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{
    "localId": "7788604",
    "label": "War Department Report, The Soviet Union",
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    "id": "7788604",
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    "contentType": "document",
    "title": "War Department Report, The Soviet Union",
    "citationUrl": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/7788604",
    "collections": [
        "President's Secretary's Files (Truman Administration)",
        "Subject Files"
    ],
    "subjects": [
        "Cold War",
        "International relations",
        "United States-Soviet relations"
    ],
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            "logicalDate": "1948-01-01",
            "year": 1948
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{
    "seq": 84,
    "pageIndex": 0,
    "type": "photo",
    "url": "https://s3.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/opastorage/live/4/7886/7788604/content/presidential-libraries/truman/602191/750715/hst-psf_750715_02-76.jpg",
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    "ocrText": "RESTRICTED\nAIR WARFARE\nsuch. Soviet \"long-range bombers\" were used, through\nstrictions on those responsible for the technical reconstruc-\nforce of circumstances, on tactical targets throughout\ntion of the fighting services. A high degree of care and\nWorld War II, leaving the strategic targets to the United\ndiscrimination necessarily will precede their decisions,\nStates and Great Britain. The Soviet operational bomber\nand in each case proposals will be scrutinized critically and\nforce of today is believed to be little different from that\nwill have to be justified. It is considered that the effect of\nwhich existed at the end of the war.\nthese conditions will be a marked trend in the direction of\nA major strategic consideration, in any Soviet evalua-\nqualitative improvement, accompanied by a corresponding\ntion, is that in any major war of the future, as in the\nsacrifice in numerical strength.\nconflict just concluded, the productive power of the poten-\ntial opponents may well be the bulwark of victory. The\nConclusions\nSoviet Union must have some means of striking at the\nopponent's industry before that industry can arm and\nIt was obvious upon the close of hostilities in 1945 that\nequip the air forces which will be necessary to destroy the\nthe massive numerical strength attained by the Soviet Air\nSoviet Union's ability to wage'war The strategic striking\nForce in the closing phase of World War II could not avoid\narm of the Soviet Air Force may be based on rockets and\ndrastic reductions in peacetime if it were to avoid obsoles-\natomic bombs, on a long-range heavy bomber force, or on\ncence. In the year and a half since VE-day the number of\nboth. In any event, a powerful offensive force will be\naircraft in operational units has declined considerably\ncreated.\nfrom the wartime level. In the interest of modernization\nTo a considerable degree, the Soviet Union has been\nand basic long-term planning it is foreseen that a further\ndrained of her resources and impoverished by the war.\nreduction in strength may occur as large scale overhaul,\nThe Soviet Union, however, possesses the capacity to per-\nre-equipping, and reorganization are continued. Soviet\nform radical and widespread reconstruction. Although,\nattention is believed to be focused, at present, on qualitative\nin a forecast of military policy there is frequently to be\nimprovements, entailing an extended and more thorough\nfound a too ready inclination to see the solution of all\ncourse of training for personnel, a limited and cautious\nproblems in a general and indiscriminate program of\npolicy of re-equipment, and a reinforcement and strength-\nexpansion, the Soviets' ability along this line must be con-\nening of the research and experimentation program. This\nsidered. Restricting this ability somewhat, on the other\nresearch program is supported by prominent technical per-\nhand, is the widespread human and material destruction\nsonnel from Germany, along with a considerable mass of\nwhich the war wrought in the U. S. S. R., creating a\nboth laboratory and manufacturing equipment and im-\nskilled-manpower problem, and imposing the severest re-\nportant documentary material.\n3\nRESTRICTED\n77"
}