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DEFENSE POLICY
good. Continued activity of the Comintern abroad kept
expediency. The Soviets' behavior after mid-1939 temp-
distrust of the Soviet Union alive. Many influential
ered the West's confidence in the new ally ; and the Soviets,
people in the West feared ultimate Soviet and Communist
on their side, looked on the war-time association between
aggrandizement more than they did expansionist Germany
the United States-British Allies and themselves as a
and Japan and, on the other hand, Litvinov's plan of
temporary association born of necessity.
rapprochement with the West was accepted with reserva-
The Soviet Union was greatly weakened by the un-
tions by the Politburo. Soviet opinion saw Fascism more
precedented struggle in Eastern Europe, but her position
as an agent of the Powers that had carried out the inter-
on the Continent was vastly strengthened by the elimina-
vention in Russia in the Civil War than as a threat to
tion of Germany. Through the geographic course of the
those Powers. This view finally prevailed among the
war, her zone of influence moved forward through Central
Soviet leaders, and the fall of Austria and the Munich
Europe and the Balkans. England emerged from the
Agreement discredited Litvinov.
war impoverished and weakened, and public opinion in
the United States required some months to begin to ap-
Preparation for War
preciate the new continental imbalance in Eurasia and
realize American's role in the postwar world. Similarly
With the collapse of Litvinov's foreign policy, further
in the Far East, as a result of their three weeks' participa-
strengthening of the armed forces and of the economic
tion in the coup-de-grace stage of the Japanese war, the
base of military strength was pushed with all urgency.
Soviets regained most of what Russia had lost in 1905, and
Since 1932 the Army has been receiving new matériel, and
became the strongest continental Power in eastern Asia.
by 1938 it had grown from 560,000 to nearly 2,000,000.
These gains in Europe and the Far East the Soviets pro-
Territorial (or national guard) formations, which com-
ceeded to consolidate, and they essayed tentative direct or
prised 75 percent of the units of the Army in 1932, were,
indirect moves against Turkey, Iran, and Greece.
for the most part, absorbed into the Active Army, so that
Communist parties in countries overrun by the Axis and
by 1938 only 25 percent of the units were of this category.
in Axis countries emerged from the war with enhanced
The purges of 1937-38 temporarily weakened the officer
strength and prestige in most of the countries of Western
corps, but assured the Army's loyalty to the regime. The
Europe and Central Europe. These non-Russian Com-
industrial center of gravity of the country gradually was
munist parties are powerful and subservient allies of the
being moved east, to the Urals and beyond.
Soviet Union; but, except in the new Soviet sphere of
Late and half-hearted military negotiations with France
influence, they have not attempted to seize power in their
and England were broken off in August 1939 when the
own countries. They spread their influence through al-
Soviets acepted the Germans' offer for a non-aggression
liance with other Leftist parties in their countries, with
pact. Shortly after, a similar pact was signed with Japan.
a view to ultimate absorption of those parties.
The Soviets committed themselves to a hazardous tempo-
The immediate postwar policy of the Soviet Union soon
rizing policy with aggressive neighbors with whom there
was little chance of lasting peace, and the break between
became apparent-to exploit, as much as possible, con-
them and the West was complete. The tempo of military
fusion and goodwill in the West for expanding her for-
preparation increased, and in 1939 a gradual mobilization
ward areas, and to consolidate the extensive regions her
began. The Soviets began to build up a forward defensive
forces already had overrun. It must soon have become
area; eastern Poland, the Baltic States, and Bessarabia
apparent to the Soviet policy makers that their rough and
were occupied; and the war with Finland yielded strategic
somewhat uninhibited expansionism was dissipating what
areas in the defense scheme of the Soviet north.
good-will they had abroad, even including neighboring
The long war of mutual attrition in the West which the
regions which they controlled. In the new world balance
Soviets had counted on did not materialize; the brief cam-
of power, as the Soviets appear not to have realized fully,
paign in northern France in 1940 left the Germans as the
larger matters are at stake than the acquisition of a shallow
only other real military Power in Europe, and the Soviets
territorial forefield, effective chiefly in terms of ground
found themselves quite alone. They had gained almost
warfare. The Soviets are aware of the rapidly changing
two years' reprive from war, but it is doubtful that they
emphasis in strutegy which is growing out of new military-
were really comparatively better off when war reached
technical means. but they tend still to look on ground forces
them in June 1941.
as overwhelmingly the basic strategic arm.
World War II and Its Aftermath
Conclusions
Rapprochement between the Soviets and the other
In their present diplomacy in the United Nations and
Powers opposing the Axis began at once as a matter of
elsewhere, the Soviets are demonstrating that they are
RESTRICTED
69
743731°-47-6
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"ocrText": "RESTRICTED\nDEFENSE POLICY\ngood. Continued activity of the Comintern abroad kept\nexpediency. The Soviets' behavior after mid-1939 temp-\ndistrust of the Soviet Union alive. Many influential\nered the West's confidence in the new ally ; and the Soviets,\npeople in the West feared ultimate Soviet and Communist\non their side, looked on the war-time association between\naggrandizement more than they did expansionist Germany\nthe United States-British Allies and themselves as a\nand Japan and, on the other hand, Litvinov's plan of\ntemporary association born of necessity.\nrapprochement with the West was accepted with reserva-\nThe Soviet Union was greatly weakened by the un-\ntions by the Politburo. Soviet opinion saw Fascism more\nprecedented struggle in Eastern Europe, but her position\nas an agent of the Powers that had carried out the inter-\non the Continent was vastly strengthened by the elimina-\nvention in Russia in the Civil War than as a threat to\ntion of Germany. Through the geographic course of the\nthose Powers. This view finally prevailed among the\nwar, her zone of influence moved forward through Central\nSoviet leaders, and the fall of Austria and the Munich\nEurope and the Balkans. England emerged from the\nAgreement discredited Litvinov.\nwar impoverished and weakened, and public opinion in\nthe United States required some months to begin to ap-\nPreparation for War\npreciate the new continental imbalance in Eurasia and\nrealize American's role in the postwar world. Similarly\nWith the collapse of Litvinov's foreign policy, further\nin the Far East, as a result of their three weeks' participa-\nstrengthening of the armed forces and of the economic\ntion in the coup-de-grace stage of the Japanese war, the\nbase of military strength was pushed with all urgency.\nSoviets regained most of what Russia had lost in 1905, and\nSince 1932 the Army has been receiving new matériel, and\nbecame the strongest continental Power in eastern Asia.\nby 1938 it had grown from 560,000 to nearly 2,000,000.\nThese gains in Europe and the Far East the Soviets pro-\nTerritorial (or national guard) formations, which com-\nceeded to consolidate, and they essayed tentative direct or\nprised 75 percent of the units of the Army in 1932, were,\nindirect moves against Turkey, Iran, and Greece.\nfor the most part, absorbed into the Active Army, so that\nCommunist parties in countries overrun by the Axis and\nby 1938 only 25 percent of the units were of this category.\nin Axis countries emerged from the war with enhanced\nThe purges of 1937-38 temporarily weakened the officer\nstrength and prestige in most of the countries of Western\ncorps, but assured the Army's loyalty to the regime. The\nEurope and Central Europe. These non-Russian Com-\nindustrial center of gravity of the country gradually was\nmunist parties are powerful and subservient allies of the\nbeing moved east, to the Urals and beyond.\nSoviet Union; but, except in the new Soviet sphere of\nLate and half-hearted military negotiations with France\ninfluence, they have not attempted to seize power in their\nand England were broken off in August 1939 when the\nown countries. They spread their influence through al-\nSoviets acepted the Germans' offer for a non-aggression\nliance with other Leftist parties in their countries, with\npact. Shortly after, a similar pact was signed with Japan.\na view to ultimate absorption of those parties.\nThe Soviets committed themselves to a hazardous tempo-\nThe immediate postwar policy of the Soviet Union soon\nrizing policy with aggressive neighbors with whom there\nwas little chance of lasting peace, and the break between\nbecame apparent-to exploit, as much as possible, con-\nthem and the West was complete. The tempo of military\nfusion and goodwill in the West for expanding her for-\npreparation increased, and in 1939 a gradual mobilization\nward areas, and to consolidate the extensive regions her\nbegan. The Soviets began to build up a forward defensive\nforces already had overrun. It must soon have become\narea; eastern Poland, the Baltic States, and Bessarabia\napparent to the Soviet policy makers that their rough and\nwere occupied; and the war with Finland yielded strategic\nsomewhat uninhibited expansionism was dissipating what\nareas in the defense scheme of the Soviet north.\ngood-will they had abroad, even including neighboring\nThe long war of mutual attrition in the West which the\nregions which they controlled. In the new world balance\nSoviets had counted on did not materialize; the brief cam-\nof power, as the Soviets appear not to have realized fully,\npaign in northern France in 1940 left the Germans as the\nlarger matters are at stake than the acquisition of a shallow\nonly other real military Power in Europe, and the Soviets\nterritorial forefield, effective chiefly in terms of ground\nfound themselves quite alone. They had gained almost\nwarfare. The Soviets are aware of the rapidly changing\ntwo years' reprive from war, but it is doubtful that they\nemphasis in strutegy which is growing out of new military-\nwere really comparatively better off when war reached\ntechnical means. but they tend still to look on ground forces\nthem in June 1941.\nas overwhelmingly the basic strategic arm.\nWorld War II and Its Aftermath\nConclusions\nRapprochement between the Soviets and the other\nIn their present diplomacy in the United Nations and\nPowers opposing the Axis began at once as a matter of\nelsewhere, the Soviets are demonstrating that they are\nRESTRICTED\n69\n743731°-47-6"
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