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Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty - SALT, 1978
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142120
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Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty - SALT, 1978
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Office of the Chief of Staff Files
Hamilton Jordan's Confidential Files
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Nuclear nonproliferation
Nuclear test ban treaties
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Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty/SALT, 1978, 4/78
Folder Citation: Collection: Office of the Chief of Staff Files; Series:
Hamilton Jordan's Confidential Files; Folder: Comprehensive Test Ban
Treaty/SALT, 1978, 4/78; Container 34a
To See Complete Finding Aid:
http://www.jimmycarterlibrary.gov/library/findingaids/Chief_of St
aff.pdf
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS SERVICE
WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)
FORM OF
DOCUMENT
CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE
DATE
RESTRICTION
memo
hj to je
7/7/78
ILE LOCATION
Chief of Staff (Jordan) /Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty--Salt (78)
Confidential File
ESTRICTION CODES
A) Closed by Executive Order 12356 governing access to national security information.
3) Closed by statute or by the agency which originated the document.
C) Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in the donor's deed of gift
ENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION
GSA FORM 7122 (REV. 5-82)
come
RELATIONSHIP OF SALT II TO CTB
You suggested at one of our recent breakfast meetings
not
true
dersion
that SALT II and CTB were of equal importance to you
SALT
as President and that you planned to send them up to the
Congress together. I would like to argue both points.
true
They
be
5:1ned
Politically and substantively, SALT II is the most import-
ant issue you will deal with as President. SALT has come
to represent in this country and around the world the
ability of the American President to effectively manage
the U.S. - Soviet relationship. Politically, it will be
the greatest and toughest fight of your Presidency. If
we ratify a SALT II Agreement in 19.79, and the economy is
in reasonably good shape, I believe that it will insure
your re-election in 1980. If we are defeated on SALT II,
I believe that it will destroy your ability to be an
effective President and probably cost you re-election.
"Electrostatic reproduction made for preserva
purposes."
It is important to have CTB to give credibility to our
nuclear non-proliferation efforts around the world. But
substantively, and it is symbolically less important than
SALT and politically it is a secondary issue with the
American people.
I share your belief that the lab directors have greatly
exaggerated the risks of a comprehensive test ban. But
the substance of CTB is not my concern. It is my
contention that to proceed at this point to make a final
decision on CTB will have a significant and adverse impact
on prospects of Congressional approval for SALT II.
The following are the arguments against making a final
decision on CTB at this time:
1. Once you have made a decision on CTB, the public and
political debate will begin. Cy argues that the debate in
the Congress will not really begin until we send the treaty
to the Hill. I respectfully disagree. Once you have made
your decision on CTB, it will be leaked to the press.
Opponents of CTB and SALT as well as political opport-
nists of both parties will begin to attack your decision
before the treaty is consumated. Senator Jackson will
begin Congressional hearings and the political and public
debate will begin right away.
2. Given the present mood of the country, there is little
hope that the debate will be balanced or objective. Op-
ponents of SALT will use CTB as a warm-up. It will be used
as a partisan issue by the Republicans in the Fall elections
to symbolize the allegation that the Carter Administration
is not tough enough and is responsible for the erosion of
U.S. military strength. The result will be that CTB will
become the captive issue of both the current political mood
and of the opponents of Jimmy Carter and SALT. The real
loser in the debate will be the American people who will
not hear a rational and balanced debate on the question of
a test ban.
I'm not
3.
Our public substantive arguments in support of CTB
sure his
are weaker than our public substantive arguments in
15 true
favor of SALT. Consequently, it can be argued that we
should lead with SALT followed by CTB. In SALT II, we
will be able to point to tangible and real concessions
made by the Soviet Union. In CTB, we will be adhering
to an agreement that is very difficult to verify and that
the American people will expect the Soviets to violate.
The same recent survey that showed overwhelming public
support for SALT also showed that 18% of the American
people would not expect the Soviet Union to abide by the
terms of the agreement. The deep suspicion that the
American people have currently of the Soviet Union, coupled
with the fact that the CTB will be difficult to verify,
will make CTB vulnerable to political charges that can
be refuted in the case of SALT.
4.
On SALT II, the Administration will be united - on
CTB, the Administration will be sharply divided. When we
went to the Senate this year on tough foreign policy issues,
we were greatly strengthened by the fact that State, Defense,
NSC and the Joint Chiefs publicly and privately sup-
ported our policies. As it presently stands, we will
have the Joint Chiefs and the lab directors officially
opposing our position and Jim Schlesinger's lukewarn
support, which will be interpreted in the Congress as
private opposition. It could not be a worse situation for
us politically - the President versus the Joint Chiefs
and the lab directors on the question of the reliability of
our nuclear stockpile. It will make the media coverage of
the neutron bomb controversy pale by comparison.
5.
We need time to calm the American people down, to
focus on our military strengths and correct the misimpress-
ion that has been created and does exist that the Soviets
have gained some significant military advantage in the past
few years. A protracted, highly publicized and contro-
versial debate over the next several months which pits you
against military and technical spokesmen of your own
Administration will have the impact of only continuing
and exacerbating the present mood.
Mr. President, five or ten years from now no one will
care or remember whether we consumated CTB in the Fall of
1978 or the Spring of 1979. People will care and it will
matter if we were successful in winning Congressional
approval for CTB and SALT.
CTB is a natural follow-up to SALT II. I believe that
our public and political posture on SALT is stronger than
CTB. We have been doing the necessary groundwork in Con-
gress and with the political community on SALT. We are
not well prepared to begin the CTB debate now.
We need badly to have some time to change the present
atmosphere in the country that is not favorable to SALT
or CTB SO that those debates can take place in fair and
favorable circumstances.
In a recent meeting with Cy, Zbig and Harold, I posed
the question, "Why the rush"? They responded that you
were anxious to consumate the treaty (a good and legitimate
reason) and that it would be helpful to Jim Callaghan
in the British elections. I doubt if Jim Callaghan would
want us to proceed if he knew that we would be jeopardizing
the chance of winning Congressional approval for both CTB
and SALT.
I also asked if there were imminent decisions to be made
by India or Brazil or other countries that would be adverse-
ly affected by a modest delay in CTB. The response was
negative.
Consequently, it is a scheduling decision that you must
make, and the overriding considerations in that decision
should be what course and/or schedule would enhance Con-
gressional approval for CTB and SALT. I feel strongly
that SALT, followed by CTB, makes the most sense.
Harold Brown also thinks that with some time and tangible
work on the issues of verification and safeguards
he may be able to bring the Joint Chiefs along. If forced
to make a decision and judgement now on CTB, their response
will be negative. With time and work, he thinks he may
change them to a position of explicit acceptance,
though not approval.
Mr. President, I don't usually make a request on a
personal basis, but I feel as strongly about this as I have
any decision you have made since coming to office. Before
you decide to proceed with CTB, talk with members of
Congress, Frank Moore and others whose opinions you
respect. We have made a lot of decisions in the last
eighteen months without regard to political circumstances
and to Congressional sentiments. This is too important a
decision to be made that same way.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
July 7, 1978
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
FROM:
JERRY RAFSHOON
JR
After meeting with Hamilton, Zbig, Secretary Vance and Secretary
Brown concerning the timing of CTB and SALT, I strongly endorse
the position that we should not try to get approval on CTB until
after SALT. Aside from the obvious concerns that I have regard-
ing too much visibility on foreign affairs while the economy
is so bad, I think that you are running a real risk in intro-
ducing to the public another discordant (and it will be
discordant) element before SALT. It is going to be hard enough
to do SALT in today's atmosphere. Preceding that with something
more vulnerable and with which you will have divided voices
in your administration will hurt us in trying to project you as
someone in control of our own government. I share your desire
to lessen the threat of nuclear destruction, but it must be
done in a way that will be effective politically. There has
been no dialogue on CTB and you are not prepared for the fight.
(I am getting ready to work up a communications plan on the
whole subject of SALT, CTB, and foreign policy in general.)
There are those who compare CTB with the Kennedy nuclear test
ban but there are some differences: JFK's treaty came when
there were real concerns about fallout and radiation poisoning,
and it came after he had put the Russians in their place
during the Cuban missle crisis. You don't have that going
for you.
Please, Mr. President, we need some good, visible domestic
victories before we solve the world's problems.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
July 7, 1978
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
FROM:
Jody Powell
gsl
I have read and agree with Hamilton's memo. If because of
foreign policy considerations you feel that we must go for-
ward on CTB now despite the handicaps, I'm sure we will all
give it our best.
I must tell you, however, that I do not believe our best will
be good enough. The odds are that we will lose and that we
will also further damage our changes on SALT. This would be
bad enough if the damage were limited to these two issues,
but it will not be SO limited.
Our greatest vulnerability is the perception that we cannot
govern. We simply cannot afford failure on an issue this
important lest this perception be set in concrete.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
July 7, 1978
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
FROM:
FRANK MOORE
F.M.lar
SUBJECT:
COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN TREATY -
CONGRESSIONAL IMPLICATIONS
We believe a decision by you to decide on final terms and to
seek a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty this year will have a
direct and adverse effect on successful Congressional action
on both CTBT and SALT. Several factors contribute to this
conclusion: (1) a CTBT submitted to the Senate before a
SALT agreement will result in a premature and damaging debate
on SALT; (2) the present anti-Soviet sentiment on the Hill
and in the country makes the climate for approval of a CTBT
very difficult; (3) potential conservative supporters of
SALT may be lost as a result of a protracted debate on CTBT;
(4) the JCS and elements of DOE oppose a CTBT; (5) SALT
supporters will not want a debate on CTBT IF THEY BELIEVE
IT WILL HAVE AN ADVERSE effect on SALT; and (6) a CTBT will
be perceived as premature coming before a successful conclu-
sion of SALT.
Staunch opponents of SALT will use a debate on CTBT to attack
SALT. Already Dewey Bartlett has urged Scoop Jackson to
hold hearings on CTBT with the express purpose of putting
the JCS further on the record in opposition to CTBT.
(Dave Jones is already on record opposing a restrictive CTBT).
Opening the SALT debate early via a CTBT debate will preempt
our efforts to educate the Congress thoroughly on the terms
of SALT. Although we have been briefing on SALT for months
we are handicapped in presenting our complete case due to the
sensitivity of negotiations and several unresolved issues.
This has given opponents of SALT complete freedom to attack
the agreement in the absence of counter arguments from our
side. A CTBT debate will aggravate this situation further
by giving opponents a broad and exposed platform to attack
SALT.
- 2 -
The strong anti-Soviet climate on the Hill makes it
extremely difficult to debate rationally any agreement with
the Soviets. It is critical to both CTBT and SALT that
this climate improve before we begin any debate. Extensive
consultations, good treaty terms, positive action by the
Soviets, and time will help lessen the tension. An early
debate on CTBT will only aggravate the present climate.
Additionally CTBT, more than SALT, requires a certain amount
of trust in the Soviets' willingness to comply with the
Treaty terms. Even with strong verification measures, it
will be very difficult to convince anyone on the Hill that
the Russians, at least recently, are at all trustworthy.
In order to pass a SALT agreement we must have the support
of conservatives like Nunn, Stennis, and Hollings. To secure
their support we must make a strong case that SALT is in
the best national security interests of the U.S. To do this
we must have a united Administration, particularly DOD and
the JCS, strongly behind SALT. Opposition to a CTBT by the
JCS exposes the agreement to charges of weakness and potentially
detrimental to U.S. security interests. This may force Nunn,
Stennis, et al, to join forces with Garn and McClure to defeat
CTBT, forming an alliance which could, if continued post CTBT
in an anti-Soviet posture, spell disaster for SALT.
Additionally, failure to rally the JCS behind CTBT will raise
questions about our ability to get their strong backing for
SALT.
SALT supporters will not be inclined to take up the battle
for CTBT if they believe such a debate will have an adverse
effect on SALT. Our supporters have cautioned us that even
under the best of circumstances SALT will be difficult. It
is likely that they will see CTBT detrimental to SALT and will
be hesitant to use any chips on CTBT at the expense of SALT.
Supporters further argue that CTBT is premature without a
SALT agreement and that it is a natural followup to SALT, not
an opening salvo in the arms debate. The same arguments
against a CTBT preceding SALT apply to a simultaneous sub-
mittal. Having both agreements before the Congress at the
same time will result in conflicting debate, tradeoffs between
the two, and split constituencies which could cost votes for
both agreements. Our strong advice is to go slow on CTBT
and submit a SALT agreement first. A successful resolution
of SALT will enhance passage of CTBT. A divisive battle on
CTBT before or during the SALT debate could have disastrous
consequences for both.