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Administration Review, Goals and Priorities - First Draft of December 1977 - Memo
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Administration Review, Goals and Priorities - First Draft of December 1977 - Memo
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Administration Review, Goals & Priorities-First Draft of December
1977 Memo
Folder Citation: Collection: Office of the Chief of Staff Files; Series:
Hamilton Jordan's Confidential Files; Folder: Administration Review,
Goals & Priorities-First Draft of December 1977 Memo; Container 33
To See Complete Finding Aid:
http://www.jimmycarterlibrary.gov/library/findingaids/Chief_of; St
aff.pdf
WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)
FORM OF
CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE
DATE
RESTRICTION
DOCUMENT
lemo
HJ to President Carter, 116 pp.
n.d.
A
Opened 1/20/93
FILE LOCATION
arter Presidential Papers, Staff Offices, CHief of Staff (Jordan), Confidential File
Administration Review, Goals & Priorities]--First Draft of December 1977 Memo
RESTRICTION CODES
(A) Closed by Executive Order 12356 governing access to national security information.
(B) Closed by statute or by the agency which originated the document.
(C) Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in the donor's deed of gift.
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
NA FORM 1429 (6-85)
CONTENTS
-Review of 1977
LACK COME. + EXPLANATION OF MGDIA x ACTUAL
X
-The Carter Administration and Congress COMPLETE
*
-The 1978 Congressional ElectionsCONPLETE
*
-Setting Priorities and the Decision-Making Process
F.P.
S.P.
cone.
X
The 1980 Presidential Campaign
k
-Maintaining a Political Base for Governing Effectively
Ce.
CONSTITUENT PLAN
DAC
-Summary
cork
E)
Summary s COLLEGAN in
I think that it is an instructive exercise to
review 1977 with a critical eye to identify our
weaknesses and mistakes.
REVIEW OF 1977
PAGE MILLION
INTRODUCTION
AND i + 27ᵗʰ &
It is possible for us to engage in the kind of
comprehensive planning for 1978 that we were unable
to do in 1977 for good and obvious reasons.
A year ago, we were all preoccupied with the
problems of transition, the organization of the
White House staff, the selection of your Cabinet
and numerous other decisions which dealt with
organizing and assuming the responsibilities and
powers of the Presidency.
I believe that we have all profited from the last
ten months and are wiser from our collective
experiences. We have also experienced some set-
backs and made mistakes which can be avoided
and should not be repeated.
I have attempted in this review to answer several
questions:
-What do the American people expect
from President Carter?
-How as President Carter perceived by
the American people in his first year
3
in office?
-How did President Carter actually
spend his time?
In answering these questions, I have compared
the foreign policy and domestic dimensions of
each subject. I did this for several reasons:
-Foreign policy and domestic issues bring
conflicting political pressures to bear
on a President.
-The foreign policy and domestic in-
stitutions of government compete
actively for the President's political
support.
-Foreign policy and domestic advisers
compete vigorously for the interest,
time and attention of the President.
-These conflicting political and in-
stitutional pressures must be
continually reconciled and do not lend
themselves to either long-range
planning or easy solutions.
THE EXPECTATIONS OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE
As a beginning, it is a worthwhile exercise to
examine and understand the reasons for your
election as President. Certainly, your moral
and political right to lead this country is an-
chored in the collective hopes and desires of the
American people.
Why then was Jimmy Carter elected President of
the United States? What do the American people
expect of this particular President? It is cert-
ainly reasonable to expect that the American
people will continually measure your performance
as President against their collective expectations.
To develop a bnechmark against which we can
measure our progress and failures, I have re-
viewed the post-general election survey of the
American people conducted for us by Pat Caddell
and Cambridge Survey Research. The persons in-
terviewed were asked to state what four things
they thought President-elect Carter should do as
President. The graph that follows is stated in
terms of what per cent of those persons inter-
viewed thought that each topic was one of the
four most important matters and/or problems de-
serving Presidential attention and action.
In January 1977, the American people were asked to list their top four
areas of concern for President Carter to work on - their response:*
Jobs/Unemployment
78%
Tax Reform
52%
Stimulate Business & Economy
50%
Welfare System Reform
44%
New Energy Policy
44%
Restore Trust in Govt.
38%
Fight Crime
22%
Reduce Defense Budget
18%
Health Care
16%
Reorganize Fed. Govt.
14%
Reshape Foreign Policy
14%
Domestic
Problems of Cities
13%
Reduce Nuclear Proliferation
Foreign
12%
Race Relations
11%
*Source: Cambridge Survey Research. January, 1977 Survey
Sone observations
1.00
The med is studios point at to diffe 10th $
tan sustand public what
a ISSUE 61 program
Only two donestic issues - energy. ad
the economy - received major, sustand
mens coverage over the 10 month period
study. TL energy issue received Give
this as much coverage as the economy. And,
to some extent, the coverage 8 the economy
is automatic as stock market reports
and maths indications dictate that-
carta and of attention will be revested
to th is topic every moth by the medic
Connersely some donestic which are
high priontial 8 this Admistration received
specific al/n slight coverage.
Revised and The budget -two issues which
you are exclusive idexifier with as a
result of your copy promizer, did not
receive the man counge they deserved.
Insequently if you asked +4 America page
todg. "Has J.C. me mere 70 Nersing
the Far sont. and below to ?: +
would suspet they would rapod mojating
because they here not sea or been
tool of an activit is.
The conclusions that can be drawn from this
analysis are obvious and not surprising:
1. The American people continue to show that
their major personal concerns are economic -
jobs, unemployment, inflation and the general
condition of the economy.
2. Foreign policy issues have a secondary pol-
itical impact on the voting attitudes of the
American people. In this particular survey,
the broad topic of "domestic issues" was ascribed
a value of approximately 80% and the broad topic
of "foreign policy issues" was ascribed a value
of about 20%.
Another comment a LaL welfore
None and social count Both ws
generatedconsiderable generated considerable at the the
our programs was amoried only
to napiday fede from the ass
consciousness of the Areric public
High visits
Histly visible dramatic components
a programs might 514 particular
intiative -god sand-qf.
b at it will artaing require a
sustem public effort to build understand
and political support.
As netes to UP issues, the malic
analysis indicates That three
issues - the midocot, SALT/2 Soriets
and +L. Power Card - received
significal
sustand coverage for the period studed.
Human nists - which you home described
repeatedly - or TU "besis for on
contry's 100y policy - received a
significat amount of coung - +6 eas
months of the Administration Los
has diminished stockly ever shice
This certainly inplies a reduction
of Administration interest - this wish
It is also interesting to noto the
major sustained coverage of
the PC. tracties. This is due -
pat to the contraving sound of this
issue but also is a result of me islue
prr activities activities and owner political and Pr.
THE PERCEPTIONS OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE
Introduction
Studies have shown that the news media is the dom-
inant force in shaping the attitudes and percept-
ions of the American people about political figures,
issues, and news events.
The President of the United States is able to dom-
inate the American news media in a way that is im-
possible for political leaders at other levels of
our political system. I would contend that the
American people develop a tolerance - if not an
immunity - to what their President says. There
is a consious or subconscious expectation and
Im summary the madia survey leastrated
several this:
acceptance of the fact that something the Pres-
ident says or does will be in the newspaper almost
every day and on the evening news.
This presents interesting problems and oppor-
tunities for us which should be analyzed in terms
of the goals and objectives of your Presidency.
A good start is a detailed analysis of the media
coverage given your Presidency in the first
ten months you were in office.
Methodology
As was previously stated, the dominant force in
shaping American public opinion is the news media.
Studies have shown that the evening network news pro-
grams are the single dominant force in the per-
ceptions of the American people about their poli-
Summary
{
1. Although argument could be made
2
that 8 are spending excessive amounts
of time on foreign Policy, you will have
to make that determination yourself.
I would argus that the amount
the months left. on ress time then be
of time spent on for policy in the last
meodofto doal with domestic issuer and
maintain an effections political base,
P. And while no one would export the
to the spart on donostic issues
and foreign policy to musion the expertations
of the America pape donastic/80% VI.
600 gm g according - to to Cablet
survey) it is not unreasonse 6 us
to a conscious effort to
be move visible
on donostic issues or less visible on 606g
polig issues.
If we fail to maintain an effective political
bese, will lack TL contring support.
we mad we on the mumerous 6.00 intiations
of your Adm.
tical leaders. It is estimated that the three
evening network news programs - ABC, CBS and NBC -
have a combined national viewing audience of ap-
proximately ? million viewers.
Consequently, to measure how the first year of
your Presidency was perceived by the American
people vis-a-vis the news media, we have conducted
a detailed analysis which uses the network news
programs as the basis for the study.
As you know, each day the Press Office prepares
a "Daily News Summary" based on an analysis of
the network news programs, wire stories and news-
paper editorial comment. In their analysis, they
measure very precisely (to the second) how much
time each story was allotted on the news program.
As the basis for my study, we have done the fol-
lowing:
*
-Broken the news stories from the network
evening news into simple catagories by issue
or topic.
-Calculated for the month and the year how
much time cumulatively was devoted to each
issue and/or topic by the three networks.
-Using these catagories and totals, it is
possible to make some judgements about the
interaction between the news media and your
Presidency.
The single criteria in this study for a news
story to be included in this analysis is what
I call "Presidential involvement". This means
that if a news story contained the comments that,
"The President said today that
" or, "It
was learned today that PResident Carter plans to
send the Congress a message
" or, "Carter
reacted today to reports that
"
My point here is that the controlling factor in
determining whether or not a story was included
in this analysis was the mention of the President's
*
name in connection with an event, a story, a
program or an issue.
And although this is certainly not an exact or
perfect measure of the perceptions of the Amer-
ican people, I would contend that it is less ar-
bitrary than other methods which might be used.
EXPLANATION OF CHARTS IN MEDIA STUDY
The charts which follow deserve some comment and
explanation; and are preceded by a general
listing of the issues which comprised three
broad categories: "Foreign Policy/Defense,"
"Domestic Goals and Programs," and "Other." "
-The first two charts in this section
measure the amount of time devoted to
domestic issues cumulatively and by
month.
-The second group of charts in this section
measures the amount of time devoted to
foreign policy issues cumulatively and
by month.
-The summary chart compares the cumulative
time spent on foreign and domestic issues.
LISTING OF ISSUES IN MEDIA SURVEY BY CATEGORY
FOREIGN POLICY/NATIONAL SECURITY
Arab boycott
Pipeline
Arms sales
SALT
B-1 bomber
South Africa
CIA payment
Trade issues/shoe imports/
textiles *
China
Travel - foreign
Concorde *
Uganda
Cruise missile
Uruguay
Cuba
USSR
Foreign visitors
Vietnam
Human rights/SAkharov
Zaire
Illegal aliens *
Korea/Singlaub/Copter down
Latin America
Mideast
Northern Ireland
NATO
Neutron bomb
Nuclear test ban
Panama Canal treaties
*
covered in both domestic and foreign policy issues
LISTING OF ISSUES IN MEDIA SURVEY BY CATEGORY
DOMESTIC ISSUES
Abortion
Labor law reform
Airline deregulation
Minimum wage
Bakke case
Marijuana decriminalization
Blacks/minorities
Mass transit
Breeder reactor
No-fault insurance
Budget
Oil tanker standards
Cargo preference
Pipeline *
Concorde *
Reorganization/staff
reduction
Congressional relations
Retirement - mandatory
Consumer agency
Social security
Disaster relief
Steel prices
Education/busing
Stripmining
Economy/$50 rebate
Tax reform
Election law reform
Trade issues/shoe imports/
Energy
textiles *
Environment
Travel - domestic
ERA
Urban policy
Ethics
Veterans/draft
Farm bill/policy
Water projects/draught
Food stamps
Welfare reform
Hospital cost-containment
Wiretapping/bugging
Illegal aliens *
Jobs bill/unemployment
*covered in both domestic and foreign policy issues
LISTING OF ISSUES IN MEDIA SURVEY BY CATEGORY
MISCELLANEOUS
Major Appointments
Democrat/Campaigning
Ford and Carter
Carter Inauguration
Lance
Liddy
V.P. Mondale
Style (personal/family/vacations)
Andrew Young
353
Domestic Issues As Reported By The National Media*
Domestic Priorities
of the Carter Administration
70
Other Reported Issues/Topics
38
27 27 23
22
21
17
19
19
23
25
29
15
15
16
5.5
Economy
Reform
Budget Social Security
Blacks/ Minorities Breederrgo Reactor
Farm Hospitalic Costs Policy
Travel Labor Reform Urban
Policyeransiects
Water
"Cumulative minutes of coverage of three major network news programs.
From detailed analysis Jan.-Oct. 1977.
Domestic Priorities of the Carter Administration*
Energy
Economy
Reorganization
100
40
40
80
20
20
60
0
0
(Minutes of Coverage)
FMAMJJASO
FMAMJJASO
Social Security
Welfare Reform
Budget
40
40
40
40
20
21
20
20
20
0
0
0
0
FMAMJJASO
FMAMJJASO
FMAMJJASO
FMAMJJASO
*Detailed monthly analysis of network evening news (Jan - Oct 1977)
Foreign Policy Issues As Reported By The National Media*
440
IS
2
3
S
6
222
Foreign Policy Priorities
of the Carter Administration
/ 63
106
Other Reported Items
73
63
51
48
33
38
24
31
30
15
15
Human Rights
Mideast Panama Canal /Soviets South Africa
B. B.1 Bomber
Foreign Cuba Visitors
Korea Neutron Nuclear Bomb Test Foreign Ban Travel Viefnam
"Cumulative minutes of coverage of three major network news programs.
From detailed analysis Jan.-Oct. 1977.
Foreign Policy Priorities of the Carter Administration*
Panama Canal
SALT/Soviets
40
40
Mideast
80
20
20
60
(Minutes of Coverage)
FMAMJJASO
FMAMJJASO
40
Human Rights
South Africa
40
40
20
20
20
FMAMJJASO
FMAMJJASO
FMAMJJASO
* Detailed monthly analysis of network evening news (Jan - Oct 1977)
How President Carter Spent His Time (Jan 77-Oct 77)
As Reported by the Media*
Other
323 min.
15.4%
Domestic Goals
926 minutes
& Programs
44.3%
842 minutes
40.3%
Foreign Policy-
National Defense
*Detailed analysis of network evening news (Jan - Oct 1977)
HOW THE PRESIDENT SPENT HIS TIME
You can certainly make a valid argument that the
President's priorities are generally reflected
by the way he spends his time.
With the help of Tim Kraft's office, we have
conducted a very extensive and detailed study of
how you spent your time in the first ten months
of 1977.
The details of this study will be presented to you
later in the month in a comprehensive report, but the
following chart takes the major components of that
report and measures the comparable amount of time
you spent on foreign and domestic issues.
Summary of Presidential Meetings, Jan-Oct 1977
Domestic/Political*
hours
Members of Congress
162
Govenors, Mayors & Local Officials
21
Other Political Leaders
18
Special Interest Groups
35
(includes Labor, Blacks, Hispanics, Women, Consumers,
Environmentalists, Ethnic Groups, etc)
236
Foreign Policy/Defense**
Foreign Heads of State (received in U.S.)
141
Meetings with Heads of State Abroad (London)
40
Other Foreign Officials
54
Separate & Group Meetings with Vance,
Brzezinski, & Brown on Foreign Policy/
Defense Matters
156
391
*
Excludes daily Brzezinski briefings and meetings with NSC staff on Foreign Policy matters
Excludes private meetings with White House Staff on domestic issues
Disclaimer - "Presidential Meetings" Chart
It is difficult - if not impossible - to meas-
ure precisely the amount of time spent on foreign
and domestic issues. It is important, however,
that I point out one discrepancy in this analysis
that could not be avoided because it was imposs-
ible to get the information for several more weeks.
In the "Foreign Policy/Defense" portion of the
chart, you will see the catagory "Separate and
Group Meetings with Vance, Brzezinski, and Brown
on Foreign Policy/Defense Matters". In the
"Domestic/Political" section of the chart you
will not find a comparable component which meas-
ures the amount of time that you spent in meet-
ings with domestic members of your Cabinet.
It was not possible for me to obtain this inform-
ation from the Scheduling Office for several more
weeks
However, I would still contend that the general
time comparison presented in this chart is valid*
(62% of your time spent on foreign policy/defense
matters and 38% of your time on domestic issues)
The fact that we do not have included in this
chart the amount of time you spent with domestic
members of your Cabinet on issues is offset by:
-A good portion of time spent with members of
Congress was on foreign policy issues.
-A portion of your time with special interests
groups was on foreign policy issues.
-In terms of your private time for reading,
study and preparation, more of your time is
spent on foreign policy than domestic issues.
*The archivist who accounts for your time and pro-
vided me this information supports my argument
that the 62%-38% figure is accurate.
In support of my contention, let's consider the
amount of time that is actually required for an
official State Visit.
In addition to the "actual scheduled time" which
appears on your offical schedule, there is:
-Preparation time which requires reviewing
the Briefing Book, determining what you will
say at the Welcoming Ceremony and at the
State Dinner.
-Bilaterals usually go longer than scheduled.
-Private time after the State Dinner that you
spend with almost every important visitor.
I believe that you will find the following chart
interesting. It shows the extraordinary emphasis
that you have placed on building relationships
with other nations. It also shows that an enorm-
ous amount of your time was spent in this effort.
Meetings between US Presidents and
Foreign Chiefs of State/Heads of Government
- in first year of office
*
68
43
43
32
21
John F.
Lyndon B.
Richard M.
Gerald R.
Jimmy Carter
Kennedy
Johnson
Nixon
Ford
*
If scheduled foreign trip takes place this year,
this number will increase to 71.
SUMMARY
I have attempted in this section to measure
the following things:
-What the American people expect President
Carter to work on and/or accomplish.
-What President Carter was perceived as work-
ing on.
-How President Carter actually spent his time.
These three dimensions are measured and recon-
ciled in the following chart. And although my
methods are not exact and somewhat arbitrary, I
believe the conclusions are sound.
The American People
What they expected of
President Carter
How President Carter
actually spent his time
How they perceive
President Carter
Domestic Issues
Foreign Policy/
Defense
Cambridge Survey
% of Media Coverage
% of Meeting Time
THE CARTER ADMINISTRATION AND THE CONGRESS
It is important that we understand and appreciate
the critical role that the Democratic leadership
and the Democratic members of Congress have played
in our legislative progress this year.
Although party discipline in the Congress is not
rigid (some would say not effective), we are the
benficiaries of partisan feelings that do exist
and are evident.
With the help of Frank Moore's staff, I have
attempted to measure and present the degree of
support for key Administration issues by party
in the following chart.
Congressional Support for Administration Priorities, by Party *
House of Representatives
289
146
68.2%
Senate
62
38
27.1%
72.9%
44.2%
Democrats Republicans
Democrats Republicans
* Based on 34 key votes in House, and 26 key votes in Senate as determined by Congressional Relations Staff
We have also analyzed and tried to demonstrate
not only the high proportion of Democratic support
for key Administration bills but also our slight
margin of victory in passing these measures.
We have chosen votes in both houses that
are key Administration measures to demonstrate
the party alignments this year that have
been typical.
Close votes in Congress on key issues
289
HOUSE
Motion to kill Energy Bill
Administration position won 219 # 203
146
216
(75%)
289
3
Democrats Republicans
Coal Conversion
146
Administration position won 221 - 198
212
(74%)
9
289
Democrats Republicans
Natural Gas De-regulation
146
Administration position won 227 - 199
210
(73%
289
17
Democrats Republicans
$1.4 billion for construction of five
146
B-1 bombers
183
Administration position won 204 - 194
(63%)
21
Democrats Republicans
Close Votes in Congress on Key Issues
SENATE
62
38
Motion to table Pearson/Bentsen Amendment
43
(de-regulation)
(69%)
7
Administration position won 50-46
62
38
Social Security Financing
40
Administration position won 42-41
(65%
2
(with VP breaking tie)
62
38
Presidential Pardon of Draft Resisters
35
Administration position won 48-46
57%)
13
Democrats Republicans
CONCLUSIONS
It becomes apparent from this analysis that the
Carter Administration is the chief beneficiary
of the heavy Democratic majorities in the Con-
gress, and that we also benefit from the parti-
san attitudes that develop on specific programs
and goals of this Administration.
This has several clear implications:
1. We should be very active and very visible
in the 1978 elections. More on this in the
next section of this memorandum, but heavy Demo-
cratic losses in either house of the Congress
will seriously jeopardize our chances of pass-
ing progressive legislation (welfare reform,
tax reform, national health insurance, etc.) in
1979 and 1980.
2. To the extent that your actions as Presi-
dent - substantively and symbolically - are
those expected of a Democratic President, it
will help us tremendously among Democrats, the
traditional Democratic consitutuencies and par-
ticularly with the Democartic members of Con-
gress.
For example, rightly or wrongly, Dr. Burns rep-
resents symbolically traditional Republican
philosophy. To most Democrats, he represents
the flawed economic policies of the last eight
years, a lack of concern for the disadvantaged
*
and a strong bias for big business. I don't
think that this perception is fair or complete-
ly accurate, but it is the way that Dr. Burns
is perceived by the people who elected you.
My argument to you in simple: Without aband-
oning your conservative fiscal approach, you
will be a stronger and more effective President
politically if your actions are those expected
of a Democratic President.
s'
i of 3
AMERICAN DEALING ASSASSINATION To FOUND POLSON PLOT
DAY /
E of SIZES t TOTAL the
MARI R 2nd * * SUANA FRA COL. FRANK WRITER NK LULS T.I
ARRIV
AL
HELICOPTER
TAKEN P HOUSE
STATE required
DRINKS/SOME CONVERSATION
of
CABRIEL'S NOUSE
AMBACSADOR'S RESIDENCE
LATE NIGHT DIZINK
DAY 2
& RE, PARTY Y. 8
ARMES MET
GOT UP EARLY- AWOKEYED BY TORRIJOS
SAUWAISWIM
WITNESS AT CIVIL coethony of DAUGHTER
NOT
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GIVE DAUGHTER AWAY / IGNORDO HIM/ABUSOS Him
OTHER NOME/SON-OMAR| minimum SECURITY
DROVE AROUNO/TORRSOS mercodes/ HE DROVE
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LORK THEME
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LUNCH WITH COLOWELS I COOD DROMI RESPECT
PAUS MORE ATTENTION To ENLISTED mov THAN OFFICIS
SPECIAL FORCE
KEEPS COLONEL SEPARATE, REPORTING TO HIM
BACK TO AMBAYADON'S HOME / CONVERSATION
CANAL ZONE GOVERNOR / PARFAIT/ OUTHINED w CONCORNOO
maJoR GENERAL ENGINEDLI
NL by E u/s/ i OF THE S y JOSE THIS of THE the
MARCH MONDAY
AMERICAN EMBASSY / TORRIJOS WITHSEWATORS
MIDNIGHT NAP TO CONTADOR - BLAND PURCHASED 134 GABRIEL
miaming
LEWIS
1255 ss
49 CT.
PORTUGAL
DAY 3
BREAKFAST TOGETHER
PLAYED TENNIS/ HUMIDITY UNBELIDABLE/EWD OK RAIHY SEASON
TRIP AROUND ISLAND
CARLOS PEREIRA MANUE
LUNCH
De
GENERAL CALLOD
FLEW TO FARALLON MILITARY LEST or PANAMA CITY
PRIVATE TALK WITH TORRIJOS
/ NOUR
PRIVATE DOCUALVIN
PLAN To
DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
BY
PER 1/11/93 yes NSc Hr RE MR-MLC-42-10
NARS. DATE 1/20/93
THE 1978 CONGRESSIONAL ELECTIONS
The 1978 Congressional elections are important
to your Administration and to your Presidency for
two reasons:
1.
The real damage to our policies and programs.
If we suffer Congressional losses of the mag-
nitude that have been predicted by some of
the knowledgeable Democratic observers, we
would lack the margins to pass many of our
controversial programs through either house
of the Congress.
NOT INTERESTED 100 MANAGEMENT of COUNTRY
LIKES TO VISIT AROUND COUNTRY, MILITARY,
DRINK - scren.
INTENSTY OR COUNTY To HIM AMONG MINISTDLS/
NOT INTOW TOO IN DAY-TO-DAY DAY -To- DAY MANAGEMENT OR
HIS COUNTRY BUT NOT IN A POLITICAL SITUATION
WHICH WILL ALLOW FOR Him TO DO OTHERWISE
IF WE CAIN RATIFICATION, MY CUBS would 15 THAT
HE WILL MAKE SOME CHANGES IN MILITARY,
AWD RUN for PRESIDENT
some AROUND HIM GET FRUSTRATED WITH LIFESTMLE
DECLASSIFIED
PER 1/11/93 NSC HCRE MK-01C-92-10
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
BY Or NARS, DATE 1/20/93
2.
The perceived political damage which will
be attached by the press and political
critics to the President if we suffer large
Congressional losses. The result will be
2
that we are held politically accountable for
our losses in 1978 and given very little
credit for the successes.
It is worthwhile first to understand the recent
history of the Congressional losses suffered by
the party in power in the off-year elections.
The following chart illustrates this history.
$ 250.000 oor CASH / ARIAS WILL COME TO Power IN
2
EXCHANGE FOR CAMBUNC CASINO
SCIAR 1
?
?
?
?
?
DECLASSIFIED
1/14/83 HSC HVRE MR NE -92-10
E.O. 12356. Sec. 3.4
PER BV Jef NARS, DATE 1/20/93
Congressional Losses to Party in the White House
in Off-Year Elections
TRUMAN
EISENHOWER
EISENHOWER
KENNEDY
JOHNSON
NIXON
FORD
1950
1954
1958
1962
1966
1970
1974
2
1
1
1
5
5
5
12
13
18
29
House Senate
47
48
48
Since the 1950 elections, the party in power has
experienced consistent losses in the House of
Representatives and in the Senate, the only ex-
ceptions being the slight Senate gains in 1962
and 1970.
The losses in the Senate appear less dramatic due
to the fact that only thirty-three seats are up
every two years.
Because the present Democratic majorities in
both houses of Congress are so heavy, an
argument could be made that an active President
confronting controversial issues must expect
Congressional losses in the off-year election
at least as great as the historical average -
thirty (30) House seats and three (3) Senate
seats.
The Democratic leadership in the Congress and
the leadership of the Congressional Campaign Com-
mittees which monitor these races closely expect
us to do worse than the historical average. If
this proves true, we will find ourselves polit-
ically handicapped during 1979 and 1980 as we try
to pass progressive legislation through the Con-
gress.
Our Role in the 1978 Congressional Campaigns
You have already made a commitment to the lead-
ership of the House and the Senate that you will
be active in the 1978 Congressional campaigns.
Our collective help can and should take many forms,
including:
-Presidential campaigning
-Vice-Presidential campaigning
-Spouses and families of President and Vice-
President campaigning
-Cabinet members campaigning
-White House staff campaigning
-Direct financial assistance from DNC
-Technical assistance from DNC on campaign
management, polling, issue analysis and fund-
raising
As a practical matter, it will be impossible for
you to campaign in the marginal House seats as there
are so many involved. We can have Administration
officials at the Cabinet and sub-cabinet level rep-
resent us in many of the House races.
My own recommendation would be that you and the
Vice-President focus almost exclusively (with some
exceptions) on the Senate races for several reasons:
-The marginal Senate seats are a manageable
numbers of races that you and the Vice-President
can concentrate on and have a great impact on.
-While campaigning in key Senate races, you will
be helping the entire ticket, including the
House members. Also, in choosing where we go
in a particular state to assist the Senate cand-
idate, we can be sensitive to marginal House
races in that same state.
-We have been stronger politically in the House
this year than in the Senate as is witnessed by
the legislative successes we have had in both
bodies. We need to minimize our losses and/or
make gains in both Houses of Congress, but this
is particularly true of the Senate.
Assessment of the Senate Races
With the assistance of the Vice-President's staff
and Frank Moore, I have conducted a political survey
of the Senate seats that are up in 1978.
To begin with, it is important for us to analyze
not only who is up, but what their record of support
for key Administration measures has been. This is
illustrated on the following chart.
DEGREE OF SUPPORT FOR KEY ADMINISTRATION ISSUES
AMONG SENATORS UP FOR RE-ELECTION IN 1978*
Clark, lowa
Democrat
92.0%
Pearson, Kansas
Republican
60.9%
Biden, Delaware
Democrat
91.3
Eastland, Mississippi
Democrat
59.1
Anderson, Minnesota
Democrat
87.5
Johnston, Louisiana
Democrat
59.1
Pell, Rhode Island
Democrat
87.0
Nunn, Georgia
Democrat
57.7
Haskell, Colorado
Democrat
85.0
Baker, Tennessee
Republican
50.0
McIntyre, New Hampshire
Democrat
82.6
Griffin, Michigan
Republican
47.6
Hathaway, Maine
Democrat
79.2
Thurmond, South Carolina
Republican
45.8
Abourezk, South Dakota
Democrat
78.9
Domenici, New Mexico
Republican
42.3
Sparkman, Alabama
Democrat
78.9
McClure, Idaho
Republican
39.1
Metcalfe, Montana
Democrat
78.3
Stevens, Alaska
Republican
36.4
Randolph, West Virginia
Democrat
74.1
Curtis, Nebraska
Republican
33.3
Hatfield, Oregon
Republican
72.7
Helms, North Carolina
Republican
33.3
Huddleston, Kentucky
Democrat
69.2
Hansen, Wyoming
Republican
29.6
Percy, Illinois
Republican
68.2
Scott, Virginia
Republican
23.1
Case, New Jersey
Republican
64.0
Bartlett, Oklahoma
Republican
21.1
Brooke, Massachusetts
Republican
64.0
Tower, Texas
Republican
16.7
McClellan, Arkansas
Democrat
62.5
Based on analysis by Congressional Relations Staff on 26 key issues.
Several observations on this chart:
-All the Democratic Senators up for re-election
in 1978 have at least a 50% rating of support
for key Administration issues.
-Most of the Republican Senators who are up for
re-election this year who have supported us
more than 50% of the time are considered "safe".
The exception is Case who will have good Demo-
cratic opposition.
-The group of Senators who receive the highest
rating from our analysis are without except-
ion the moderate and liberal members of the
Senate.
-This same group of Senators are the ones who
face the greatest amount of opposition in 1978.
Anderson, Pell, Haskell, McIntyre and Hathaway
all have very difficult races. Clark would have
had a tough race if Governor Ray had decided to
oppose him.
-Conversely, the Democratic Senators who have
shown the least support for our legislative
initiatives are the ones who are considered
"safe" in terms of their re-election campaigns.
Eastland, Johnston, Nunn and Huddleston fall
into this catagory.
-There are as many opportunities to pick up
Republican seats as there are opportunities
to lose Democratic seats.
With the help of Frank Moore, the Vice-President's
staff and friends on the Hill, we have made a
joint assessment of the Senate seats up in 1978.
The chart which follows is an attempt to present
the best current thinking as to what will happen
in each state. The focus of this analysis is
whether or not the seat will go Democratic or
Republican. The focus is on the seat, not the pol-
itical personalities involved.
For example, in spite of Senator McClellan's
recent death, there is a feeling that the Demo-
cratic nominee will win that seat because Arkansas
is a Democratic state and there are a number of
good potential candidates for his seat. Conse-
quently, for the purpose of this analysis, we put
Arkansas in a "leaning Democratic" column.
105
90
75
POLITICAL ANALYSIS OF SENATE SEATS - 1978
WASHINGTON
MONTANA
MAINE
45
Glympts
78
NORTH DAKOTA
Lake
79
MINNESOTA
Superior
Neiena,
88
83
5
39
Brimarch
73
MICHIGAN
7
Montpelist
SOUTH DAKOTA
WISCONSIN
Buron
WYOMING
79
Tuke
30
St.Paul
Michigan
48
NEW YORK
Albany
MASS PS 64
PACIFICE
CALIFORNIA
Phire
NEVADA
Wadrien
IOWA
Luke
Langing
Ene
PENNSYLVANIA
87
UTAH
NEBRASKA
z
OCEAN
92
33
Trenton
Chayanne
68
INDIANA
OHIO
DesMoiners
Harrisburg
64
Sacramento
Carson City
Salllano
City
COLORADO
MD
Lincoln
indianapolity
Columbus
85
MISSOURI
Denver
KANSAS
VIRGINIA
TATLANTIC
61
23
Topoka
Richmond
latterson City
OCEAN
ARIZONA
69
NEW MEXICO
NORTH CAROLINA Raisigh
OKLAHOMA
33
42
TEXAS
21
ARKANSAS
50
Oklahoma City
62
CAROLINA
17
Columbia ,
Photnis
Due Reck
46
30
30
59
FLORIDA
120
MEXICO
Tallahassee
ARCTIC
OCEAN
U.S.S.R.
M
105
160
5
CANADA
OF
MEXICO
GULF
ISLANDS
BERING
36
P
Honglulu
60
HAWAII
SAFE
SAFE
7
(principal Islands)
DEMOCRATIC
TOSS-UP
REPUBLICAN
sunsay
20
5
PACIFIC OCEAN
LEANING
LEANING
DEMOCRATIC
REPUBLICAN
0
MILES
600
o
MILES
150
Figures represent % of support to Administration on 26 key issues by incumbent Senators.
IRO
PACIFIC OCEAN
150
160
155
55308 3.67
Early Campaign Trips
I believe that there are very good reasons for
your taking two campaign trips in the first few
months of the year.
Trip I would take you to Delaware for Biden,
Maine for Hathaway, New Hampshire for McIntyre,
and Rhode Island for Pell.
Trip II would take you to Minnesota for Anderson,
Colorado for Haskell and Iowa for Clarke.
The advantages of your taking these specific
trips are:
1. It will be clear signal to other Democrats
that you are going to be active on behalf of
the party and its candidates.
2. This particular group of Senators are all
in trouble and your early and active help will
indicate to the Congress that we do not forget
our friends and are not reluctant to campaign for
Senators in tough races.
3. As was demonstrated earlier, this same group
of Senators have supported the Administration on
key issues more than 80% of the time. These seven
Senators are the top seven in terms of their
support on key votes.
4. You will have to campaign for this same group
some time during the year. If you do it early and
get it out of the way, then you will be able to
Recommended Early
Presidential Campaign Trips, 1978
WASH.
MAINE
MONT.
N. DAK.
VT.
MINN.
OREG.
IDAHO
WIS.
N.Y.
S. DAK.
CONN
21
MICH
WYO
PA.
IOWA
NEBR.
DEL
NEV.
UTAH
W.VA
CALIF.
COLO
VA.
KANS.
MO.
KY.
N.C.
TENN.
OKLA,
ARIZ.
ARK.
S.C.
N. MEX
GA.
ALA,
MISS.
TEX
LA.
FLA.
spend time later in the year helping Democratic
challengers (like Ravenal in South Carolina)
to Republican incumbents who will not be nominated
until late in the Spring or the Summer.
5. Reports of the help you are able to give
these Senators will get back to the Hill and will
help to counter the rhetoric that "Carter is go-
ing to be a liability" and "Carter has no coattails.
CONCLUSIONS
You have already made a strong commitment to
be active in the 1978 Congressional elections.
In terms of other things which need to be de-
cided soon and/or done, I have two recommenda-
tions:
First, that you take the two early trips
I suggested during the first several
months of the year, February, March or
April.
Second, that you reinforce with the Cabinet
directly the political mechanism for
their appearances on behalf of members
of Congress. Frank Moore's office is
set up to clear Cabinet appearances to
avoid having us campaign for people who
have not supported us or turn down in-
vitations from people who have supported us.
SETTING PRIORITIES AND THE DECISION-MAKING PROCESS
Introduction
I don't think that anyone in your Cabinet or
on the White House staff has any serious object-
ions to the quality of your decisions as Pres-
ident or major criticism of the processes used
to make these decisions. I do think that we
have not dealt adequately with the continuing
relationship of foreign policy decisions to the
domestic political situation. An analysis
of the foreign policy decision-making process
is presented for your review and consideration.
Secondly, I have tried to present what I be-
lieve to be a simple and very practical system
for setting priorities and goals for this Ad-
ministration. Building on the excellent work
done by the Vice-President in preparing for
1978, I believe that the system presented here
will be a useful tool.
And finally, I have presented an example of the
kind of comprehensive policy/political planning
which should be an integral part of this process.
DELETE
SETTING PRIORITIES FOR THE CARTER ADMINISTRATION
It is my strong contention that we cannot expect
the American people to understand the purpose of
your Presidency if the leadership of your Adminis-
tration - your Cabinet and staff - does not have
a collective sense of your goals and priorities.
Although you have a strong personal sense of the
relative importance of each program and policy,
you find it difficult - if not impossibe - to say
that "this problem is not important enough to
merit my personal attention" , As a result, too
many policies, programs and issues receive
what I would describe as excessive "Presidential
attention " and absorb too much of the precious
"political and moral capital of your Presidency.
We need to devise and seek a consensus on a
system that will allow you to assess the
relative importance of issues and programs
and make decisions which will have clear
implications as to how each program will be
managed, politically and substantively.
I believe the following chart outlines a
system that meets the practical need
we have for setting priorities.
SETTING PROGRAM AND POLICY PRIORITIES FOR THE CARTER ADMINISTRATION
PROGRAM/POLICY
PUBLIC
CONGRESSIONAL
DEVELOPMENT
PRESENTATION/EDUCATION
PLANS
COORDINATION
PRESIDENTIAL
Subject matter designated by Pres-
Public announcement by President
White House Congressional Relations
Designation of lead Agency and
INITIATIVE
ident as "Presidential Initiative"
of Initiative
Staff has primary responsibility
White House Staff Coordinator
Options paper presented to the
Continuing statements of focus and
Coordinates lobbying efforts of
Formation of Working Group to
President
support
affected agencies
coordinate White House/Agency
activities
Briefing(s) with President, affected
Use of maximum public relations
Consultation with Congress during
agency heads and White House
tools 1. e. major speech, fireside chat,
program development
Development of political work P
Staff to discuss options
etc.
for approval by the President
Presidential involvement at briefings
Decision made
and at critical stages of Congressional
debate
Cabinet involved when necessary
ADMINISTRATION
Subject matter designated by White
Joint announcement by President and
Agency Congressional liaison has
Agency workplan prepared and
INITIATIVE
House as "Administration Initiative"
Agency head
primary responsibility
approved by agency head
Agency-White House reviews options
Agency head has primary responsibility
Limited White House involvement
White House Staff (Domestic
and makes final recommendation to
for public education
Council or NSC) reviews and
President
Presidential involvement only in an
approves work plan
Very limited Presidential involvement
emergency situation when recom-
President reviews and approves final
mended by White House Congress-
program
ional Relations Staff
AGENCY
Subject matter designated by Agency
Program announced by Agency head
Agency Congressional liaison has
Internally as directed by Agency
INITIATIVE
head as "Agency Initiative"
exclusive responsibility
head
No White House involvement
Agency head makes program decisions
No White House involvement
Final program reviewed by White House
to insure compatibility with Adminis-
tration policy and goals
THE FOREIGN POLICY DECISION-MAKING PROCESS
I have attempted in this section to analyze the
manner in which foreign policy and national secur-
MOVE
ity problems are presented to you for decision
DOWN
and implementation.
I would contend that the process you have devised
for making these decisions is efficient, deliber-
ate and well-organized to insure inpurt from your
principal foreign policy advisers.
You have heard the allegation that there is no
systematic or organized political input into the
many foreign policy decisions that you must make.
This weakness in our system is perceived and also
real. It has been greatly exaggerated, but
it is a fact that information, problems and
recommendations on foreign policy matters are
presented to you for decision without the benefit
of comment or reaction from the members of your
staff who will have to explain your decision or
action (Powell), deal with the Congress in
passing related legislation (Moore), and
develop a strategy for winning political and
public support (Jordan).
As is demonstrated in the following chart, there
are four people who are primarily involved in
foreign policy decisions: the President, the
Vice-President, the Secretary of State and the
National Security Adviser. The Secretary of
Defense and the Director of Central Intelligence
are involved in those decisions that have major
defense and intelligence components.
Foreign Policy & National Security Decision Making Process
PRESENTATION OF PROBLEMS
& INFORMATION
DECISION MAKING
IMPLEMENTATION
STATE
Secretary's daily report
Important diplomatic messages
Weekly breakfast meeting with President
Frequent direct communication with President
Notations on State, NSC, CIA,
STATE
and Defense reports
NSC
Brzezinski daily briefing
Oral directives & decisions
NSC
NSC paperwork and communications
to principals
NSC meetings
PRESIDENT
PRM process
Decisions made at scheduled
Frequent unscheduled meetings with Brzezinski
Defense
& group meetings
Defense
Formal decisions on NSC/State
Frequent communications with the Secretary
documents & PRM's
CIA
Written and oral reports
CIA
Daily intelligence report
Weekly intelligence meeting with President
Special reports as requested and/or needed
None of the principals involved in these de-
cisions are immune to political considerations,
but they are preoccupied with other dimensions
of the problems and decisions.
As President, you are focused on understanding
the problem and making quality decisions that are
compatible with your view of the world and our
foreign policy goals.
Vice-President Mondale is learning with you and
trying to assist you in making these difficult
decisions.
Secretary of State Vance is preoccupied with the
management, implementation and negotiation of these
decisions and policies.
National Security Adviser Brzezinski is responsible
for presenting you with the views and opinions
of your other advisers while trying to reconcile
your day-to-day decisions with long range policy
goals.
With these responsibilities, it is understandable
that when the four principals sit down to make
a major decision, there is not a person who is
preoccupied exclusively with the political dimen-
sions of the decision, including:
-What are the domestic political implications
of this action or decision?
-Will Congressional action be necessary?
-Is Congressional notification and consultation
needed?
-Which groups and organizations should be con-
sulted and/or notified in advance of a public
announcement?
-How should this action/decision be presented
to the American people?
-Are the political implications of this de-
cision compatible with our priorities,
the Congressional schedule and our own pol-
itical schedule?
In the previous chart, I outlined the fourteen
most obvious ways that information and decisions
are presented to you and the several ways that
these decisions are implemented. There is not a
single person on the White House staff outside
of the National Security Council who sees or re-
views any of the information going into or coming
out of your office. Dozens of foreign policy
bureaucrats will see these materials and know about
your decisions, but your political staff will hear
about them from someone on the Hill who has good
contacts in the State Department or read about them
in the newspaper. And from that point on, we are
reacting politically to a decision made by the
Administration instead of taking the political
initiative.
*
I should emphasize that none of us on the White
House staff want to be or expect to be foreign
policy experts or decision makers. We could
point out political problems and opportunities if
involved early enough in the process.
In fairness to Zbig and his staff, they have made
a continuing effort to keep us informed. But
until some slight adjustment is made in the
process that has evolved that requires systematic
political input, the high quality of your foreign
policy decisions will be undermined unnecessarily
by domestic political considerations. I believe that
this slight flaw can be corrected very simply
and in a way that does not complicate nor compromise
the process by which you presently make decisions.
THE 1980 PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN
It is not too early to begin to think and plan for
the 1980 Presidential campaign.
And in our planning, we should presume the worst,
and resist the historical arguments and notions
that you will be re-elected President simply be-
cause you are the incumbent.
In fact, the recent history of American politics
would suggest that that theory about incumbent Pres-
idents is no longer valid, or at least, it is less
valid than at any other period in our nation's
history.
Recent examples to support this argument:
-Lyndon Johnson announced his intention not to
seek re-election after Eugene McCarthy's strong
showing in the New Hampshire. There is little
doubt that Johnson would have sought re-election
absent strong political opposition to him within
his own part.
-Gerald Ford barely won the nomination of his
own party. He won the nomination at the Rep-
ublican National Convention.
-Gerald Ford lost the general election to Jimmy
Carter.
In summary, I feel strongly that we should pre-
sume the worst and assume that we will be challenged
within our own party and also face strong opposition
in the general election.
Need for Early Planning
There is also a tendency to think of the next
election as being further off than it actually is.
In a little more than two years from now, the
Democratic primaries and caucuses will begin.
Without involving you unnecessarily or taking
any of your time, we should begin a planning pro-
cess that is informal and comprehensive with the
goal of developing a 1980 campaign strategy that
is compatible with the goals and objectives of
your own Presidency.
The general process is outlined in the following
"1980 Timetable" for your review and comment.
Timetable for 1980 Presidential Campaign
1978
1979
1980
Major
Democratic
Democratic
Political
Congressional
Midterm
Primaries
National
Ger
Events
Elections
Conference
Begin
Convention
Ele
Planning
Meets on Monthly Basis
Group Formed
1980
Plan for 1980
Strategy
Developed
Development
Reviewed and Approved by
President and Vice-President
Implementation
Begins
Carter-Mondale
'80 Committee Formed
National
National Headquarters
Organization
Opened
National Staff
Hired
Low-Profile Work in
Key States
State Headquarters in
Key States
State
Key Leaders and
State Headquarters in
Organization
Workers Identified
Every State
Staff for Key
State Plans
States Hired
Developed
State Functions at
State
White House
Presence
and
Activities
President and Vice-President
Active in Targeted States on
Behalf of Democratic Candidates
Begin Implementation of
Fund-Raising Plan
Fund
1980 Fund-Raising
Raising
Plan Developed
Budgets for Key
States Prepared
National Budget Developed
and Reviewed by '80 Planning Group
State Surveys in Early
DNC National Surveys
Collateral
Primary States Begin
Continue on Quarterly Basis
Activities
Media Plan for 1980
Prepared for Manning Group
The Planning Group
The first step would be the formation of the
1980 Planning Group. It should be relatively
small, informal and would attempt to keep its act-
ivities out of the news although I think we all
know how difficult that is to do.
The membership of that group should include:
Kirbo for his general advice and counsel.
Powell for his knowledge of the news media.
Rafshoon for his advice on media and themes.
Caddell for his understanding of the mood of
the country.
Moe for his political knowledge and to repre-
sent the Vice-President.
Lipshutz for his knowledge of the Federal
Election Law and fundraising.
Kraft/Wise for political organization.
Strauss for general advice and counsel.
Political Prognosis
WHAT
Some of my own thoughts on will happen in the
1980 Presidential campaign:
-We will face a serious challenge from within
our own party and also in the general election.
-The chances are greater, in my opinion, that
we will be ambushed in our own party than de-
feated in the general election.
-There will be a coalition of persons and groups
within the Democratic Party that will form to
deny you the nomination.
-The challenge in the party will come from the
left.
If I had to paint the worst possible situation,
it would be that we would be challenged by both
Jerry Brown and Ted Kennedy. They will agree that
their first objective will be to defeat you and
that they will fight it out later, to see who gets
the nomination. Their collective strategy:
-Brown will concentrate on the West where Carter
was weak in 1976 and where Brown is strong.
-Kennedy will focus on the Northeast and the
Midwest where the traditional Democrats, ethnics,
and urban Catholics are concentrated.
-Brown and Kennedy will encourage favorite son
candidacies in key states (New York) to deny
Carter successes and momentum.
-The Brown-Kennedy coalition will be comprised of
disenchanted party activists, liberals, Jews,
urban ethnics, organized labor, minorities,
women activists and key big city political
machines.
This then is the worst possible case. The only way
to insure that it does not happen is to prepare for
it happening.
It is difficult, if not impossible, for a pol-
itical leader to maintain the same precise pol-
itical coalition over an extended period of time.
A political leader's base usually changes, but
there are very few politicians who are able to
survive major shifts in their basic coalition.
Consequently, it is necessary to counter loss
of support within a particular group or constit-
uency with gains in other groups.
In terms of what was previously described as the
"Key Carter Constituent Groups", I find the
slight increase of support among Southerners and
Hispanics encouraging, the slight decrease in sup-
port among Democrats and union members predictable,
and the sharp decline in support among Jews and
blacks a cause for real concern.
PROFILE OF KEY CARTER CONSTITUENT GROUPS
In the following chart, I have identified the
key constituent groups that were responsible for
your election. The disproportionate support given
us by these overlapping constituencies were re-
sponsible for our narrow general election victory.
The basis for this comparison is the amount of
support each group provided in the general elect-
ion (as was determined by a post-election survey
conducted by Cambridge Survey Research) and
the "job performance" ratings from an October
survey from Cambridge Survey Research.
Key Carter Constituent Groups*
85%
82%
67%
68%
General
58%
55%
Election
Support
Job
Performance
DEMOCRATS
BLACKS
UNION MEMBERS
71%
65%
68%
60%
56%
41%
JEWS
SOUTHERNERS
HISPANICS
*Based on Cambridge Survey Research, Post Election Analysis & October, 1977 National Survey
A Plan for Dealing with Constituent Groups
Although you spent a modest amount of time
this year dealing with organized constituent
groups, it was almost always in reaction to
some problem they had or specific need we had.
I would like to outline for your consider-
ation a positive plan whereby we take the init-
iative in dealing with these groups in a way
that enhances the quantity and quality of their
support for the goals and programs of this
Administration.
If we don't present our programs and plans to
these groups and their leadership, they are
put in the position of sitting on the sidelines,
analyzing and usually criticizing your pro-
grams not because they are against you, not
because they want you or your programs to
fail, but because they were not consulted and
do not understand what it is we are trying to
accomplish.
I believe that we all become callous (if not
immune) to the great attraction of the Presi-
dency and the White House. The plan that I
recommend calls for our taking the initiative
in doing a series of things with these various
groups. It has the following components:
White House Dinners. A small number of White
House Dinners.
Major Speech/Address. A substantive speech
on an issue of concern to several of these
groups.
Informal White House Events. Picnics or re-
ceptions for several groups, particularly for
groups. of early Carter supporters from key prim-
ary states: New Hampshire, Iowa, Florida, etc.
Meetings with the President. Private brief
meetings with you. I would recommend that we
do this early in the year so you can present to
these various groups your legislative prior-
ities for 1978.
Special Constituency Press Briefings. Some of
these groups - particularly labor, Jews and
blacks - have very extensive and effective ways
of communicating. Your spending thirty minutes
every six months with some of these groups would
insure positive support of our programs. A good
example is the UAW newsletter which is attached.
The AFL-CIO has a newsletter than has a circu-
lation of 14 million people.
JAN
NAVILETTER
Constituent Plan for 1978
Primary
Total
Democratic
State
Business
351
Environ
Activity
Activity
Blacks
Labor
Hispanics
Jews
Leaders
Southerners
Friends
Leaders
Women
Consumers
mentalists
Hours
Major
Speech or
Address
1
1
1
1
1
1
6
Convention
White House
2
2
Dinner
1
1
6
White House
Informal Social
1
1
Event
4
6
Picnic/Reception
Meeting
4
6
2
3
2
6
2
2
2
With the
19.5
President
(4x1-4)
(6x.7=4.2)
X .5 1)
(3x.7=2.1)
(2 X .5 11
(6x.7=4.2)
(2x.5=1)
(2 X .5 1)
(2x.5=1)
Special
Constituent
2
1
2
5
Press Briefing
Total
Cumulative
Group
9
7.2
3
5.1
4.0
1.0
4.0
5.2
2.0
1.0
1.0
Total
Hours
42.5
THE ROLE OF THE DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL COMMITTEE
Introduction
For a variety of reasons, the Democratic Nat-
ional Committee has not been as effective a
political mechanism as it can be and should be.
There are a number of reasons for this, including:
-Ken Curtis is a wonderful person, but he has
not been a strong and effective chairman.
-Phil Wise's early departure left Ken with-
out a strong and effective internal manager
that could work closely with us.
-I did not pay enough attention to the
continuing problems of the DNC.
Although there are certainly limitations to
what the DNC can do, it can and should be a pol-
itical assest, not a liability. In the past
few months it has become a political liability
that requires our attention and action.
For the purpose of making these decisions, I
would like to outline for you what the DNC
should be.
Purpose of the DNC
The goals of the DNC should be to:
-Mobilize support for the President's pro-
grams
-Monitor the processes of the Party,
particularly those dealing with the rules
for selecting delegates for 1980
-Stay in touch with Carter supporters and
Democratic leaders and activists
-Pay off old debts
-Provide financial and technical assist-
ance to Democratic candidates, and
-Try to build and develop the Party.
Measuring our performance this year against these
objectives, I would say that:
-We have done a good job in monitoring the
party rules.
-We have done a very good job in terms of
retiring the old debt.
-We have done an adequate job in terms of
providing technical assistance to candidates.
-We have done a less than adequate job in
keeping in touch with party leaders and act-
ivists and our Carter supporters.
-We have done a poor job in mobilizing sup-
port for the President's programs and in
trying to build the party.
long-Reep Play
Although w have donies any substations
"lukgs between on verious drostic
and 6.P. initiatives it is unevitwble the that
'does - ocen at at solitical
on lovels lave Possible - and - paraytic loves.
I believe That it is mecassary 65
the mg makers & you administrator
to perform what I'll describe
as mocro policy political
planing THE
attempts to novamicle on S.P. inticting,
our donestic programs with the donostic
politive situation at The reality
a son Provideng.
The Mondale nolo = plan on 1978
11 a stop :- the dict
Let mo proset to yr -
exceple of To und of comprehen policy policed
play which I this can ed sure
occur.
I the will besin by examing the
perceptions 9 you polis as detend
by somez by Pat the medic
analysis presents earlier. we more take +L
which reciel the great
coverage (with the excepting a SALT/Somed Us relater
because no sundy information effectives covered
subsject) ad procession - the ballong
chart the support or sect The new figne,
on lace topics.
Domestic issues comparison
This charts the amount of time devoted by the news
media to each of numerous issues. For comparison,
i made an arbitrary judgment that certain issues
were prioirtiy isses. They included:
-The economy
-Energy
-Reorganizaiton
-Welfare reform
-Budget
-Social security
The amount of time eac h of these isseus attracted
on the networks is presented here.
I then presented other issues which received time int
in exceess of 15 minutes. These issues are gauged
on this same chart and deserve special attention and
comment later.
Overall, if pressed to grade the quality of
the performance of the Democratic National
Committee, I would give it a C or C-. We can
and should do better.
Need for New Leadership
I have had a frank talk with Ken Curtis and he
will be ready to leave in January if we can come
up with a replacement by then.
Lets look at the ideal qualities which a chair-
person should possess:
-The ability to work well with the pol-
itical people at the White House
-Knowledge of and credibility with our early
Carter supporters
-Someone with technical political skills
who can plan for 1980 and also see that
the DNC is a politically sensitive oper-
ation
E
Several observation:
1
Only two of the foreig policy int. be
the American people - on h.r. policy and
of their Advistration a supported by
am Howe pdig.
2
The police and intiations
which claimst the support of c mayoring
q the America people received you time as
much coverage cs the two issues supportal
by - maganty 9 the Amix rogle. (440 to 111 a comment muth
3
To size U.P. issue with the overwling
support
a to Previe people -han
nights - received + major coverage itials
a
These the at
They the are the parts about The
perception 8 Annia b.e. who you
Presity.
As relat.
We stould be cale to lose at our
police = this mg of for some
addr necomedation to
implication of this analysis is that as
Pros. you no pownelly identified its too 10
a these inticting 500 identification drawn
as industries investable but I behave
you have became detiful 1 - chost
extraording -g'
with that son shoul
2
make If yo consers agree decision To let to state Department
ass/or - A. your to tale the land - - - public
comet to no specific issue, For example,
-A good fundraiser
-A good manager and a leader
Joel McCleary is doing a superb job as Treas-
urer of the DNC so the fundraising component is
less essential. There still obviously are very
few people who possess all or even most of these
qualities.
I have reviewed numbers of lists of people in
trying to develop some good candidates. I have
reviewed lists of current state party chairmen,
previous chairmen, early Carter supporters, former
governors and members of Congress, party activists,
and asked people I trust for some suggestions.
I must confess that we have identified very few
good, new names for your consideration, These
are the best candidates, in order of my own per-
sonal preference and evaluation.
-witz the
you cause take +L posits that all
on V. Sath Africe at
fortune public stated - afficus nec to
Give the but of wherest noe, i the 1 pame.
3
you identification personally with a
log make of coplex 6.P. instituting
is at the expense $ the for +L it
Low to be dealt with in mean future
4
It also cractes the perception 8
at puts so in the position as Pres. to
have to cartioll recorile each of
you action LITL the other.
$
^ criticism & an for is that is
importanted w last cohance.
I feel provide that on politically
and substations that hum right
poing cn be all shower be the she TLT
you one provides the moral basis for
one policies but also
the politied support meassager to pursue
Here controversial issues.
This compretering plaing and the mesting & the
major component parts of you Projideng will
Tim Kraft is the best person possible to be
chairman of the Party.
The advantages of Tim Kraft are:
-He is totally loyal and committed to you;
-He knows the early Carter supporters and
also the Democratic party leaders and
activists;
-He is sophisticated politically and can
deal effectively with the diverse
groups and people who make up the
Democratic Party;
-He is well organized and hardworking;
-He is a natural leader and earns the
respect and loyalty of those who work
for him;
-He is a good manager and can make the
changes and improvements at the DNC
that are needed;
-By being Chairman of the Party, it would
be a natural thing for him to run the
1980 campaign. He has always been my
choice for 1980.
His disadvantages:
-He is valuable to you where he is, although
I would argue that Phil Wise could easily
move up and take over Tim's present
responsibilities;
This mensn has att the to
rever the but to the V you
& 8 Ad ., 2
and werks, aticipations,
Im conclusion I would like to
summary
the
I
this
-
posvide
so with - recomedion:
I.Roving1977 As a nowlt the includes
Main :- this study, I would read
the pleasing actions:
1. That T.K. and The schoolity 9f propore
a master schodule that will alean r
to consibe adjustments in the time spent
on various activities.
- A
- 4
2. That Jody be asked to review the
- going issues comp up this year and
submit to son a plan 60 maing
you more visible on donastic using
of less visible on forg policy using
- A
- D
3. Because # you had so my state
visits : 8am firth you -A because they
are so the corsing I would
recomed that Sn CSH INSCA S tate
to submit a long may plan 6
to next the years which mill Sin
you their priorities -l will allow
us suffect faxibiting A
1
\
D
-You will probably find him reluctant to
leave the White House. You would have
to either ask him to do it for you
or talk him into it.
TL
II Cata Adv. I Coposs al Coyes
1.I hope that mayor uped 9 this
adger was to coress - you
advance the transon benefits we
derive Gron on partison
association with the Resertee Congrass.
Also, the groat stahe we home symbollically
and substating - the 1978 corporal
ele ctor.
2. To insure the proper and efficient - politinal
cooducts of Adm. officials 1 the
1978 congretted electrons I would recomed
a short briding for the Cabinet by
Free More of his staff at which you
would neinforce - the mead on all
political appears to be cleard
by the express you doshe
that they be actual 6 behalf of
Dear.
- A
'σ
3. That for .s4 T.K and +6 sclembing
office to box to the work +4
8 tip with FM. to plan
capir t-p :- the out Lover l
months of 1978.
- A
- D.
Bert Lance is another person who could be con-
sidered.
His advantages are numerous and obvious:
-He would be totally loyal to you;
-He would be a strong leader;
-He would be a great help in fundraising;
-As Chairman, he could be a great help
in working with the Congress;
-He would be very popular in the South
and with certain elements of the Party;
-He would make the changes and improve-
ments that are needed at the DNC;
-He is anxious and willing to help us
anyway - this would provide him with a
base of operation.
His disadvantages are:
-We would have to wait until his legal
problems are resolved and the DNC needs
new leadership as soon as possible;
-He probably could only be a part-time
Chairman and would need the support of
a strong Executive Director;
III Selt I Priorties & the Process
1. If you agree severally that we need
C. no process medianism 60 setting
priorities. I would recomed that:
- V.P. monde at the Exec. can
review an modify the system
have propose and the
them make specific judgerets about
sach risue proper. The find document
sloud review be proceded to so for your
-A
- D
- The Cabnet stould be brief about
this system so that well understad
fully to proter of - usines
be in assigned - specific lavel of
activity.
s -
D -
2. I world in - opportunity to proset
to 8 painly several
mmor this the Can do to usine
adoquate political input ito
the D.P. decision making process
A
D
-His selection would be controversial with
some elements of the Party and might
result in a messy fight to get the
DNC to approve his selection;
-He would not be a candidate for the
1980 campaign manager's position.
The 1980 Pas. CO.D Elab
IV IV IN would the
1. I would I'm to have you permission
to have a metis eug = the
son of the Plans Grip for 1980 as
was outlined 3 would do it
on - waken a any 50 the WH.
I D
- P
2. I and like to non is you
gree generally with the tratable
proseted. If 50, this will has
our sereal appoal
- A
- D.
menting
1. If you agree with the meed for
on tally the initiatine with they
very constluet group -l
the 12 outlined I would ein
to among - matty bet when
Roselyne's steff, Tillereft as the
appriate WH staff makers to bogin
to pl- 6a 1978
- A
- D
Anne Wexler would be my third choice to head
the Party. She is the most effective woman
I know in American politics.
Advantages:
-Widely respected by Democratic Party
activists and leaders;
-She is totally loyal to you;
-She is a superb manager;
-She is good at political organization;
-She would provide strong leadership
for the DNC;
Disadvantages:
-She has the reputation of being a
"liberal" and would not be well
received initially by conservative
labor people and conservatives in
the Party;
-She does not know our early Carter
supporters.
2. Im tens of the D. Parks.
I was to have you
seneral reator to the the man
submitted Are you
Internated in some to these paper
- 3 wat more more,
CONCLUSIONS
I believe that the plan outlined here is pos-
itive, practical and takes a modest amount of
your own time. Going into the 1978 elections
and a tough legislative sessions, we will need
the goodwill and support which will come from
the implementation of such a plan.
Rosalynn might have different and/or better
ideas about how to deal logistically with these
various groups. This was just my first at-
tempt to present a listing of groups that need
to be included.
There is no question in my mind that Tim Kraft
is by far the best choice we have to be DNC
Chairman. He comes as close as anyone
possibly can to having all of the necessary
traits. You will have to decide first
whether or not you can afford to lose him
here. He does a superb job managing your
time and the scheduling staff. I believe you
can afford to lose him because I think
Phil Wise can quickly learn the job.
Tim is capable of providing the kind of
leadership and management at the Democratic
National Committee that will transform
what has become a political liability into
a political asset.
The decision about the DNC chairmanship should
be addressed and decided before Christmas if
at all possible so to prepare for the transition
between the old chair and the new chair. If
you decide to go with Tim, you will have to make
that request personally and probably have to talk
him into it.
?
DANI
SGT. JESUS MARTINEZ
CHU CHU
586
RODRIDCO - GONZALEZ 75
?
HOSP QUIS SOSA
ARTURO MCGOWAN
EDWARDO NAVARRO
ALFREDO DE LA GUARDIA
JORGE CARRASCO
RUFINO FLORES
NIKO
)
NICHOLAS GONZALEZ
REVILLA
Romwed ESEMBATE
Bill JONAN