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{
    "localId": "7788604",
    "label": "War Department Report, The Soviet Union",
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    "id": "7788604",
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    "contentType": "document",
    "title": "War Department Report, The Soviet Union",
    "citationUrl": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/7788604",
    "collections": [
        "President's Secretary's Files (Truman Administration)",
        "Subject Files"
    ],
    "subjects": [
        "Cold War",
        "International relations",
        "United States-Soviet relations"
    ],
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            "logicalDate": "1948-01-01",
            "year": 1948
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{
    "seq": 64,
    "pageIndex": 0,
    "type": "photo",
    "url": "https://s3.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/opastorage/live/4/7886/7788604/content/presidential-libraries/truman/602191/750715/hst-psf_750715_02-62.jpg",
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    "ocrText": "MILITARY IMPLICATIONS OF SOVIET\nFOREIGN POLICY DURING 1946\nSoviet foreign policy is determined by Soviet leaders\nConciliation by Western Powers Fails to\non the basis of : (1) the dictates of Marxist ideology ; or\nAppease Soviets\n(2) the political implication of the Soviet geographical\nposition; or (3) a combination of the two. The initial\nInitial Anglo-American diplomatic response to this\ntrend in Soviet conduct of international relations was\nlong-range Soviet aim appears to be establishment of a\ndominant position for the U.S. S. R. on the Eurasian land\ncharacterized by compromise in which every care-con-\nmass. The ultimate Soviet aim appears to be an unlimited\nsistent with the national dignity of the United States and\nGreat Britain-was taken to conciliate the U. S. S. R.\nextension of Soviet power. Soviet approach to these aims\nhas been, is, and will continue to be modified constantly\nThe outstanding example of this conciliatory attitude was\nAnglo-American agreement at the Second Council of\nby opportunistic appraisal of changing local conditions.\nForeign Ministers at Moscow in December 1945 to recog-\nnize the Governments of Rumania and Bulgaria, subject\nSoviet Foreign Policy Approach Belligerent\nonly to the inclusion in minor cabinet posts of those mem-\nAfter VJ-day\nbers of opposition parties least objectionable to the\nU.S.S.1 R.\nDuring World War II, the Soviet Government tempor-\nDuring the opening sessions of the U. N. General As-\narily suspended the approach to international relations\nwhich presupposed the inevitability of an eventual armed\nsembly in London, it became increasingly clear that this\nclash between communism and capitalism. Following\nconciliatory attitude had neither appeased the Soviets\nnor convinced them of the sincerity of Anglo-American\nVJ-day, however, the U. S. S. R. began to pursue an\ndetermination to support effective international organ-\nincreasingly aggressive policy in her dealings with her\nization. The U. S. S. R. attempted to obtain decisions un-\nmajor Western allies. On the diplomatic level, this policy\nfavorable to Great Britain on the question of the presence\nwas evidenced by a seemingly endless series of disputes\nof British troops in Greece and Indonesia. Moreover, the\nover implementation of the agreements in principle con-\nU. S. S. R. vetoed both an Australian motion on Spain\ncluded among the U.S. S. R., the United States, and Great\nand a United States proposal for direct Anglo-French\nBritain at Yalta and Potsdam.\nnegotiation with the Levant States for the withdrawal\nThe Soviets succeeded in exacting concessions from\nof foreign troops-thus obstructing decisions acceptable\nGreat Britain and the United States considerably in ex-\nto the voting council majority in violation of the promise\ncess of the provisions of the Yalta Agreement. These\ngiven by the Big Five at San Francisco that the veto power\nconcessions dealt with : (1) reorganization of the Polish\nwould not be used.\nGovernment; (2) the rights of the peoples of liberated\nEurope to choose the form of government and the condi-\nMolotov's 27 May 1946 Statement\ntions under which they will live; and (3) the conditions\nunder which the U. S. S. R. was to invade Manchuria\nMore crucial were the problems that arose between the\nU. S. R. and the Western Powers at the Third Council\nto join the war against Japan. As for the Potsdam\nof Foreign Ministers which met in Paris on 25 April 1946\nAgreement, Soviet interpretation of the clause pertaining\nto prepare peace treaty drafts for presentation to a meet-\nto German external assets allowed the U. S. S. R. to re-\ning of all nations who participated in the war on the Allied\nmove industrial equipment and take over industrial\nside. The Council adjourned without having achieved\ninstallations in the Danubian countries without regard for\nany measure of agreement on any important points at\nthe economy of these countries. British and American\nissue. These points were summarized by Soviet Foreign\nattempts, on the other hand, to interpret liberally the\nMinister V. M. Molotov in a lengthly \"report to the people\"\nclauses in the Potsdam Agreement dealing with what\nappearing in Pravda on 27 May 1946.\nPowers should be signatories of the Balkan peace treaties\nItalian reparations, disposition of former Italian col-\nled to the breakdown of the First Council of Foreign\nonies, the Italo-Yugoslav frontier in Venezia Giulia, and\nMinisters in September 1945.\nthe disposition of Trieste, all were the subjects of fruit-\n62"
}