Senate Report Number 140, ECA [Economic Cooperation Administration] and Strategic Materials - Report of the Joint Committee on Foreign Economic Cooperation Created Pursuant to Section 124 of Public Law 472, Eightieth Congress
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ECA AND STRATEGIC MATERIALS
ECA AND STRATEGIC MATERIALS
45
ration through storage, acquisition and stock piling of these materials prior to war
D. DEPLETION OF DOMESTIC RESERVES
will make available larger amounts of shipping space to move such commodities
as coffee, sugar, palm oil, cocoa beans, copra, and other important seasonal or
The domestic production of certain minerals and metals in this war has in-
perishable items. In particular, during the war, necessary heavy movements of
creased beyond all previous records, and our reserves have been depleted at an
coffee and sugar from the Caribbean area and South America have imposed ship-
alarming rate. The quantity of minerals produced in 1943 was 57 percent
ping shortages in these areas, necessitating a very great allocation of space for
greater than the output in 1918, and 23 percent above that in the boom year
strategic or critical materials.
1929. Unless new reserves are discovered, therefore, our country in the future
Obviously, the necessity for importing extraordinarily large tonnages of raw
will be even more dependent upon foreign sources than it has been in the past;
materials vital to the munitions program, under the most hazardous conditions,
and, to a large extent, stock-pile goals must therefore be raised. The continuance
imposes heavy responsibilities on the Navy in escorting such movements and, in
of the existing domestic program of exploration of natural resources is clearly
consequence, reduces the availability of fleet units for direct military operations.
imperative. In addition, the rapid depletion of our domestic reserves emphasizes
the extreme importance of developing a program for obtaining information on
the location and extent of world resources and for acquiring stock piles of raw
B. EXPANDED REQUIREMENTS IN WAR
materials in which this country is largely deficient.
Aside from shipping difficulties, the Nation has been faced with the problem
of obtaining sufficient supplies of imported raw materials from established sources.
E. GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS
Experience has proved that the mining and other production of raw materials
cannot, without many difficulties, be expanded to meet the rapidly increasing
manila fiber and quinine and other materials accumulated under the act of June
On account of the considerations discussed in the foregoing, the stock piles of 7,
demands of our own military services and those of our allies. Considerable time
is required to develop new sources of supply and to increase the production of
1939, and the stocks of crude rubber acquired by other arrangements, have proved
existing mines and smelters. In this war it has been necessary sometimes to
invaluable. Likewise, the early action of the Reconstruction Finance Corpora-
adopt extraordinary measures, such as the furloughing of soldiers for work in the
tion in procuring manganese and tin has been most helpful to the war programs.
mines, in order to increase the production of copper and zinc. It has further
We should also note that the initiative and patriotism of the manufacturers of the
Nation in building up their working stocks of needed materials before the war
proved necessary in some cases to establish costly incentives for vital materials
to insure production of adequate supplies thereof.
and in the early phase of the war alleviated the situation with respect to critical
The securing during wartime of safe margins of reserve stocks for wartime
use
materials. Nevertheless, it still proved necessary strictly to conserve existing Con-
of strategic or critical materials is a difficult undertaking, and is indeed impossible
stocks in order to meet military requirements and essential civilian needs.
in many cases. Such margins of reserves require procurement of these materials
servation in this war has necessitated drastic reduction in, or substitution of, less
in amounts substantially in excess of amounts required for current consumption.
desirable materials for materials normally used in our manufacturing processes.
Acquisition of supplies from foreign sources is hampered by rapidly rising prices,
The results, in some cases, were higher costs, higher replacement rates, and delays
increased shipping and insurance costs, and trade barriers. Furthermore, our
caused by altering industrial processes and rearranging facilities, as well as some have
enemies during a war are actively engaged in preclusive buying.
less desirable products for civilian consumption. Much effort and time could
been saved for other important tasks had a program been started well in advance
of the war to accumulate strategic raw materials and to plan for the expansion of
C. WARTIME EFFICIENCY
facilities for their production. Moreover, during the last two major conflicts, this
Adequate stock piles of strategic and critical materials at the outset of hostilities
terials in friendly countries. A different alinement of nations in a future war,
country has been fortunate in having access to large foreign sources of raw ma-
permit a more effective form of governmental control of supplies than would
otherwise be the ease. The materials can be more efficiently allocated to im-
involving enemy control of different geographic areas, might drastically curtail
portant needs, and available shipping space can be more effectively utilized to
the movements of such materials into the United States.
bring in those materials which must be imported. Stock piles would also tend
In concluding this discussion of the reasons for stock piling, we interpose a word of
to eliminate much of the confused competition among procurement and consuming
of caution as to the extent of reliance which is to be placed upon this means
agencies, both here and abroad, and the practice of hoarding which prevailed to
national security. We must not delude ourselves by adopting a Maginot-line
some degree in 1941 and 1942.
psychology by relying solely or too heavily on stock piling as a measure of na-
Acquisition prior to a war of materials of grades and qualities not economically
tional defense. Our strategy of national defense will be properly based upon
available in this country also makes possible the greater use during an emergency
many other considerations of which stock piling is one of the essential parts.
of certain lower-quality domestic materials which would otherwise not be usable
by our manufacturing industries, and which can be mixed or blended with the
high-grade materials from the stock pile.
Amother obvious advantage of prewar stock piling is a more efficient utiliza-
APPENDIX II
tion of labor and equipment. To the extent that adequate stock piles are main-
tained in this country, available labor and facilities can be used more effectively
MUNITIONS BOARD
for other purposes.
During this war many less desirable materials had to be substituted for materials
NATIONAL MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT
available elsewhere in the world, with the result that end products were often less
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.
useful or less convenient than would otherwise have been the case. We recognize,
however, that shortage of facilities and manpower have also contributed to our
Circular No. 53
September 23, 1948.
forced acceptance of less desirable products. We want to emphasize that the
ultimate goal of the Army and Navy Munitions Board is a sufficient supply of
CURRENT LIST OF STRATEGIC AND CRITICAL MATERIALS
materials so that this Nation, in event of a future emergency, can develop an
efficient military machine in the shortest period possible, and, at the same time,
(The following forms an inseparable part of
maintain a sound civilian economy. If the Congress deems it advisable to adopt
the strategic- and critical-materials list)
the program outlined herein, and if continuous efforts are made to adjust the
2. 1. The following definition of strategic and critical materials is issued, pursuant
MB Circular No. 46, dated August 27, 1948, is hereby rescinded.
program to changing circumstances and unforeseen developments, it is believed
that there will be less need to make use of substituted and more expensive materials
to Public Law 520, Seventy-ninth Congress, insofar as it refers to stock piling, and
in the event of a future war.
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