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    "title": "Cuba - USSR Brigade",
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    "seq": 1,
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    "url": "https://s3.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/lz/presidential-libraries/carter/JC-1005/142099/cos_142099_034a_12.pdf",
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    "ocrText": "Cuba-USSR Brigade\nFolder Citation: Collection: Office of the Chief of Staff Files; Series:\nHamilton Jordan's Confidential Files; Folder: Cuba-USSR Brigade;\nContainer 34a\nTo See Complete Finding Aid:\nhttp://www.jimmycarterlibrary.gov/library/findingaids/Chief_of St\naff.pdf\nNATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS SERVICE\nWITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)\nFORM OF\nDOCUMENT\nCORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE\nDATE\nRESTRICTION\nreport\nCuba--USSR brigade\n9/18/79\nA\nSanitized sersion and a/8/94\nFILE LOCATION\nChief of Staff/Jordan/Confidential File/Cuba--USSR Brigade\nRESTRICTION CODES\n(A) Closed by Executive Order 12356 governing access to national security information.\n(B) Closed by statute or by the agency which originated the document.\n(C) Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in the donor's deed of gift.\nGENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION\nGSA FORM 7122 (REV. 5-82)\nentral\nintelligence\nSANITIZED\n8/29/94 C/A HRE MR-NLC-94-25\nE.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4\nPER BY & NARS. DATE 9/22/94\nUpdated Reoor from\nCround F.\nBrigadeln Cuba\nInteragency/Intelligence Memo Andum\nMemorandum to Holders\nTob Secret:\nUPDATED REPORT ON\nSOVIET GROUND FORCES BRIGADE IN CUBA*\nPREFACE\nThis memorandum is a followup to the Interagency Intelligence\nMemorandum, \"Possible Presence of Soviet Ground Forces in Cuba,\"\nthat was published on 19 July 1979. This memorandum is based on\ndata, some of which\nhas been reexamined or collected since then. It is not a definitive\nstudy of the origins and evolution of the Soviet ground forces bri-\ngade in Cuba. Further collection and analyses are continuing.\nThis memorandum to holders of the 19 July 1979 IIM, \"Possible Pres-\nence of Soviet Ground Forces in Cuba,\" was prepared under the aus-\npices of the National Intelligence Officer for USSR and Eastern\nEurope, National Foreign Assessment Center. It was coordinated\nwithin the Central Intelligence Agency; with the Bureau of Intelli-\ngence and Research, Department of State; with the Defense Intelli-\ngence Agency; with the National Security Agency; and with the in-\ntelligence organizations of the Departments of the Army, the Navy,\nand the Air Force. Information available as of 1700 EDT on 18\nSeptember 1979 was used in the preparation of this memorandum.\nReview On\n18 Sep 1999\nDerived From Multiple\ni\nTopiSecre\nToo Secret\nSUMMARY\nA Soviet ground forces combat unit--called a brigade by the\nSoviets--has been in Cuba since at least the mid-1970s. It is pos-\nsible that the unit or its precursors have been there since the\nearly 1960s as a residual of the 1962 Soviet troop presence. The\nbrigade consists of motorized rifle, tank, and artillery battalions,\nplus various other combat support and service support elements.\nThe brigade probably has a strength of some 2,600 men, although the\nunit might have additional support elements that could raise its\nstrength to 3,000 or even somewhat higher. We have insufficient\ninformation to determine the brigade's mission. We believe the\nmost likely mission is to provide a small but concrete Soviet\ncommitment to Castro, implying a readiness to defend Cuba and\nhis regime. Another mission, particularly for the elements of the\nbrigade stationed at Lourdes, may be to provide security for Soviet\nfacilities. There is no evidence indicating that the Soviet unit\nhas participated in training Cuban personnel or units. While it\ncannot be excluded that the Soviet unit has been used for demon-\nstrations of Soviet military tactics and techniques to Cuban ob-\nservers, there is no evidence from\nthat this is the case.\n1\nTop Secre\nTop Secret\nDISCUSSION\nIntroduction\nThis IIM sets forth what we now know about the presence of\nSoviet combat troops in Cuba based on recently acquired information\nand on older data reinterpreted in light of current analytical\njudgments.\nA 19 July IIM, \"Possible Presence of Soviet Ground Forces in\nCuba,\" concluded, after a review of\ndata gathered\nover several years, that a Soviet ground forces brigade was possibly\nstationed in Cuba, but that its size, location(s) and mission\nwere uncertain. Since then, the Intelligence Community has sub-\nstantially increased its attention to the Soviet military in Cuba.\nintelligence collection efforts\nagainst Cuba have been augmented. Various intelligence agencies\nhave established working groups to assemble and examine data on\nSoviet activities there.\nThe heightened intelligence collection and analysis effort\nhas confirmed that a Soviet military unit, called a brigade by the\nSoviets (and, on one occasion, by the Cubans\n), is in Cuba. The collection effort has provided data on\nthe organization, strength, and locations of the unit, as well as\nsome information on its history. Thus far, however, we have not\nbeen able to determine what its current mission may be, or exactly\nhow long the brigade or elements of it have been in Cuba. It is\npossible that the brigade or its precursors may date as far back\nas 1962.\nRecent Evidence\nIn April and July 1979, in support of the production of an\nIIM assessing the overall Cuban-Soviet military relationship, the\nNational Security Agency published several summary reports on Soviet\nground forces organization and activities in Cuba. In addition to\nambiguous references to a \"brigade\"\nreported instances of small-\nscale Soviet tactical training that took place over a three-year\nperiod beginning in July 1976. Taken together, in July 1979,\nto the\npresence or Soviet ground forces units in Cupa, subordinated to a\nSoviet brigade command, and consisting of one tank battalion, one,\nand probably two, motorized rifle battalions, a multiple rocket\nlauncher battalion, as well as other combat and service support\nelements.\n2\nTop\nSecret\nTop\nSecret\nduring the first two weeks of August.\nresulted in evidence of\nsmall-scale Soviet tactical training.\nenabled us to conclude for the first time with a high\ndegree of confidence that it was actually Soviet, and not Cuban,\nunits\nThere was enough equipment for one tank battalion, a motorized\nrifle company, two howitzer batteries, two multiple rocket launcher\nbatteries, three antitank missile batteries, and elements of a mortar\nbattery. In addition, there were enough tents in the bivouac to\naccommodate a full complement of personnel for these units.\nMost of the\nequipment\nwas at Santiago de\nlas Vegas, a garrison facility of sufficient size to accommodate\nmost of the units subordinate to the brigade.\n3\nTon Secret*\nSTATEMENTS\nEXP\nTop-Secret:\nwore uniforms that had no insignia and were distinctly different\nfrom Cuban uniforms--were frequently in Santiago de las Vegas or\nManagua in civilian clothes either shopping or having a night on the\ntown.\na Soviet ground\nforces brigade has been in Cuba since at least 1964. The unit was\nreportedly well equipped with tanks, armored personnel carriers,\nand other equipment, and the equipment was kept in sheds, presumably\nto prevent it from being identified. The soldiers assigned to the\nbrigade received six months' training before being sent to Cuba,\nspent one year there, and served their final six months' duty in the\nUSSR.\nthe mission of the unit is not to train Cubans. Subsequently,\ncorroborating the existence\nsince at least 1967 or such a Soviet ground forces combat unit in\nCuba.\nEarlier Intelligence\nOn the basis of a review of archival material, we believe that\nthe Soviets may have maintained ground forces units in some form in\nCuba since 1962, although we cannot confirm this as yet. Soviet\nground forces units--numbering between 4,000 and 7,500 men organized\nin highly mobile armored combat groups--were deployed primarily at\nfour locations in Cuba between August and October 1962. In October\n1963, we estimated that by then most Soviet ground forces personnel\nhad been withdrawn from these four main camps. The Soviets remain-\ning were then judged to be no longer organized as combat groups but\nwere believed to be involved in training Cuban units. A recently\ninitiated, but still incomplete, review of photography suggests,\nhowever, that elements of a Soviet ground forces unit may have re-\nmained at the Santiago garrison since the fall of 1962.\nIn light of\nrecent evidence and retrospective analysis, these units were prob-\nably elements of the Soviet brigade or its precursors. The force\nconsisted of a headquarters, a tank battalion, and two infantry\nbattalions. The formation's headquarters were indicated to be at\nthe approximate location of the Santiago de las Vegas garrison.\n4\nTob Secret\nTop Secret:\nto Soviet ground forces involved in exercises and training activity,\nand since October 1975, periodically to a \"brigade.\" These were\nregarded in the Community at the time as consistent with the known\nSoviet military training and advisory presence in Cuba. (TS U)\nThe Brigade's Organization and Strength\nA synthesis of the\nintelligence confirms that a Soviet ground forces brigade 1S 111\nCuba, and suggests that its headquarters is located near Santiago de\nlas Vegas. Available information indicates the brigade consists\nof four maneuver battalions one tank and three motorized rifle-\nplus combat support elements, including one multiple rocket launcher\nbattalion and a field artillery battalion, and service support\nelements. If the brigade were fully manned, it would have some\n2,600 men. The brigade could include more small combat support\nor combat service support units that could push its strength to\n3,000 men or even somewhat higher.\nWe believe that the Soviet brigade is at or near its full\npersonnel strength.\nMission\nthe most likely mission is to\nprovide a small but concrete Soviet commitment to Castro,\nthus implying a readiness to defend Cuba and his regime. *\nAnother mission--particularly for the elements of the\nbrigade stationed at Lourdes--may be to provide security\nfor Soviet facilities.\n*\nThe Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of\nthe Army, believes the most likely mission to be security for\npresent and future Soviet facilities. If a Soviet commitment\nto defend Cuba were the principal mission, the Soviets would\nmore likely have advertised this unit's presence, rather than\ndeliberately conceal it.\n5\nTop Secret\nTop Secret\n-- The Soviet brigade lacks the air and sea lift capability\nrequired to give it a power projection role. In any case,\nwe believe it is highly unlikely that the Soviets view\nsuch a mission as militarily and politically plausible.\n-- While the brigade or its precursor elements may have had\nsome role in training Cubans in the 1960s, there is no\nevidence that this has been the case in recent years. The\napparent lack of communications between elements of the\nbrigade while on exercises and Cuban army elements, and\nevidence that Soviet and Cuban elements make separate\nuse of the San Pedro training area, strongly suggest that\nthe Soviet unit does not train Cuban personnel or units.\nalso indicates that the unit does not conduct training\noperations with Cubans. Moreover, known Soviet training\nunits elsewhere- that is, MAAG missions--usually consist\nlargely of officers, and it is unlikely that such\nan officer-heavy group would train as an integral Soviet\nunit or that it would, or could, exercise in the way that\nwe have observed the Soviets exercise at San Pedro. While\nit cannot be excluded that Cuban military personnel have\nobserved Soviet exercises as a demonstration of militarv\ntactics and techniques,\n-- We believe that direct collaboration with Cuban personnel\nin training efforts today is primarily the function of\nthe personnel of the Soviet military advisory mission,\nwhich appears to us to be an entity separate from the\nbrigade.\n6\nToo\nSecret"
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