport a large, modern army. There were concurrent\npeace for the healing of her wounds and the achievement\ninternal social goals.\nof the economic strength without which the other elements\nof her security are imperfectly founded. The consequences\nThe Quest for Security\nof the two wars differ greatly, and in many regions today\nthe peace is an uneasy par sovietica, but the fundamental\nBefore the first Five-Year Plan was completed in 1932,\nfactors are similar. Bewilderment and exhaustion in most\ninternational events had vindicated the effort it entailed.\nof Europe and the ferment of nationalism in Asia off er\nNazism in Germany, the expansion of Japan in Asia, and\ngreat temptations to the Soviets; however, the basic goal\nthe deepening world-wide economic depression all por-\nof security for the present outweighs any immediate ex-\ntended a future which might jeopardize world peace.\npansionist aims.\nAs the Soviet Union's heavy industry grew, quantities of\nmatériel were produced to equip the army, and the army\nDevelopments Up to the First Five-Year Plan\nitself grew in numbers and effectiveness. At the same\ntime, the Soviets tried to strengthen their isolated political\nFor the first two decades of its existence, the Soviet\nand economic position through diplomatic negotiations.\nregime pursued a policy of security which took various\nAs early as 1922 they had concluded the Treaty of Rapallo\nforms. After the October Revolution and in the Civil War\nwith defeated Germany, which provided mutual economic\nintervention period, the policy (which was directed to the\nbenefits and laid the ground for limited military coopera-\nimmediate preservation of the regime) involved absolute\ntion. The Soviet Union was a signatory of the Kellogg-\npriority to the army, ruthless consumption of dwindling\nBriand Pact in 1928. In 1932, Foreign Commissar Lit-\nreserves of all sorts, and abandonment of outlying areas.\nvinov set forth an unsuccessful disarmament proposal at\nDefense of the principal centers of Russia was coupled\nGeneva, as much perhaps for propaganda effect as for\nwith an effort to counterattack the interventionist Powers\nan actual basis for disarmament. Other exchanges were\nthrough revolution abroad. The defense succeeded ; revo-\nfollowed by the Soviet's entry into the League of Nations\nlution failed.\nin 1934, and by mutual assistance treaties with France and\nFor five years after the Civil War the Soviet Union was\nCzechoslovakia in 1935.\nso exhausted that she could not be considered a real threat\nAt that time it was certainly advantageous to the Soviet\nabroad, either as a military Power or as a center of world\nUnion to join with the democratic West in an effort to\nrevolution. A sort of truce took place-within the U. S.\ncontain Fascism, which was an immediate threat to both\nS. R. in the form of the New Economic Policy, a relaxa-\nthe West and the Soviets. Mutual suspicions, however,\ntion of socialist stringency which gave respite to the\nwere not overcome. The Soviets' bungling of their aid to\npeople; and between Soviets and the outside world as\nthe Republicans in Spain in 1936-37 did more harm than\n68\nRESTRICTED"
}