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POLITICAL REINDOCTRINATION OF THE
SOVIET ARMED FORCES
All Soviet military personnel today receive a compre-
from a doctrinaire approach during that period and
hensive re-education in the principles of Marxism, Lenin-
showed the real reasons for resuming an intensified pro-
ism, and Stalinism. Using such tried methods as group
gram: of political instruction at the present time. After
discussion, guided study, and organized propaganda,
1942, the Red Army was a national rather than a
Soviet leaders are attempting to recreate in the present
proletarian force, as it was composed largely of vast,
armed forces the same high degree of political reliability
heterogeneous, newly mobilized reserves. The Communist
which was achieved in the Red Army and Navy before
Party was removed from its domination and leadership
World War II.
of the Army, a position which it previously had occupied.
This program is not a phenomenon limited to the armed
Even political control of the Army was taken from the
forces alone, but is a part of a nationwide campaign
Party's hands and placed in those of the military. In
affecting all sections of the population. Political indoc-
contrast to prewar and early-war practices, Communist
trination is being stressed everywhere, not only because
Party membership no longer was mentioned in official
of the necessity of assimilating the more than 2,000,000
personnel records. To the Party machinery was left only
former soldiers and sailors who entered the Communist
the responsibility of joining with the church, the press,
Party ranks during the war, but also because it is a means
the theater, and other Soviet institutions in the task of
of arousing the Soviet people from a natural postwar
mobilizing the moral energies of the Soviet peoples.
apathy and of solidifying their efforts behind the regime.
At the same time, the prestige of the Army was rein-
The political re-education of the armed forces, however,
forced by : (1) this elimination of dual military-political
has assumed particular importance to the Soviet political
command; (2) the greater disciplinary authority granted
heads. They have proclaimed publicly that such rein-
to commanders: (3) the recrystallization of the officer and
doctrination is necessary to assure the full effectiveness
NCO corps; and (4) the introduction of new and more
of the Soviet military forces in the event of future conflict
elegant insignia. The personal pride and self-esteem of
with the hostile capitalist world. They did not, and need
all ranks were increased by : (1) Soviet and Allied recog-
not, add that this re-education program is designed also
nition of the achievements of the Red Army; (2) mass
to decontaminate the returning servicementen who may have
decorations, accompanied by increases in pay and (3)
absorbed Western ideas and culture in occupied Europe,
wide opportunities for advancement. Although many
and to complete the control of the Soviet political leaders
new officers were recruited promptly into the Party, this
over the peacetime armed forces.
was done in rather routine fashion, the usual ritual of an
apprenticeship period and a course of study in Marxist
Army Political Education During the War
science being omitted. The majority of wartime Party
Years
recruits hardly could be called Communists in the
ideological sense.
The return to a study of the works of Marx and Lenin
in the Soviet Army represents an important change from
the policies pursued during World War II. During the
The Postwar Problem
war, the Communist Party paid more attention to increas-
With the end of the war, the problem presented itself of
ing production and rallying the people around the all-out
integrating millions of returning servicementen into the
war effort than to theoretical education. Even within the
peacetime structure of the U. S. S. R. and of making
Party, the standards of theoretical training were relaxed
them into satisfied and politically tractable citizens. For
considerably. Moreover, the formal education of millions
the first time, many of them had been beyond the nation's
of persons was interrupted by wartime displacement,
borders and were bringing back impressions, sometimes
employment, or military service. The propaganda carried
rather favorable, of life in non-Soviet countries. As
on in the Army was national rather than political, follow-
prisoners of war, some had been exposed to vigorous Ger-
ing the general theme of war for the Fatherland.
man anti-Communist and anti-Stalin propaganda. There
The relationship between the Communist Party and the
even was a danger that the new nationalism, instilled
Soviet armed forces during the war followed a trend away
by the Soviet authorities themselves, would get out of con-
RESTRI
89
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"ocrText": "POLITICAL REINDOCTRINATION OF THE\nSOVIET ARMED FORCES\nAll Soviet military personnel today receive a compre-\nfrom a doctrinaire approach during that period and\nhensive re-education in the principles of Marxism, Lenin-\nshowed the real reasons for resuming an intensified pro-\nism, and Stalinism. Using such tried methods as group\ngram: of political instruction at the present time. After\ndiscussion, guided study, and organized propaganda,\n1942, the Red Army was a national rather than a\nSoviet leaders are attempting to recreate in the present\nproletarian force, as it was composed largely of vast,\narmed forces the same high degree of political reliability\nheterogeneous, newly mobilized reserves. The Communist\nwhich was achieved in the Red Army and Navy before\nParty was removed from its domination and leadership\nWorld War II.\nof the Army, a position which it previously had occupied.\nThis program is not a phenomenon limited to the armed\nEven political control of the Army was taken from the\nforces alone, but is a part of a nationwide campaign\nParty's hands and placed in those of the military. In\naffecting all sections of the population. Political indoc-\ncontrast to prewar and early-war practices, Communist\ntrination is being stressed everywhere, not only because\nParty membership no longer was mentioned in official\nof the necessity of assimilating the more than 2,000,000\npersonnel records. To the Party machinery was left only\nformer soldiers and sailors who entered the Communist\nthe responsibility of joining with the church, the press,\nParty ranks during the war, but also because it is a means\nthe theater, and other Soviet institutions in the task of\nof arousing the Soviet people from a natural postwar\nmobilizing the moral energies of the Soviet peoples.\napathy and of solidifying their efforts behind the regime.\nAt the same time, the prestige of the Army was rein-\nThe political re-education of the armed forces, however,\nforced by : (1) this elimination of dual military-political\nhas assumed particular importance to the Soviet political\ncommand; (2) the greater disciplinary authority granted\nheads. They have proclaimed publicly that such rein-\nto commanders: (3) the recrystallization of the officer and\ndoctrination is necessary to assure the full effectiveness\nNCO corps; and (4) the introduction of new and more\nof the Soviet military forces in the event of future conflict\nelegant insignia. The personal pride and self-esteem of\nwith the hostile capitalist world. They did not, and need\nall ranks were increased by : (1) Soviet and Allied recog-\nnot, add that this re-education program is designed also\nnition of the achievements of the Red Army; (2) mass\nto decontaminate the returning servicementen who may have\ndecorations, accompanied by increases in pay and (3)\nabsorbed Western ideas and culture in occupied Europe,\nwide opportunities for advancement. Although many\nand to complete the control of the Soviet political leaders\nnew officers were recruited promptly into the Party, this\nover the peacetime armed forces.\nwas done in rather routine fashion, the usual ritual of an\napprenticeship period and a course of study in Marxist\nArmy Political Education During the War\nscience being omitted. The majority of wartime Party\nYears\nrecruits hardly could be called Communists in the\nideological sense.\nThe return to a study of the works of Marx and Lenin\nin the Soviet Army represents an important change from\nthe policies pursued during World War II. During the\nThe Postwar Problem\nwar, the Communist Party paid more attention to increas-\nWith the end of the war, the problem presented itself of\ning production and rallying the people around the all-out\nintegrating millions of returning servicementen into the\nwar effort than to theoretical education. Even within the\npeacetime structure of the U. S. S. R. and of making\nParty, the standards of theoretical training were relaxed\nthem into satisfied and politically tractable citizens. For\nconsiderably. Moreover, the formal education of millions\nthe first time, many of them had been beyond the nation's\nof persons was interrupted by wartime displacement,\nborders and were bringing back impressions, sometimes\nemployment, or military service. The propaganda carried\nrather favorable, of life in non-Soviet countries. As\non in the Army was national rather than political, follow-\nprisoners of war, some had been exposed to vigorous Ger-\ning the general theme of war for the Fatherland.\nman anti-Communist and anti-Stalin propaganda. There\nThe relationship between the Communist Party and the\neven was a danger that the new nationalism, instilled\nSoviet armed forces during the war followed a trend away\nby the Soviet authorities themselves, would get out of con-\nRESTRI\n89"
}