Ask the Scholar
Document scope · 1 page
Scholar
Ask about this object, its catalog metadata, its source description, or the page inventory.
For page-specific OCR and visual context, open one of the page chats.
Scholar Source Context
Document identity
localId
142199
label
Panama Canal Treaty, 10/77-12/77 [1]
core
doc
dtoType
document
citationUrl
pageCount
1
Source metadata
id
142199
sourceUrl
contentType
document
title
Panama Canal Treaty, 10/77-12/77 [1]
citationUrl
collections
Office of the Chief of Staff Files
Hamilton Jordan's Confidential Files
subjects
Panama
Treaties
Panama Canal Treaties (1977)
thumbnailUrl
largeImageUrl
imageCount
1
hasImages
yes
source
import
hasTranscription
no
Source extras
naId
142199
coverageEndDate
logicalDate
1978-01-01
year
1978
coverageStartDate
logicalDate
1978-01-01
year
1978
levelOfDescription
fileUnit
recordType
description
ocrSource
nara-archive
Single page context
seq
1
pageIndex
0
type
document
mediaId
5c433dc40ed0f3fb
ocrText
Panama Canal Treaty, 10, 11, 12/77 (1)
Folder Citation: Collection: Office of the Chief of Staff Files; Series:
Hamilton Jordan's Confidential Files; Folder: Panama Canal Treaty, 10,
11, 12/77 (1); Container 36
To See Complete Finding Aid:
http://www.jimmycarterlibrary.gov/library/findingaids/Chief_of St
aff.pdf
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS SERVICE
WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)
FORM OF
CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE
DATE
RESTRICTION
DOCUMENT
memo
Omar Terrijos to JC (4 pp.) OPENED 8/9/03
12/3/77
A
memo
HJ to JC, ZB (4 pp.) 3 copies
Openel 1/31/91
11/29/77
A
memo
HJ to JC (6 pp.) Openal 1/31/91
n.d.
A
memo
HJ, Bob Pastor to JC (4 pp.)
Oxend 1/31/91
10/14/77
A
memo
Bob Pastor to HJ (4 pp.)
opened 1/31/91
11/17/77
A
memo
JC to Omar Torrijos (1 p.)
opened 4/22/91
11/2/77
A
memo
Warren Christopher's evening report OPENED 8/9/03
10/1/77
A
memo
Bob Pastor to HJ, Rick Inderfurth (3 PP. sanitized 1/24/02 11/29/77
A
report
Analysis of Treaty (2 pp.)
11/29/77
A
FILE LOCATION
Chief of Staff (Jordan)/Confidential File/Panama Canal Treaty-Oct., Nov., Dec. 1977 [1]
RESTRICTION CODES
(A) Closed by Executive Order 12356 governing access to national security information.
(B) Closed by statute or by the agency which originated the document.
(C) Closed in accordance with restrictions conteined in the donor's deed of gift.
GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION
GSA FORM 7122 (REV. 5-82)
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
October 14, 1977
Mr. President:
If this memo seems incoherent, it is because we
wrote it at 2:00 a. m.
One of the objectives of the State Department was
to have possible clarification language nailed
down going into the meeting. Torrijos was
completely uninterested in the details or the wording
of the statement.
He and his key staff have had it for five days.
They had it tonight before them in Spanish. I
assumed from their reluctance to discuss it that
while they were not excited about having to explain
new language to the people of Panama, they were
reconciled to doing it because they realize it is
important to us politically. We talked about the
clarification language in terms of the need for a
joint statement.
Ham
DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356. Sec. 3.4
PER 7/26/90 MSL Hrre MR-4LC-90-22
BY Jay NARS, DATE 1/30/91
MEMORANDUM
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
October 14, 1977
MEMORANDUM FOR:
THE PRESIDENT
HE
FROM:
HAMILTON JORDAN AND BOB PASTOR
But
SUBJECT:
Meeting with General Torrijos
We spent about six hours tonight with General Torrijos at the
Panamanian Embassy talking mostly about the problems of gaining
ratification for the treaties in our respective countries.
We did not dwell on the details of the statement which was drafted
by Warren Christopher in conjunction with the Senators in an attempt
to clarify certain points. Copies of our statement had been translated
into Spanish by the Panamanians and circulated to their negotiators
and key members of their staff. General Torrijos was not interested
in discussing the contents of that document, but was more concerned
about why we needed such a statement at this time. Our impression
is that they are reconciled to having to do something to help us with
"our" political problem, but Torrijos would like to think that the fact
he is meeting with you will be sufficient. We told him that clarification
was essential.
Torrijos is very concerned about the political problems which have
emerged in Panama while he has been travelling through Europe during
the past three weeks. He doesn't doubt that the treaties will be ratified
in the plebiscite in 10 days, but he is bothered by the increasing criticism
being directed at the treaties and himself. He is particularly worried
about how his meeting with you to "clarify" treaties so recently signed
will be interpreted in Panama. We believe that you will find him very
reluctant to do anything until he has had a chance to return to Panama
and evaluate the situation there. We believe getting a commitment from
him as to language is possible, but believe that he will want to wait until
he gets back to Panama to make any public statement.
DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
PER 7/26/90 NSS HrRE MR-4Ld-90.2c
BY Jay NARS, DATE 1/30/91
2
One obvious fact is that the Panamanians have a very limited and
superficial understanding of the way our government functions and
of the ratification process. They see the President as the most
powerful person in the world and have difficulty comprehending why
you are having problems getting the Senate to ratify this treaty.
In explaining the need for a clarifying statement of some kind, we
noted that in the process of trying to sell a single product to two
markets, both sides had made statements which antagonized the buyers
in the other's market. In the U.S., several Senators who had supported
the treaties, now tell us they won't vote for it unless several provisions
are clarified. If we don't recapture these Senators and the momentum
now, before the Panamanian plebiscite, we will lose the treaties.
We told them that key Senators had worked with us in developing some
language which tried to deal with the political objections raised in both
countries. To the extent that We used this same language to clarify
these differences, we would be winning votes in the Senate for the
treaties. If we changed or modified this language, we would risk losing
their support.
Torrijos never explicitly said that he accepted the language. Panamanian
negotiator Escobar made clear that he had problems with the third
provision -- closure due to unprofitability -- primarily because he felt
that it had been considered in the negotiations and subsequently dropped.
Since it wasn't in the treaty, he argued that we couldn't very well have
a clarifying statement on it. While noting that the neutrality treaty
incorporated the concept of an "open" Canal, we said that we didn't want
to engage in a "legalistic" argument over what is essentially a political
issue. (Lewis had told us before that Torrijos had made this same
argument a number of times.)
Both sides raised hypothetical questions about the meaning of the treaties,
and agreed that if We answered such questions differently, we would just
invite future problems which could make ratification of the treaties
impossible.
Scenario
Torrijos would very much enjoy talking privately with you for about
10 or 15 minutes before the meeting, and this offers the opportunity
for you to impress upon him the need for his complete agreement on
the text of the "Joint Statement."
3
Talking Points:
-- Torrijos is very proud of the trip he has just completed
to ten countries. You should inquire about it, compliment
him on the serious attention it received, and seek the
reaction of the Heads of State to the treaty. We would
suggest you ask him for a brief report at the outset of
the group meeting -- believe that this will set a good tone
for discussion.
-- Treaty will not be ratified in this country unless these key
points are clarified.
-- If these clarifications do not take place before the Panamanian
plebiscite, opponents of the treaties here will argue that
the Panamanian people have voted for a treaty that they did
not understand.
-- It is possible to clarify the differences raised in both
countries with language which is mutually beneficial.
-- Because some key Senators were involved in developing
the language which was presented as a working draft, we
would be jeopardizing their support if We changed their
draft significantly.
-- For that same reason, we tried to draft that language in a
way that was sensitive to the politics of Panama. This is
the reason for the "non-intervertion" clause.
-- And while we are not very flexible on the language for
clarification, we would defer to General Torrijos as to the
best time and mechanism for making public this clarification.
-- Lastly, there remains the problem of trying to ensure
that no new discrepancies emerge. It's important for
Torrijos to recognize the problems we will have if the
Panamanians interpret the treaties differently than the
way we do.
Ham
J
Coor d 10 State
CONFIDENTIAL
TO:
PRESIDENT CARTER
FROM:
HAMILTON JORDAN N.J.
RE:
MORNING MEETING WITH TORRIJOS
Along with Bob Pastor (NSC) and Terrence Todman, I had
breakfast and a two hour meeting with Torrijos this
morning. There were several things that were said that
you should know about.
He is in this country in route to the Mideast and
Western Europe. He is obviously trying to balance his
trip earlier this year to Libya that was highly publi-
cized.
He is obviously very interested in the political sit-
uation here as regards to ratification, and I tried to
DECLASSIFIED
PER 7/2-190 NYC HrRE MR-NLC-40-26
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
BY Day NARS. DATE 1/32/91
Electrostatic Copy Made
fre Preservation Purposes
give him a pragmatic assessment of the political
situation in the Senate. I told them that our hope
was still for an early vote on the treaty although we
were less optimistic about this because of Senator
Byrd's recent statements.
I outlined for him the things we were doing to insure
ratification and spent some time reviewing the process
by which the Senate would review the treaty. I tried
to distinguish for him the difference in a "reservation"
and an "understanding" so that these terms would be
familiar to him and so that they would not overreact
politically to their mention by Senators in the process
of debating ratification.
As you know, their referendum on the treaty is in late
October. Once the referendum is over, they will have
acted officially on the treaty initialed by the two
governments. This will leave Torrijos in the position
of having to go back to his people for their additional
approval if a "reservation" is added or agreed to by
the Senate the first of the year. Torrijos said it
will even be difficult to refrain from responding
officially to an "understanding" if that "understanding"
states in very explicit terms things that were only
implied in the treaty already signed.
At any rate, we need to be continually mindful of the
political pressures under which Torrijos governs. He
obviously has a great deal more flexibility than we
do, but we should also understand that there are limits
to what he can do.
For the time being, I would strongly recommend the
following in terms of our own strategy:
1.
That we are opposed to all reservations. That
we believe strongly in the treaty that has been
negotiated and signed by the two countries. To
suggest that we would even consider a "reservat-
ARE
ion" at this point suggests that we^ready and
willing to make early political concessions.
It should also be explained that the talk of
a "reservation" jeopardizes the possibility of
a new treaty as the Panamanians would have to
vote twice on the treaty. Put more simply, you
might pose the question as to how the Senate
would feel if, after passing the treaty, they
were asked to vote a second time on a less satis-
factory treaty. The fact that Torrijos has pol-
itical problems like this underscores the fact
that he is not a dictator with total control of
his country and unresponsive to public opinion.
At the same time, we must be respectful of the
Senate right to add reservations, but you should
make clear to them the process by which you
would agree to such an act.
2.
That we are opposed generally to the addition
of numerous "understandings" and would only
look favorably on those that were necessary to
clarify the true meaning of the treaty and the
intentions of both countries. Again, to look
favorably on "understandings" suggests a willing-
ness on our part to compromise early and ignores
the political realities that face Torrijos. We
were only able to get a treaty because our defense
rights after the year 2000 were implied and not
explicit. If the opponents choose to state those
rights explicitly, it will probably pick us up
the votes in the Senate that we will need to win
ratification. It obviously will create major pol-
itical problems for Torrijos.
I posed the question as to whether General Torrijos
might approve personally any "understanding" or
even a "reservation" if it did not change sub-
stantively the meaning of the treaty and in that
way avoid the need for a possible second referen-
dum in Panama. He laughed and said that it was
impossible for him to be a "democratic leader" for
the first referendum and a "dictator" for the second.
In summary, I suspect the General has more political flex-
ibility than he allows at this point, but we should not
ignore the political situation he faces in his own
NOR
country
assume his willingness and/or ability to
go along with any "understanding" or "reservation" the
Senate might attach. Therefore, we should be very cautious
in our public comments to discourage the idea of adding
"reservations" or "understandings".
My own sense of the thing is that we will probably have
to agree to some "understandings" in the final stages
to secure enough votes for passage, and that at that point
it can be explained to Torrijos in a manner that he will
find satisfactory. The addition of any "reservations"
will require him to go back to his people and could be a
major obstacle to getting a treaty. We should just keep
his political situation in mind as well as our own as
we go into the final stretch.
More importantly, we should take - for the time being -
a hard line in opposition to any "reservations" and dis-
courage Byrd and others from talking about them.
P.S. Bob Thompson memo which follows explors
these legalisms further.
Warren Christopher's Evening Report
October 1, 1977
Canal Treaties. During last week's Senate Foreign
Relations Committee hearings, two broad issues surfaced
on which I want to make recommendations today.
(a) Releasing Documents. The first issue concerns
Senator Baker's request that the Administration provide
the Committee with all its records concerning the treaty
negotiations. Be asked specifically for minutes of the
negotiations with the Panamanians, cables, internal
position papers, and communications between you, Cy
and our negotiators.
We have quickly reviewed the historical precedents
and can find no case in which the Executive Branch has
released to the Senate the full and confidential record
of treaty negotiations or the record of its internal
deliberations. There are cases, beginning with the Jay
Treaty in 1796, in which the President has refused such
requests. Over the years, Presidents have endeavored to
resolve disputes with Congress over provision of documents
by practical accommodations, including summaries and
briefings, but have resorted to the exercise of executive
privilege where necessary.
It is our recommendation that the Administration
I gree
should not release the minutes of the negotiating ses-
sions. We have a clear understanding with the
Panamanians that the negotiations are to be kept
confidential and, moreover, the precedent set by their
release could cause massive future problems. We also
recommend that a storn position be taken against the
release of any Presidential documents (e.g., PRM 1).
DECLASSIFIED
E.0.12958, Sec.3.6
SECRET.
GDS
PER 8/31/00 NSC RE NLC-00-128
BY allen NARS. DATE 6/26/03
SECRET
SECRET
- 2 -
As a matter of constitutional practice and conduct
oh, but
of foreign affairs, it is very tempting to turn down
Baker's request. But a flat refusal could lead him to
oppose the treaties and might well lead to Senate re-
jection of them. Therefore, it is recommended that we
Be
&
respond to Senator Baker's request by the following:
(i) offer a full briefing to Senator Baker, or any other
Senator, on any aspect of the treaties in which they are
consentive
interested, (ii) provide summaries, on a confidential
basis, of the minutes of the negotiating sessions
beginning with the Tack/Kissinger Principles of 1974
where specifically requested, and (iii) provide care-
fully controlled access to defined categories of
negotiating documents such as position papers exchanged
between the parties since 1974. On the latter two points,
we would need to get the concurrence of the Panamanians,
and also insist that the summaries and documents not be
published.
(b) Interpretation of the Treaties. As a result
of questions raised by Senators Baker, Stone and others,
it is apparent that it will be important to try to resolve
several questions of interpretation which have arisen.
Some but not all of these questions arise from the
August 19 and 22 statements of Panamanian negotiator
Escobar. The principal questions appear to relate to
neutrality, "intervention," and expeditious passage.
I recommend that we begin to explore the possibility
need
of an interpretive exchange of notes, and I met with
Ambassador Bunker this afternoon to ask that he and Sol
to I have
start the process. There are several delicate issues
involved. Torrijos may be reluctant to agree publicly
t.o our interpretations prior to his October 23 plebiscite.
Moreover, an early exchange would be subject to the risk
that new questions of interpretation may arise as Senate
consideration of the treaties proceeds, and it might
clare
also fied
not be possible to have a further exchange which ad-
drossed them. On the other hand, an exchange of notes
after the plebiscite could be open to challenge as not
being binding on the Panamanians. After we have given
further consideration to these matters of timing and
substance and tested the water with the Panamanians,
we will make specific recommendations to you.
SECRET
SECRET
10 Moulton Street, Cambridge, Massachusetts 02138
Cambridge Survey Research
An Analysis of Public Attitudes
Toward
The Panama Canal Treaties
Prepared for
The Democratic National Committee
An Analysis of Public Attitudes
Toward
The Panama Canal Treaties
Prepared for
The Democratic National Committee
CSR #970
October 1977
STRICTLY CONF IDENTIAL
DETERMINED TO MIE BE AN ADMINISTRATIVE DATE 7/1/87
MARKING BY
MONITION
As with any survey, the release of selected figures
from this report without the analysis that explains
their meaning would be damaging to us. Therefore,
we reserve the right to correct any erroneous or
misleading release of this data in any medium through
the release of correct data or analysis.
Cambridge Survey Research
TABLE OF CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION
Methodology
3
Notes on analysis
4
Maps
6-8
OVERVIEW AND SUMMARY OF FINDINGS
9
THE BASIC QUESTION
12
Reasons for support or opposition
17
Testing arguments
24
Defense issue
38
The partisan relationship
43
Positive and negative sentiment on implications
of the treaty
46
Attitudes of treaty supporters
46
Attitudes of treaty opposers
50
Attitudes of the undecideds
53
CHANGING THE PUBLIC'S MIND
56
Potential impacts on voters' attitudes toward the
treaty
56
Potential impacts on treaty supporters
57
Potential impacts on treaty opposers
59
Potential impacts on the undecideds
62
APPENDIX
&
Cambridge Survey Research
National
-2-
This report presents and discusses the results of a poll
taken of a sample of the American public on their feelings
about the proposed Panama Canal Treaty. Results presented
here are based on 1000 telephone interviews with people who
voted in the 1976 Presidential election. The interviews were
conducted between October 5th and October 9th prior to President
Carter's meetings with General Torrijos.
Cambridge Survey Research
National
-3-
Methodology
The methods used in conducting this survey were the same
professional ones used in all Cambridge Survey Research work.
The most important points to remember are:
1. The sample was designed to reflect the
actual voting behavior of Americans in the
November general election. To this end,
interviews were conducted at several different
geographically selected locations around
the country.
2. All the interviews were conducted by trained,
professional interviewers under the supervision
of the Cambridge Survey Research field staff.
A number of interviews were validated to insure
honest and accurate completion.
3. All the interviews were returned to Cambridge
where they were coded and compiled using modern
data processing methods.
Cambridge Survey Research
National
-4-
4. This analysis represents our attempt to
extract the most meaningful and interesting
data from a great mass of facts. Obviously,
various points covered in the analysis may
be of greater or lesser interest to various
readers. We are always prepared to furnish
supplementary analysis on any points of
particular interest.
Notes on analysis
It will be helpful to keep several points in mind:
1. An asterisk (*) by a row or column of
figures indicates that the numbers
are based on a sample size too small to
be entirely reliable and, thus, conclusions
based on them should be treated with
caution. This does not mean that the
figures are wrong, but that an insufficient
number of interviews makes it impossible to
show that they are definitely right for the
area.
Cambridge Survey Research
National
-5-
2. In demographic tables, the number in
parentheses after a designation, [e.g.,
Democrats (55) 1, shows the percentage that
the group represents in the overall
population.
3. Maps showing the areas used in the analysis
follows these notes on analysis.
4. An Appendix follows the body of this
report.
Cambridge Survey Research
MAINE
MONTANA
CANADA
NORTH DAROTA
WINNESOTA
IDANO
OREGON
MICH.
CANADA
WISCONSIN
NV
0
Northeast
SOUTH DAROTA
MICHIGAN
WYOMING
CW YORK
CALIFORNIA
PERRSYLVANIA
NLVADA
IOWA
MEDRASKA
ILLINOIS
UTAH
NOIANA
OHIO
Midlands
Industrial
nt
COLORADO
VIRGINIA
MISSOURI
VIAGINIA
RANSAS
Central
KENTUCKY
Pacific
NORTH CAROLINA
ARIZONA
NEW MEXICO
OXLAHOMA
TENNESSEE
TEXAS
ARKANSAS.
S.
CAROLINA
MISSISSIPPI ALABAMA GEORGIA
LOUISIANA
South
ALASHA
FLORIDA
MEXICO
HAWAR
-
-
-
:
MALE - sale
MAINE
WASHINGTON
CANADA
MONTANA
NORTH DAKOTA
MINNESOTA
DAHO
CANADA
MICH.
New Bngland
OREGON
WISCONSIN
No
0
New
SCHM
SOUTH DAKOTA
MICHIGAN
NEW YORK
York
COME
WYOMING
CALIFORNIA CALH
IDWA
NEVADA
NEDRASKA
ILLINOIS
INDIANA OHIO
UTAH
$
Midwest
Industrial
VIRGINIA
COLORADO
VIRGINIALS
MISSOURI
West
Border
KANSAS
KENTUCKY
BORTH CAROLINA
ARIZONA
NEW MEXICO
TENNESSEE
California
OKLAHOMA
AHKANSAS
CAROLINA
CLONGIA
MISSISSIPPI ALABAMA
South
LOUISIANA
ALASHA
FLORIDA
MEXICO
NAWAM
the
---
PARK
SCALE - MARK
1. (upe or repreduce this applicated map. of any pertion theiref, t, any method. including office
100,00
-
for
probable
01
company
...
01
-
11
-
MAINE
MONTANA
CANADA
HORIN DAKOTA
MINNESOTA
DAHO
ORIGON
MICH.
CANADA
WISCONSIN
N2
0
SOUTH DAKOTA
MICHIGAN
STATE
WYOMING
NEW YORK
CORN.
CALIFORNIA
PENNSYLVANIA
VADADA
IOWA
THEURASKA
ILLINOIS
UTAH
INDIANA
OHIO
MO
COLORADO
VIRGINIA
MISSOURI
VIRGINIAL
ANSAS
Rocky Mountains
XENTUCKY
NORTH CAROLINA
ARIZONA
NEW MEXICO
OKLAHOMA
TENNESSEE
TEXAS
ARXANSAS.
CAROLINA
GEORGIA
MISSISSIPPI ALABAMA
LOUISIANA
ALASHA
FLORIDA
MEXICO
HAWAN
0
ETT.
-
-
----
8
-
-
SCALE - -
200
(,
-
1a " or reproduce this map. on thereof o, ,,, nctuding office
for
will
National
-9-
Overview and Summary of Findings
Overall, American voters tend to oppose the treaty
by nearly a two-to-one majority. Fifty-five percent of the
voters questioned said they were opposed to the treaty,
compared with 30% who favor it. The remainder (15%) indicated
they had not formed a decision. Strongest opposition to the
treaty comes from Republicans, conservatives and those with
an unfavorable opinion of President Carter. Support tends to
be concentrated in the younger, better-educated, upper-income
segments of the population.
The primary reason for opposing the treaty is the feeling
that it is seen as a "give away" of American property. Supporters,
on the other hand, tend to feel that the Canal rightfully belongs
to the Panamanians.
While there is concern among those who oppose the treaty
that giving up the Canal will impair U.S. security, the feeling
does not appear to be overwhelmingly strong.
While opposition to the treaty is widespread, neither
opposition nor support appear to be deeply rooted views. For
example, 43% of those who favor the treaty and 49% of those who
oppose it indicates that they really don't know enough about the
issue to make an informed judgment.
Cambridge Survey Research
National
-10-
Pressed for their reasons for opposing the treaty, 49%
say that they feel that it represents a "give away" of
American property. By contrast, only 5% name national
security as a reason for not giving it up. The pattern
overall is that those who oppose the treaty can see no good
reason to give up the Canal and, since they feel it is
rightfully ours, believe we should keep it. Those who favor
the treaty feel that the Canal is rightfully the property
of Panama and, because they see no real reasons for keeping
it, we should give it up.
A substantial indication that voters' views on the issue
do not tend to be adamant comes from the fact that, during the
course of the interview, 15% of the respondent's changed their
views on the issue. While most of those who changed were
among those who were undecided at the beginning, 15% of those
who initially favored and 8% of those who initially opposed
the treaty reversed their positions.
To the extent that the survey contains good news it is
twofold. First, the issue does not seem to be all that important
to the average American voter , given his admitted lack of
knowledge and the ease with which opinions seem to be changed.
Secondly, it is possible to change the views of a fair number
of voters who oppose the Canal treaty.
Cambridge Survey Research
National
-11-
The bad news, however, is that the position of those
who favor the treaty is even more weakly held than that of
the opposition. For every voter who came to favor the treaty
during the course of the interview, one also came to oppose
it.
Cambridge Survey Research
National
-12-
The Basic Question
To find out the level of support for the treaty today,
we asked the American people, based on what they knew about
the treaty, whether they favored or opposed it. Our findings
reflect that a majority of Americans today oppose the treaty,
with less than one-third reporting that they favor it.
From what you do know about the treaty, do you
generally favor or oppose it?
Favor
30%
Don't know
15
Oppose
55
The following tables show the demographic breakdowns for
this response, from which the following patterns emerge.
1. Strongest political support for the treaty
come from Democrats, the liberally inclined,
those favorable to Carter and those who think
Carter is doing a good job.
2. Strongest opposition comes among Republicans,
conservatives and Carter detractors.
Cambridge Survey Research
National
-13-
3. Professionals, college graduates, those in
high-income categories, and thirty-five years old
and under are more inclined to favor the treaty
than other groups. Conversely, anti-treaty
sentiment is highest among older Americans,
the poor, and less-educated segments of the
population.
4. Regionally, strongest support for the treaty
is evidenced by residents of the Northeast and
Pacific regions, while the South and Central
regions show stronger-than-average opposition.
Cambridge Survey Research
National
-14-
From what you do know about the treaty do you generally
favor or oppose it?
Favor
Don't know
Oppose
Overall
30%
15
55
Party preference
Democrat (54)
34
16
51
Independent (24)
31
14
55
Republican (21)
24
13
63
Political ideology
Liberal (26)
43
11
46
Moderate (29)
37
14
49
Conservative (37)
22
15
63
Carter rating
Favorable (74)
38
16
46
Unfavorable (17)
15
10
76
Can't rate (9)
12
15
73
Carter performance rating
Excellent (7)
43
21
35
Good (49)
39
15
46
Only fair (34)
21
15
65
Poor (8)
8
5
87
Don't know) 2) *
22
70
8
Sex
Female (51)
30
17
53
Male (49)
31
12
57
Race
White (88)
29
14
57
Black (10)
38
18
44
Occupation
Professional (5)
46
12
41
White collar (18)
30
13
57
Blue collar (25)
31
14
55
Government (6)
31
20
50
Teacher (4) *
52
16
31
Self-employed (7)
16
17
68
Retired (24)
23
15
63
Cambridge Survey Research
National
-15-
From what you do know about the treaty
(continued
Favor
Don't know
Oppose
Education
Some grade school (13)
21
26
53
Some high school (16)
26
15
60
Graduated high school (32)
27
14
59
Technical/vocational (4) *
10
11
78
Some college (18)
29
16
54
Graduated college (10)
38
13
49
Graduate/professional (7)
51
8
41
Religion
Protestant (57)
28
14
58
Catholic (30)
30
18
52
Jewish (3) *
30
16
54
Other (5)
38
5
57
None (4) *
44
13
43
Total household income
$0-3,999 (8)
16
27
57
$4-6,999 (9)
18
12
71
$7-9,999 (12)
37
14
50
$10-12,999 (12)
28
17
55
$13-14,999 (10)
33
9
58
$15-19,999 (15)
32
12
56
$20-24,999 (11)
33
12
55
Over $25,000 (10)
41
12
47
Union membership
Respondent (17)
40
9
51
Family member (12)
43
21
36
No member (71)
27
14
58
Age group
18-25 (10)
43
15
42
26-35 (20)
38
17
45
36-45 (18)
31
14
55
46-55 (17)
32
17
51
56-65 (18)
17
13
71
Over 65 (19)
21
13
67
Cambridge Survey Research
National
-16-
From what you do know about the treaty
(continued)
Favor
Don't know
Oppose
Areas
Northeast (15)
39
10
51
Industrial (25)
31
17
52
Midlands (15)
21
27
52
South (19)
27
13
60
Central (14)
24
11
65
Pacific (13)
40
13
48
Areas
California (10)
42
13
44
West (12)
27
11
62
New York (9)
40
12
49
South (14)
28
13
60
Industrial (27)
30
20
50
Border (8)
25
10
65
New England (6)
39
8
54
Midlands (13)
22
21
57
Cambridge Survey Research
National
-17-
Reasons for support or opposition
The strongest argument for supporting the treaty
among those that favor it, is that the Canal really belongs
to Panama. Other reasons that had moderate margins of support
include the position that returning the Canal to Panama is
the only fair thing to do, and that it is not really that
valuable or strategic to the United States anyway. Others see
it as a way to prevent communism by showing the World and
South America that the United States is a fair country.
Why do you take that position in regards to the Panama
Canal?
It belongs to Panama
32%
The right, fair thing to do
12
Not valuable or strategic
6
Show U.S. is fair, prevent communism
5
Fair to both sides
4
President knows what he's doing,
Carter's right
4
We stole it, should give it back
3
Not necessary
2
Both sides happy
1
Other
20
Don't know
11
Cambridge Survey Research
National
-18-
The reason most often cited for opposing the Canal treaty
among respondents who felt that way was the amount of money
the United States had invested in the Canal -- the idea that
because we paid for it, we have a right to it. Other responses
by treaty antagonists had to do with the security issue: the
fear of a Communist takeover and the need to protect the U.S.
Why do you take that position in regard to the Panama Canal?
U.S. spent too much in money/ lives to
give it up
18%)
U.S. should keep it
11 )
It's ours, belongs to us
9 )- - 49%
We built it, we should keep it
8 )
Why should U.S. give away everything?
3 )
Vital to our security
5
The commies will take over
4
You can't trust the Panamanians
4
U.S. might need it again, need it, need it
for trade
4
Cost U.S. too much to use in future
3
U.S. can take care of it better
3
U.S. might lose access to it
2
Unstable government in Panama
1
Other
13
Don't know
11
Cambridge Survey Research
National
-19-
Though most Americans had an opinion on the issue, we
were also interested in finding out how informed people felt
themselves to be about the Panama Canal treaty. Interestingly,
the majority of Americans felt they were not in a position to
make an informed judgment about it.
Do you feel that you are currently informed enough about
the Panama Canal treaty to make an informed judgment
about it?
Yes
43%
Not sure
6
No
51
Demographically, as the following table shows, Democrats,
liberals, Carter supporters and the young feel less informed
than their counterparts on the treaty. However, those in the
upper-income groups, the better-educated and residents of the
Pacific states -- some segments of the population that tended
to report favorably toward the treaty -- feel they are
sufficiently familiar with the issue to make such a judgment.
Among those who feel they are not informed enough, blacks,
those in blue collar occupations, lower-income groups and
residents of the Midlands are least informed of all.
Cambridge Survey Research
National
-20-
Do you feel that you are currently informed enough about the
Panama Canal treaty to make an informed judgement about it?
Yes
Not sure
No
Overall
43%
6
51
Party preference
Democrat (54)
38
7
56
Independent (24)
49
6
45
Republican (21)
49
4
48
Political ideology
Liberal (26)
41
4
56
Moderate (29)
50
6
45
Conservative (37)
45
7
49
Opinion of treaty
Favor (30)
49
8
43
Don't know (15)
15
12
73
Oppose (55)
48
3
49
Carter rating
Favorable (74)
40
7
54
Unfavorable (17)
55
4
41
Can't rate (9)
36
5
59
Carter performance rating
Excellent (7)
48
6
45
Good (49)
40
7
53
Only fair (34)
42
5
52
Poor (8)
64
3
34
Don't know (2) *
30
-
70
Sex
Female (51)
38
8
54
Male (49)
50
3
47
Race
White (88)
46
5
49
Black (10)
28
6
66
Cambridge Survey Research
National
-21-
Do you feel
informed enough about the Panama Canal
(Continued)
Yes
Not sure
No
Occupation
Professional (5)
45
5
50
White collar (18)
48
6
47
Blue collar (25)
37
3
59
Government (6)
51
2
48
Teacher (4) *
41
13
46
Self-employed (7)
45
9
46
Retired (24)
41
8
52
Education
Some grade school (13)
36
11
54
Some high school (16)
27
11
62
Graduated high school (32)
42
6
52
Technical/vocational (4) *
59
4
38
Some college (18)
45
3
52
Graduated college (10)
54
3
43
Graduate/professional (7)
53
3
44
Religion
Protestant (57)
46
4
50
Catholic (30)
44
7
50
Jewish (3) *
29
13
58
Other (5)
38
6
57
None (4) *
37
11
52
Total household income
$0-3,999 (8)
42
21
37
$4-6,999 (9)
39
11
51
$7-9,999 (12)
35
5
60
$10-12,999 (12)
34
--
66
$13-14,999 (10)
52
3
45
$15-19,999 (15)
51
3
46
$20-24,999 (11)
45
2
53
Over $25,000 (10)
54
2
44
Union membership
Respondent (17)
47
4
50
Family member (12)
32
11
57
No member (71)
46
5
50
Cambridge Survey Research
National
-22-
Do you feel
informed enough about the Panama Canal
(Continued)
Yes
Not sure
No
Age group
18-25 (10)
40
4
56
26-35 (20)
39
4
57
36-45 (18)
51
7
42
46-55 (17)
47
6
47
56-65 (18)
41
6
53
Over 65 (19)
46
6
48
Areas
Northeast (15)
45
6
50
Industrial (25)
43
9
48
Midlands (15)
31
4
65
South (19)
42
4
54
Central (14)
45
4
50
Pacific (13)
56
5
39
Areas
California (10)
60
7
33
West (12)
49
1
50
New York (9)
43
3
53
South (14)
42
4
54
Industrial (27)
39
10
52
Border (8)
46
4
50
New England (6)
47
9
45
Midlands (13)
36
6
59
Cambridge Survey Research
National
-23-
We asked those Americans who were unsure or who felt they
were not adequately informed with regard to the treaty, what
additional information they would need to arrive at a
conclusive decision. Most responded that they would simply
like more details in general, and increased media coverage
specifically. Smaller numbers were interested in learning the
reactions of Panamanians to the treaty and its implications
for the United States.
What additional information would you most like to
have to help you make a decision?
General information
19%
More things published
12
Points of the treaty
9
More TV coverage
6
Rights, controls U.S. will have
5
How Panamanians feel, alternatives
will accept
4
The truth
3
Neutrality issue, degree of U.S.
intervention
2
Cost to U.S. of future use of Canal
2
Amount of U.S. investment in
Panama lost by treaty
2
Other
12
Don't know
24
Cambridge Survey Research
National
-24-
Further, we looked to see whether lack of information
correlated in any way with anti-treaty sentiment. While over
one-half of the respondents who feel they lack sufficient
knowledge on the issue oppose the treaty, the remarkable
finding here is that 61% of those who feel sufficiently
informed also oppose it.
Opinion of treaty
Favor
Don't know
Oppose
Overall
30%
15
55
Informed enough:
Yes
34%
5
61
No
26%
21
53
Testing arguments
To elicit more specific reactions and fears about the
Panama Canal treaty, we posed a set of statements to respondents
and asked them to tell us to what degree they felt each of the
statements to be true or false. In every instance, we found
that the majority of respondents were more likely to claim as
false those statements which suggested that the United States
would lose face if the treaty was not ratified.
Cambridge Survey Research
National
-25-
Americans tend to reject the idea, for instance, that other
countries will no longer trust the President's ability to
negotiate, or that internal unrest in Panama will ensue if the
treaty is not ratified. Further, the majority was inclined
to disbelieve that the U.S. would no longer be trusted by
other Latin American countries, or that failure to ratify the
treaty would result in communist charges of U.S. imperialism.
On the other hand, pluralities also reject the idea that
ratification of the treaty will have a negative impact on the
world's image of the United States. For though a majority of
Americans may oppose the treaty, they do not believe, by a
two-to-one margin, that the Canal treaty implies that the
United States is growing weak and can no longer play a strong
role in world affairs. Nor does a majority perceive the treaty
as an indication that any little dictatorship can kick the U.S.
around: nor would a majority be willing to send American troops
into the Canal zone to fight guerrillas. (Though a surprising
number would).
The pattern that seems to emerge is that while the majority
of Americans see no major disadvantage to ratification of the
treaty, they see no advantages either. In fact, a significant
58% of Americans believe that the Canal is a giveaway of
American property, for which they see little in return.
Cambridge Survey Research
National
-26-
Moreover, confidence in Carter's judgment on the issue as
sufficient reason for ratification -- while at the 40% level --
is rejected by a larger margin. It would appear that no-one
-- including the President -- has given a sizeable proportion
of Americans a persuasive argument for giving up the Canal
zone.
As to the charge that the Republican Party has seized on
opposing the treaty because it is politically advantageous for
them to do so, almost one-half of the population seem to feel
that this is true, although a sizeable minority -- 19% -- were
unsure about it.
Cambridge Survey Research
National
-27-
I'm going to read you a number of statements that have been made
about the Panama Canal issue and I'd like you to tell me whether
each statement is very true, only somewhat true, somewhat false,
or absolutely false.
Only
Very
somewhat
Somewhat
Absolutely
Don't
true
true
false
false
know
If the Senate refuses to
ratify the treaty, the
country will be hurt
because other countries
won't trust the President's
ability to negotiate.
17%
27
17
29
10
The Canal Treaty is basically
a give away of American
property.
40%
18
16
19
6
I have enough faith in Jimmy
Carter that if he says the
treaty is needed the Senate
should back him up.
22%
18
19
34
7
The Panama Canal treaty
indicates that any petty
little dictatorship can kick
the U.S. around.
25%
17
17
34
8
If we don't ratify the treaty,
there will be violence and
bloodshed in Panama.
16%
23
21
26
15
I would be willing to send
American troops to fight
against guerrillas in
the Canal zone.
25%
11
12
40
12
If we don't help Panama by
agreeing to the Canal
treaty other Latin
American countries won't
trust the United States
17%
21
19
33
10
The communists will gain a
great deal of advantage if
we don't ratify the treaty
because they will be able
to show that the U.S. is
only interested in itself
and not in other countries.
17%
18
15
42
9
The Canal treaty is just one
more symbol that the U.S. is
growing weak and can no longer
play a strong role in
world affairs.
16%
14
14
50
6
Cambridge Survey Research
National
-28-
Statements made about Panama Canal (continued)
Only
Very
somewhat
Somewhat
Absolutely
Don't
true
true
false
false
know
The Republican Party has seized
on opposing the Canal Treaty
not SO much because they
believe in it but because
they think it is too their
political advantage.
23%
24
13
22
19
The "give away" issue
When we look at support for the treaty by validity of each
statement, the sharpest polarity of viewpoints is evidenced
by the statement that the treaty is a give away of American
property. Treaty opposers see it as the most compelling argument
against the treaty. At the same time, treaty supporters are
overwhelmingly negative toward this suggestion, the implication
being that they do not consider it American property in the first
place. Those that are undecided are about evenly split on the
issue.
The Canal Treaty is basically a give away of American property.
True
Don't know
False *
Favor
23%
5
72
Don't know
40%
18
42
Oppose
82%
4
14
* For ease of presentation, we have collapsed the scale into a
true-false dichotomy.
Cambridge Survey Research
National
-29-
Looking at the demographic breakdowns which follow,
"give away" sentiment is highest among lower-income groups,
the poor, blue collar workers, and older citizens. Residents
of the Central states moreover are much more likely to see
giving up of the Canal Zone as a loss of U.S. property than
other areas.
Those who reject the idea most fervently are liberals,
the college-educated and professional people. Moreover,
residents of the Northeast and Pacific regions -- while still
more inclined than not see the Canal as belonging to the United
States -- are more apt to reject this idea than all other
geographic groups.
From a partisan point of view, there is some indication that
feelings about the "give away" issue and feelings toward the
Administration are inextricably linked. A very high proportion
of Republicans (69%) and Conservatives (69%) see the treaty as
An American give away. Further, over three-quarters of those
unfavorable to Carter perceive the treaty as a hand-out.
Conversely, higher-than-average proportions of Democrats,
Independents, liberals, moderates, and those favorable to Carter
agree with the notion that the United States is not giving anything
away. In addition, there is a linear relationship between giving
Carter a favorable performance ratng and being less inclined to
perceive the treaty as a give away.
Cambridge Survey Research
National
-30-
The Canal treaty is basically a give away of American property.
True
Don't know
False
Overall
58%
6
36
Party preference
Democrat (54)
56
7
37
Independent (24)
55
5
40
Republican (21)
69
4
27
Political ideology
Liberal (26)
44
8
48
Moderate (29)
53
7
40
Conservative (37)
69
3
29
Opinion of treaty
Favor (30)
23
5
72
Don't know (15)
40
18
42
Oppose (55)
82
4
14
Carter rating
Favorable (74)
50
6
44
Unfavorable (17)
76
5
19
Can't rate (9)
72
11
17
Carter performance rating
Excellent (7)
46
7
47
Good (49)
49
6
45
Only fair (34)
67
6
27
Poor (8)
85
4
11
Don't know (2) *
--
41
59
Sex
Female (51)
61
6
33
Male (49)
56
6
38
Race
White (88)
59
6
35
Black (10)
52
11
38
Cambridge Survey Research
National
-31-
Canal treaty is basically a give away (continued)
True
Don't know
False
Occupation
Professional (5)
47
2
51
White collar (18)
52
3
45
Blue collar (25)
63
9
28
Government (6)
56
2
42
Teacher (4) *
39
--
62
Self-employed (7)
70
4
26
Retired (24)
66
11
23
Education
Some grade school (13)
67
17
16
Some high school (16)
64
10
25
Graduated high school (32)
63
7
30
Technical/vocational (4) *
73
--
27
Some college (18)
59
3
39
Graduated college (10)
47
2
51
Graduate/professional (7)
38
8
54
Religion
Protestant (57)
59
6
35
Catholic (30)
62
6
33
Jewish (3) *
43
--
57
Other (5)
65
--
35
None (4) *
44
11
46
Total household income
$0-3,999 (8)
69
12
20
$4-6,999 (9)
72
8
20
$7-9,999 (12)
48
8
44
$10-12,999 (12)
59
3
37
$13-14,999 (10)
64
3
34
$15-19,999 (15)
54
8
38
$20-24,999 (11)
51
4
45
Over $25,000 (10)
54
1
46
Union membership
Respondent (17)
63
7
30
Family member (12)
54
5
42
No member (71)
58
6
36
Cambridge Survey Research
National
-32-
Canal treaty is basically a give away (continued)
True
Don't know
False
Age group
18-25 (10)
56
4
40
26-35 (20)
50
2
48
36-45 (18)
58
5
36
46-55 (17)
47
6
47
56-65 (18)
70
9
21
Over 65 (19)
68
10
22
Areas
Northeast (15)
53
2
45
Industrial (25)
62
7
31
Midlands (15)
61
6
34
South (19)
52
9
39
Central (14)
66
5
29
Pacific (13)
49
10
41
Areas
California (10)
47
9
44
West (12)
62
4
34
New York (9)
51
1
47
South (14)
61
5
35
Industrial (27)
62
6
31
Border (8)
60
9
32
New England (6)
55
4
41
Midlands (13)
56
11
32
Cambridge Survey Research
National
- 33-
In a further attempt to measure respondents' sentiment
about the rights of the United States to the Canal Zone, we
suggest to respondents that seventy-five years after taking
the Canal Zone from Panama, that it was only fair and an
indication of U.S. magnamity, that we now return it to Panama.
The majority of respondents, however, didn't buy the belief
that the U.S. had stolen the Canal Zone or that it was time
to give it back.
Seventy-five years after taking the Canal Zone from
Panama, it is only fair and just, and a sign that we
are a great nation, that we return it to Panama.
Strongly agree
17%)
-
34%
Somewhat agree
17 )
Somewhat disagree
18)_
-
58%
Strongly disagree
40 )
Don't know
8
When we look at this response by reactions to the treaty,
again we find that a vast majority of those opposed to the
treaty -- and a significant plurality of the undecideds ---
believe the United States should not return the Canal Zone
to Panama. On the other hand, almost three-quarters of those
who support the treaty agree that giving it back is the only
fair thing to do.
Cambridge Survey Research
National
-34-
Those who hold treaty position:
Agree
Don't know
Disagree
Favor
74%
5
21
Don't know
30%
23
48
Oppose
14%
81
6
As the following demographic tables show, similar patterns
emerge for this question as for the previous one, with
staunchest support for keeping the Canal Zone coming from
Republicans, conservatives, and those with anti-Carter sentiments.
In addition, poorer Americans, older citizens, and residents
of the South and Central regions hold stronger reservations than
other groups about giving back the Canal Zone.
Again, those in the higher socio-economic groups, Democrats,
liberals, Carter admirers, and residents of the Northeast and
Pacific states are more inclined to feel that the Canal Zone
belongs to the Panamanians
Cambridge Survey Research
National
- 35-
Seventy-five years after taking the Canal Zone from Panama, it
is only fair and just, and a sign that we are a great Nation,
that we return it to Panama.
Strongly
Somewhat
Somewhat
Strongly
Don't
agree
agree
disagree
disagree
know
Overall
17%
17
18
40
8
Party preference
Democrat (54)
19
20
18
35
8
Independent (24)
16
16
17
42
9
Republican (21)
14
14
21
45
7
Political ideology
Liberal (26)
27
24
18
25
6
Moderate (29)
14
20
16
39
12
Conservative (37)
13
15
18
49
6
Opinion of treaty
Favor (30)
42
32
12
9
5
Don't know (15)
11
19
18
30
23
Oppose (55)
5
9
22
59
5
Carter rating
Favorable (74)
21
21
18
32
9
Unfavorable (17)
8
9
18
59
6
Can't rate (9)
9
11
21
49
9
Carter performance rating
Excellent (7)
22
26
8
36
8
Good (49)
24
20
23
26
8
Only fair (34)
10
15
17
49
9
Poor (8)
5
--
13
80
2
Don't know (2)*
51
--
8
--
41
Sex
Female (51)
16
20
18
37
9
Male (49)
18
14
18
43
7
Race
White (88)
15
17
19
42
8
Black (10)
23
22
19
26
10
Cambridge Survey Research
National
-36-
it is only fair and just that we return (the canal) to
Panama. (Continued)
Strongly
Somewhat
Somewhat
Strongly
Don't
agree
agree
disagree
disagree
know
Occupation
Professional (5)
13
28
21
34
3
White collar (18)
20
16
19
37
8
Blue collar (25)
18
18
22
33
9
Government (6)
19
14
23
35
10
Teacher (4) *
19
37
2
37
6
Self-employed (7)
8
13
17
61
1
Retired (24)
13
14
9
53
11
Education
Some grade school (13)
21
17
10
45
8
Some high school (16)
12
15
10
47
17
Graduated high school (32)
14
18
18
44
7
Technical/vocational (4) *
3
16
40
41
--
Some college (18)
21
17
23
35
5
Graduated college (10)
15
22
18
38
8
Graduate/professional (7)
28
16
17
30
9
Religion
Protestant (57)
16
17
19
39
9
Catholic (30)
15
17
18
35
6
Jewish (3) *
10
13
15
48
14
Other (5)
29
8
30
27
5
None (4) *
23
28
10
32
7
Total household income
$0-3,999 (8)
17
16
10
55
2
$4-6,999 (9)
13
12
15
48
13
$7-9,999 (12)
20
13
35
26
6
$10-12,999 (12)
18
17
13
43
9
$13-14,999 (10)
19
14
22
40
6
$15-19,999 (15)
14
21
21
38
6
$20-24,999 (11)
15
22
17
40
6
Over $25,000 (10)
21
20
16
36
8
Union membership
Respondent (17)
21
15
19
40
6
Family member (12)
18
22
15
36
9
No member (71)
16
17
18
41
8
Cambridge Survey Research
National
-37- -
if is only fair and just
that we return (the canal) to
Panama (Continued)
Strongly
Somewhat
Somewhat
Strongly
Don't
agree
agree
disagree
disagree
know
Age group
18-25 (10)
24
25
24
24
4
26-35 (20)
20
22
25
30
3
36-45 (18)
17
17
14
45
6
46-55 (17)
21
14
21
31
13
56-65 (18)
11
12
13
51
13
Over 65 (19)
11
13
11
57
10
Areas
Northeast (15)
24
19
14
39
3
Industrial (25)
17
19
20
37
8
Midlands (15)
11
14
16
43
17
South (19)
14
17
17
45
8
Central (14)
22
8
22
42
6
Pacific (13)
16
27
20
29
9
Areas
California (10)
16
28
15
33
8
West (12)
25
8
25
35
7
New York (9)
26
20
13
40
1
South (14)
14
17
16
44
9
Industrial (27)
17
17
20
37
9
Border (8)
13
19
18
45
5
New England (6)
22
19
16
38
6
Midlands (13)
10
14
20
43
13
Cambridge Survey Research
National
-38-
Defense issue
A major reason for this sentiment would appear to be that
many people feel that the Canal Zone is still vital to the
defense of the United States. Even when given a choice of
statements, one of which indicated that the Canal is now too
small for many of U.S. vessels -- and consequently no longer
important -- a majority of respondents still opted for retaining
the Canal zone as necessary for the protection of the United
States.
Vital to U.S. defense
58%
No longer important
34
Don't know
7
When we look at this response by support for the treaty,
it is not surprising to find that almost three-quarters of
treaty opposers feel the Canal zone is still strategically
necessary. It is significant that a plurality of the undecided
respondents feel this way also.
Vital
Don't know
No longer important
Treaty position:
Favor
34%
6
59
Don't know
48%
17
34
Oppose
74%
5
20
Cambridge Survey Research
National
-39-
Demographic breakdowns of this response, as the following
table shows, reinforces many of the patterns we have seen
previously, with the same segment of the population invariably
more inclined to opt for keeping the Canal.
Cambridge Survey Research
National
-40-
Which of these two statements is closer to your opinion: retaining the Canal
and Canal Zone is vital to the defence of the United States, or while it
might once have been of vital importance, since our big submarines and air-
craft carriers can't even fit through it, the Canal is no longer really
important to the U.S. defense?
Vital to
Not really
defense
important
to defense
Don't know
Overall
58 %
34
7
Party preference
Democrat (54)
57
36
6
Independent (24)
55
33
11
Republican (21)
63
31
5
Political ideology
Liberal (26)
45
46
8
Moderate (29)
61
33
6
Conservative (37)
64
29
6
Opinion of treaty
Favor (30)
34
59
6
Don't know (15)
48
34
17
Oppose (55)
74
20
5
Carter rating
Favorable (74)
52
38
9
Unfavorable (17)
75
22
2
Can't rate (9)
62
32
6
Carter performance rating
Excellent (7)
54
43
3
Good (49)
47
44
8
Only fair (34)
68
25
6
Poor (8)
83
14
4
Don't know (2) *
--
38
62
Sex
Female (51)
56
34
9
Male (49)
60
34
6
Race
White (88)
59
34
6
Black (10)
55
34
10
Cambridge Survey Research
National
-41-
Which of these two statements is closer to your opinion:
the Canal
is
vital to the defense
or
is no longer really important
(Continued)
Vital to
Not really import-
defense
ant to defense
Don't know
Occupation
Professional (5)
53
41
6
White collar (18)
55
40
4
Blue collar (25)
57
34
8
Government (6)
60
34
5
Teacher (4) *
42
50
8
Self-employed (7)
67
26
6
Retired (24)
67
26
7
Education
Some grade school (13)
62
24
13
Some high school (16)
64
22
13
Graduated high school (32)
63
30
6
Technical/vocational (4) * 69
27
4
Some college (18)
57
38
4
Graduated college (10)
50
46
5
Graduate/professional (7)
45
46
8
Religion
Protestant (57)
61
32
6
Catholic (30)
62
32
5
Jewish (3) *
55
36
9
Other (5)
43
41
15
None (4) *
38
57
6
Total household income
$0-3,999 (8)
56
33
10
$4-6,999 (9)
63
21
15
$7-9,999 (12)
57
32
10
$10-12,999 (12)
59
39
2
$13-14,999 (10)
58
40
1
$15-19,999 (15)
63
32
4
$20-24,999 (11)
56
38
5
Over $25,000 (10)
54
37
9
Union membership
Respondent (17)
63
31
6
Family member (12)
51
37
11
No member (71)
58
34
7
Cambridge Survey Research
National
-42- -
Which of these two statements is closer to your opinion:
the Canal
is
vital to
defense
or
is no longer really important
(Continued)
Vital to
Not really import-
defense
and to defense
Don't know
Age group
18-25 (10)
51
45
3
26-35 (20)
55
41
3
36-45 (18)
51
38
10
46-55 (17)
56
35
8
56-65 (18)
71
18
10
Over 65 (19)
65
27
7
Areas
Northeast (15)
62
32
6
Industrial (25)
53
37
9
Midlands (15)
50
36
13
South (19)
65
31
3
Central (14)
59
29
11
Pacific (13)
56
41
4
Areas
California (10)
53
44
3
West (12)
58
29
13
New York (9)
62
32
6
South (14)
66
29
4
Industrial (27)
49
40
10
Border (8)
70
29
1
New England (6)
62
31
6
Midlands (13)
55
33
11
Cambridge Survey Research
National
- 43-
The partisan relationship
As we have seen previously, a relationship exists between
feelings toward the Administration and feelings toward the
Panama Canal treaty issue. In this regard, segmentation on
the statement that best equates confidence in Carter's judgment
with the need to ratify the treaty, underscores the previous
findings. The vast majority of those who favor the treaty
agree with the statement that if Jimmy Carter says the treaty
is needed, the Senate should back him up. On the other hand,
the vast majority of those who oppose the treaty feel that the
statement is false. Interestingly, the majority of those who
are unsure about the treaty feel the statement to be true.
I have enough faith in Jimmy Carter that if he says
the treaty is needed the Senate should back him up.
True
Don't know
False
Favor
71%
7
22
Don't know
55%
18
27
Oppose
19%
5
77
Cambridge Survey Research
National
- 44-
In addition, the following, related patterns emerge:
1. A majority of those favorable to Carter (54%),
Democrats (51%) and liberals (51%) believe
the Senate should back the President up on
the treaty issue.
2. Those that give Carter an excellent performance
rating support the statement by a three-to-one
margin, while support among those that give
Carter a good rating is at the 55% level.
3. Doubts that Carter's integrity on the treaty
issue is reflected by Republicans and conservatives
by 66% and 64% respectively, and independents by
57%.
4. Not surprisingly, 71% of those that give Carter
a fair rating, and 93% of those that rate him
poorly, reject the idea that the Senate should
back him up.
Cambridge Survey Research
National
-45-
Further, a majority of those who favor the treaty are more
likely to credit the Republican Party with political motivation
for opposing the treaty rather than because the party believes
in it. Treaty opposers, however, were about evenly divided on
the issue.
The Republican Party has seized on opposing the Canal
treaty not SO much because they believe in it, but
because they think it is to their political advantage.
True
Don't know
False
Overall
46%
19
35
Favor
58%
14
28
Don't know
36%
33
31
Oppose
42%
18
40
Looking at responses to the statement along partisan-political
lines, it is not surprising to find that those respondents who
are most skeptical toward the Republican Party for their
opposition are Democrats (58%), liberals (54%), moderates (50%),
and those favorable to Carter (50%). In addition, those that
give Carter excellent and good ratings feel this is true by 60%
and 49% respectively. While the plurality of Republicans -- at
the 49% level -- feel this statement to be false even a significant
number of Republicans are critical or uncertain about their own
Party's motives.
Cambridge Survey Research
National
-46-
Positive and negative sentiment on implications of the treaty
In order to better understand voters' reasons for favoring
or opposing the Panama Canal treaty, we examined how those
who favored or opposed the treaty felt about those statements
dealing with the long- and short-term implications of treaty
ratification. The results of these analyses give a clearer
picture of both the support and opposition to the signing of
the treaty. In addition, we examined the beliefs of those
voters who are still undecided on the treaty -- the pool from
which additional public support for the President's position
is most likely to come.
I. Attitudes of treaty supporters
The following table shows how treaty supporters feel about
the pros and cons of treaty ratification. Several clear patterns
emerge from the table. First the majority of those who support
the treaty feel that failure to ratify will be detrimental to
the image of the United States -- especially in the Third World
countries.
Cambridge Survey Research
National
-47-
1. Over one-half of those who support the
treaty feel that if we don't help
Panama by agreeing to the Canal treaty,
other Latin American countries won't trust
the United States.
2. A majority also feels that if the Senate
refuses to ratify the treaty, the country
will be hurt because other countries won't
trust the President's ability to negotiate.
3. Finally, one-half of those who favor the
treaty feel that the Communists will gain
a great deal of advantage if we don't
ratify the treaty because they will be able
to show selfish motivations in U.S. foreign
policy.
In line with their idea of negative consequences if the
treaty is not ratified, treaty supporters reject wholeheartedly
the idea that the treaty is a sign of U.S. weakness.
Cambridge Survey Research
National
-48-
1. More than four-out-of-five reject the idea
that the Panama Canal treaty indicates that
any petty little dictatorship can kick the
U.S. around.
2. Also rejected by 82% of those who support
the treaty is the idea that it is just one
more sign that the U.S. is growing weak and
can no longer play a strong role in world
affairs.
While accepted by a plurality of those who support the
treaty -- 44% versus 40% -- the idea of violence in Panama
if the treaty is not ratified does not appear to be a strong
issue to supporters of the treaty.
On the other hand, while over one-half indicate that they
would not be willing to send American troops to fight against
guerrillas in the Canal Zone, over one-third of those who
support the treaty indicate that they would be willing to
send American troops to defend it against Panamanians.
Cambridge Survey Research
National
-49- -
Base = treaty supporters
True
Don't know
False
If the Senate refuses to ratify the
treaty, the country will be hurt
because other countries won't trust
the President's ability to negotiate.
52%
7
42
The Panama Canal treaty indicates that
any petty little dictatorship can
kick the U.S. around.
11%
7
83
If we don't ratify the treaty, there
will be violence and bloodshed in
Panama.
44%
16
40
I would be willing to send American
troops to fight against guerrillas
in the Canal zone.
34%
8
58
If we don't help Panama by agreeing to
the Canal treaty other Latin American
countries won't trust the United
States.
55%
5
41
The communists will gain a great deal
of advantage if we don't ratify
the treaty because they will be
able to show that the U.S. is only
interested in itself and not in
other countries.
50%
6
44
The Canal treaty is just one more
symbol that the U.S. is growing
weak and can no longer play a
strong role in world affairs.
14%
4
82
Cambridge Survey Research
National
-50-
II. Attitudes of treaty opposers
Besides feeling that the Canal treaty is basically a
give away of American property, an other strong motivation
for opposing the treaty expressed by those who oppose its
ratification is that it indicates that any little dictatorship
can kick the U.S. around. As the following table illustrates,
this feeling is endorsed by 59% of those opposing the treaty.
Nevertheless, less than one-half of the anti-treaty group
would be willing to send U.S. troops to fight guerrillas in
the Canal Zone, although a majority of opposers reject the
idea that the treaty is just one more sign that the U.S. is
no longer able to play a strong role in world affairs.
Within the opposition, however, there are signs of areas
where opinions may be changed, at least among a sizeable
minority.
1. Two-out-of-five feel that failure of the
Senate to ratify the treaty will hurt the
country because other countries won't
trust the President's ability to negotiate.
2. Nearly one-third believe that if we don't
help Panama by agreeing to the Canal treaty,
other Latin American countries won't trust
the United States.
Cambridge Survey Research
National
-51-
2. Over one-fourth believe that the Communists
will gain a great deal of advantage if
we don't ratify the treaty because they
will be able to show that the U.S. is
only interested in itself and not in other
countries.
Cambridge Survey Research
National
-52-
Base = treaty opposers
True
Don't know
False
If the Senate refuses to ratify the
treaty, the country will be hurt
because other countries won't
trust the President's ability to
negotiate.
41%
9
51
The Panama Canal treaty indicates
that any petty little dictatorship
can kick the U.S. around.
59%
7
34
If we don't ratify the treaty, there
will be violence and bloodshed in
Panama.
35%
13
52
I would be willing to send American
troops to fight against guerrillas
in the Canal zone.
43%
12
46
If we don't help Panama by agreeing to
the Canal treaty other Latin
American countries won't trust the
United States.
31%
9
60
The communists will gain a great deal
of advantage if we don't ratify
the treaty because they will be
able to show that the U.S. is
only interested in itself and not
in other countries.
28%
7
65
The Canal treaty is just one more
symbol that the U.S. is growing
weak and can no longer play a
strong role in world affairs.
41%
5
54
Cambridge Survey Research
National
-53-
III. Attitudes of the undecided
As might be expected, those who are undecided about the
treaty are split on most of the issues surrounding the treaty.
In terms of looking for possible support for the treaty among
members of this group, there is both good and bad news as
reflected in the table that follows.
On the "good news" side, we find the following:
1. Nearly two-out-of-every-three say they would
be unwilling to send American troops to fight
guerrillas in the Canal Zone;
2. A plurality feel that failure to ratify the
treaty will weaken the President's ability
to negotiate with other countries;
3. Nearly one-half reject the idea that the
treaty indicates that the U.S. can be kicked
around by petty dictatorships;
4. The idea that the treaty is a symbol that
the U.S. can no longer play a strong role
in world affairs is rejected by nearly a two-
to-one margin.
Cambridge Survey Research
National
-54-
On the negative side, however, the undecideds reject the
idea that failure to ratify the treaty will hurt the United
States' image in communist countries and Latin America.
1. Over one-half disagree that the communists
will use the failure of the U.S. to ratify
the treaty to show that we are only interested
in ourselves and not in other countries.
2. A plurality reject the idea that other
Latin American countries won't trust the
United States if we fail to help Panama by
ratifying the treaty.
Undecided respondents also tend to reject the idea that there
will be violence and bloodshed in Panama if the treaty is not
ratified.
Cambridge Survey Research
National
-55-
Base = treaty undecideds
True
Don't know
False
If the Senate refuses to ratify the
treaty, the country will be hurt
because other countries won't trust
the President's ability to negotiate.
40%
23
37
The Panama Canal treaty, indicates that
any petty little dictatorship can
kick the U.S. around.
38%
16
46
If we don't ratify the treaty, there
will be violence and bloodshed in
Panama.
36%
23
41
I would be willing to send American
troops to fight against guerrillas
in the Canal zone.
17%
19
65
If we don't help Panama by agreeing
to the Canal treaty other Latin
American countries won't trust
the United States.
34%
23
44
The communists will gain a great
deal of advantage if we don't
ratify the treaty because they
will be able to show that the U.S.
is only interested in itself and
not in other countries.
29%
20
51
The Canal treaty is just one more
symbol that the U.S. is growing
weak and can no longer play a
strong role in world affairs.
25%
13
42
Cambridge Survey Research
National
-56-
Changing the Public's Mind
Potential impacts on voters' attitudes toward the treaty
To find out more about what might influence voters'
attitudes toward the Canal treaty one way or the other,
we asked what impact it would have on their views of the
treaty if the statements we had made before were, in fact,
true. Specifically, we looked to see what effect negative
statements would have on those with positive attitudes about
the treaty, and how the positive statements, if true, would
change the views of those opposed to the treaty. Finally,
we examined the impact of each of the statements on those
who have yet to decide on the issue.
Generally, the findings indicate that those who are
currently in support of the treaty would be somewhat more
affected by finding negative statements true than would treaty
opposers who find positive statements true. Among the
undecideds, however, it was the positive or pro-treaty state-
ments which appeared to be the more persuasive.
We further examined how certain "trade-offs" might affect
voters' views toward the treaty, specifically with regard
to foreign aid to Panama, the regime in Panama, and the right
of the United States to build a larger canal in the future.
Cambridge Survey Research
National
-57-
Potential impacts on treaty supporters
Among treaty supporters, we were interested in finding
out what ramifications of the treaty might cause an erosion
of support. As the following table demonstrates, a significant
waning of support for the treaty would result if pro-treaty
Americans believed them to be true.
1. Over one-half said that they would be less
inclined to support the treaty if they felt
it was true that it indicated that the
United States could be pushed around by
petty dictatorships.
2. Fifty-one percent of the supporters indicated
that they would be less favorable toward the
treaty if they felt it were true that the
treaty was really a give away of American
property.
3. Nearly one-half said they would be less likely
to favor ratification if they felt that the
treaty symbolized U.S. weakness in the area
of world affairs.
Cambridge Survey Research
National
-58-
4. Finally, 45% indicated that, if they had
to send troops to fight guerrillas in the
Canal Zone, they would be less inclined to
support ratification of the treaty.
Potential impact of "true" statements on treaty supporters. If statement
were true, would you be:
More
Less
inclined
No
inclined
Don't
to support
difference
to support
know
The Canal treaty is basically a
give away of American property.
37%
7
51
5
The Panama Canal treaty indicates
that any petty little dictatorship
can kick the U.S. around.
36%
5
55
4
I would be willing to send American
troops to fight against guerrillas
in the Canal zone.
42%
5
45
9
The Canal treaty is just one more
symbol that the U.S. is growing
weak and can no longer play a
strong role in world affairs.
40%
5
47
9
Though the majority of treaty supporters believe the United
States should give the Canal Zone back to the Panamanians, they
do not believe that the U.S. should also give them foreign aid.
This suggests that there is a limit to what treaty supporters
will accept, and that any discussion of foreign aid to Panama
might tend to reduce favorable sentiment among a majority of
this group.
Cambridge Survey Research
National
-59-
I wouldn't mind giving up the Canal, but we should not
give the Panamanians any foreign aid to go along with
it.
Agree
54%
Don't know
7
Disagree
39
Potential impacts on treaty opposers
In contrast with treaty supporters, it is notable at the
outset that treaty opposers are even more adamant in their
negative views of the treaty when asked to assume that certain
positive statements about the treaty are true. In almost
every instance, over one-half of those who oppose the treaty
felt that such a fact would make them even less inclined to
support the measure.
In fact, the only "fact" that would make less than a
majority of treaty opposers even less favorable was the state-
ment that the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the military have
supported the treaty for some time on the grounds that the Canal
is not defensible, and feel that the treaty would increase
security. However, less than four-out-of-ten of those opposing
the treaty said that such a fact might make them more inclined
to support ratification.
There are some signs, nevertheless, that each of these
statements would encourage some shift to the pro-treaty side.
As the following table indicates, about one-in-three said they
Cambridge Survey Research
National
-60-
would be more favorable toward the treaty if each statement
were true.
Potential impact of "true" statements on treaty opposers. If statement
were true would you be:
More
Less
inclined
No
inclined
Don't
to support
difference
to support
know
If the Senate refuses to ratify
the treaty, the country will be
hurt because other countries
won't trust the President's
ability to negotiate.
32%
8
52
8
I have enough faith in Jimmy
Carter that if he says the treaty
is needed the Senate should back
him up.
33%
6
58
4
If we don't ratify the treaty,
there will be violence and
bloodshed in Panama.
36%
6
51
6
If we don't help Panama by agreeing
to the Canal treaty other Latin
American countries won't trust
the United States.
33%
7
55
5
The communists will gain a great
deal of advantage if we don't
ratify the treaty because they
will be able to show that the
U.S. is only interested in
itself and not in other countries.
32%
9
54
5
If it was true that the Joint Chiefs
of Staff of the military have
supported the treaty for several
years because they believe that
the Canal in its present form is
incapable of being defended and
recognize the treaty as a means of
improving security.
38%
5
45
12
Cambridge Survey Research
National
-61-
However, a slightly wider margin of pro-treaty sentiment
would be evidenced among opposers were the treaty to include
a provision that gives the United States the right to build
a new and larger Canal that could accommodate U.S. oil
tankers and aircraft carriers.
If Panama agrees as part of the current treaty to give us
the right to build a new canal, how inclined would you be
to support the treaty?
More inclined
40%
Less inclined
46
No difference
7
Don't know
8
Moreover, it is evident, that the regime that presently
exists in Panama is a major factor in opposing the treaty.
A sizeable majority of treaty opposers report that they would
be willing to give the Canal to Panama if it had a free,
Democratic government instead of the dictatorship presently
ruling.
I'd agree to give the Canal to Panama if it had a free,
Democratic government but I don't think we should give
it to the dictatorship that currently rules.
Agree
60%
Don't know
3
Disagree
36
Cambridge Survey Research
National
-62-
Potential impacts on the undecideds
It is the opinions of the 15% who are still undecided on the
issue which are of special interest as they are probably the most
susceptible to change. To get a better picture of this group and
how it might be brought over to the "supporter" side, we first
looked at the impact which both positive and negative "facts"
would have on their attitudes.
Looking at the impacts of the positive statements, we find
the following:
1. Over one-half say they would be more favorable
toward the Canal treaty if they found it was
actually supported by the Joint Chiefs of
Staff.
2. Over one-half say they would be more favorable
toward the Canal treaty if it were true that
failure to ratify would hurt the President's
ability to negotiate with other countries.
3. Forty-two percent would be more inclined to
support the treaty if failure to ratify would
give the communists the opportunity to say
that the U.S. doesn't care about other countries.
Cambridge Survey Research
National
-63-
4. Pluralities of the undecideds would be more
favorable toward the treaty, if they felt
that riots would result in Panama, or that
Latin American countries would not trust
the United States if the treaty were not
ratified.
5. Only one-quarter, however, would be more
inclined to support the treaty if they felt
the Republican Party had ulterior motives
in opposing the treaty.
The impact of negative "facts" appear to be considerably
weaker than the impact of positive ones among the undecideds.
1. If they felt that the Canal treaty was simply
another symbol of U.S. loss of world power,
40% would be less inclined to support the
treaty.
2. If they were willing to send U.S. troops to
the Canal Zone to fight guerrillas, nearly one-
half would feel less inclined to support the
treaty.
Cambridge Survey Research
National
-64-
3. Pretending that the treaty was simply
a give away of American property or
that it showed petty dictators could
push us around, resulted in only the
slightest plurality shifting from
undecided to less inclined
Cambridge Survey Research
National
-65-
Potential impact of "true" statements of the undecideds. If statement
were true would you be:
More
Less
inclined
No
inclined
Don't
to support
difference
to support
know
If the Senate refuses to ratify the
treaty, the country will be hurt
because other countries won't
trust the President's ability
to negotiate.
51%
7
21
21
The Canal treaty is basically a
give away of American property.
33%
2
38
27
I have enough faith in Jimmy Carter
that if he says the treaty is
needed the Senate should back
him up.
50%
4
24
21
The Panama Canal treaty indicates
that any petty little dictator-
ship can kick the U.S. around.
36%
3
37
24
If we don't ratify the treaty,
there will be violence and
bloodshed in Panama.
41%
6
29
24
I would be willing to send American
troops to fight guerrillas in
the Canal zone.
23%
3
48
25
If we don't help Panama by agreeing
to the Canal treaty other Latin
American countries won't trust
the United States.
41%
4
30
25
The communists will gain a great
deal of advantage if we don't
ratify the treaty because they
will be able to show that the
U.S. is only interested in it-
self and not in other countries.
42%
5
33
21
The Canal treaty is just one more
symbol that the U.S. is growing
weak and can no longer play a
strong role in world affairs.
28%
6
40
26
The Republican Party has seized on
opposing the Canal treaty not SO
much because they believe in it
but because they think it is to
their political advantage.
25%
9
36
30
Cambridge Survey Research
National
-66-
Impact of "true" statements on undecideds (continued)
More
Less
inclined
No
inclined
Don't
to support
difference
to support
know
If it was true that the Joint
Chiefs of Staff of the military
have supported the treaty for
several years because they
believe that the Canal in its
present form is incapable of
being defended and recognize
the treaty as a means of
improving security.
52%
5
16
27
Among the "trade-off" issues, those that would shift
the undecideds to a pro-treaty stance were the following:
1. Fifty-two percent of the undecideds would be
more inclined to support the treaty were it
to include a provision that gave the U.S. the
right to build a new and larger Canal.
2. A plurality (48%) supported the argument that
they wouldn't mind giving up the Canal Zone as
long as foreign aid to Panama was not part of
the deal.
In addition, a Democratic government in Panama would make
a majority of the undecideds (56%) more favorable toward the
treaty.
Cambridge Survey Research
National
-67-
To find out whether discussion of the issue had, perhaps,
changed respondents' views on the treaty, we asked them to
give us their vote again. Overall, the responses were much
the same as before, with 3% of the undecideds dividing two-
to-one against the treaty.
However, when we look at the actual crossovers, 15% of
treaty supporters now have doubts or have shifted to the anti-
treaty column. 41% of the undecideds have reached a conclusion,
with slightly more opposing the treaty than favoring it. Treaty
opposers remain firmest in their initial decision, although
some positive shift is evidenced.
For
Not sure
Against
Treaty position:
Favor
85%
7
8
Don't know
18%
59
24
Oppose
5%
3
92
Cambridge Survey Research
National
-68-
When we asked respondents who had changed their positions
on the treaty issue their reason for doing so, a surprisingly
high percentage were not sure why they had. This suggests
that some Americans are still fuzzy on the issues surrounding
the treaty, and subject to change their minds again.
The primary reason cited by pro-treaty respondents for
changing their minds was that discussion of the treaty had
made them more aware of the issues.
[Not sure or favored the treaty] What if anything stands
out as a reason for changing your mind?
Additional information
15%
Keep Communism out, U.S. more
secure
7
Shouldn't give it away, U.S. built
it
7
Sending troops
6
Opening to Communism
2
Other
27
Don't know
36
Additional information was also cited by those who had
originally opposed the treaty as the main reason for changing
their minds. The idea of sending troops into the Canal Zone
had disturbed a small minority of switchers; others had been
convinced by the idea that we shouldn't get involved in Panama,
that it's too small and of no military value any more.
Cambridge Survey Research
National
-69-
[Not sure or opposed the treaty] What is anything stands
out as a reason for changing your mind?
Additional information
23%
Sending our troops
6
U.S. shouldn't get involved
4
Panama is too small, has no
military value
4
[IF] Joint Chiefs of Staff are
in favor of it
2
Other
27
Don't know
34
Demographic breakdowns for the second vote on the treaty
show much the same overall patterns as for the initial response.
However, the Midland region shows a net gain of 10% in the
number who oppose the treaty, and is now second only to the
Central region in lack of treaty support. The Border states
moreover, reflect an 11% increase in the number of people
supporting the treaty, while the Southern states reflect a 6%
increase in support.
Professional people, teachers and the self-employed all
showed stronger gains than other occupational groups, as did
college graduates among educational groups. Those in the 18-25
year old age group made a marked shift into the anti-treaty
column, although those in the 36-45 age group reflected a six-
point gain in support.
Cambridge Survey Research
National
-70-
Net change between first and second response
For
Not sure
Against
Overall
+ 1%
- 3
+ 2
Party preference
Democrat (54)
---
- 2
+ 1
Independent (24)
+ 1
- 3
+ 2
Republican (21)
+ 2
- 2
+ 1
Political ideology
Liberal (26)
+ 2
- 2
+ 1
Moderate (29)
- 4
+ 2
+ 2
Conservative (37)
+ 2
- 4
+ 2
Carter rating
Favorable (74)
+ 2
- 3
+1
Unfavorable (17)
- 1
- 1
+ 1
Can't rate (9)
--
- 4
+ 4
Carter performance rating
Excellent (7)
+ 3
+ 2
- 3
Good (49)
+ 2
- 4
+ 2
Only fair (34)
+ 1
- 3
+ 2
Poor (8)
- 2
- 1
+ 3
Don't know (2) *
--
--
--
Sex
Female (51)
+ 1
- 1
-
Male (49)
+ 1
- 4
+ 3
Race
White (88)
+ 1
- 3
+ 2
Black (10)
+ 3
+ 2
- 5
Occupation
Professional (5)
+ 2
- 4
+6
White collar (18)
- 1
- 5
+ 3
Blue collar (25)
+ 2
+ 2
- 1
Government (6)
- 5
- 4
- 3
Teacher (4) *
- 1
- 7
+11
Self-employed (7)
+ 3
- 2
+ 8
Retired (24)
-
-
- 2
Cambridge Survey Research
National
-71-
Net change (continued)
For
Not sure
Against
Education
Some grade school (13)
+ 7
- 5
- 2
Some high school (16)
- 2
+ 4
- 2
Graduated high school (32)
+ 2
- 1
--
Technical/vocational (4) *
+ 9
+ 1
- 9
Some college (18)
+ 2
- 8
+ 7
Graduated college (10)
- 1
- 4
+ 5
Graduate/professional (7)
- 3
+ 1
+2
Religion
Protestant (57)
+ 2
- 3
+ 1
Catholic (30)
+ 1
- 2
+ 2
Jewish (3) *
--
+ 7
- 7
Other (5)
- 6
+ 3
+ 3
None (4) *
+3
- 7
+ 3
Total household income
$0-3,999 (8)
+ 5
+ 4
- 9
$4-6,999 (9)
- 1
- 1
+1
$7-9,999 (12)
+ 4
- 3
- 1
$10-12,999 (12)
+ 2
- 9
+ 7
$13-14,999 (10)
+ 3
-
- 3
$15-19,999 (15)
- 2
- 3
+ 4
$20-24,999 (11)
+ 4
- 4
+1
Over $25,000 (10)
- 2
- 2
+ 5
Union membership
Respondent (17)
- 2
+ 4
- 1
Family member (12)
- 6
- 1
+ 8
No member (71)
+ 3
- 3
+1
Age group
18-25 (10)
- 5
- 4
+10
26-35 (20)
+ 5
- 4
- 2
36-45 (18)
+ 6
- 6
--
46-55 (17)
- 2
- 2
+ 4
56-65 (18)
+ 1
+ 3
- 5
Over 65 (19)
+ 1
- 3
+ 2
Cambridge Survey Research
National
-72-
Net change (continued)
For
Not sure
Against
Areas
Northeast (15)
-
+ 2
- 2
Industrial (25)
--
- 1
+2
Midlands (15)
+ 2
-11
+10
South (19)
+ 6
- 6
-
Central (14)
- 2
- 1
+3
Pacific (13)
- 4
+ 4
--
Areas
California (10)
- 7
+7
+1
West (12)
+ 2
- 1
- 1
New York (9)
+1
-
- 2
South (14)
+ 3
- 6
+ 2
Industrial (27)
-
- 3
+ 3
Border (8)
+11
- 5
- 6
New England (6)
- 3
+4
- 1
Midland (13)
- 2
- 8
+10
Cambridge Survey Research
National
-73-
Sometimes as we discuss an issue and bring up arguments for and against
something, people switch their minds about it. We've raised arguments
for and against the treaty in this discussion. Given all you're heard
do you think if you had to vote yourself right now for or against the
treaty, how would you vote?
For
Not sure
Against
Overall
31%
12
57
Party preference
Democrat (54)
34
14
52
Independent (24)
32
11
57
Republican (21)
26
11
64
Political ideology
Liberal (26)
45
9
47
Moderate (29)
33
16
51
Conservative (37)
24
11
65
Opinion of treaty
Favor (30)
85
7
8
Don't know (15)
18
59
24
Oppose (55)
5
3
92
Carter rating
Favorable (74)
40
13
47
Unfavorable (17)
14
9
77
Can't rate (9)
12
11
77
Carter performance rating
Excellent (7)
46
23
32
Good (49)
41
11
48
Only fair (34)
22
12
67
Poor (8)
6
4
90
Don't know (2) *
22
70
8
Sex
Female (51)
31
16
53
Male (49)
32
8
60
Race
White (88)
30
11
59
Black (10)
41
20
39
Cambridge Survey Research
National
-74-
for or against the treaty, how would you vote?
For
Not sure
Against
Occupation
Professional (5)
46
8
47
White collar (18)
32
8
60
Blue collar (25)
30
16
54
Government (6)
33
20
47
Teacher (4) *
47
11
42
Self-employed (7)
15
10
76
Retired (24)
26
13
61
Education
Some grade school (13)
28
21
51
Some high school (16)
24
19
58
Graduated high school (32)
29
13
59
Technical/vocational (4) *
19
12
69
Some college (18)
31
8
61
Graduated college (10)
37
9
54
Graduate/professional (7)
48
9
43
Religion
Protestant (57)
30
11
59
Catholic (30)
31
16
54
Jewish (3) *
30
23
47
Other (5)
32
8
60
None (4) *
47
6
47
Total household income
$0-3,999 (8)
21
31
48
$4-6,999 (9)
17
11
72
$7-9,999 (12)
41
11
49
$10-12,999 (12)
30
8
62
$13-14,999 (10)
36
9
55
$15-19,999 (15)
30
9
60
$20-24,999 (11)
37
8
54
Over $25,000 (10)
39
10
52
Union membership
Respondent (17)
38
12
50
Family member (12)
37
20
44
No member (71)
30
11
59
Cambridge Survey Research
National
-75-
for or against the treaty, how would you vote?
For
Not sure
Against
Age group
18-25 (10)
38
11
52
26-35 (20)
43
13
43
36-45 (18)
37
8
55
46-55 (17)
30
15
55
56-65 (18)
18
16
66
Over 65 (19)
22
10
69
Areas
Northeast (15)
39
12
49
Industrial (25)
31
16
54
Midlands (15)
23
16
62
South (19)
33
7
60
Central (14)
22
10
68
Pacific (13)
36
17
48
Areas
California (10)
35
20
45
West (12)
29
10
61
New York (9)
41
12
47
South (14)
31
7
62
Industrial (27)
30
17
53
Border (8)
36
5
59
New England (6)
36
12
52
Midlands (13)
20
13
67
Cambridge Survey Research
APPENDIX
CSR #970
Cambridge Survey Research
National
Al
Regardless of whether you vote or not, do you generally consider yourself
a Democrat, a Republican or what?
Democrat
46%
Independent
29
Republican
22
Don't know
3
Do you generally think of yourself as more of a liberal, or more of a
conservative?
Liberal
28%
Moderate
16
Conservative
47
Don't know
8
The United States government has recently concluded a treaty with the
government of Panama to return the Panama Canal, and the Canal zone to
Panama over time finishing by the year 2000. The U.S. would retain rights
to defend the Canal and Panama agrees to maintain its neutrality and keep
it open.
Do you feel that you are currently informed enough about the Panama Canal
treaty to make an informed judgment about it?
Yes
43%
Not sure
6
No
51
Cambridge Survey Research
National
A2
What additional information would you most like to have to help you make
a decision?
More about it, what it involves, general information, a
whole lot
19%
Read more about it, more things published on it
12
Points of the treaty, details in negotiations
9
More coverage on TV news
6
How much use will the U.S. have, what will our rights be,
what control will the U.S. have
5
How do the Panamanians feel, more about different
interpretations of the treaty, the alternatives the
Panamanians will accept
4
The truth
3
Neutrality issue, would we fight if the Russians came in,
how much can we intervene, how much will our military
be involved
2
How much will it cost, how much will U.S. have to pay for
future use of Canal
2
How much are we losing, how much is invested there
2
Other
12
Don't know
24
From what you do know about the treaty do you generally favor or oppose it?
Favor
30%
Don't know
15
Oppose
55
Cambridge Survey Research
National
A3
Why do you take that position in regards to the Panama Canal?
FAVOR
It belongs to Panama, it isn't ours, they own it, it's on
their land, it's their country, it's in the middle of
Panama
32%
It's the right thing to do, it's the just thing, it's
fair to them
12
Not valuable or strategic, not worth that much
6
It will show the world and South America that we are fair
and will help prevent communism from coming in
5
It's fair to both sides, terms are fair
4
President knows what he's doing, Carter is right
4
We stole it originally, we should give it back
3
Not necessary
2
If it made both sides happy
1
Other
21
Don't know
11
OPPOSE
We spent too much in money and lives to keep it or build
it, we've invested too much in it to give it up, we
paid for it
18%
We should keep it, don't think we should give it up
11
It's ours, it belongs to us
9
We built it, we built it and we should keep it
8
Vital to our security, might need it during time of war, we'd
be jeopardizing our national security
5.
The Commies will take over
4
You can't trust the Panamanians, they might not keeep their
promises
4
Never know when we might need it again, we need it for
trade, we need it
4
Why should we give away everything
3
Will cost us too much to use it in the future, what future
expenses might be
3
We can take care of it better
3
We might lose access to it
2
Other
16
Don't know
11
Cambridge Survey Research
National
A4
I'm going to read you a number of statements that have been made about the
Panama Canal issue and I'd like you to tell me whether each statement is
very true, only somewhat true, somewhat false or absolutely false.
Very
true Only somewhat Somenhat true Absolutely false false 1x know
If the Senate refuses to ratify the treaty,
the country won't trust the President's
ability to negotiate.
17%
27
17
29
10
The Canal Treaty is basically a give
away of American property.
40%
18
16
19
6
I have enough faith in Jimmy Carter that
if he says the treaty is needed the
Senate should back him up.
22%
18
19
34
7
The Panama Canal treaty indicates that
any petty little dictatorship can
kick the U.S. around.
25%
17
17
34
8
If we don't ratify the treaty, there will
be violence and bloodshed in Panama.
16%
23
21
26
15
I would be willing to send American
troops to fight against guerrillas in
the Canal zone.
25%
11
12
40
12
If we don't help Panama by agreeing
to the Canal Treaty other Latin American
countries won't trust the United States.
17%
21
19
33
10
The communists will gain a great deal of
advantage if we don't ratify the treaty
because they will be able to show that
U.S. is only interested in itself and
not in other countries.
17%
J8
15
42
9
The canal treaty is just one more symbol
that the U.S. is growing weak and can
no longer play a strong role in world
affairs.
16%
14
14
50
6
The Republican Party has seized on opposing
the Canal Treaty not SO much because they
believe in it but because they think
it is too their political advantage.
23%
24
13
22
19
Cambridge Survey Research
National
A5
Now, that we've established whether or not you feel each of these
statements was true or not. I'd like you to assume that these statements
are true and go through the list again and tell me if it was true would
it make you much more inclined to support the treaty, somewhat more
inclined, somewhat less inclined or much less inclined to support the
treaty?
Much Inclined Somewhat inclined Much less less Makes
ou
If the Senate refuses to ratify the treaty,
the country will be hurt because other
countries won't trust the President's
ability to negotiate.
20%
24
15
24
7
10
The Canal Treaty is basically a give away of
American property.
15%
15
16
42
5
7
I have enough faith in Jimmy Carter that if
he says the treaty is needed the
Senate should back him up.
25%
23
14
27
5
6
The Panama Canal Treaty indicates that any
petty little dictatorship can kick the
U.S. around.
15%
15
14
43
5
8
If we don't ratify the treaty, there will
be violence and bloodshed in Panama.
24%
20
14
27
6
9
I would be willing to send American troops
to fight against guerillas in the
Canal zone.
20%
15
14
36
6
10
If we din't help Panama by agreeing to the
Canal Treaty other Latin American
countries won't trust the United States.
20%
23
16
27
7
7
The communists will gain a great advantage
if we don't ratify the treaty because
they will be able to show that the U.S.
is only interested in itself and not
in other countries.
23%
19
15
28
8
8
The Canal Treaty is just one more symbol
that the U.S. is growing weak and
can no longer play a strong role in
world affairs.
15%
18
17
35
6
9
The Republican Party has ceased on opposing
the Canal Treaty, not SO much because
they believe in it but because they
think it is too their political
advantage.
13%
17
19
30
10
12
Cambridge Survey Research
National
A6
Much inclined Someihat inclined Much less less
Makes no erence 20n know
If it was true than the Joint Chiefs
of Staff of the military have
supported the treaty for several
years because they believe that the
Canal in its present form is
incapable of being defended and
recognize the treaty as a means of
improving security.
26%
24
13
19
6
13
Which of these two statements is closer to your opinion:
Retaining the Canal and Canal Zone is vital to the
defense of the United States.
58%
While it might once have been of vital importance,
since our big submarines and aircraft carriers
can't even fit through it, the Canal is not
longer really important to the U.S. defense.
34
Don't know
7
One fact about the Panama Canal is that it is currently too small for many
of the largest ships -- oil tankers and aircraft carriers. A solution to
that would be to build a new Canal. If Panama agrees as part of the current
treaty to give us the right to build a new Canal would you be much more
inclined, somewhat more inclined, somewhat less inclined or much less inclined
to support the treaty?
Much more inclined
29%
Somewhat more inclined
21
Somewhat less inclined
12
Much less inclined
23
Makes no difference
6
Don't know
9
Cambridge Survey Research
National
A7
Would you strongly agree, somewhat agree, somewhat disagree or strongly
disagree with the following statements:
Seventy-five years after taking the Canal Zone from Panama, it is only fair
and just, and a sign that we are a great Nation, that we return it to
Panama.
Strongly agree
17%
Somewhat agree
17
Somewhat disagree
18
Strongly disagree
40
Don't know
8
I'd agree to give the Canal to Panama if it had a free, Democratic government
but I don't think we should give it to the dictatorship that currently rules.
Strongly agree
36%
Somewhat agree
20
Somewhat disagree
20
Strongly disagree
17
Don't know
7
I wouldn't mind giving up the Canal, but we should not give the Panamanians
any foreign aid to go along with it.
Strongly agree
31%
Somewhat agree
16
Somewhat disagree
24
Strongly disagree
22
Don't know
8
Sometimes as we discuss an issue and bring up arguments for and against
something people switch their minds about it. We've raised arguments for
and against the treaty in this discussion. Given all you've heard do you
think if you had to vote yourself right now for or against the treaty,
how would you vote?
For
31%
Not sure
12
Against
57
Cambridge Survey Research
National
A8
You said earlier you [FAVORED/OPPOSED] the treaty. What if any things
stand out as a reason for changing your mind?
FOR
My lack of knowledge, need to think about it more, have
raised some good questions, additional information has
changed my mind
23%
About sending our troops
6
We shouldn't get involved
4
It's too small anyway, it has no military value
4
[IF] Joints Chiefs are in favor of the treaty
2
Other
27
Don't know
34
AGAINST
My lack of knowledge, need to think about it more,
have raised some good questions, additional information
has changed my mind
15%
Help keep Communism out, help make U.S. more secure
7
Shouldn't give it away, we should keep it, we built it
7
About sending our troops
6
Opening to Communism
2
Other
27
Don't know
36
Cambridge Survey Research
Warren Christopher's Evening Report
October 1, 1977
Canal Treaties. During last week's Senate Foreign
Relations Committee hearings, two broad issues surfaced
on which I want to make recommendations today.
(a) Releasing Documents. The first issue concerns
Senator Baker's request that the Administration provide
the Committee with all its records concerning the treaty
negotiations. He asked specifically for minutes of the
COPY CARTER LIBRARY
negotiations with the Panamanians, cables, internal
position papers, and communications between you, Cy
and our negotiators.
We have quickly reviewed the historical precedents
and can find no case in which the Executive Branch has
released to the Senate the full and confidential record
of treaty negotiations or the record of its internal
deliberations. There are cases, beginning with the Jay
Treaty in 1796, in which the President has refused such
requests. Over the years, Presidents have endeavored to
resolve disputes with Congress over provision of documents
by practical accommodations, including summaries and
briefings, but have resorted to the exercise of executive
privilege where necessary.
It is our recommendation that the Administration
I agree
should not release the minutes of the negotiating ses-
sions. We have a clear understanding with the
Panamanians that the negotiations are to be kept
confidential and, moreover, the precedent set by their
release could cause massive future problems. We also
recommend that a stern position be taken against the
release of any Presidential documents (e.g., PRM 1).
DECLASSIFIED
E.0.12958, Sec.3.6
SECRET
GDS
PER 8/31/00 NSC RE NLC-00-128
BY arm NARS. DATE 6/26/03
CERRET
SECRET
SECRET
- 2 -
As a matter of constitutional practice and conduct
oh,but oh, but
of foreign affairs, it is very tempting to turn down
Baker's request. But a flat refusal could lead him to
oppose the treaties and might well lead to Senate re-
jection of them. Therefore, it is recommended that we
Be
&
respond to Senator Baker's request by the following:
Canticus
(i) offer a full briefing to Senator Baker, or any other
Senator, on any aspect of the treaties in which they are
consentive
interested, (ii) provide summaries, on a confidential
basis, of the minutes of the negotiating sessions
beginning with the Tack/Kissinger Principles of 1974
where specifically requested, and (iii) provide care-
fully controlled access to defined categories of
negotiating documents such as position papers exchanged
between the parties since 1974. On the latter two points,
we would need to get the concurrence of the Panamanians,
and also insist that the summaries and documents not be
published.
(b) Interpretation of the Treaties. As a result
of questions raised by Senators Baker, Stone and others,
COPY CARTER LIBRARY
it is apparent that it will be important to try to resolve
several questions of interpretation which have arisen.
Some but not all of these questions arise from the
August 19 and 22 statements of Panamanian negotiator
Escobar. The principal questions appear to relate to
neutrality, "intervention," and expeditious passage.
I recommend that we begin to explore the possibility
I need
of an interpretive exchange of notes, and I met with
Ambassador Bunker this afternoon to ask that he and Sol
to have
start the process. There are several delicate issues
involved. Torrijos may be reluctant to agree publicly
to our interpretations prior to his October 23 plebiscite.
Interproted
there
Moreover, an early exchange would be subject to the risk
that new questions of interpretation may arise as Senate
consideration of the treaties proceeds, and it might
clare fied
not be possible to have a further exchange which ad-
dressed them. On the other hand, an exchange of notes
also
after the plebiscite could be open to challenge as not
being binding on the Panamanians. After we have given
further consideration to these matters of timing and
substance and tested the water with the Panamanians,
we will make specific recommendations to you.
SECRET
SECRET
7154
Paster
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
November 2, 1977
Dear General Torrijos
Let me again extend my congratulations to you and your govern-
ment on the successful vote on the Panama Canal treaties. You can
be proud of the free and open discussions in Panama on the Canal
treaties. The debate and the vote demonstrated to the world that
the Panamanian people support the treaties. In ratifying the
treaties, Panama has set an example, which I pledge to you the
United States will follow.
Upon his return from Panama, Bob Pastor reported to me about
his enjoyable and useful conversation with you. I have read
through the reports of your trip, which you gave him, and I
found them fascinating, informative, and extremely valuable.
I especially appreciate your efforts at obtaining international
support for the treaties. The statement by Prime Minister
Begin that he will ask Senators who are friendly to Israel to
vote favorably on the Canal treaties is an important one.
You have a keen ability to know people very quickly and your
insights were very interesting. I especially appreciate the
trust you have put in our friendship by sharing your thoughts
and experiences with me.
My best wishes,
Jimmy Sincerely, Carter
His Excellency
General Omar Torrijos Herrera
Chief of Government of the
Republic of Panama
DECLASSIFIED
Panama City
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
PER 4/9/91 NSC Hr RE MR-MLC-91-1
BY Juny NARS. DATE 4/22/91
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
November 17, 1977
TO:
HAMILTON JORDAN
FROM:
BOB PASTOR
Zbig condensed the original memo, but
I am attaching it because it offers a
couple of other reasons why we may
want to move more slowly on the
democracy in Panama issue.
DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
PER 7/26/90 Nx HARE MR-MLC-90-20
BY Ju NARS, DATE 1/30/91
MEMORANDUM
UN IDENTIAL
THE WHITE HOUSE
7504
WASHINGTON
CONFIDENTIAL
November 14, 1977
C
Feve
MEMORANDUM FOR:
THE PRESIDENT
FROM:
ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI
B.
SUBJECT:
Senator Byrd's Trip -- An Assessment
By all accounts, the trip by Senator Byrd and six other Senators to Panama
was a success. It was well planned to give the Senators a flavor of
political dissent in Panama, to permit them to see the full commitment of
the Panamanian people to the Canal Treaties, and to be briefed on Panama's
plans for the future economic development of Panama and the Zone. It also
gave the Senators an opportunity to see a good cross-section of well-
educated and intelligent Panamanians. Torrijos spent a good deal of time
with the Senators, and came to like and respect Senator Byrd.
There is one set of issues on which the Senators pressed Torrijos quite
hard, and which may cause us some problems. It is the future of democratic
government in Panama.
There is the danger that some Senators will seek concessions in the area as
a way to divert attention from the Treaties. If Torrijos does not make the
concessions regarding democracy that several believe he promised, they could
use that as an excuse to vote against the Treaties. Therefore, I think
it is in our interest not to couple the democracy-in-Panama issue with the
Canal Treaties. I think we are more likely to lose votes if Torrijos does
not make good on his supposed concessions than win them if he does.
DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
PER 7/20/90 HSC HrRE MR-MLC-40-26
BY Jay NARS, DATE 1/30/91
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
7504
MEMORANDUM
CONFIDENTIAL
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
CONFIDENTIAL
MEMORANDUM FOR:
THE PRESIDENT
FROM:
ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI
SUBJECT:
Senator Byrd's Trip -- An Assessment
By all accounts, the trip by Senator Byrd and six other Senators to Panama
was a success. It was well planned to give the Senators a flavor of political
dissent in Panama, to permit them to see the full commitment of the Panamanian
people to the Canal Treaties, and to be briefed on Panama's plans for the future
economic development of Panama and the Zone. It also gave the Senators an
opportunity to see a good cross-section of well-educated and intelligent
Panamanians. Torrijos spent a good deal of time with the Senators, and
came to like and respect Senator Byrd.
There is one set of issues on which the Senators pressed Torrijos quite hard,
and which may cause us some problems. It is the future of democratic
government in Panama. While Torrijos was tolerant of the criticism and
even somewhat accommodating of the recommendations, I think this is one
area where it would be wise to suggest more cautiousness in the future.
For one, the future structure of the Panamanian government is not really
relevant to the Senate's decision on the Canal Treaties. Any and all
Panamanian governments will have a considerable stake in the smooth
implementation of the Canal Treaties and the efficient operation of the Canal.
One would be hard-pressed to argue that a more democratic Panamanian
government would be a better guarantee of a well-run Canal.
There is no question that the Senators will seek concessions in the area as
a way to divert attention from the Treaties. If Torrijos does not make the
concessions that several believe he promised, they will use that as an
excuse to vote against the Treaties. Therefore, I think it is in our interest
to de-couple the democracy-in-Panama issue from the Canal Treaties. I
think we are more likely to lose votes if Torrijos does not make good on his
supposed concessions than win them if he does.
CONFIDENTIAL-GDS
DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
PER
RE
BY
MR-NCC-90-26
NARS,
DATE
1/30/91
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
A second and in many ways equally important reason why we should tread
lightly on the democracy issue is because it carries paternalistic connotations
which could undermine the new approach you have outlined for U.S. relations
with Latin America. All of us in the U.S. and most people in Latin America
believe that all governments are justified in speaking out on human rights
violations, wherever they occur. While many in the U.S. believe we are
justified in telling other countries how they should organize their govern-
ments, this view is not shared by Latin Americans. Indeed, many believe
the Alliance for Progress failed primarily because we placed such great
emphasis on the importance of democratic government (as we know it)
as a means to the pursuit of our lofty goals. Latin Americans saw this as
a new form of imperialism or evangelism.
I believe the success of your new approach to Latin America has been that
we have avoided telling the Latin Americans how to organize their govern-
ments, but rather have stated in very general terms that we have an obvious
preference for those countries which share our democratic values. Rather
than suggesting changes in governments, we have tried to create a climate
where such changes can become more likely. One possible result of this
approach is the stated intention of five Latin American military governments
to begin the transition toward democratic and civilian rule. I think this
process would be setback if our approach to this issue were to become any
more explicit or direct.
In summary, I would recommend you suggest to Byrd the dangers to the Canal
Treaties and to our overall relations with Latin America of linking the Treaties
to progress towards a more democratic form of government in Panama.
CONFIDENTIAL
11
PERSONAL AND CONF IDENTIAL
TO:
PRESIDENT CARTER AND DR. BRZEZINSKI
FROM:
HAMILTON JORDAN H.P.
RE:
CALL FROM AMBASSADOR GABRIEL LEWIS
I received a call today from Panama from Ambassador
Gabriel Lewis who asked if he could come and see me
as soon as possible. I replied that he could and
thought nothing of it as we stay in touch constantly
on matters related to ratification of the Treaty.
I asked him how he was doing and he responded that,
"things are going badly here - that is why I must
talk to you as soon as possible".
This was a curious remark SO I inquired of Bob Pastor
as to any recent information on the internal situation
in Panama. He provided me with the following inform-
ation and the attached memorandum. From all that I
DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
PER 7/26/90 NY HrRE MR NCC 90-26
BY Day NARS, DATE 1/30/91
can learn, Torrijos has become personally despondent
for several reasons.
First, the Panamanian economy is in poor shape.
Unemployment and inflation are high and foreign in-
vestment is off. Torrijos thinks that potential for-
eign investors are holding off because of uncertainty
about treaty ratification and/or rejection and the
implications of either action.
Secondly, for the first time, Torrijos has permitted
criticism of his leadership and the treaty and the
groups of people opposed to him and the treaties are
exercising their new rights freely. He has been booed
at several rallies and was shaken by it.
Thirdly, and probably most importantly, they do not
understand our system of government and are confused
about the repeated delays in final consideration of
the treaties by the Senate. We told them initially
that we would work for an October vote on the treaties
and have postponed the likely date for a vote several
times. All we can say now is that after the energy
bill is passed, we will focus on the Panama Canal
Treaties.
At any rate, I believe that Gabriel and General
Torrijos need to be reassured that the treaty will
be taken up early in the year, that we are working hard
for ratification and that prospects for passage are im-
proving. We get criticized on the Hill for "not doing
enough on the Panama Canal Treaties" so I am sure
that it must be difficult to see any interest or momentum
from Panama.
We need to keep Torrijos in a positive frame of mind
SO that he will continue to make positive statements
and gestures in Panama in addition to courting the
Senators who visit. For that reason, I plan to do the
following with Bob Pastor when we meet with Gabriel
Wednesday:
-Review likely timetable for Congressional action
-Point out that we are delaying SALT II for Panama
Canal Treaties
-Point out recent good signs (mail, polls, etc.)
-Review what we have been doing, including White
House briefings, support of Citizens' Committee,
endorsements received, work with individual Senators,
Speakers' Bureau that has been set up, etc.
Generally, without misleading Gabriel on underestimating
the difficulty of ratification, I would like to reassure
him of the prospects and our own commitment to its
passage.
If you and Zbig think it is appropriate, I might like
to bring Gabriel in to see you just briefly so he can
report back to General Torrijos that he got to see you
and has your personal reassurance. You might just pick
up the telephone and get Senator Byrd to spend five
minutes with Gabriel outlining the likely Senate schedule
for consideration of the treaty.
Torrijos has been very helpful and it is in our own
interests to reassure him and keep him positive.
792
OP IMMED
SECRET
NOVEMBER 29,1977
MEMORANDUM FOR:
HAMILTON JORDAN AND RICK INDERFURTH
FROM:
BOB PASTOR
SUBJECT:
1'. ATTACHED IS AN EXCERPT FROM AN INTERCEPT OF
HOTHE
I AM FORWARDING TO YOU FYI.
PSN:353368 PAGE 11 OF 21 TDR#190/13:592 DTG1091348Z JUL. 77
*******U NCLASSIFTE D*******8 COPY
0
SANITIZED
E.0.12958, Sec.f.5
PER 6/26/01 DOD RE NLC- NLC-00-129
BY BAZ NARS.DATE 7/24/03
Entire page exempted.
CONFIDENTIAL
Letter from General Torrijos to Menachem Begin, Prime
Minister of Israel - For Delivery to President Carter
Panama City, December 3, 1977
Dear Friend:
Allow me to make, briefly, a series of comments reflecting
the way I see things after having familiarized myself with
the Middle East problem.
Your accession to the office of Prime Minister of your
country does not represent the election of a new leader, but a
change in the attitude of a people.
In times of very serious crises, people find themselves
again, close ranks, and look for someone to direct them and
lead them, not someone to manage them. The leader who
says "Follow me" replaces those who say "Go," or "This
must be done."
Prolonged periods of tension prevent people from thinking
calmly and from seeking someone capable of remaining calm when
everything is in disarray. This justifies taking dangerous
risks, provided that they break the status quo.
The slogan of a boss is: "When in doubt, stop," that of
a leader is: "When in doubt, attack.' "
DECLASSIFIED
E.0.12958, Sec.3.6
PER 8/31/00 NSCORENCC -00-627
BY arm NARS. DATE 6/26/03
-2
Your country is in a permanent state of alert. I have the
impressions that in your region there are many who love
hatred. Their hatred has claws and powerful destructive
machinery. Your generation gave the Jewish State a
Fatherland, a home, a sanctuary, a passport, and a place
where, in respectful reverence, all can bow their heads at
the sacred shrines of their faith.
Several decades have passed since these unquestionable
conquests took place. Although they have been very serious,
your subsequent generations have had to pay a very high
price: that of being born to die, rather than being born
to live. This is unnatural, and all unnatural things must
come to an end.
I was impressed by the destructive capability of the
"Centurion," but I was even more impressed by the age of the
children who are handling these war machines. The ages of
the five of them combined did not amount to 100. They are
children prematurely aged by life. A sad child is a
very sad thing to see. I was not completely shocked because
their tanks were protecting the kibutzim. If they had been
protecting large estates, I would have ended my trip that same
day.
-3
At the officers' mess luncheon, when the colonel who
commanded the base was talking to me, I asked him to explain
the enemy's battle plan. "Syria has so many tanks in this
or that position," he said. Then I asked him to tell me
about his counterpart in the Syrian forces. "We both have
10 years' combat experience," he said. "During the war of
'67 he did not have much training, but he has been improving.
He trains a lot and his men are well trained. I must
admit that in the Yom Kippur war he acted like a true
professional."
I found such honesty and professionalism in this Israeli
colonel! He described his enemy counterpart as the man
really is, not as a fanatic would describe him.
I, as an old soldier, wondered: Who can possibly sleep
in peace before so many threatening tanks? Behind his pre-
maturely aged features I saw the youngest old man that I have
ever met. At 32, having spent 10 years in combat, this
fellow does not laugh; he does not have the normal cares
of people his age. He lives with the fixed idea that his
country is not to be invaded through that front. I thought
that the other one, the Syrian, was in exactly the same
situation.
-4
If each one of them were to walk 10 kilometers some
night, alone, unarmed, and if they were to meet somewhere
where they could talk about their sadnesses, their hopes,
their frustrations, it would not be fallacious to think that
they might reach agreement and to join forces and aim their
guns at everything they feel is preventing them from living
the normal life of a man just turned 30.
These men in uniform who impressed me so highly expect
a lot from you. Do everything in your power to make happiness
return to their faces.
Please forgive me if I am meddling in what is not my
business, but remember that one only talks to a friend in
these terms.
You set the date for your trip to my country. I want
to be able to take care of you as well as you took care of
me. I ask only that you give me 10 days' notice.
Cordially,
Omar Torrijos H.
( lor/Dec)
77
PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL
TO:
PRESIDENT CARTER AND DR. BRZEZINSKI
FROM:
HAMILTON JORDAN H.P.
RE:
CALL FROM AMBASSADOR GABRIEL LEWIS
I received a call today from Panama from Ambassador
Gabriel Lewis who asked if he could come and see me
as soon as possible. I replied that he could and
thought nothing of it as we stay in touch constantly
on matters related to ratification of the Treaty.
I asked him how he was doing and he responded that,
"things are going badly here - that is why I must
talk to you as soon as possible".
This was a curious remark SO I inquired of Bob Pastor
as to any recent information on the internal situation
in Panama. He provided me with the following inform-
ation and the attached memorandum. From all that I
DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
PER 7/24/90 NX Hr RE MR HLC-40-26
BY Jay NARS, DATE 1/30/91
can learn, Torrijos has become personally despondent
for several reasons.
First, the Panamanian economy is in poor shape.
Unemployment and inflation are high and foreign in-
vestment is off. Torrijos thinks that potential for-
eign investors are holding off because of uncertainty
about treaty ratification and/or rejection and the
implications of either action.
Secondly, for the first time, Torrijos has permitted
criticism of his leadership and the treaty and the
groups of people opposed to him and the treaties are
exercising their new rights freely. He has been booed
at several rallies and was shaken by it.
Thirdly, and probably most importantly, they do not
understand our system of government and are confused
about the repeated delays in final consideration of
the treaties by the Senate. We told them initially
that we would work for an October vote on the treaties
and have postponed the likely date for a vote several
times. All we can say now is that after the energy
bill is passed, we will focus on the Panama Canal
Treaties.
At any rate, I believe that Gabriel and General
Torrijos need to be reassured that the treaty will
be taken up early in the year, that we are working hard
for ratification and that prospects for passage are im-
proving. We get criticized on the Hill for "not doing
enough on the Panama Canal Treaties" so I am sure
that it must be difficult to see any interest or momentum
from Panama.
We need to keep Torrijos in a positive frame of mind
so that he will continue to make positive statements
and gestures in Panama in addition to courting the
Senators who visit. For that reason, I plan to do the
following with Bob Pastor when we meet with Gabriel
Wednesday:
-Review likely timetable for Congressional action
-Point out that we are delaying SALT II for Panama
Canal Treaties
-Point out recent good signs (mail, polls, etc.)
-Review what we have been doing, including White
House briefings, support of Citizens' Committee,
endorsements received, work with individual Senators,
Speakers' Bureau that has been set up, etc.
Generally, without misleading Gabriel on underestimating
the difficulty of ratification, I would like to reassure
him of the prospects and our own commitment to its
passage.
If you and Zbig think it is appropriate, I might like
to bring Gabriel in to see you just briefly so he can
report back to General Torrijos that he got to see you
and has your personal reassurance. You might just pick
up the telephone and get Senator Byrd to spend five
minutes with Gabriel outlining the likely Senate schedule
for consideration of the treaty.
Torrijos has been very helpful and it is in our own
interests to reassure him and keep him positive.
11/29/77
PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL
C
TO:
PRESIDENT CARTER AND DR. BRZEZINSKI
FROM:
HAMILTON JORDAN H.P.
RE:
CALL FROM AMBASSADOR GABRIEL LEWIS
I received a call today from Panama from Ambassador
Gabriel Lewis who asked if he could come and see me
as soon as possible. I replied that he could and
thought nothing of it as we stay in touch constantly
on matters related to ratification of the Treaty.
I asked him how he was doing and he responded that,
"things are going badly here - that is why I must
talk to you as soon as possible".
This was a curious remark so I inquired of Bob Pastor
as to any recent information on the internal situation
in Panama. He provided me with the following inform-
ation and the attached memorandum. From all that I
DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
PER 7/20/80 He RE NOR-NCC-90-26
BY Jay NARS, DATE 1/30/91
can learn, Torrijos has become personally despondent
for several reasons.
First, the Panamanian economy is in poor shape.
Unemployment and inflation are high and foreign in-
vestment is off. Torrijos thinks that potential for-
eign investors are holding off because of uncertainty
about treaty ratification and/or rejection and the
implications of either action.
Secondly, for the first time, Torrijos has permitted
criticism of his leadership and the treaty and the
groups of people opposed to him and the treaties are
exercising their new rights freely. He has been booed
at several rallies and was shaken by it.
Thirdly, and probably most importantly, they do not
understand our system of government and are confused
about the repeated delays in final consideration of
the treaties by the Senate. We told them initially
that we would work for an October vote on the treaties
and have postponed the likely date for a vote several
times. All we can say now is that after the energy
bill is passed, we will focus on the Panama Canal
Treaties.
At any rate, I believe that Gabriel and General
Torrijos need to be reassured that the treaty will
be taken up early in the year, that we are working hard
for ratification and that prospects for passage are im-
proving. We get criticized on the Hill for "not doing
enough on the Panama Canal Treaties" so I am sure
that it must be difficult to see any interest or momentum
from Panama.
We need to keep Torrijos in a positive frame of mind
so that he will continue to make positive statements
and gestures in Panama in addition to courting the
Senators who visit. For that reason, I plan to do the
following with Bob Pastor when we meet with Gabriel
Wednesday:
-Review likely timetable for Congressional action
-Point out that we are delaying SALT II for Panama
Canal Treaties
-Point out recent good signs (mail, polls, etc.)
-Review what we have been doing, including White
House briefings, support of Citizens' Committee,
endorsements received, work with individual Senators,
Speakers' Bureau that has been set up, etc.
Generally, without misleading Gabriel on underestimating
the difficulty of ratification, I would like to reassure
him of the prospects and our own commitment to its
passage.
If you and Zbig think it is appropriate, I might like
oh
to bring Gabriel in to see you just briefly so he can
report back to General Torrijos that he got to see you
and has your personal reassurance. You might just pick
up the telephone and get Senator Byrd to spend five
minutes with Gabriel outlining the likely Senate schedule
for consideration of the treaty.
Torrijos has been very helpful and it is in our own
interests to reassure him and keep him positive.