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Reorganization - White House Executive Operating Procedures, 1977 [1]
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Reorganization - White House Executive Operating Procedures, 1977 [1]
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Reorganization - WH/EOP, 1977 [1]
Folder Citation: Collection: Office of the Chief of Staff Files; Series:
Hamilton Jordan's Confidential Files; Folder: Reorganization -
WH/EOP, 1977 [1]; Container 37
To See Complete Finding Aid:
http://www.jimmycarterlibrary.gov/library/findingaids/Chief_of St
aff.pdf
To Bob, Richard, Hup!
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
My instructions have
not been followed. We
March 31, 1977 have added additional
people, doubtful projects, ex-
Cessive staffs In direct Contra-
verbon to our agreements
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
in Plains. Give me a
FROM:
ROBERT LIPSHUTZ
197 Correct Specific memo with to
This,
time schedule Z
With reference to your memorandum of earlier staffing
the White House staff, I am attaching an up-to- Pevels- 9
today regarding the newspaper articles concerning
date analysis of both the permanent staff and
temporary employees, along with two memorandums
will adopt
which I requested Richard Harden and Hugh Carter options
to prepare independently.
When necessary
After you have had an opportunity to review these
The
documents, I would like to meet with you personally
at your convenience to discuss the matter.
mail is
undustandable, but
Attachments
problem have should be
diminishing. Rosalynn's staff
change was authorized. As
much work as possible must be
moved out of the Write
House- In serious $
Very disappointed-
J.C.
Press
66
48
0
First Lady
26
29
11
Public Liaison
22
19
6
Personnel
19
18
0
Congressional Liaison
25
26
9
N.S.C.
1
3
2
Appointments and Scheduling
and Advance
34
22
0
Domestic Affairs, Policy,
Cabinet & Intergovernmental
30
22
3
Political & Staff Secretary
16
13
3
Budget & Administration
1
4
0
Energy
0
2
0
Drug Program
0
1
0
Special Projects
0
2
0
Miscellaneous
6
1
1
Totals
259
221
36
This proposed allocation would result in a reduction of 38 persons, which
is 10 percent.
Based upon January 20, 1977, allocation, the total employees would be
185. This would be a reduction of 74 persons, which is 29 percent+.
PLUS
(B) Detailed, short-term,
Temporary employees and
W.A.E. (work actually
employed)
Correspondence, etc
,
(in addition to 119
persons which are
included in the
permanent employee
total)
0
122
Personnel (in
addition to above)
0
42
Energy (in addition
to 2 persons on
White House staff)
0
46
PFIAB
5
5
Drug program
0
3
W.A.E.
51
35
All others
27
25
Totals
83
278
Notes: The mail volume now is about 300% of Ford's correspondence,
and there has been a very large back-log. If a large discrepancy
continues, we would need to retain some of the temporary personnel
now working in "correspondence." Regardless, 90 of these 122
people will be released by May 1, 1977.
After the transition phase is completed, it is contemplated that
the temporary "Personnel" staff would no longer be needed.
When the Energy Reorganization is approved, the personnel in
the "Energy" category would be removed from the White House
staff.
SUMMARY OF COMMENTS RECEIVED ON EOP AND
WHITE HOUSE REORGANIZATION PAPERS AS OF 6PM, 6/29/77
WHITE HOUSE STAFFING LEVELS
Hugh Carter
1. Offers suggestions for clarifying personnel
figures and definitions.
2. States that the activities of the Special
Assistant for Budget and Organization would
not be performed in the Central Administrative
Unit but would remain with the Special Assistant
for Administration.
3. Suggests that a more appropriate assignment for
the Director of White House Projects is with the
Public Liaison Office rather than the Cabinet
Secretary/IGR office.
4. Suggests that the Ombudsman would be more
appropriately assigned to Public Liaison Office
than to Congressional Relations.
5. Suggests that IOB remain on the White House
Staff.
Barry Jagoda
Agrees with OTP recommendation and recommendation concerning
Special Assistant for Media and Public Affairs but suggests
abolishing the present reporting responsibility to the Press
Secretary because it leaves the Administration open to
criticism for confusing public relations and policy-making.
Frank Moore
1. Opposes any staff reduction in Congressional Liaison
as jeopardizing progress made thus far in establishing
good congressional relationships. Cites as factors
suggesting the need for a larger CL staff:
a. large amount of Administration legislation
b. high congressional expectations of the new
Administration after eight years of Republican
rule
C. diffusion of congressional power brought about
by recent reforms requires larger CL staff
2
d. a reduction in staff would be interpreted
by some on the Hill as diminished interest in
a good relationship with Congress
e. a number of Congressmen have requested that CL
staff not be reduced, and some suggest it be
increased to increase coordination and
communication
2. Does not see how several of his units could perform
their functions with a reduction in staff.
3. Indicates that the proposal to reduce the staff
to 15 or 17 persons at a later date was not
discussed with him and he believes that the
suggestion that the workload will be lighter
when people are more familiar with their work is
unfounded.
Bunny Mitchell
1. Strongly disagrees with the proposed merger of
her office with Intergovernmental Relations as
structurally, substantively, and politically
inappropriate for the functions performed by her
office.
2. Distressed that such a recommendation could be
offered after spending so much time with the study
team explaining her activities and requirements
to do an effective job.
3. Her most frequent cooperative relationships are
with the Domestic Policy Staff whereas she spends
only 1/4 of her time on IGR activities as D.C. Liaison.
4. "Focus and direction" for her office are not problems
and her effectiveness cannot be enhanced by a merger
with a singularly focused shop.
5. For routine organizational accountability other
than to the President, rationality would dictate
that it should be to Eizenstat.
3
Richard Pettigrew
Offered language to provide a better explanation for the
recent creation of the Office of the Assistant to the
President (Reorganization).
Jim Fallows
Objects strongly to the elimination of both speechwriter
positions. Would object less to elimination of only one
speechwriter, and one secretary.
Tim Kraft
Strongly objects to the suggestion of staff reductions in
Appointments Scheduling and Advance operation.
Notes that ASA has already sustained one thirty percent cut
from Ford Administration number.
Notes that work is highly time-sensitive and visible, and
that cuts would substantially hamper performce ability.
4
EOP REORGANIZATION
Richard Harden
"Quite well done" - suggestions include the following:
1. Suggests a reference in the Summary to the
fuller discussion of the policy process
management function contained in the full
Report.
2. Option 3 appears illogical since it places the
President in the position of having to resolve
differences among four Assistants all drawing
upon the same staff pool.
3. Option 3 also goes against the President's
wishes to keep the White House staff as small as
possible and related to personal support functions.
4. Option 3 also seems to imply that, although
foreign, domestic, economic, and political
considerations need to be coordinated, budgetary
considerations should not be. They are of equal
importance and should be treated similarly.
Charles Schultze
"In general, thoughtful and sound
endorse all suggestions
with the following exceptions:"
1. COWPS
a. Discussion should clearly state that the
proposal to reduce COWPS' staff directly
contradicts President's call in his anti-
inflation message for an expanded COWPS.
Cannot achieve the program's objectives with
this staff reduction.
b. Discussion of the proposal to abolish COWPS is
deficient - no other agency could intervene in
regulatory proceedings of another agency.
5
C.
"Arms-length" stature of COWPS, allowing
intervention without appearing to act for the
President, cannot be replicated.
d. Department of Labor could not easily provide
independent evaluation of costs of major wage
settlements in disagreements with the unions.
e. COWPS' abolition will deprive President's
advisers of capability for industry analysis
which cannot be recaptured through token in-
creases in CEA staff.
f. COWPS has access to corporate data which firms
would be reluctant to give another agency
closer to the President.
g. EOP would lose the ability to independently
analyze wage and price proposals without COWPS
All of the above should be clearly stated in the memo.
2. CEA Staff Reduction -
a. It is a mistake to reduce CEA microeconomics
staff because of the number of important micro-
economic issues dealt with and the need for micro-
economic analysis in understanding macroeconomic
issues.
b. Staff reductions now run risk of diminishing
effectiveness of the Council and its ability to
serve the President.
6
Zbigniew Brzezinski
"
generally endorses organizational, procedural, and
administrative recommendations as they affect national
security matters with certain reservations.
1. Option I or II acceptable but concerned about
crucial ambiguity in relationship between White
House, National Security Adviser, and NSC staff
reflected in organizational charts. No organiza-
tional structure should be interposed between
the White House Office and the President.
2. Strong objection to Option III because it does
not take account of complexity of issues con-
fronting Government and President and the size of
the foreign affairs/national security bureaucracy,
making it impossible under Option III to provide
quality and level of support the President expects
and requires.
3. Consolidation of the EPG staff within a Policy
Support Staff would not fill the need for a
coordinating mechanism for international and
domestic economic issues.
4. Will need to work closely with the reorganization
team during coming months to insure that adminis-
trative consolidation does not jeopardize ability
to respond quickly to the President or the integrity
of the distribution of classified material and the
computerized records management system.
5. Must recognize that in some cases involving
national security issues, the President's interest
could be ill-served by circulation outside the White
House of draft decision memoranda.
6. Would appreciate opportunity to review NSC portions
of subsequent annexes to the Report.
7
Jack Watson
1. Opposes having Cabinet memoranda flow through
Staff Secretary. Sees problems which would
become clear when implementation choices are
considered. Problems involve possible delays
and duplicative staffing, inadequate knowledge
of the Staff Secretary concerning the interests
and activities of Cabinet members causing
inappropriate routing of staff papers, and con-
fusion between the advisory and "neutral broker"
roles of the Domestic Adviser.
2. Offers several specific suggestions to clarify
and further delineate the follow-up responsi-
bilities of the Cabinet Secretary in the Report.
3. Suggests participation of Cabinet Secretary/IGR
Assistant in the Issue Planning process.
4. Suggests that Cabinet Secretary retain responsibility
for supporting Cabinet sub-groups involved in the
coordination of the implementation of policy in
contrast to the development of policy.
5. Observations concerning EPG seem accurate. It
appropriately belongs in the Domestic Affairs Unit.
6. Suggestion that Cabinet Secretary serve as "an
alternative senior channel to the President when
necessary" is meaningless since any senior staff
member can raise policy concerns with the President.
7. Follow-up responsibilities of Cabinet Secretary
requires that he be in the center of information
flow from Cabinet to the President and be involved
in overall development of policy strategy.
8. Offers suggestions for clarifying distinction
between White House and OMB responsibilities in IGR
area and suggests that Assistant for IGR should have
the lead responsibility in crisis management/disaster
relief with OMB providing support and that this be
addressed more fully in the Report.
9. Suggests that the President be given a choice on
the FRC question and presents alternatives for
consideration.
8
Robert Lipshutz
Suggests that the top professional person on the IOB Staff
be given a White House assignment, leaving the rest of the
staff in the EOP. This gives stature to IOB and protection
for classified information. (Submits supporting letters
from Thomas L. Farmer, Chairman, IOB)
Thomas L. Farmer
1. Opposes the recommendation of the EOP Reorganization
team as: (a) being inconsistent with the President's
view of the proper IOB role, (b) unnecessarily
complicating the President's relationship with the
Senate Intelligence Committee, (c) impairing the
Board's ability to advise the President effectively,
and (d) threatening the confidentiality of its
operation.
2. Urges the retention of IOB in its present status
to preserve immunity from congressional intrusion.
3. States that neither the President nor the Board
favors an investigative capability for the IOB,
perferring to rely on the cooperation of the
intelligence community which depends on the
community's belief in the fairness and
confidentiality of the Board's deliberations.
Si Lazarus
"EOP plan is, basically, just the right thing."
1. Suggests abolition of OSTP and creation of
Science Adviser with reduced staff.
2. Announce intention to abolish STR (after current
crisis is over) and move it to State or Treasury.
3. Abolish the distinction between the White House
Office and Executive Office.
PRESIDENT'S
we
REORGANIZATION
PROJECT
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20503
April 4, 1977
MEMORANDUM FOR: Advisory and Review Committee,
President's Reorganization Project
FROM: A. D. FRAZIER
ADF
Attached correspondence is provided as promised.
CC: The Honorable
James Schlesinger
EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT:OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET
EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT REORGANIZATION TEAM
FIRST INTERIM REPORT OF
THE EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
REORGANIZATION PROJECT
A Report of
Assumptions, Objective and Criteria
March 30, 1977
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
1. INTRODUCTION
1
2. ASSUMPTIONS UNDERLYING THE
REORGANIZATION
1
3. OBJECTIVES OF THE REORGANIZATION
3
4. REORGANIZATION CRITERIA
5
"
if political leaders can understand what
is right and fair, devise a comprehensive plan
for improvement, and describe to the public
clearly what should be done, then even the most
far-reaching reforms are possible." (Jimmy Carter
on governmental reform, Why Not the Best, 1976.)
1. INTRODUCTION
The reorganization of the Executive Branch is based on
the Presidential goals of efficiency, economy, account-
ability and openness in government. The project first
analyzes the Executive Office of the President for two
reasons:
To insure that the functions and activities of
the Executive Office of the President effectively
support the President in achieving his goals and
carrying out his responsibilities.
To subject the President's household to the same
rigorous examination that will be applied to other
agencies and departments in the Executive Branch.
The first principle in such an effort is that the functions
of the Executive Office must fit the organizational needs,
the policy pricrities and the personal operating style of a
particular President. But a number of more general assump-
tions, objectives and criteria provide useful starting points.
2. ASSUMPTIONS UNDERLYING THE REORGANIZATION
In analyzing the Executive Office of the President, certain
assumptions must be made about the present structure and
potential improvements. These assumptions are:
2.1 An "Executive Office of the President,"
extending beyond White House staff assistants,
is necessary to assist the President in achieving
the goals and objectives of his Administration, and
in carrying out his legal responsibilities. Thus,
the Executive Office of the President consists of
"a logically consistent subject for reorganization"
as defined by the Congress.
- 2 -
2.2 The existing structures and functions of the
Executive Office of the President are an inheritance from
the past. They are a result of the goals and manage-
ment styles of past Presidents and the emergence of
national and international problems. The Executive
Office of the President, as currently structured,
may not reflect the objectives, the management style,
and other needs of the President.
2.3 The composition of the Executive Office of
the President may change from time to time.
Functions or units currently within the Executive
Office of the President may be unessential or need
not be performed within the Office.
2.4 A team of management and organizational
specialists, working closely with incumbent
staff and with inputs from recognized experts
in government reorganization, the Congress and
the public, can develop an organizational structure
that meets the President's objectives.
2.5 Reorganization should result in more effective
use of resources (people, time, money) within the
Executive Office of the President.
2.6 The Executive Office of the President can and
should reflect the highest principles of open and
responsive government.
2.7 The departments and agencies of the Federal
Government can gain both direction and initiative
from improved effectiveness of the Executive Office
of the President.
2.8 Congress has a legitimate interest in seeking
a more effective organization of the Executive
Office of the President.
2.9 The following are tasks which may appropriately
be performed, in some organizational structure,
within the Executive Office of the President:
1. Identifying issues requiring Presidential
attention or decision.
- 3 -
2. Evaluating alternative courses
of action and possible consequences.
3. Presenting information in the form
of options for Presidential decision making.
4. Coordinating and resolving conflicts
among the policies and activities of various
organizations within the Executive Branch.
5. Providing independent appraisal of costs
and benefits of actions proposed to the
President by others.
6. Disseminating Presidential policy and
guidelines, and assessing adherence to
Presidential decisions.
7. Monitoring implementation of Presidential
policy and instructions.
8. Assessing the results of Administration
policies and actions.
9. Facilitating communication with the Congress
and the public.
10. Providing the President with specialized
expertise, and direct personal and administra-
tive support.
3. OBJECTIVES OF THE REORGANIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
The reorganization of the Executive Office of the President
must be aimed at achieving a well-defined set of objectives.
These objectives are:
3.1 Establish within the Executive Office of the
President only those organizational and staffing
requirements needed to support the President.
This objective will be met by:,
a. Reviewing the many organizational
and staffing requirements needed to
support the President.
- 4 -
b. Determining which existing functions
within the Executive Office of the
President should remain, maintaining
:
only those functions required by the
President and which cannot be performed
better elsewhere.
C. Developing an appropriate organiza-
tional structure for the Executive Office
of the President.
d. Establishing a means for periodic review,
recognizing that needs and priorities will
change.
3.2 Design a more efficient and effective
organization. This objective will be met by:
a. Determining the proper assignment
of unit responsibilities.
b. Establishing a management system
to facilitate the flow of information
and decisions.
C. Improving planning and evaluation
capabilities.
d. Simplifying the coordination,
advisory, and administrative support
functions.
e. Establishing a follow-up and reporting
system for Presidential review.
3.3 Increase the efficiency and economy of
operations. This objective will be met by:
a. Identifying duplicative or over-
lapping functions or tasks.
b. Clarifying the responsibilities of
each function and suggesting ways for
delegating and directing work.
C. Standardizing common operations
(printing, mail-handling, etc.)
d. Assessing the value of specific
activities in terms of their costs.
- 5 -
3.4 Promote open and responsive government.
This objective will be met by:
a. Insuring the consideration of
public input to the decision making
process.
b. Considering the needs of State and
local government and the effect of
Federal action upon them.
C. Encouraging increased public aware-
ness of the functions of the Executive
Office of the President in achieving the
goals and objectives of the President.
d. Establishing clear accountability
for all actions and delegating appro-
priate authority to meet responsibilities.
3.5 Insure that the coordinating mechanisms in
the Executive Office of the President support the
President's desire for a strong collegial role
for the Cabinet.
3.6 Insure that the coordinating mechanism in the
Executive Office of the President promotes the
integration of Foreign and Deomestic Policy.
4. REORGANIZATION CRITERIA
Based on the Project objectives, four sets of criteria
are being developed. The following are examples of some
initial thoughts. These will be elaborated on or modified
as the study progresses.
4.1 Criteria for Inclusion or Exclusion of Functions
a. Function is required for résolution of con-
flicts between departments/agencies.
b. Function is required for implementation,
follow-up, or evaluation of major Administration
initiatives.
- 6 -
C. Function is required for impartial data
collection and objective issue presentation for
the President and Vice President.
d. Function is a required form of close support
for other essential Executive Office of the
President entities.
e. Function cannot be better performed elsewhere.
4.2 Criteria for Organizing Functions
a. Are unit responsibilities clearly defined?
b. Is ther unnecessary layering (too many
intermediaries) ?
C. Are resources consistent with organizational
needs?
4.3 Criteria for Evaluating Management Effectiveness
and Efficiency
a. Does a recognized set of priorities
exist for allocating resources?
b. Are channels of communications clearly
defined?
C. Are the objectives of the organization
worth the investment of people, time, and
money?
d. Is the investment justified by the
quality, quantity and timeliness of the
work effort?
4.4 Criteria for Evaluating Openness and Responsiveness
a. Is there sufficient congressional and public
awareness of the activities of the President and
his Executive Office?
b. Is there sufficient congressional and public
input to the decision making process?
C. Does the operation of the Executive Office of
the President generate public trust and confidence.
- 7 -
4.5 Utilization of Criteria
Criteria will be used by Project team members
as a guide for the types of information to be
collected and in the subsequent analysis of that
information.
EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
FIRS INITED
OFFICE OF management AND BUDGET
WASHINGTON. D.C. 20503
June 29, 1977
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
Subject: Executive Office Reorganization and White House
Office Staffing Levels
I transmit two reports for your review: (1) Reorganization
of the Executive Office of the President, and (2) White House
Office Staffing Levels. This memorandum summarizes the
findings and recommendations of each report and proposes next
steps for your further review and implementation.
Reorganization of the EOP
1. Overall EOP Structure
The team finds that a number of functions within
EOP do not bear a close relationship to the President's work
and do not require an EOP home for their effective perform-
ance. Many of these activities are in offices that handle
specialized policy areas. To streamline the Executive
Office and concentrate its work on Presidential pricrities,
the team presents three organizational options.
Option 1
Modify current structure; eliminate inactive units
and Office of Telecommunications Policy; concentrate
on removing non-essential functions from the rest.
(13 EOP units would remain, compared to 18 on
January 20.)
Option II
Eliminate most separate specialized staffs that deal
with limited areas of policy; i.e., those removed in
Option I plus Council on Environmental Quality,
Council on Wage and Price Stability, and Office of
Drug Abuse Policy. Under this approach, there would
2
be ten separate EOP staff units: White House Office,
Office of the Vice President, three policy management
units (Office of Management and Budget, National
Security Council, a renamed Domestic Council), two
specialized advisory units (Council of Economic Ad-
visers, Office of Science and Technology Policy),
Office of the Special Representative for Trade
Negotiations, Intelligence Oversight Board, and a
Central Administrative Unit.
Option III
Eliminate all specialized units and create a central
EOP policy staff incorporating NSC, DC, CEA, OSTP
and Economic Policy Group to manage decision processes
and provide economic and other expertise. Under this
approach, there would be six EOP units.
The study team recommends the second approach. This
would limit specialized advocacy within EOP, and reduce
full-time permanent EOP positions from 1,712 to approx-
imately 1, 413.
In each case the team recommends the establishment of
a central administrative unit in which to consolidate ad-
ministrative services currently dispersed throughout the
EOP.
Background data on the Council on Environmental Quality,
the Office of Drug Abuse Policy and the Office of Tele-
communications Policy is included in a separate volume.
Disposition of these three units may generate controversy.
2. Policy Process Management
The team finds that although the President is well
served by many outstanding staff aides, there are limita-
tions in how the overall policymaking system works to
support the President on specific issues. These problems
relate to the range of choices provided, the quality of
staffing, the timeliness of information, and the way in
which advice is sought and received from Presidential ad-
visers. To strengthen the decision process, the team
recommends:
a. Establishing Process Rules and Institutions, by
1) Instituting a PRM process for domestic
and economic issues;
3
2) Creating an Executive Committee of Presi-
dential Advisers to set priorities among
issues and oversee their staffing;
3) Assigning the Assistant to the President
(Political Coordination) a more explicit
responsibility for coordinating political
input to policy issues;
4) Sharing of Presidential decision memoranda
on policy issues with Cabinet and EOP
advisers most affected;
5) Consolidating the two White House paper
circulation systems, and including the
OMB Director and the CEA Chairman in the
White House circulation list.
6) Building a capacity to review the decision-
making process periodically.
b. Making process management on domestic and econ-
omic issues the explicit and primary responsi-
bility of the current Assistant for Domestic
Affairs and Policy.
C. Merging the Domestic Council and Economic
Policy Group staffs under the Domestic Adviser,
with the combined unit renamed Policy Support
Staff.
These recommendations and supporting documentation are pre-
sented in full in the study team's Decision Analysis Report,
which is also transmitted for your reference.
White House Staffing Levels
The study team concludes that substantial staff reduction
is both feasible and desirable. Current policy/political
staff can be reduced by 30 percent below the Ford Adminis-
tration level of 250; comparable reductions in other White
House staffing are possible if the team's proposal to
centralize EOP administrative services is adopted.
4
Next Steps
We are scheduled to meet with you during the morning
of July 7th to further explain these recommendations and
answer questions. Pending your approval, we will
1. Develop detailed implementation plans.
2. Work with current EOP managers to accomplish
these improvements.
3. Assist in developing materials to explain those
actions to the press and public.
4. Draft instruments such as revised Executive Orders
and Congressional messages.
BenRan BERT LANCE
Director
PRESIDENT'S REORGANIZATION PROJECT
Recommendation Memo No. EOP-1
June 29, 1977
ISSUE: Reorganization of the Executive Office of
The President
Contents
Page
Introduction
1
Strengthening Process Management
5
of Policy Issues
Restructuring the EOP
10
Option II
14
Option I
22
Option III
24
Appendix A - Comparison of Options
Appendix B - Unit Staffing Levels for Proposed Options
Appendix c - - EOP Unit Descriptions
1
INTRODUCTION
This report presents recommendations for improving the
operations and structure of the Executive Office of the
President (EOP). Following this introduction, we present
a series of suggested operational improvements and then
describe three organizational options for the EOP and the
elements of each.
To provide a frame of reference, we first briefly discuss:
The appropriate functions of the EOP.
The organization of the EOP today.
The findings that have shaped our recommendations
for improvement.
Appropriate EOP Functions
The EOP serves as the principal staff institution to the
President. As such, it should:
Provide day-to-day operational support (e.g., sched-
uling, appointments) and facilitate Presidential
communication to and from the public, the Congress
and the news media.
Manage the budget and coordinate Administration
positions on matters before the Congress.
Manage the Presidential decisionmaking processes in
a timely, rigorous, disciplined, systematic, and
fair manner.
Provide staff resources for the President to:
- plan and set priorities
- monitor and evaluate progress toward achieving
the President's objectives
- understand and resolve major conflicts among
line subordinates
- manage crises, especially in national security
matters.
Staff high priority Presidential initiatives.
2
Provide immediate and personal advice to the President
on a wide range of issues including political coordi-
nation.
Additionally, the EOP has included selected line functions for
which there has been no other natural or appropriate placement.
Finally, Presidents have created EOP units to highlight their
concern for and commitment to resolving particular issues and
problems.
Current EOP Organization
The President inherited an EOP comprised of eighteen separate
organizational entities with 1,655 full-time permanent posi-
tions and a shifting number of detailees and special employees.
One of them--the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory
Board--has been abolished. Current activities range from the
routine (e.g., clearance of agency forms) to the indispensable
(e.g., NSC support of Presidential crisis management).
EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
EXISTING EOP (1/20/77)
PRESIDENT
INTELLIGENCE
OFFICE
OVERSIGHT
OF THE
BOARD
VICE-PRESIDENT
COUNCIL
OFFICE OF
WHITE
OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL
OF
MANAGEMENT
HOUSE
REPRESENTATIVE FOR
ECONOMIC ADVISORS
AND BUDGET
OFFICE
TRADE NEGOTIATION
NATIONAL
DOMESTIC
SECURITY
COUNCIL
COUNCIL
COUNCIL ON
OFFICE OF
COUNCIL ON
OFFICE OF
WAGE AND PRICE
SCIENCE TECHNOLOGY
ENVIRONMENTAL
DRUG ABUSE
STABILITY
POLICY
QUALITY
POLICY
ECONOMIC
COUNCIL ON
OFFICE OF
FEDERAL
ENERGY
PREEIDENT'S
POLICY
INTERNATIONAL
TELECOMMUNICATIONS
PROPERTY
RESOURCES
FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE
GROUP
ECONOMIC POLICY
POLICY
COUNCIL
COUNCIL
ADVISORY BOARD
3
This structure is in no meaningful sense an organization. It
is, rather, a conglomeration of units and functions created
or placed close to the President at different times for dif-
ferent reasons. A number of units were established by Congress;
many have identifiable political or bureaucratic constituencies
with a keen interest in their placement and activities; some
reflect the priorities of past administrations.
The White House Office concentrates on close personal support,
including policy and political advice and administrative and
operational services. A detailed discussion of these units
and staff levels is found in the separate White House Report.
The Office of the Vice President provides similar, though more
limited, support to him. OMB's primary mission is to develop
and implement the budget; it also carries out a number of
management and reorganization activities.
In addition to the Cabinet Secretary in the White House, four
EOP units have responsibility for managing policy development
processes:
Economic Policy Group
National Security Council
Domestic Council
Council on International Economic Policy
(currently inactive)
The other 10 are more specialized offices that offer analysis
and advice, participate in policy development in certain areas,
symbolize high Presidential interest in certain areas or per-
form special projects. These are:
Council of Economic Advisers
Council on Wage and Price Stability
Office of the Special Representative for Trade
Negotiations
Council on Environmental Quality
Office of Science and Technology Policy
Office of Drug Abuse Policy
Office of Telecommunications Policy
Intelligence Oversight Board
Federal Property Council
Energy Resources Council
4
Findings
This amalgam of units and functions by and large has served
the President well, although our fact-finding revealed a
number of opportunities for improvement:
1. There are several inactive units that should be
formally abolished.
2. Many units perform routine operations and line
activities which may be performed more appropri-
ately by other agencies outside the EOP.
3. Functional overlap, duplication, and unclear roles
within the EOP have led to jurisdictional disputes
among units and principals.
4. Administrative functions are fragmented and vary in
the quality and level of support they provide to
particular units.
5. There is evidence of some non-directed or self-
initiated work that may be highly productive or
desirable in some instances, but often leads to
jurisdictional conflict, confusion, and lack of
accountability.
6. There are inadequacies in the process by which deci-
sions are made and policies developed and refined
within the administration. These problems relate to
the range of options provided on specific issues, the
completeness of staffing, the timeliness of informa-
tion, and the procedures through which senior advisors
convey their views on matters relevant to their
responsibilities.
7. There is also insufficient systematic attention to
follow-up on Presidential decisions.
8. The EOP should be reviewed again within the next four
years. The results of other reorganization activity
may affect EOP structure and the President may wish
to consolidate further at a later date.
5
STRENGTHENING PROCESS MANAGEMENT OF POLICY ISSUES
Regardless of any other reorganization actions, the study
team believes there is a significant need to improve "process
management" in the EOP. The public success of EOP reorgani-
zation may well rest on the extent of White House staff
reductions and the streamlining of EOP through elimination
or consolidation of specialized units. But its impact on
matters of greatest importance to the President and the
nation may well rest on how effectively it can address the
procedural problems in the performance of policy development
and coordination functions which clearly belong in the
Executive Office.
Process management includes: developing a Presidential agenda
of issues and priorities among them; presenting issues and
options to the President; drawing on the sources cf infor-
mation and analysis throughout the government relevant to a
particular issue; assuring that senior advisers have the
opportunity to convey their views on an issue at the most
appropriate time; and following up on decisions made.
The study team does not wish to convey a predominantly nega-
tive judgment on the performance of these functions. More-
over, there is no perfect, neat, tidy solution for process
problems. Presidential policymaking is complex because
workable procedures are dependent on effective personal
relationships and because any structural and procedural
arrangements must respond to competing needs. Nonetheless,
the team's Decision Analysis Report, which investigated
eight recent policymaking cases, concludes that:
1. The full resources of government have not always been
brought to bear on particular issues in a timely
manner;
2. The President has not always been presented with a
full range of realistic options on an issue, each
supported by sufficient staff work;
3. There has not been enough forward planning and
priority setting to promote coordination among
issues;
4. Procedures have been inadequate to ensure that EOP
advisers have the opportunity to weigh in on issues
relevant to their expertise and policy responsibilities;
6
5. There has not been enough systematic staff effort to
follow up on Presidential decisions.
More specifically,
1. Presidentially imposed short leadtimes and the intrusion
of crises into the EOP decisionmaking process make the
development of better process control mechanisms all the
more important.
2. Political analysis within the EOP, related both to the
Congress and the broader political environment, is not
applied to decisionmaking on a systematic basis.
3. Departmental specialists have demonstrated high compe-
tence in support of EOP decisionmaking, but their
involvement is not consistently included, varying
widely across policy areas. Moreover, strong depart-
mental advocacy should be balanced by early inter-
departmental review by departments, agencies, EOP
units and Presidential advisers, i.e. structured
conflict.
4. The Economic Policy Group is not fully effective as
currently operating. This has resulted in inadequate
staffing of the economic aspects of some issues.
5. Two separate paper circulation processes now exist in
the White House Office: the Cabinet and Staff
Secretariats. Though the two normally integrate at
some point, this often occurs too late in the process.
Thus, White House staffing papers may be developed
without benefit or full knowledge of departmental
positions and vice versa.
These problems highlight the need for greater procedural
regularity, and for central policy staffs whose primary task
is to manage the process according to accepted process rules.
Such staffs need to be the President's preferred channels
for handling substantive issues if they are to be effective.
They need also to take care that advocacy of particular
viewpoints not compromise their objective presentation of
alternatives to the President. We have found evidence that
this has sometimes occurred, to the detriment of the
President's ability to choose. Moreover, this currently
appears more likely to happen in domestic and economic
policy. In the national security area, the Assistant and
his staff operate within a tradition which encourages them
to distinguish between the role of conveying views and
7
information objectively to the President, and the role of
giving him personal, confidential advice. The current
Assistant for Domestic Affairs and Policy is also generally
viewed as fair in his dealings on particular issues. But
there is no comparable staff tradition nor set of established
procedures to protect the process manager role from competing
pressures in day-to-day issues management. Moreover, the
Domestic Council staff is viewed by many other policy partic-
ipants more as an advocacy group, which gives priority to
developing and presenting its own views, though it has also
sometimes functioned as an "honest broker" in expanding the
range of options for the President.
To deal with these problems, the study team puts forward a
set of related proposals aimed at regularizing policy pro-
cedures and assuring that key staffs will give primacy to
the process management role. The recommendations are offered
both on the appropriate process rules and on responsibility
for implementing them.
Process Rules. The study team recommends the following:
1. Establishment of a PRM Process for Management of Many
Domestic and Economic Issues.
Apply the procedure for organizing interagency studies
of national security issues to other areas of policy.
It should also be modified to involve departments more
effectively in the initial definition of problems to
be addressed and in the preparation of the Presidential
decision and implementation documents.
2. Executive Committee for Issues Planning
Establish an Executive Committee of senior advisers
with responsibility for building and continually
updating the President's decisionmaking agenda,
setting priorities among issues and dealing with
interrelationships among them. This would be
composed of the OMB Director, the CEA Chairman, and
the Assistants to the President for National Security,
Domestic Policy, Intergovernmental Relations, Political
Coordination, Press, Public Liaison and Congressional
Relations. Active participation by the Vice President
would strengthen this process; consideration should be
given to having him chair this group.
8
3. Political Input
Strengthen the process for ensuring that the White House
provides views to the decision process by expanding the
role of the Assistant to the President (Jordan) to in-
clude coordination of the various political activities
within EOP units. Development of policy options should
reflect a detailed assessment of Congressional, interest
group, and general public reaction.
4. Sharing of Decision Memoranda
Establish a process rule that decision memoranda prepared
by Presidential policy aides should normally be circulated
or shown to the Cabinet and EOP advisers most involved
(prior to their submission to the President) so that they
can judge whether their analyses and views are objectively
presented. This will reinforce staff priority to the
process management role.
5. White House Paper Circulation
Consolidate the two paper circulation systems. To assure
the most timely circulation of both Cabinet and senior
White House staff papers, both circulations should be
coordinated by the Staff Secretary. Under this recom-
mendation, Cabinet memoranda for the President would
flow first through the Staff Secretary who would then
forward the submissions to the Cabinet Secretary. It
would be the responsibility of the Cabinet Secretary to
handle the staffing and circulation of such Cabinet memo-
randa to other Cabinet members as appropriate. In addi-
tion, the "White House loop" for circulating policy papers
to the President should be expanded to include the OMB
Director and the CEA Chairman.
6. Periodic Review of Process
Consider building the capacity to review the decisionmaking
apparatus periodically, through a combination of compre-
hensive interviews and case study analyses. Presidents
historically have been unable to assess systematically the
performance of their Office.
Responsibility for Managing the Policy Process. As important
as establishing clearer process rules is the need to determine
which staffs should have primary process management respon-
sibilities for particular issues. Clearer delineation of this
9
responsibility will generate more thorough staffing of
issues for Presidential decision if the staffs assigned
this responsibility give it primacy over other roles. The
national security adviser and staff currently exercise such
responsibility for foreign policy. The study team proposes
that the Policy Support Staff, under the direction of the
current Domestic Adviser, have such responsibility for
domestic and economic policy.
Alternatively, the President could designate the Cabinet
Secretary as the primary process manager outside the
National Security Adviser, or retain the current dispersed
responsibility. The study team does not recommend either.
Problems with the current structure have already been
documented; the Cabinet Secretary lacks both the staff
resources and day-to-day involvement with the issue devel-
opment process to manage it efficiently. The Domestic
Adviser is the more natural "process manager" because he
has sufficient staff and because he already handles sub-
stantive issues for the President. The recommended process
rules, moreover, should help assure that the Adviser's
staff gives priority to the process manager role.
The team also recommends:
1. That responsibility for staffing Cabinet subgroups
engaged in substantive policy development be trans-
ferred from the Cabinet Secretariat to the Domestic
Adviser;
2. That follow-up responsibility for major Presidential
decisions be assigned to the Cabinet Secretary,
particularly where they relate to his intergovern-
mental relations (IGR) responsibilities;
3. That the division of responsibility between the
White House IGR staff and OMB be clarified: IGR
should provide policy leadership and White House
communication with State and local government
leaders; OMB should implement IGR programs and
administer field operations.
The implications of these process management proposals for the
Domestic Council and the Economic Policy Group are treated in
the section on overall EOP organizational options below.
10
RESTRUCTURING THE EOP
The study team has developed three broad options for improving
EOP structure. All would make the Executive Office simpler
than that which the President inherited on January 20. All
would provide for placement outside of EOP of functions not
requiring an EOP home. All would involve significant reduc-
tions in EOP staff. All would require reorganization plan
for implementation. All assume the adoption of the study team's
recommendations on process management.
Option I modifies the current structure by eliminating inactive
units and the Office of Telecommunications Policy. It suggests
that most of the active units are useful and should be retained.
Accordingly, this option concentrates on eliminating non-
essential functions and staff within the remaining units.
Option II incorporates the changes proposed in Option I and
eliminates COWPS, CEQ, and ODAP as well. It preserves speci-
alized units only in broad policy areas such as science and
economics. The study team recommends this option.
Option III eliminates almost all specialized units and consol-
idates NSC, DC, CEA, EPG, OSTP in a central Policy Support
Staff to manage decision processes and provide economic and
other policy expertise. Although structure would change, EOP
functions remain as proposed for Option II.
The following table compares the number of units and estimated
full-time permanent positions under the three options.
Ford
Current
Options
Levels
Levels
I
II
III
Number of EOP Units
18
17
13
10
6
Number of Authorized
Full-Time Permanent
EOP Positions
1,655
1,712
1,473
1,413
1,413
Number of Authorized
Full-Time Permanent
White House Positions
485
485
340
343
353
Estimated Budget Costs
(Annual)
$75.8M
$79.1M
$64.3M $59.0M $59.0M
The next three pages display organization charts for each
option. An analysis of our recommended option, its impli-
cations for particular EOP units, and a comparison of its
advantages and disadvantages with those of the other two
approaches follows the organization charts. The appendices
provide more specific information about each option.
EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
OPTION I
PRESIDENT
INTELLIGENCE
OFFICE
OVERSIGHT
OF THE
BOARD
VICE-PRESIDENT
WHITE
CENTRAL
COUNCIL
OFFICE OF
HOUSE
OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL
ADMINISTRATIVE
OF
MANAGEMENT
OFFICE
REPRESENTATIVE FOR
UNIT
ECONOMIC ADVISORS
AND BUDGET
POLICY
NATIONAL
TRADE NEGOTIATION
SUPPORT
SECURITY
POLICY
NATIONAL
SUPPORT
SECURITY
STAFF
STAFF
COUNCIL ON
OFFICE OF
COUNCIL ON
OFFICE OF
WAGE AND PRICE
SCIENCE & TECHNOLOGY
ENVIRONMENTAL
DRUG ABUSE
STABILITY
POLICY
QUALITY
POLICY
UNITS ELIMINATED:
ECONOMIC POLICY GROUP
COUNCIL ON INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC POLICY
OFFICE OF TELECOMMUNICATIONS POLICY
FEDERAL PROPERTY COUNCIL
ENERGY RESOURCES COUNCIL
NOTE:
PRESIDENT'S FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL AND ECONOMIC POLICY
11
OFFICE OF DRUG ABUSE POLICY IIN ONE YEAR)
GROUP ARE RETAINED AS CABINET LEVEL COMMITTEES.
DOMESTIC COUNCIL
"STAFF CONSOLIDATED WITH POLICY SUPPORT STAFF
EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
OPTION II
PRESIDENT
INTELLIGENCE
OFFICE
OVERSIGHT
OF THE
BOARD
VICE PRESIDENT
WHITE
CENTRAL
COUNCIL
OFFICE OF
HOUSE
OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL
ADMINISTRATIVE
OF
MANAGEMENT
OFFICE
REPHESENTATIVE FOR
UNIT
ECONOMIC ADVISORS
AND BUDGET
POLICY
NATIONAL
TRADE NEGOTIATION
SUPPORT
SECURITY
OFFICE OF
POLICY
NATIONAL
SCIENCE & TECHNOLOGY
SUPPORT
SECURITY
POLICY
STAFF
STAFF
UNITS ELIMINATEO:
COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY
OFFICE OF DRUG ABUSE POLICY*
COUNCIL ON WAGE AND PRICE STABILITY
ECONOMIC POLICY GROUP
COUNCIL ON INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC POLICY
OFFICE OF TELECOMMUNICATIONS POLICY
FEDERAL PROPERTY COUNCIL
NOTE:
ENERGY RESOURCES COUNCIL
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL ECONOMIC POLICY
PRESIDENT'S FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD
GROUP AND COUNCIL ON WAGE AND PRICE STABILITY
DOMESTIC COUNCIL*
RE TAINED AS CABINET LEVEL COMMITTEES
"STAFF CONSOLIDATED WITH POLICY SUPPORT STAFF
"ADVISER ADDED TO WHITE HOUSE OFFICE
12
EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
OPTION III
PRESIDENT
INTELLIGENCE
OFFICE
OVERSIGHT
OF THE
BOARD
VICE-PRESIDENT
OFFICE OF
WHITE
OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL
MANAGEMENT
HOUSE
REPRESENTATIVE FOR
AND BUDGET
OFFICE
TRADE NEGOTIATION
CENTRAL ADMIN.
UNIT
POLICY
NATIONAL
SECURITY
ECONOMICS
OTHER
UNITS ELIMINATED:
POLICY SUPPORT STAFF
COUNCIL OF ECONOMIC ADVISORS* :
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL STAFF*
OFFICE OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY POLICY' :.
COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY
OFFICE OF DRUG ABUSE POLICY* ..
COUNCIL ON WAGE AND PRICE STABILITY
ECONOMIC POLICY GROUP'
COUNCIL ON INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC POLICY
OFFICE OF TELECOMMUNICATIONS POLICY
FEDERAL PROPERTY COUNCIL
13
NOTE:
ENERGY RESOURCES COUNCIL
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL, ECONOMIC POLICY
PRESIDENT'S FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD
GROUP AND COUNCIL ON WAGE AND PRICE STABILITY
DOMESTIC COUNCIL'
ARE RETAINED AS CABINE Γ LEVEL COMMITTEES.
*STAFF CONSOLIDATED WITH POLICY SUPPORT STAFF
**ADVISER ADDED TO WINTE HOUSE OFFICE
14
Option II
This option has a more dramatic impact upon the form and
functions of the EOP than does Option I but is a less visible
change than Option III. The following discussion describes
units to be: (1) eliminated; (2) retained but merged with
other EOP units; (3) retained but modified, redefined or
otherwise changed in function; and (4) created.
Units Eliminated from the EOP
Several specialized staffs inherited by this Administration
would be eliminated. These are:
1. Office of Drug Abuse Policy (ODAP)
2. Council on Wage and Price Stability (COWPS)
3. Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ)
4. Office of Telecommunications Policy (OTP)
5. Council on International Economic Policy (currently
inactive)
6. Federal Property Council (currently inactive)
7. Energy Resources Council (Department of Energy
legislation would eliminate)
8. President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board
(already eliminated)
EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
OPTION "
PREMIDENT
INTELLIGENCE
OFFICE
OVERSIGHT
OF TME
BOARD
VICE-PRESIDENT
WHITE
CENTRAL
COUNCIL
OFFICE OF
HOUSE
OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL
ADMINISTRATIVE
OF
MANAGEMENT
OFFICE
REPRESENTATIVE FOR
UNIT
ECONOMIC ADVISORS
AND BUDGET
POLICY NATIONAL
TRADE NEGOTIATION
SUPPORT SECURITY
OFFICE OF
POLICY
NATIONAL
SCIENCE . TECHNOLOGY
SUPPORT
SECURITY
POLICY
STAPP
STAPF
LIMITE ELEMMATED
COUNCIL OM ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY
OFFICE OF DRUG ABUSE POLICY**
OM WAGE AND PRICE STABILITY
BCONCING POLICY GROUP
COLUNCIL OR TIONAL ECONOMIC POLICY
OFFICE OF TELECOMMUNICA TICNS POLICY
FEDERAL PROPERTY COUNCIL
NOTE
ENERGY RESOURCES COUNCIL
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL ECONOMIC POLICY
PRESIDENTS FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD
GROUP AND COUNCIL - WAGE AND PRICE STABILITY
DOMESTIC COUNCIL'
RETAINED AS CASHIER LEVEL COMMITTEE
"STAFF CONSOLIDATED WITH POLICY SUPPORT STAFF
***ADVISER ADDED TO SHITS HOUSE OFFICE
15
Office of Drug Abuse Policy (ODAP) activities overlap with
activities of the President's Reorganization Project which
logically can absorb drug abuse reorganization functions. A
Presidential adviser and two staff members would remain in the
White House to assure Presidential awareness of drug issues.
The study team concludes that a Presidential adviser could
provide the necessary policy advice to the President and
provide coordination among separate Federal drug abuse efforts
without continuing a separate office.
The Council of Wage and Price Stability (COWPS) carries out
such functions as "jawboning," monitoring private sector wage
and price actions, conducting studies, and assessing the in-
flationary impact of Federal regulations. This kind of func-
tion is normally performed outside the EOP, particularly in
Commerce. COWPS' work is usually self initiated, although it
often provides analytic assistance to the CEA.
Under this proposal, all COWPS functions would be transferred
to other agencies. "Jawboning" (where necessary) would be
assigned to a subcabinet working group chaired by Treasury to
be known as the "Interagency Committee on Inflation." CEA
could be allowed additional positions to provide analytical
backup and draw on departmental wage-price analysis.
COWPS has been highly publicized as a weapon in the Adminis-
tration's anti-inflation program and eliminating it might
appear as a change in direction. The President might choose
to retain COWPS but have it report through the CEA.
The Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ) would be transferred
intact to the Department of the Interior. This is consistent
with the assumption that only those functions relating most
directly to Presidential needs would remain within the EOP.
Thus, more operational and routine responsibilities are trans-
ferred to a Cabinet Department, reinforcing the concept of
strong Cabinet government. This option also recognizes the
value of having a visible council to address environmental
policy issues.
While most of the functions currently performed by the Office
of Telecommunications Policy (OTP) can be (or are currently
being) performed outside the EOP, it is important that a
"neutral home" be maintained to allow dispute resolution;
that the President have immediate and informed advice and
options on telecommunications and information policy issues
when needed; and that to a lesser extent, Congress and others
be placated in their desire for direct access to Presidential
level decisionmaking. To achieve these objectives requires
16
only a small staff and no new statutory body within EOP, thus
achieving the reductions and efficiencies desirable.
Therefore, we propose to abolish statutory OTP and retain only
a small telecommunications and information policy staff headed
by a new Associate Director for Communications and Information
Policy within the new Policy Support Staff (formerly Domestic
Council Staff). This will also require redefinition of the
role of the current Special Assistant to the President for
Media and Public Affairs. Management of government communi-
cations and arbitration of interagency disputes regarding
frequency allocation would be transferred to OMB. All other
functions (with the exception of developing Presidential
policy options) would be transferred to an upgraded office
within the Department of Commerce.
In addition to these four units, the units eliminated consist
of inoperative or, in the case of President's Foreign Intelli-
gence Advisory Board, recently abolished units. The Council
on International Economic Policy and the Federal Property
Council have been inactive; the Energy Resources Council is
covered under the Department of Energy; and PFIAB was abolished
by Executive Order on May 5, 1977.
Units Retained in the EOP, but Merged
A new Policy Support Staff, reporting to the White House domestic
adviser, would be formed from the existing staffs of the Economic
Policy Group (EPG) and the Domestic Council. This staff would be
primarily responsible for managing domestic and economic issues
in the policy process system described in the prior section.
Merging the EPG staff with that of the Domestic Council would
assist in solving the problems currently created by separation
of EPG staff from the two major aides for substantive issues.
The EPG would be retained as a Cabinet-level forum. Its eleven-
member Executive Committee would be abolished; a four-agency
Steering Committee would be established to plan for EPG meetings
and strengthen informal policy coordination. EPG meetings on
particular issues would be attended by Steering Committee mem-
bers plus those cabinet members with strong direct interest in
those issues.
EOP Units to be Retained
Seven EOP units are recommended to continue with some modifica-
tion. They are:
1. Office of the Vice President
17
2. Office of Management and Budget (OMB)
3. Council of Economic Advisers (CEA)
4. Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP)
5. Office of the Special Representative for Trade
Negotiations (STR)
6. National Security Council (NSC)
7. Intelligence Oversight Board (IOB)
The operations of the Office of the Vice President reflect the
combination of constitutional, statutory, and Presidentially
assigned duties that make it unique among EOP units. Because
the scope of his interests and assignments covers virtually the
entire Presidential agenda, the Vice President requires a staff
that parallels the President's in all respects other than size.
The office is well run and efficient, already having achieved
operating economies wherever possible. Its basic functions
should not be changed. However, we do believe that certain of
the Vice President's support functions involving accounting,
personnel services and supply functions, should be transferred
to a centralized EOP Administrative Unit.
The Office of Management and Budget would remain as a separate
EOP entity. An internal reorganization of OMB's management
arm to emphasize major Presidential initiatives such as zero
base budgeting, reorganization, paperwork reduction, and regu-
latory reform is our most important recommendation.
The most significant structural issue is whether to maintain
the Office of Federal Procurement Policy (OFPP) as a separate
statutory entity or to abolish it and transfer its functions
to the Director of OMB. OFPP and its staff of 27 was created
as an outgrowth of the recommendations of the Commission on
Government Procurement. It reports both to the President and
the Congress and there is substantial Congressional interest
in maintaining the current structure. From a managerial stand-
point, however, OFPP could be more effective if it were more
closely linked to other related OMB functions. Therefore, the
study team recommends its staff be reduced to 20 people, that
it be redesignated as an OMB division, and that it be abolished
as a separate statutory unit.
The strength of the Council of Economic Advisers (CEA) lies
in its economic analysis directly relevant to current policy
choices. It also has responsibility for presenting objective
economic data, macroeconomic forecasts, and analysis of
economic trends and their impact on the national economy. CEA
analysis currently feeds regularly into Presidential decision-
making. Should COWPS be abolished, as is recommended earlier
in this report, a small staff with expertise in wage-price
analysis should be added to CEA to allow CEA to coordinate
18
information and analysis of others and advise the President
on wage-price issues.
The challenge of the Office of Science and Technology Policy
(OSTP) is to structure it so that it can be used effectively
by the President. Removing non-Presidential encumbrances
would place OSTP squarely in the role of close support. If
the OSTP head is consulted by the President and is part of a
network of important advisers, the President can ensure him-
self of the best possible advice on the scientific and tech-
nological implications of a wide range of issues.
OSTP should retain only those science and technology func-
tions which provide advice to the President and support
policy formulation, budget review, and decisionmaking in
other EOP units. The work of the intergovernmental panels
should be performed through OMB; the Federal Coordinating
Council on Science and Technology would operate as a sub-
Cabinet working group; and the reorganization work of the
President's Committee on Science and Technology would be
placed in the President's overall reorganization effort.
Remaining PCST functions and reports should be transferred
to the National Science Foundation. OSTP would provide
science-related advice and support on environmental and tele-
communications policy issues.
This proposal places manageable parameters on OSTP's broadly
defined congressional mandate. It places emphasis on
"Presidential" functions and promotes specialist expertise
capability for input into EOP policy and budget formulation.
If the President wishes to follow this option but consolidate
further within it, he could choose to replace OSTP with a
personal, non-statutory adviser in the White House.
The Office of the Special Representative for Trade
Negotiations (STR) is now operating effectively under a strong
trade representative. The Office imposes few burdens on the
EOP. The benefits to be derived from transferring the STR
functions to another department or an independent agency do
not justify either the political costs or the probable loss
of STR's effectiveness as a broker of trade interests and as
an international trade negotiator. If a later reorganization
study concludes that all trade responsibilities should be con-
solidated, action on STR should be taken at that time.
The National Security Council (NSC) staff has increasingly
emerged as a Presidential foreign policy staff, although it
also maintains several operational responsibilities,
especially in national security crisis management. The
19
President has already reorganized it and, with the exception
of a few non-substantive administrative activities, its staff
is fully and usefully occupied. Freedom of Information Act
responsibility may be transferred to the State Department
resulting in a minimal staff reduction. Establishing a
central administrative unit would further reduce this staff.
The National Security Council's PRM process represents a
useful foundation upon which to develop a sound policy pro-
cess for both the NSC and the Policy Support Staff. The
recommended Policy Staff Management System builds upon this
PRM model.
The number of staff provided for the Intelligence Oversight
Board (IOB) should be increased to provide staff for field
operations, and performance of all of its functions. This
proposal is based upon the assumption that the President
wishes to enlarge on the investigatory role of IOB and that
this can be accomplished at relatively insignificant dollar
cost.
We recommend placing the expanded unit in the EOP. The
study team is aware, however, that the current IOB members
feel the expansion of staff and placement of that staff in
a separate EOP unit could compromise the mission the
President has assigned to them. If the President wishes to
retain the unit with its current mission and staff size,
the unit's one full-time staff member could remain on the
White House political/professional payroll.
Central Administration Unit to be Created
About 380 (22%) of the full-time, permanent EOP personnel
are performing administrative support services in the 17 EOP
units. Most EOP entities outside of the White House and OMB
are too small to provide comprehensive administrative ser-
vices internally. They depend upon the White House, OMB,
GSA or some other Federal department for these services and
sometimes upon more than one of these sources. This results
in wide variation in the quality and completeness of admin-
istrative services in EOP and in uncoordinated administrative
management for EOP as a whole. This has produced numerous
service duplications, inconsistent distribution of services
(excess capacity in some units and deficiencies in others),
missed opportunities for economies of scale, and lack of
cost controls.
To address these deficiencies, EOP administrative support
operations should be combined into a Central Administrative
Unit in EOP to (1) provide support in administrative ser-
vices that are common to all EOP entities, and (2) provide
20
technical support and coordination of the ZBB system in EOP.
The central unit would be headed by a Presidential appointee
reporting to the President or his designee.
The White House Operations staff would be scaled down and
retained to carry out only those functions that are con-
sidered to be direct support to the President. Each EOP
entity outside the White House would retain a minimal
administrative capability to perform service liaison with
the Central Administrative Unit.
Implementation of this proposal would result in:
estimated savings of $1.4 million and 52 positions;
an administrative base on which to develop service
innovations, and improved service outreach to EOP
users,
a management focus for accountability, responsibility
and monitoring of administrative services in EOP;
a base for an effective EOP budget/planning system
through which the President can manage an integrated
EOP rather than a collection of 17 separate units.
The EOP study team recommends that the proposed unit be a
separate EOP entity because of the need to assure equal
access by all other units. Other options--to integrate it
into White House administrative operations or attach it to
OMB--would not result in a separate EOP unit.
Advantages of Option II
Likely to be received by public as major reorganiza-
tion, since it nearly halves number of units existing
on January 20.
Establishes principle that specialized units should
not be placed in EOP unless case is very strong.
Reduces number of units to which President does not
directly or frequently relate.
Disadvantages of Option II
Would require reversal of previous Presidential
decisions on COWPS, CEQ, and ODAP.
21
Would remove from EOP specialized competences in wage-
price policy, environment, and drug abuse that
President may desire to retain.
Would generate substantial resistance from environmental
policy community.
22
Option I
This option is the most conservative of the three and could be
followed if the President wished to retain more specialized
policy competence in EOP than the study team recommends. It
retains the Council on Wage and Price Stability, the Council
on Environmental Quality, and the Office of Drug Abuse Policy.
It would, however, deny COWPS the increased funds and staff
provided for in its supplemental appropriation, and reduce
CEQ staff by transferring certain functions (such as detailed
oversight of National Environmental Policy Act implementation)
to the Environmental Protection Agency. It would also limit
ODAP to a life of one year. During this time, ODAP would
continue to develop plans for the drug abuse area and complete
its mission of making institutional improvements to the
current fragmented federal system of addressing drug abuse
problems. All other recommendations remain the same.
EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
OPTION
PRESIDENT
INTELLIGENCE
OFFICE
OVERSIGHT
OF THE
BOARD
VICE PREMONT
WHITE
CENTRAL
COUNCE
OFFICE OF
HOUSE
ADMINISTRATIVE
OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL
OF
MANAGEMENT
OFFICE
UNIT
ECONOMIC ADVISORS
REPRESENTATIVE FOR
AND BUDGET
POLICY
NATIONAL
TRADE NEGOTIATION
SUPPORT
SECURITY
POLICY
NATIONAL
SUPPORT
SECURITY
STAFF
STAFF
COUNCIL ON
OFFICE OF
COUNCIL ON
OFFICE OF
WAGE AND PRICE
SCIENCE TECHNOLOGY
ENVIRONMENTAL
DRUG ABUSE
STABILITY
POLICY
QUALITY
POLICY
UNITS ELIMINATED:
ECONOMIC POLICY GROUP*
COUNCIL ON INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC POLICY
OFFICE OF TELECOMMUNICATIONS POLICY
FEDERAL PROPERTY COUNCIL
EMERGY RESOURCES COUNCIL
NOTE:
PRESIDENTS FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL AND ECONOMIC POLICY
OFFICE OF DRUG ABUSE POLICY (IN July YEAR)
GROUP ARE RETAINED AS CABINET LEVEL COMMITTEES
DOMESTIC COUNCIL*
'STAFF CONSOLIDATED WITH POLICY SUPPORT STARP
23
Advantages of Option I
Maintains specialized staff capacity for wage-price, en-
vironmental, and drug abuse policy, if President wishes
to emphasize these.
Eliminates functions from particular units that are remote
from Presidential needs.
Minimizes Congressional and interest group opposition.
Least disruptive of existing relationships; therefore
easiest to implement.
Disadvantages of Option I
Unlikely to be viewed as really major reorganization.
(Reforms in process management and transfer of non-essen-
tial functions are harder to dramatize than major shifts
in organization chart.)
Retains relatively large number of specialized units in
EOP, inviting Congress to establish more or attach new
functions to current ones.
Would retain several units without significant direct re-
lationships to President fostering self-generated work.
24
Option III
Option III, the boldest option, would combine the major
EOP policy staffs--NSC, DC, CEA, OSTP, EPG--into a single
Central Policy Support Staff. Implementing this option
would leave six EOP units. Presidential Assistants for
National Security, Domestic Policy, Economic Policy, and Science
Policy--each with one or two personal advisers--would be lo-
cated in the White House Office. The current NSC, DC, CEA,
OSTP and EPG staffs would be merged into a single unit. The
staff would have no single director as such but an Executive
Secretary for Administration. Divisions or clusters within
the staff would be tasked by each of the four identified Pres-
idential Assistants. Additional Presidential Assistants with
narrower jurisdictions could be appointed as Presidential needs
require. For example, the President might wish to create an
Assistant for Environmental Affairs. The statutory Domestic
Council and National Security Council would not be eliminated
but redesignated as working groups of the Cabinet. In many
ways, this arrangement can be viewed merely as an administra-
tive convenience involving the same staff and advisers as in
Option II but funded through a single appropriation.
EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
OPTION III
PRESIDENT
INTELLIGENCE
OFFICE
OVERSIGHT
OF THE
BOARD
VICE-PRESIDENT
OFFICE OF
WHITE
OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL
MANAGEMENT
HOUSE
REPRESENTATIVE FOR
AND BUDGET
OFFICE
TRADE NEGOTIATION
CENTRAL ADMIN.
UNIT
POLICY
NATIONAL
SECURITY
ECONOMICS
OTHER
UNITS ELIMINATED:
POLICY SUPPORT STAFF
COUNCIL OF ECONOMIC ADVISORS* ..
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL STAFF*
OFFICE OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY POLICY* ..
COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY
OFFICE OF DRUG ABUSE POLICY*
COUNCIL ON WAGE AND PRICE STABILITY
ECONOMIC POLICY GROUP*
COUNCIL ON INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC POLICY
OFFICE OF TELECOMMUNICATIONS POLICY
FEDERAL PROPERTY COUNCIL
NOTE:
ENERGY RESOURCES COUNCIL
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL, ECONOMIC POLICY
PRESIDENT'S FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD
GROUP AND COUNCIL ON WAGE AND PRICE STABILITY
DOMESTIC COUNCIL
ARE RETAINED AS CABINET LEVEL COMMITTEES.
*STAFF CONSOLIDATED WITH POLICY SUPPORT STAFF
**ADVISER ADDED TO WHITE HOUSE OFFICE
25
The Policy Support Staff could be attached to the White
House Office or merged with OMB. Merger with OMB would
approach the creation of an Office of Planning and Budget.
The White House placement appears most logical in light of
the staff reporting relationships to White House advisers
and the President's expressed desire to avoid concentrating
too much authority in one individual. The central adminis-
trative unit is attached to OMB in Option III. Alternatively,
it could be constituted either as an independent EOP unit or
as attached to the White House Office.
This option was developed late in our study and we recommend a
full review of its implications if selected. We do not believe
that selection of either of the other two alternatives will
foreclose later implementation of Option III.
Advantages of Option III
Creates a bold reorganization initiative and precedent.
Could lead to greater interaction of staff members on
issues cutting across foreign-domestic economic lines
(e.g., energy).
Provides flexibility to add, reduce or reallocate staff
resources without creating new units that may develop a
bureaucratic life and political constituency of their own.
Offers President a "home" for placing new staffs he decides
he needs without creating separate new EOP units.
Disadvantages of Option III
Creates opportunity for substantial initial apprehension
by Presidential advisers fearing loss of responsive staff
support.
Holding company for separate policy staffs may be regarded
as ruse for reducing "boxes" on EOP organization chart and
giving appearance of tidiness.
Largest political gamble of the three approaches; would
probably generate greatest Congressional resistance. (Would
leave only OMB Director and Special Trade Representative as
EOP officials who testify on Capitol Hill.)
Could generate role confusion by lumping process management
staffs (NSC, DC) together with advisory staffs (CEA, OSTP).
Provides one large, vulnerable target for Congress if it
wishes to reduce Presidential staff. May generate miscon-
ception that White House staff size has been increased.
PRESIDENT'S REORGANIZATION PROJECT
RECOMMENDATION MEMO NO. EOP-1
REORGANIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
Appendix A - Comparison of Options
Appendix B - Unit Staffing Levels for Proposed Options
Appendix C - EOP Unit Descriptions
COMPARISON OF OPTIONS
Appendix A
Page 1 of 6
SUMMARY
ORGANIZATIONAL UNIT
OPTION I
OPTION II
OPTION III
RETAIN; TRANSFER SOME STAFF TO
RETAIN; TRANSFER SOME STAFF TO
RETAIN; TRANSFER SOME STAFF TO
OFFICE OF VICE-PRESIDENT
ADMINISTRATIVE UNIT
ADMINISTRATIVE UNIT
ADMINISTRATIVE UNIT
INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT BOARD
RETAIN; INCREASE STAFF
RETAIN; INCREASE STAFF
RETAIN; INCREASE STAFF
OFFICE OF SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE
FOR TRADE NEGOTIATION
RETAIN; REDUCE STAFF
RETAIN; REDUCE STAFF
RETAIN; REDUCE STAFF
RETAIN; STRENGTHEN 'M' SIDE; INTEGRATE
RETAIN; STRENGTHEN 'M' SIDE; INTEGRATE
RETAIN; STRENGTHEN 'M' SIDE; INTEGRATE
OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT & BUDGET
PROCUREMENT POLICY; ABOLISH OFPP
PROCUREMENT POLICY; ABOLISH OFPP
PROCUREMENT POLICY; ABOLISH OFPP
CENTRAL ADMINISTRATIVE UNIT
ESTABLISH NEW UNIT IN EOP
ESTABLISH NEW UNIT IN EOP
ESTABLISH NEW UNIT, ATTACHED TO OMB
BECOMES POLICY SUPPORT STAFF' RE-
BECOMES 'POLICY SUPPORT STAFF' RE-
DOMESTIC COUNCIL
PORTING TO W.H.O.
PORTING TO W.H.O.
BECOMES PART OF POLICY SUPPORT STAFF
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL STAFF
RETAIN; REPORTS TO W.H.O.
RETAIN; REPORTS TO W.H.O.
BECOMES PART OF POLICY SUPPORT STAFF
RETAIN; REDUCE FUNCTIONS; ADD SOME
COUNCIL OF ECONOMIC ADVISORS
RETAIN; REDUCE STAFF
COWPS FUNCTIONS
BECOMES PART OF POLICY SUPPORT STAFF
ABOLISH; DISPERSE FUNCTIONS, SOME TO
ABOLISH; DISPERSE FUNCTIONS, SOME TO
COUNCIL ON WAGE & PRICE STABILITY
FREEZE CURRENT EMPLOYMENT LEVEL
C.E.A.
GENERAL POLICY SUPPORT STAFF
OFFICE OF SCIENCE & TECHNOLOGY
ABOLISH; CREATE WHITE HOUSE SCIENCE
POLICY
RETAIN; REDUCE FUNCTIONS
RETAIN; REDUCE FUNCTIONS
ADVISER: STAFF TO POLICY SUPPORT STAFF
COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY
RETAIN; REDUCE FUNCTIONS
TRANSFER FUNCTIONS TO INTERIOR
TRANSFER FUNCTIONS TO INTERIOR
ABOLISH; DISPERSE FUNCTIONS, CREATE
ABOLISH; DISPERSE FUNCTIONS, CREATE
OFFICE OF DRUG ABUSE POLICY
RETAIN; PHASE OUT OVER ONE YEAR
PRESIDENTIAL ADVISER
PRESIDENTIAL ADVISER
MERGE STAFF WITH 'POLICY SUPPORT
MERGE STAFF WITH 'POLICY SUPPORT
MERGE STAFF WITH 'POLICY SUPPORT
ECONOMIC POLICY GROUP
STAFF'; RETAIN GROUP AS CABINET COMM.
STAFF'; RETAIN GROUP AS CABINET COMM.
STAFF'; RETAIN GROUP AS CABINET COMM.
COUNCIL ON INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC
POLICY
ALLOW TO LAPSE 9/30/77
ALLOW TO LAPSE 9/30/77
ALLOW TO LAPSE 9/30/77
OFFICE OF TELECOMMUNICATIONS POLICY
ABOLISH; DISPERSE FUNCTIONS
ABOLISH; DISPERSE FUNCTIONS
ABOLISH; DISPERSE FUNCTIONS
FEDERAL PROPERTY COUNCIL
ABOLISH; FUNCTIONS TO GSA & OMB
ABOLISH; FUNCTIONS TO GSA & OMB
ABOLISH; FUNCTIONS TO GSA & OMB
ENERGY RESOURCES COUNCIL
ABOLISH; FUNCTIONS TO ENERGY
ABOLISH; FUNCTIONS TO ENERGY
ABOLISH; FUNCTIONS TO ENERGY
PRESIDENT'S FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE
ADVISORY BOARD
ABOLISH
ABOLISH
ABOLISH
COMPARISON OF OPTIONS
Appendix A
Page 2 of 6
[OP UNIT
OPTION 1
OPTION 11
OPTION III
Office of the
Transfer some administrative sup-
Same as Option I
Same as Option I
Vice President
port staff to central adminis-
trative unit
IOB
Increase substantive staff to
Same as Option I
Same as Option 1
allow for field operations and
performance of all four functions,
as well as Increased public
liaison function. Establish 10B
as a separate unit within EOP.
OSRTN
Maintain current STR functions
Same as Option I
Same as Option I
and structure, with reduced staff,
pending consideration of location
of all trade functions by the
President's Reorganization
Project.
OMB
Change the "M" side of OMB from
Same as Option I
Same as Option I
a "holding company" of disparate
and often Ineffective activities
to a smaller, better-focused
effort targeted on activities
of Presidential priority.
Eliminate OFPP and transfer
procurement policy to the
Director.
COMPARISON OF OPTIONS
Appendix A
Page 3 of 6
EOP UNIT
OPTION I
OPTION II
OPTION III
Centrol Ad-
Establish an Independent Central
Same as Option I
Establish a Central Administrative
ministrative
Administrative unit to
Unit attached to OMB, serving all of the
Unit
provide a more uniform level of
EOP. Continue small White House unit.
administrative services through-
out EOP and reduce administrative
costs. Continue small White
House unit.
Domestic
Streamline and create a Policy
Same as Option I
Create a new Policy Support staff super-
Council
Support staff, replacing the
seding the Domestic Council, EPG, OSTP,
Domestic Council, to provide
and CEA staffs. This staff of specialists
coordination and policy support
to be supervised by section heads who
for all Cabinet and sub-Cabinet
serve as Assistants to the President;
interagency working groups, In-
functions incorporate both process manage-
cluding the EPG and any spe-
ment and forward planning.
cialized EOP unit abolished as
a result of reorganization.
This staff would also have
responsibility for policy
process management.
NSC
Make small reduction in non-
Same as Option I
Same as Option I and fold NSC staff into
substantive staff.
Policy Support staff national security
section; retain NSC as cabinet level com-
mittee.
CEA
Reduce professional and support
Reduce professional and support
staff for Micro-economic Issues.
staff for micro-economic Issues.
Abolish; staff to form economic staff for
Add professional and support staff
general policy support staff; Chairman to
to work on wage-price analysis to
become Presidential adviser.
compensate for transfer of COWPS
outside EOP.
COMPARISON OPTIONS
Appendix A
Page 4 of 6
EOP UNIT
OPTION I
OPTION II
OPTION III
COWPS
Maintain current activities but
Transfer all evaluation to other
Same as Option II except wage-price analysis
do not add the 1977 supplemental
governmental agencies; council con-
capacity placed In general policy support
and freeze current employment
tinuing to exist as interdepartmental staff.
levels, except for the Director
Committee and umbrella for jawboming
position.
where necessary. Allow CEA additional
positions to provide analytic backup
and draw on departmental wage-price
analysis.
OSTP
Retain in OSTP only those science
Same as Option I
Abolish; establish Special Assistant to the
and technology functions which
President for Science and Technology Policy.
provide advice to the President
Some staff shifted to general support
and support policy formulation.
Policy staff. Disperse other functions as
budget review, and decision-
In Option 1.
making In other EOP units. Per-
form work of Intergovernmental
Science, Engineering and Technology
Panels through OMB-TRRO, operate
the Federal Coordinating Council
on Science and Technology (FCCST)
as a sub-Cabinet level working
group, and fold the work of the
President's Committee on Science
and Technolgy (PCST) into the
President's overall reorganization
effort; transfer remaining PCST
functions and reports to NSF.
Have OSTP provide science-related
advice and support on tele-
communications policy Issues.
COMPARISON OF OPTIONS
Appendix A
Page 5 of 6
EOP UNIT
OPTION I
OPTION II
OPTION III
CEQ
Retain CEQ with reduced functions
Transfer functions to Interior
Same as Option II
and staff, emphasizing Presiden-
tial advisory, overall policy
coordination, and analytic acti-
vities. Transfer specific
National Environmental Policy Act
oversight functions to EPA, In-
cluding recently-granted authority
to issue regulations on environ-
mental impact statements and rou-
tine publication of EISs. Retain
responsibility for issuing annual
report but have specific sections
prepared mainly outside EOP, in
EPA and other departments and
agencies. Reduce number of studies
undertaken directly by CEQ.
ODAP
Maintain current functions for one Abolish; establish special adviser Same as Option II
year during which ODAP will develop to the President with a small staff,
plans for the drug abuse area and
transfer functions to OMB, State,
make institutional Improvements
and HEW
within Government agencies, allow-
ing ODAP to terminate operations
at the end of the year.
EPG
Transfer function of staffing EPG Same as Option I
EPG work supported by general
to Policy Support staff which
Policy Support Staff
supports all Cabinet groups;
abolish Executive Committee.
Establish a Steering Committee of
Treasury (Chairman), CEA, OMB,
and perhaps State as core EPG
members to organize agenda for
meetings. Cabinet and other ex-
officio members of full EPG would
be invited to particular meetings
as Interests dictate.
COMPARISON OF OPTIONS
Appendix A
Page 6 of 6
EOP UNIT
OPTION I
OPTION 11
OPTION III
CIEP
Abolish by allowing statute to
Same as Option I
Same as Option I
lapse on September JO, 1977.
OΓP
Abolish statutory OTP and retain
Same as Option I
Same as Optlon 1
small telecommunications and
Information policy staff within
a new policy support staff. Re-
define the role of the Special
Assistant to the President for
Media and Public Affairs to cover
the more substantive areas of
Information Policy and Cultural
Affairs. Transfer all functions
(with the exception of developing
Presidential policy options and
resolving Interagency disputes) to
an upgraded office within the
Department of Commerce.
FPC
Abolish the Executive Order and
Same as Option I
Same as Option I
handle matters by having GSA go
to OMB Director with major Issues
and to the President as needed.
ERC
Abolish; responsibilities assumed
Same as Option I
Same as Option I
by the Department of Energy.
PFIAB
Abolished.
Same as Option I
Same as Option I
Appendix B
Page 1 of 1
UNIT STAFFING LEVELS FOR PROPOSED OPTIONS
(Assumes transfer of certain positions to Central Administrative Unit)
Positions
Current Authorization
Option
Option
Option
Budget
Positions
I
II
III
Office of Vice-President
$ 1.3M
30
27
27
27
Intelligence Oversight Board
0.0
0
5
5
5
Office of Special Representa-
tive for Trade Negotiation
2.6
49
41
41
41
Office of Management & Budget
29.2
709
610
610
610
Central Administrative Unit
0.0
0
143
143
143
Domestic Council
1.8
40
39
41
41*
National Security Council
Staff
3.3
70
56
56
56*
Council of Economic Advisors
1.9
42
35
39
34*
Council on Wage & Price
Stability
1.9
57
35
0
0
Office of Science & Technol-
ogy Policy
2.3
32
22
22
17*
Council on Environmental
Quality
3.3
40
24
0
0
Office of Drug. Abuse Policy
1.1
10
10
0
0
Economic Policy Group
0.0
0
0
0
0
Council on International
Economic Policy
1.5
21
0
0
0
Office of Telecommunications
Policy
8.5
41
0
0
0
Federal Property Council
0.0
0
0
0
0
Energy Resources Council
0.0
0
0
0
0
President's Foreign Intelli-
gence Advisory Board
0.0
0
0
0
0
White House Office
17.2
485
340
343
353
Other
3.5***
86**
86**
86**
86**
Totals
$79.1M
1712
1473
1413
1413
*These staffs would be part of the combined policy support staff.
**The current authorized full-time permanent positions include 86 Department of
Interior positions to maintain the Executive mansion.
***The additional $3.5M includes the President's compensation and expenses,
President's unanticipated needs, White House and V-P residence. The difference
between this figure and the sum of the organizational unit budget authorities
is due to rounding the unit budget figures to the nearest one hundred thousand.
Appendix C
Page 1 of 50
EOP UNIT DESCRIPTIONS
This Appendix includes more detailed reference material on
our recommendations. For each EOP unit, we.
- Present current budget and staffing levels and pro-
posed staffing for each major option.
-
Summarize principal functions, denoting those stat-
utory.
- Provide historical perspective and other background
information.
- Describe the impact of each major option on the
structure and operation of the unit, noting varia-
tions and advantages/disadvantages.
- Note additional organizational variations consid-
ered but not proposed.
Index
Unit
Page
Office of the Vice President
2
Intelligence Oversight Board
5
Office of Special Trade Representatives
8
Office of Management and Budget
11
Central Administrative Unit
14
Domestic Council
17
National Security Council Staff
19
Council of Economic Advisers
23
Council on Wage and Price Stability
26
Office of Science and Technology Policy
29
Council on Environmental Quality
33
Office of Drug Abuse Policy
37
Economic Policy Group
40
Council on International Economic Policy
44
Office of Telecommunications Policy
46
Federal Property Council
49
Descriptions have not been prepared for the Energy Resources
Council, which will be abolished under the Administration's
energy proposals, and for the President's Foreign Intelli-
gence Advisory Board, which has already been abolished.
Appendix C
Page 2 of 50
OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT
April 30, 1977
Status
Option
Authorized
Actual
I
II
III
Full-time Permanent
30
30
27
27
27
Positions
Detailees
Other
Budget Authority
$1.27M
Functions
1. Provide policy and political advice to the President.
2.
Assist in Congressional Liaison in support of Adminis-
tration proposals.
3. Participate in National Security matters (through stat-
utory membership on the National Security Council). #
4. Perform special projects of high priority for the
President.
5. Act as spokesman and advocate for the President and
the Administration to the public, interest groups, and
foreign leaders.
Background
The operations of this office reflect the combination of Con-
stitutional, statutory, and Presidentially-assigned duties,
which make it unique among EOP units. Because of his Consti-
tutional duties as President of the Senate, the Vice President
has a staff on the Senate payroll that is larger than the
Executive Branch one. Functionally, there is no significant
distinction between these groups, but the existence of a "leg-
islative" staff for the Vice President highlights his partic-
ipation in Congressional matters.
Appendix C
Page 3 of 50
The Office is well run and efficient, already having achieved
a number of operating economies. Substantial reductions in
its size could only be accomplished through elimination of
functions and a fundamental role re-definition for the Vice
President.
Unit Description Under the Three Proposed Options
Option I
Certain of the Vice President's support functions involve
accounting, personnel and supply activities that should be
transferred to a centralized EOP Administrative Unit. The
basic functions and resources of the unit should not other-
wise be altered. A reduction of three full-time personnel
is recommended.
The Vice President would benefit from having access to the
full range of services offered by the central administrative
unit, the larger pool of personnel, and the inherent backup
capability of the larger unit.
Conversely, the Vice President would forego some independence,
direct supervisory authority and control of administrative
resources.
Option II
Same as Option I.
Option III
Same as Option I.
Other Variations
The study team also considered the following options
- Maintain the present independent administrative support
function within the Vice President's office.
This was rejected because overall EOP efficiency would be
better served by centralized administrative support.
- Draw upon the resources of the White House staff
eliminating the Vice President's staff.
Appendix C
Page 4 of 50
While this option appears to eliminate duplication of func-
tions, the consequence would be a loss of the independent
perspective and operation that has contributed to the Vice
President's effectiveness.
Appendix C
Page 5 of 50
INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT BOARD
April 30, 1977
Status
Option
Authorized Actual
I
II
III
Full-time Permanent
Positions
0
0
5
5
5
Detailees
2
Board Members
3
3
3
3
3
Budget Authority
$ 0
$ 0
Functions
1. Ensure adequate operational guidelines on legality and
propriety of intelligence community activity.
2. Ensure adequate systems for discovery and reporting of
illegal or improper activities.
3. Receive and review reports of illegal and improper
activities.
4. Advise the President and others on the legality and
propriety of activities.
Background
The IOB was established in March 1976, in response to reports
of improper activities by various government intellegence
units. The IOB was empowered to review any and all activities
of the community to ensure that the past abuses would not be
repeated.
However, the three part-time Board Members and small staff
have functioned in a largely perfunctory manner. In essence,
the Board has been more a symbol than imbued with substance.
Nonetheless, the current Director of the CIA strongly supports
IOB and argues national need for it. This unit performs
functions that clearly cannot be performed as well outside the
EOP. Thus, it conforms to the study team's criteria for
EOP inclusion.
Appendix C
Page 6 of 50
Unit Description Under the Three Proposed Options
Option I
Increase professional staff by 3 to 4 people and establish
the IOB as a separate unit in EOP. This would allow the
IOB to perform all of its mandated functions and provide
the capability to publicize the work of the Board and the
intelligence community, thereby helping restore public
trust and confidence in the intelligence community. This
option also demonstrates to the intelligence community the
genuine concern of the President.
The study team is aware, however, that the current IOB members
feel the expansion of staff and placement of that staff in a
separate EOP unit could compromise the mission the President
has assigned to them. If the President wishes to retain the
unit with its current mission and staff size, the unit's one
full-time staff member could remain on the White House polit-
ical/professional payroll.
Option II
Same as Option I.
Option III
Same as Option I.
Other Variations
The study team also considered the following arrangements:
- Maintain current size, but shift emphasis to Functions
l and 2.
The IOB would remain as a symbol but provide no real pro-
tection to the President.
- Transfer all IOB functions to the Vice President or
White House Counsel.
This would save one detailed administrative staff and elimi-
nate an EOP unit. However, this option raises potential
Appendix C
Page 7 of 50
conflict of interest issues given the activities of a pre-
vious Vice President and Counsel. In combination with
elimination of PFIAB, such a decision could signal Presi-
dential neglect of the intelligence community. Strong
congressional reaction would be expected, particularly
from congressional oversight committees.
- Abolish the IOB and let the Director of the CIA
establish his own watchdog system.
This option entails an even greater risk of creating an
appearance of lack of Presidential concern in this area
eliminating a check and balance system endorsed by the CIA
Director.
Appendix C
Page 8 of 50
OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE FOR TRADE NEGOTIATIONS
April 30, 1977
Status
Option
Authorized
Actual
I
II
III
Full-time Permanent
49
45
41
41
41
Positions
Detailees
3
Other
5
Budget Authority
$2.58M
The staffing levels above do not reflect an additional 62
positions controlled by STR but attached to the State Depart-
ment budget. These positions, 40 in Geneva and 22 in
Washington, provide staff support for the multilateral
negotiations in Geneva.
Functions
1. Coordinate the development of trade policy (solicit
information and positions through interagency meetings,
public hearings and advisory groups; resolve disagreements
and recommend options to the President (Statutory) )
2. Manage and conduct trade negotiations (the ongoing multi-
lateral trade negotiations (MTN) in Geneva and other
bilateral negotiations (Statutory) )
3. Oversee and administer U.S. Trade programs (review ITC
recommendations and recommend Presidential action; e.g.,
footwear, TV's, oversee the Adjustment Assistance Pro-
gram; negotiate relief from foreign trade practices;
maintain a list of products and countries to receive
preferential trade treatment (Statutory) )
Background
The Office of the STR was created by Executive order in 1963
following the establishment of the STR position as part of
the 1962 Trade Expansion Act. The Office was legislatively
Appendix C
Page 9 of 50
mandated in the 1974 Trade Act. The Office has strong con-
gressional support and reports directly and regularly to
Congress as well as to the President. The primary reasons
for its placement within EOP are to give it a neutral home
from which to broker departmental trade interests and to
give it stature to negotiate with foreign governments.
Presently, trade policy development and negotiation respon-
sibilities are split among STR, State, and Treasury. In the
past, confusion, disagreements, and jealousy have resulted
from this arrangement to the detriment of U.S. trade inter-
ests. Congress is presently studying the possibility of
consolidating trade responsibility. Any change in STR's
status must take into consideration Congress' strong inter-
est in enhancing STR's role, the importance of maintaining
a strong hand in the MTN in Geneva, and the need for a
"neutral home" for the development of trade policy.
Unit Description Under the Three Proposed Options
Option I
Maintain current STR functions and structure, with reduced
staff, pending consideration of all U.S. Government trade
functions by the President's Reorganization Project.
The advantages of this option include continuing the "neu-
tral home" and Presidential prestige for STR and maintain-
ing the continuity of STR's role in the MTN. It recognizes
STR's past effectiveness and avoids congressional resistance
to changes in STR.
STR's total authorized positions would be reduced slightly
with half of the reduction going to the Central Administra-
tive Unit.
Option II
Same as Option I.
Option III
Same as Option I.
Appendix C
Page 10 of 50
Other Variations
The team also considered:
- Consolidate within STR all Treasury and State Depart-
ment trade policy coordinating and negotiating
responsibilities which would have added 30 positions.
- Replace STR with a Special Trade Adviser to the
President and transfer STR policy coordination and
oversight functions to a new EOP Office of Policy
Coordination and STR's negotiating responsibilities
to State Department. This would result in a transfer
out of 20 positions.
- Transfer all STR trade responsibilities and staff to
the Department of the Treasury.
Each of these were rejected, as the STR is now operating
effectively and the entire subject of organizing to support
U.S. trade efforts will be addressed by the President's
Reorganization Project.
There were, however, three additional recommendations which
should be considered:
1. Improvements should be made in STR's administrative
arrangements with the State Department or alternative
administrative arrangements established. If a central-
ized EOP Administrative Unit is established, STR should
utilize this unit.
2. The role of the STR with regard to the EPG should be
clarified to ensure that the STR's subject area exper-
tise is utilized in developing and transmitting EPG
recommendations to the President in trade-related areas.
3. Future investment and expenditure of resources on STR's
computer operations should only follow the demonstra-
tion and assessment of the utility of the information
to the STR staff, both within and outside the context
of the MTN.
Appendix C
Page 11 of 50
OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET
April 30, 1977
Status
Option
Authorized Actual
I
II
III
Full-time Permanent
Positions
709
650
610
610
610
Detailees
Other
81
Budget Authority
$29.35M
Functions
1. Assist the President in preparing the budget and formulating
the fiscal program of the government.
2. Aid the President in bringing about more efficient and
economical conduct of Government service.
3. Assist the President by clearing and coordinating depart-
ment advice on proposed legislation and on enacted
legislation.
4. Supervise and control the administration of the budget.
5. Assist in developing coordinating mechanisms to implement
Government activities and to expand interagency coopera-
tion.
6. Plan and promote improved statistical services and
information systems.
7. Plan and develop programs on personnel development.
8. Plan and conduct evaluation efforts of program efficiency
and performance and keep the President informed of agency
and departmental performance.
9. Assist in consideration and clearance of Executive orders
and proclamations.
10. Monitor compliance with Federal advisory committee
legislation (Statutory).
11. Oversee compliance with the Privacy Act (Statutory).
12. Set Federal procurement policies (Statutory).
Appendix C
Page 12 of 50
OMB is the oldest (1939), largest, and most independent unit
in the Executive Office. This Administration inherited an
agency with 13 divisions on the program side, 5 divisions on
the management side, and 9 separate units reporting to the
Director and Deputy Director.
Since 1972, several major changes have occurred which have
affected the agency, and its ability to serve the President:
The Director and Deputy Director are now Senatorially
confirmed and have become more publicly visible.
The agency as a whole has become more vulnerable to
congressional criticism through losing much of its
past anonymity.
Since the 1970 Reorganization Plan #2 that re-
designated the old Bureau of the Budget as the
Office of Management and Budget, the Congress has
mandated new functions and responsibilities to OMB:
Federal advisory committees (1972), oversight of
the Privacy Act (1974), and procurement policy (1972).
The Congressional Budget Act of 1974 required, among
other changes, that OMB update the Federal budget
four times a year, submit monthly status reports on
deferrals and recisions, and report more detailed
projections of the budget. Besides the rigorous
schedules of the new budget calendar, the demand on
OMB staff has increased as a result of interaction
with the new Congressional Budget Office and
congressional budget committees.
Unit Description Under The Three Proposed Options
Option I
Under this option, the Office of Management and Budget would
remain as a separate entity within the Executive Office of
the President. The most significant operational change is
reflected in the redirection of OMB's management arm to
emphasize major Presidential initiatives such as reorganiza-
tion, paperwork reduction, regulatory reform, productivity
improvement and evaluations of effectiveness, particularly in
light of sunset legislation opportunities.
Appendix C
Page 13 of 50
The most significant structural change is the abolition of
the statutory Office of Federal Procurement Policy within
the Office of Management and Budget. OFPP with its staff
of 27 was recommended by the Commission on Government
Procurement. Its responsibilities run both to the President
and to the Congress. There is substantial congressional
interest in maintaining this unit and its relationships as
is. The functions mandated to OFPP need to be performed and,
under this option, would be performed in a division of OMB.
At issue is the question of whether OFPP needs to be main-
tained as a statutory entity within OMB. The study team
recommends that the Office of Federal Procurement Policy be
eliminated as a separate office within OMB, that its functions
be transferred to the OMB Director, and that its staff be
reduced to 20 people and redesignated as an OMB division.
Option II
Same as Option I.
Option III
Same as Option I.
Other Variations
- Transfer all Statistical Policy Division functions except
the Forms Clearance Office to Commerce.
Because placement in OMB promotes statistical improvement (by
controlling data bases through the Forms process) and utilizes
OMB leverage to improve overall statistical coordination, we
do not recommend this change.
- Transfer all Executive Development and Labor Relations
Division functions except pay and legislative analysis
to the Civil Service Commission.
This was not recommended due to the requirement that OMB, as
the President's management arm, take an active role in
personnel management, and the likelihood that the transfer
might be interpreted as a lack of Administration concern
about labor relations.
Appendix C
Page 14 of 50
CENTRAL ADMINISTRATIVE UNIT
April 30, 1977
Status
Authorized Actual
I
II
III
Full-time Permanent
Unit Not
Positions
Established
143
143
143
Detailees
Other
Budget Authority
Functions
1. Provide general financial management services including
accounting, budget, payroll and procurement functions.
2. Operate an EOP-wide personnel support system.
3. Provide various computer services including applications
development and maintenance; management of computer
operations; and EOP planning.
4. Provide a number of general support services, including
property management; central files operations (non-
Presidential); libraries; and other information manage-
ment services; processing non-Presidential mail; printing
and reproduction; messenger service; and supply and
procurement support.
5. Provide an information base upon which the President can
base resource allocation or EOP reorganization decisions.
Background
Of approximately 1,700 full-time, permanent EOP personnel,
380 (22 percent) are performing more than 30 administrative
support services throughout EOP; they are supplemented by
military and Executive Protective Service personnel, Park
Service, Post Office employees and other temporary or
detailed employees.
Appendix C
Page 15 of 50
The White House and OMB have relatively complete administra-
tive support facilities. Other EOP entities are generally
too small to provide comprehensive administrative services
internally; they depend upon the White House, OMB, GSA, or
some other Federal department for these services, sometimes
utilizing more than one of these sources.
The lack of coordinated administrative management for EOP
as a whole has led to the following weaknesses:
1. Numerous service duplications (e.g., seven library
facilities, 11 units with messengers, and about a
dozen EOP units separately performing financial
and personnel management).
2. Services are inconsistently distributed, resulting
in excess capacity in one unit while a service
deficiency exists in another (e.g., while there is
ample computer capacity in EOP, some units cannot
obtain adequate computer applications or operations
support).
3. Opportunities for economies of scale are not realized
(e.g., payroll is done by eight different systems,
none of which provides totally adequate reports for
management; alternatively, a single system could handle
all of them at a significantly reduced average cost).
4. Cost control is inadequate because of fragmented
responsibility or hidden costs.
To address these deficiencies, the study team proposes to
combine EOP administrative support operations into two major
units: a Central Administrative Unit and a White House
Operations Unit. The latter will continue to carry out those
functions that are considered to be direct support to the
President. The Central Administrative Unit will (1) provide
support in administrative services that are common to all
EOP entities, and (2) provide technical support and coordina-
tion of the ZBB system in EOP. Each EOP entity outside the
White House Office would retain a minimal administrative
capability to perform service liaison with the Central
Administrative Support Unit.
The greatest disadvantages of centralization include per-
ceived or actual reduction in responsiveness and more rigid
priority setting. Potential loss in responsiveness would be
due to communication filters between users and service
personnel resulting from organizational separation.
Appendix C
Page 16 of 50
Unit Descriptions Under The Three Proposed Options
Option I
Establish the Central Administrative Unit, described above,
as an independent entity within the EOP. The unit would be
directed by a Presidential appointee reporting to the
President. An EOP management committee, made up of EOP unit
heads or their designees, would provide general management
oversight and ratify administrative policies and procedures
developed by the Central Unit.
This organizational placement should result in allocation
of resources between units that will correspond most closely
with Presidential priorities and that will be perceived as a
fair allocation to the various units. It may be desirable,
however, for the head of this unit to report to someone other
than the President since administrative matters or conflicts
should normally be resolved without requiring any of the
President's time.
Option II
Same as Option I.
Option III
Establish the unit attached to OMB. Since in this option
only a small number of EOP units remain, there would be
very little advantage to creating an independent administra-
tive unit. Virtually all EOP personnel would be part of OMB
or White House Office. Placement in OMB would help limit
the number of personnel in the White House Office and establish
the reporting relationship through the Director of OMB, further
from direct involvement of the President.
Other Variations
The study team also considered:
- Streamlining existing administrative operations within
various EOP units.
This alternative will not fully capitalize on economies of
scale cost reduction and would hamper efforts to install an
accurate and effective cost accounting and control system.
Appendix C
Page 17 of 50
DOMESTIC COUNCIL
April 30, 1977
Status
Option
Authorized
Actual
I
II
III
Full-time Permanent
40
34
39
41
41*
Positions
Detailees
1
-
-
-
Other
4
-
-
-
Budget Authority
$1.775M
* This staff would be part of the combined Policy Support Staff.
Functions
1.
Provide policy analysis and advice to the President (e.g.,
prepare decision memoranda, background memoranda, and Q's
and A's; respond to action memoranda; draft Presidential
messages to Congress).
2.
Implement and monitor policy (assign responsibility for
implementation of the Presidential decisions and follow-
up; e.g., to determine actions taken).
3. Provide policy advice on budgeting questions (participate
in the OMB Director's review and assist in the priority
establishment process; select issues to develop decision
memoranda to the President; review and comment on OMB
materials).
4.
Articulate and discuss Administration policy (answer
correspondence; review annual reports; prepare status
and progress reports; meet with local interest groups,
State and local government personnel, and congressional
personnel).
Background
The Domestic Policy Staff and Domestic Council Staff really
function as one operating entity, with the Domestic Policy
Appendix C
Page 18 of 50
Staff supported by the White House payroll. The Domestic
Council functions under the authority of Reorganization Plan
No. 2 (June 1970).
Although the current Domestic Councilacts as a de facto
process management unit for a broad variety of domestic
policy issues, staff responsibility for the full range
of those issues is distributed among the Domestic Council,
the Cabinet Secretary, and the Economic Policy Group (EPG).
The options below address problems raised by this diffusion
of responsibility.
Unit Description Under the Three Proposed Options
Option I
The Policy Support Staff replaces the Domestic Council. Econ-
omic Policy Group staff are transferred from their informal
assignment to the Cabinet Secretary to a new affiliation with
the Policy Support Staff. This staff becomes the process man-
ager for domestic and economic policy issues, and in-that role
is assigned staffing responsibility for all substantive Cab-
inet working groups. The staffing for this unit would
include the positions currently filled by the Domestic Council
staff plus additional staff from EPG and OTP. The current
vacant positions in the Domestic Council staff would be used
to accommodate this increase.
Option II
Same as Option I.
Option III
The Domestic Council is placed within a large single Policy
Support Staff to include Domestic Council, NSC, CEA, EPG, and
possibly OSTP policy functions.
Other Variations
The study team did consider a streamlined status quo for the
Domestic Policy group. The status quo, however, would not
resolve problems of multiple domestic policy units and dis-
persed Cabinet working group staffing as documented in the
Decision Analysis Report.
Appendix C
Page 19 of 50
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
April 30, 1977
Status
Option
Authorized
Actual
I
II
III
Full-time Permanent
Positions
70
64
56
56
56*
Detailees
25
Other
15
Budget Authority
$3.27M
* This staff would be part of the combined Policy Support staff.
Functions
1. Prepare and present action and information materials for
the President, Vice President, Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs, and the Deputy Assistant
to the President for National Security Affairs (includes
attendance at meetings where any of these four discuss
such material and the preparation of Q's and A's).
2. Support the President in national security crisis
management matters.
3. Coordinate and participate in interagency activities
other than those described above (includes chairing or
attending working group meetings, preparation of material
for interagency studies).
4. Control agency and interagency operations not specifically
related to the President (includes actions such as back-
stopping negotiations, cable clearing, coordination, and
preparation of interagency reports required by Congress).
5. Monitor important issues and gather information other
than that required for 1-4 above (includes tracking
congressional activities, attending agency briefings on
issues in the area, following press coverage of important
issues).
Appendix C
Page 20 of 50
6. Consult with members of Congress and representatives
of foreign governments.
7. Perform routine duties (includes answering correspondence
for the four principals, preparation of nightly and
weekly reports, office and personnel administration,
dissemination of information through seminars or in
response to FOI Act requests).
8. Perform general research and planning (includes prepara-
tion of "analytical think pieces," developing goals and
initiatives).
Background
Each President since 1947 has confronted problems in deciding
how to use the National Security process inherited from his
predecessor. Under each new Administration the NSC has proven
sufficiently adaptable in meeting Presidential styles and
needs. Since 1968 the NSC has expanded considerably both in.
size and scope of operations, becoming in essence, a
Presidential foreign policy staff.
The NSC reorganization plan approved by President Carter
(Executive Order 11905, and PD/NSC 1&2) went into effect
January 26, 1977. Among the aims of the plan are the
simplification of the operating structure of the NSC and
the reduction of the size of staff built up during previous
Administrations (average of 140). Since January 20, NSC
staff size has diminished gradually from 114 to 99 overall,
including a reduction from 70 FTP to 64 FTP.
Among the principal issues addressed by the study team were:
how large an NSC staff is required to carry out NSC functions
under its new structure? To what extent can functions be
better shared with or transferred to NSC agencies? To what
extent can routine tasks or non-substantive activities be
done elsewhere, eliminated, or be done more effectively?
Appendix C
Page 21 of 50
Unit Description Under the Three Proposed Options
Option I
This option makes non-substantive cuts in the NSC staff by
transferring some FOI Act responsibilities to the State
Department. Our analysis shows that the remainder of the
NSC staff is being fully occupied with Presidentially required
activities. Further cuts would require elimination or trans-
fer of functions, which would inhibit the flow of vital infor-
mation to the President.
Though we recommend no change to the NSC Information Manage-
ment staff at this time, we do recommend an independent study
of this area as we believe that further reductions may be
possible through application of sophisticated technology
and equipment.
Option II
Same as Option I.
Option III
This option replaces the NSC staff with a National Security
Section in the combined Policy Staff, while maintaining the
NSC as a Cabinet-level committee. It also calls for the
Information Management study.
Other Variations
- Retain the current functions and staff levels, but
reduce the full-time permanent personnel authorization.
This was not recommended as it did not move non-substantive
or non-Presidential supporting functions to other agencies.
- Transfer substantive functional responsibilities to
NSC member agencies, reducing staff size.
This would likely impair the overall capability of the NSC
staff to continue to quickly and efficiently handle their
responsibilities.
Appendix C
Page 22 of 50
- Add an issues planning capability by transferring four
positions to the Assistant's Office in the White House.
This was not recommended because the issues planning may be
better performed as a task in which a number of NSC specialists
can participate as specific issues dictate needs for multiple
functional area expertise.
Appendix C
Page 23 of 50
COUNCIL OF ECONOMIC ADVISERS
April 30, 1977
Status
Option
Authorized
Actual
I
II
III
Full-time Permanent
42
40
35
39
34*
Positions
Detailees
1
Other
1
Budget Authority
$1.873M
*This staff would be part of the combined Policy Support Staff.
Functions
1. Prepare objective economic reports (including data pub-
lished in the monthly Economic Indicators). .
2. Prepare macroeconomic forecasts and projects.
3. Analyse economic trends and the impact on the national
economy of Federal programs, resulting in:
(a) advice to the President;
(b) policy advocacy vis-a-vis other executive branch
officials and agencies, and the Congress; and
(c) the Economic Report of the President (annual).
Background
CEA dates from the Employment Act of 1946. Its strength lies
in performing economic analysis directly relevant to current
policy choices. It has very limited operational respon-
sibilities, and does not coordinate overall economic advice
to the President (that being EPG's function). In the early
months of the Administration, CEA's resources have been
stretched thin by the pace of economic policymaking and the
broad interests of its Chairman.
Appendix C
Page 24 of 50
In January 1977, the CEA personnel ceiling was 39, the
lowest since the early 1960's. The Administration requested
and received an additional three positions in the FY 1977
supplemental. The bulk of the staff (24 FTP) supports the
third function: general economic analysis. Some of the
first function -- preparation of data -- could logically
be done outside EOP, but only about three staff positions
are devoted to it. CEA performance of this work contri-
butes to the accuracy of CEA analytic work generally and
to its reputation for quality and objectivity (through the
monthly Economic Indicators and the annual statistical tables
in the Economic Report of the President). For this reason,
no option for separating all or part of this function was
considered.
Unit Description Under The Three Proposed Options
Option I
Option I modestly reduces the CEA staff in the microeconomic
analysis area, but maintains the CEA as an independent EOP
unit. This small change will not interfere with its
continuing success in providing economic analysis for
assessment of Presidential policy issues.
Although today's unemployment-inflation problems demand
microeconomic attention, CEA's primary mandate is in the
macroeconomic policy area. Other microeconomic staff
expertise is available elsewhere in EOP (importantly in the
COWPS).
Option II
The second option reduces microeconomic analysis staff as in
Option I, but adds professional and support staff to work on
wage-price analysis, compensatory for abolishing the indepen-
dent staff of the Council on Wage and Price Stability,
building on the Chairman's current pattern of tasking COWPS
analysis on a regular basis.
Option III
Option III abolishes the CEA and transfers its staff to the
combined Policy Support Staff, with the Chairman becoming a
Presidential Adviser.
Appendix C
Page 25 of 50
This option represents a substantial restructuring of
the EOP to de-institutionalize the specialized EOP advisory
functions. It may be interpreted as a de-emphasis of the
importance of economic policy and analysis.
Appendix C
Page 26 of 50
COUNCIL ON WAGE AND PRICE STABILITY
April 30, 1977
Status
Option
Authorized
Actual
I
II
III
Full-time Permanent
57
33
35
-
-
Positions
Detailees
-
-
Other
-
-
Budget Authority
$1.92M
(Includes 1977 supplemental of 241K and additional 10 positions
for economists and three support staff.)
Functions
1. Jawbone, monitor, review, and analyze wage and price
actions of unions and industry (Statutory).
2. Conduct studies of the inflationary impact of certain
industry and labor actions; and study supply, productiv-
ity and capacity, to forecast inflationary bottlenecks
in important industry sectors to support policy decision-
making (Statutory).
3. Review governmental action to anticipate potentially
inflationary effects and intervene with agencies after
such reviews to present its position and urge a less
costly or more cost-beneficial approach (Statutory).
Background
Created by statute in August 1974, the Council is due to
expire on September 30, 1977. It was created as a formal
body to institutionalize the activities of the previous
Cost of Living Council. The President called for an exten-
sion and expansion of COWPS in both his Economic and Infla-
tion Messages and has approved the addition of 13 new
positions in the EOP Supplemental for 1977.
Appendix C
Page 27 of 50
COWPS has been highly publicized as a weapon in the Admini-
stration's anti-inflation program. It is not yet clear what
role it will play, but the recent jawboning involved in steel
price increases suggests a carefully orchestrated relation-
ship between CEA and COWPS. COWPS receives some direction
from the CEA Chairman and often provides analytical assistance
to CEA. COWPS' work tends to be self-initiated both in wage/
price monitoring activities and in regulatory intervention.
The basic issue is whether or not COWPS requires an EOP home
and, to the extent an EOP home may be needed, at what staf-
fing levels and with what organizational form.
Unit Description Under the Three Proposed Options
Option I
Maintain current activities, freezing employment to the pre-
supplemental level (except for Director position). This
would result in a slight reduction of staff and budget in
EOP while retaining standby machinery for an anti-inflation
campaign in the EOP. All wage and price activity would be
in a central unit.
We note the value of COWPS' current activities have been
questioned, its effectiveness perceived as minimal, and much
of its work is non-directed and self-initiated. COWPS is
opposed by organized labor and some of the business com-
munity. Our original organizational criteria would exclude
its long-term research and operational functions from being
conducted in EOP.
This option may require some current employees to be released
or transferred to other jobs because COWPS, at its current
rate of spending, will spend its entire budget despite 8
vacant positions.
Option II
Abolish and transfer all functions to other governmental
agencies and transfer jawboning to a sub-Cabinet working
group to be known as the "Interagency Committee on Inflation"
chaired either by Treasury or Commerce. Allow CEA additional
positions to provide analytical backup and draw on depart-
mental wage-price analysis.
Appendix C
Page 28 of 50
This option reinforces the concept of "Cabinet Government"
and results in a significant EOP budget and staff reduc-
tion. It would give positive signals to the business com-
munity that this Administration firmly disavows wage-price
controls while retaining some standby anti-inflationary
machinery.
This option contravenes earlier strong statements by the
President and statement to Congress by OMB Director, CEA
Chairman and Secretary of the Treasury calling for contin-
uation. It is strongly opposed by CEA Chairman and others.
These functions would no longer be housed in a single unit
and there is a possibility that any analysis done by the
Departments of Labor and Commerce may be biased toward
their respective constituencies.
Option III
This option is the same as Option II except that wage-price
analysis capacity would be placed in the general Policy Sup-
port Staff.
Other Variations
Maintain current functions and staff including those to be
added through the 1977 Supplemental. The President would
have standby machinery for anti-inflation campaign in close
proximity with all wage and price activity in a central unit
with some Presidential authority associated with the Council.
COWPS' current activities have questionable, if not minimal
effect. Much of the work effort is non-directed and self-
initiated. Our original organization criteria would exclude
such long-term research and operational functions from being
conducted in EOP.
Appendix C
Page 29 of 50
OFFICE OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY POLICY
April 30, 1977
Status
Option
Authorized Actual
I
II
III
Full-time Permanent
Positions
32
17
22
22
17*
Detailees
15
Other
65
Budget Authority
$2.3M
*this staff would be part of the combined Policy Support Staff.
Functions
1. Advise the President on scientific and technological
considerations in areas of national concern (Statutory).
2. Evaluate the scale, quality and effectiveness of the
Federal effort in science and technology and advise on
appropriate changes (Statutory).
3. Assist the Office of Management and Budget with an
annual budget review for Federal R&D programs
(Statutory).
4, Advise the National Security Council and other EOP units
in matters concerning science and technology (Statutory).
5. Consider problems and developments in science and tech-
nology affecting more than one Federal agency and
recommend policies and procedures for dealing with them
through the Federal Coordinating Council on Science and
Technology (Statutory).
6. Identify, through the Intergovernmental Panels on Science,
Engineering and Technology (ISETAP), problems at the
state and local level for which science and technology may
provide solutions (Statutory).
7. Prepare reports to Congress including the President's
Annual Report on Science and Technology and an annually
updated five-year outlook (Statutory).
8. Survey, through the President's Committee on Science and
Technology (PCST), the effectiveness and efficiency of
the Federal R&D effort and recommend changes (Statutory).
Appendix C
Page 30 of 50
Background
The Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP) was re-
established on May 11, 1976, through PL 94-282. Hearings
and studies were conducted over a three-year period in
Congress following abolition of Office of Science and
Technology by President Nixon in 1973. The bill was strongly
lobbied by the science and technology community and received
strong bipartisan support in Congress.
OSTP was largely inactive until current Science Adviser/
Director of OSTP arrived. Thus, while effectiveness has been
minimal to date, the Office can be of significant value if
the Science Adviser is considered important by the President.
The Science Adviser has developed good relations with NSC,
OMB, and CEQ. He can make a significant contribution to the
domestic policy and economic units. He views the Federal
Coordinating Council and Intergovernmental Panels as important
to his work if they are focused. However, it is the view of
the reorganization team that such approaches are largely
ineffective.
The study team also believes that the work of the President's
Committee on Science and Technology (PCST) should be folded
into the President's overall reorganization effort. The
Science Adviser agrees. The remaining PCST functions, Annual
Report and Five-Year Outlook should be transferred to the
National Science Foundation or eliminated, with OSTP retain-
ing oversight. (Memorandum from Science Adviser to this
effect has been forwarded to OMB Deputy Director.) The
Science Adviser and functions have been imposed upon two
Presidents, but generally not utilized.
Unit Description Under The Three Proposed Options
Option I
This option retains only those functions that provide advice
to the President and support policy formulation, budget
review and EOP decisionmaking. Work of ISEAP would be per-
formed through OMB-IRRO, and FCCST would operate as a sub-
Cabinet working group. The work of PCST would be folded
into the President's Reorganization effort. The remaining
PCST functions would be transferred to NSF. OSTP would
provide science-related advice and support on environmental
and telecommunications policies issues.
Appendix C
Page 31 of 50
It would streamline the organization, eliminating unproductive,
duplicative functions, and providing a pool of scientific
and technical expertise. Changes to OSTP may result in
congressional resistance.
Option II
Same as Option I.
Option III
This option abolishes OSTP, retains only a Presidential
Adviser and establishes a small staff in the combined Policy
Support Staff.
This provides the President with science advice while signif-
icantly streamlining the EOP. Abolition of the OSTP would
face even greater congressional opposition.
Other Variations
The study team also considered:
- Retaining the unit with no change.
This arrangement is commensurate with congressionally mandated
responsibilities and would give the unit a chance to operate
with present responsibilities under the new Science Adviser/
Director. However, it retains functions that are not
Presidential in nature, requiring excess resources and dupli-
cating functions carried out by NSF and the OTA of Congress.
- Increase unit's functions and staff to handle science
and technology aspects of telecommunications and
environmental policy issues.
This option could be a viable alternative if CEQ or OTP were
eliminated and their functions transferred; all EOP offices
might benefit from increased science and technology staff
capability and potential. Economies of scale could be
realized. However, science and technology aspects of environ-
mental policy and telecommunications would be separated from
political, social and economic aspects if CEQ and OTP were
eliminated, and OSTP had the lead role.
- Increase unit staff to provide more support for
coordinating functions of FCCST and ISETAP.
-
Page 32 of 50
In this case, if these congressionally mandated functions
were retained, they would be strengthened, their time frames
shortened, and a secretariat capability created to handle
communications and monitor progress of the working groups.
However, these committees are not Presidential in nature, and
based upon previous experience, there is considerable question
as to their potential for success. This work could be per-
formed on an ad hoc informal basis which would not require a
legislative mandate limiting the President's prerogatives.
This option rejects other non-EOP means of accomplishing these
tasks. FCCST's work could be done in a sub-Cabinet working
group and ISETAP's in an OMB-IRRO function.
Appendix C
Page 33 of 50
COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY
April 30, 1977
Status
Option
Authorized Actual
I
II
III
Full-time Permanent
Positions
40
45
24
0
0
Detailees
4
Other
11
Budget Authority
$3.3M
Functions
All statutorily mandated and implemented by Executive Order,
as noted.
1.
Assist the President by developing and recommending
environmental policy, and providing advice on environ-
mental issues.
2.
Coordinate Federal environmental programs and policies
that cut across agency lines and resolve interagency
conflicts.
3.
Review and appraise Federal programs in accordance with
National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) oversight
responsibilities.
4.
Guide and evaluate Federal agency performance in ful-
filling their Environmental Impact Statement (EIS)
responsibilities under NEPA.
5.
Analyze long-range conditions and trends in environ-
mental quality.
6.
Prepare the President's annual Environmental Quality
Report to the Congress.
Appendix C
Page 34 of 50
Background
CEQ's basic responsibilities derive from two statutes -- Title
II of the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) 1969 and
the Environmental Quality Improvement Act (EQIA) 1970 -- which
jointly created the Council and its office. These Acts define
CEQ's broad mandates as providing Presidential advice on
environmental issues and analyzing and reporting on long-term
environmental trends and conditions. Executive Order 11514
(1970) added oversight of agency implementation of NEPA's
Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) requirements and instruc-
ted CEQ to write guidelines for that process. More recently,
Congress assigned several additional statutory functions to
CEQ, such as oversight of ERDA's energy conservation and
non-nuclear R&D programs.
The past two Administrations did not encourage CEQ involvement
in policy matters. The 40 permanent positions in the FY 1978
Budget submission compare to an actual peak of 57 positions
in FY 1972. (Staff has declined gradually since FY 1972).
In the Environmental Message issued May 23, the President gave
several specific assignments to CEQ, including a directive via
a new Executive Order amending Executive Order 11514 to issue
regulations to Federal agencies regarding their Environmental
Impact Statements. The aim is to reduce the paperwork volume
and focus such statements on "real environmental issues and
alternatives.
Abolishing CEQ or redefining overall mission would involve
legislative changes, as well as changes in Executive Orders
implementing such legislation. Major changes are likely to
be strongly resisted by the environmental constituency and
key members of Congress. Such resistance might be reduced
by the fact that the Administration's environmental record
is very favorably regarded by CEQ's champions, who may
therefore feel less need for this particular institution
than they did during past Administrations that were less
responsive to their concerns.
Appendix C
Page 35 of 50
Unit Description Under The Three Proposed Options
Option I
Retain CEQ with reduced functions and staff, emphasizing
Presidential advisory, overall policy coordination, and
analytic activities. Transfer NEPA oversight functions to
EPA, including the recently created authority to issue EIS
regulations. Retain responsibility for issuing annual report
but have specific sections prepared outside EOP, in EPA and
other departments and agencies. Reduce the number of studies
undertaken directly by CEQ.
This option's advantages include retaining a high visibility
advisory unit while transferring oversight and reporting
functions, thus taking a step toward government-wide realign-
ment of environmental functions. The disadvantages of this
option include the required modification of the May 23
Executive Order that strengthened NEPA oversight responsi-
bilities, possible opposition from some members of Congress
who would interpret the move as a major downgrading for the
environmental concerns and NEPA, and the possible problem of
giving EPA, a line agency, oversight responsibility over
agencies of equal or higher rank. EPA reportedly has no
interest in this area.
This option would retain the Presidential advisory function
within EOP showing the Administration's continuing commitment
to environmental issues. Transferring the day-to-day NEPA
oversight functions to EPA would remove from the EOP those
functions and positions (15) not directly serving the
President, but would require that EPA assume the review
function of agencies of equal or higher rank.
Option II
This option would transfer all CEQ functions to the Department
of Interior. This would further the Administration's policy
of Cabinet government by incorporating environmental functions
within the agency primarily responsible for the nation's
natural resources development and protection.
Appendix C
Page 36 of 50
This move, however, could create opposition in Congress and
strong opposition from environmental groups who may view it
as an Administration "sell-out" to the development faction.
It may also lead to resignation of CEQ council members.
A further variation of this option would entail establishing
an environmental adviser to the President with a small support
staff.
Option III
Same as Option II.
Other Variations
The study team also considered the following possibilities:
- Increase the CEQ staff by 15 to enable it to better
perform its responsibilities.
This is not consistent with the thrust of the EOP review:
to streamline operations and direct them towards close
support to the President.
- Maintain the current CEQ size and functions, with
increased emphasis on Presidential advise and
interagency coordination.
This was not recommended due to the fact that many CEQ
activities do not directly support the President.
- Abolish CEQ, replacing it with an Environmental
Quality Advisor to the President, and transfer all
its functions to EPA and elsewhere.
This is a plausible alternative but was not recommended
because Interior seemed a more appropriate recipient.
- Replace CEQ with an Advisory Commission on Environment
(like ACIR).
This was not recommended because of the inherent difficulty of
a Commission such as this, to provide regular and consistent
staff advise to the President.
Appendix C
Page 37 of 50
OFFICE OF DRUG ABUSE POLICY
April 30, 1977
Status
Option
Authorized Actual
I
II
III
Full-time Permanent
Positions
10
10
10
0
0
Detailees
Other
Budget Authority
$1.1M
Functions
1. Recommend to the President, policies, objectives and
priorities of Federal drug abuse functions (Statutory).
2. Recommend to the President changes in organization,
management, and personnel of relevant Federal agencies
as necessary to implement Function 1 (Statutory).
3. Coordinate the performance of drug abuse functions
within Federal agencies (Statutory).
4. Review regulations, guidelines, requirements, criteria,
and procedures regarding the above functions within
Federal agencies (Statutory).
5. Evaluate performance and results of drug abuse programs
in Federal agencies (Statutory).
6. Report annually to Congress on objectives, activities,
and accomplishments of ODAP (Statutory).
7. Represent the United States, at the President's dis-
cretion, in international discussions and negotiations
related to drug abuse functions (Statutory).
8. Provide strategy in terms of policy direction and coor-
dination of the law enforcement, international and
treatment/prevention programs.
NOTE: The Director of ODAP is also the Special Assistant to
the President for Health Issues and as such is actively
involved in all health issues facing the Administration.
Appendix C
Page 38 of 50
Background
Drug abuse programs are fragmented among some 40 Federal
agencies. This has resulted in overlap, duplication, con-
tradictory and confusing policies, poor coordination and
considerable mismanagement. Efforts to resolve this problem
through the Drug Abuse Office and Treatment Act of 1972 were
not successful. There are no simple answers to drug abuse
problems, with agency functions split between demand reduc-
tion (HEW, DOD, VA, Justice) and supply reduction (Justice,
Treasury, and State). In another attack on the problem,
Congress passed P.L. 94-237 in March 1976 authorizing ODAP,
but President Ford did not establish the office. However,
five persons in OMB performed some ODAP functions until
March 1977. President Ford's refusal to formally establish
ODAP became a sensitive issue with the Congress.
President Carter established ODAP in EOP on March 14, 1977.
In so doing, he emphasized those functions of ODAP relating
to reorganization, improved management, improved resource
allocation, and a strategy for program coordination to
address immediate issues as well as providing a framework
for building more permanent solutions. Current Administration
thinking is that ODAP should seek longer term solutions to
the lack of coordination and chronic management problems that
have plagued the drug policies area. The new Director is also
heavily involved in mental health and international health
issues.
Unit Description Under The Three Proposed Options
Option I
Maintain current functions for one year during which ODAP will
develop plans for the drug abuse area and make institutional
improvements within Government agencies, coordinated with the
President's Reorganization Project. ODAP would terminate
operations at the end of the year.
This option would continue to recognize drug abuse as a high
visibility public issue, may be more acceptable to con-
gressional interests than immediate abolishment and would
focus ODAP on specific policy and reorganization improvements.
Appendix C
Page 39 of 50
On the other hand, coordination of management improvement
could be handled by the President's Reorganization Project
in OMB as the scope of problems may be beyond the capacity
of a small coordination unit and the drug abuse area may be
too narrow to warrant separate EOP unit.
Option II
Eliminate ODAP. Establish a Drug Abuse and Health Adviser
to the President with a small support staff. Transfer
reorganizational responsibility and management improvement
to OMB, international negotiations to State and other
functions to drug abuse agencies (HEW).
This option recognizes that reorganization of the 40 drug
abuse agencies is central to resolving the problems that
give rise to ODAP. This option retains these responsibili-
ties in EOP only until completion of reorganization plans.
This option also preserves capacity for close advice to the
President in drug abuse areas, however, some critics may
question the need for a special adviser to the President and
others will point to congressional opposition to any elimina-
tion of ODAP's current functions.
Option III
Same as Option II.
Other Variations
We also considered:
- Transfer of ODAP, with current functions, directly to
HEW (except international negotiations to State).
- Elimination of ODAP as recommended but transfer
policy/strategy development to a sub-Cabinet working
group.
These were rejected, as they would preempt a comprehensive
reorganization effort in the first instance and, in the
second, a Presidential adviser appeared to offer better
opportunities for policy focus than the working group.
Appendix C
Page 40 of 50
ECONOMIC POLICY GROUP
April 30, 1977
Status
Option
Authorized Actual
I
II
III
Full-time Permanent
Positions
0
0
0
0
0
Detailees
9
Other
Budget Authority
$0
(The positions and budget authority for this function under
all three options are included in the Domestic Council unit
summary.)
Functions
1. Review economic policy issues in Group meetings, to
resolve them or to develop recommendations or options
to the President.
2. Coordinate staff work by member agencies on issues
coming before the Group.
3. Oversee implementation of decisions made and policies
adopted.
Background
EPG is a formal Cabinet committee charged with coordinating
Government-wide economic policies and bringing recommenda-
tions and choices to the President for action. Its eleven-
member Executive Committee (including three ex officio) has
met weekly since January 1977; and EPG Executive order is
pending. Until March, Secretary of the Treasury and Chair-
man of the CEA co-chaired the EPG; then the Secretary of the
Treasury was made sole chairman and a separate EPG staff
established.
No one questions that economic policy coordination is an
appropriate EOP activity; however, most observers and par-
ticipants in the EPG process do not believe it is currently
1
Appendix C
Page 41 of 50
playing this role effectively. The two major, related prob-
lems are: (1) heavy dependence on large, Cabinet-level
meetings as vehicles for issue management; (2) separation
of EPG staff from President's two major aides for substan-
tive policy issues, the Assistants for National Security and
Domestic Policy. (Staff is formally attached to Cabinet
Secretariat; the Executive Director reports in practice to
the Secretary of the Treasury as EPG Chairman.)
The President needs a regularized process upon which he and
his chief aides can depend to highlight major economic pol-
icy choices supported by timely staff work. Choices result
from this need with respect to: (1) the size of the EPG
Executive Committee, and (2) the location of the staff.
Unit Description Under the Three Proposed Options
Option I
The replacement of the Executive Committee with Treasury-
chaired Steering Committee including CEA, OMB, and
State supports the concept of a small, flexible group of
Presidential economic advisors with the ability to define
options more easily, and organize analytic backup more
effectively and efficiently. It would eliminate the inequi-
ties of having some (e.g., HUD) but not all (e.g., HEW) domes-
tics departments on the Executive Committee. The establish-
ment of this group would require coordination with NSC to
establish agendas and resolve disputes in the international
economic issues area, or EPG's jurisdiction over this area
might be weakened.
Transferring the EPG staff function to the Policy Support
Staff (current DC) would place the economic policy process
management responsibility under the President's Assistant
now performing that function for most EPG issues. The
addition of this function to the Domestic Council staff
and others forming the Policy Support Staff will move that
group towards the more general role of process management
and brokering of issues.
The strength gained by combining these staff functions, how-
ever, might in itself create authority problems unless the
role of this group is carefully defined. Also, the addition
Appendix C
Page 42 of 50
of this new staff function may not be enough to overcome the
tendency of the Domestic Council's staff to operate more as
an advocate than "honest broker."
Option II
Same as Option I.
Option III
Same as Options I and II, except that the staff would be inte-
grated into the Economic Section of the central Policy Support
Staff.
Other Variations
Four other EPG variations were evaluated:
- Maintain current structure of the EPG as Cabinet body
with eleven-member Executive Committee.
This arrangement would not ameliorate the problem of manag-
ing candid discussions in large meetings and gaining legiti-
macy for its recommendations.
- Eliminate EPG as a formal unit and convene it when
necessary within the Policy Staff Management System
recommended above.
This alternative would not provide continuity in economic
policy development.
- Maintain staff at its current size of nine individuals,
with current informal assignment to the Cabinet Secre-
tary.
This separates staff capability from those responsible for
serving the President on economic policy matters.
- Give CEA Chairman the additional title of Assistant to
the President for Economic Affairs; a Deputy Assistant
reporting to him would direct small economic coordi-
nating staff of six individuals.
Appendix C
Page 43 of 50
This scenario reverses the President's March decision that
the CEA Chairman should not be the central economic policy
coordinator.
Appendix C
Page 44 of 50
COUNCIL ON INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC POLICY
April 30, 1977
Status
Option
Authorized
Actual
I
II
III
Full-time Permanent
21
19
0
0
0
Positions
Detailees
Other
1
Budget Authority
$1.45M
Functions
1. Provide advice for the President on international economic
issues.
2. Organize and participate in interagency staff work and
help resolve interagency disputes.
3. Prepare the President's annual International Economic Report.
Background
The Council on International Economic Policy (CIEP) was estab-
lished by Presidential order on January 19, 1971 and given
statutory standing (P.L. 92-415) by Congress in August 1972.
It is composed of seven Cabinet Secretaries (State, Treasury,
Defense, Agriculture, Commerce, Labor, and Transportation),
the OMB Director, the CEA Chairman, and the Special Represen-
tative for Trade Negotiations (STR). The President designates
the Chairman, who, since 1973 (except for a few months in 1974)
has been the Secretary of the Treasury.
The Council has seldom met -- never in the Carter Administration.
The CIEP staff has been active in a wide range of international
economic issues, but was subordinated to the Economic Policy
Board (EPB) in the Ford Administration. The staff continues
to have 21 permanent positions, and 19 employees, but activity
Appendix C
Page 45 pf 50
has shrunk drastically since January 20, 1977. The six
professionals remaining on CIEP rolls as of the end of April
were working largely on individually arranged ad hoc projects,
in the expectation that they would soon move elsewhere on a
permanent basis. In fact, CIEP staff was told on January 24,
1977, that it would be discharged on February 18. This order
was withdrawn, however, after its legality was questioned.
CIEP will terminate on September 30, 1977, unless the
P.L. 92-415 is amended.
Unit Description Under The Three Proposed Options
Option I
Abolish by allowing statutory authority to lapse on September 30.
CIEP was established to coordinate overall international
economic policy without parochial foreign or economic policy
biases, but it has never played a major coordinating role as
has NSC. Also, Congress has mandated preparation of an
International Economic Report and a number of other advisory
functions that CIEP fills. Accordingly, there may be pressure
to reassign these functions if CIEP is abolished. Because
international economic policy issues are closely linked with
specific foreign and economic policy concerns, a separate
international economic staff does not make operational sense.
Option II
Same as Option I.
Option III
Same as Option I.
Other Variations
We considered the alternative of maintaining the current struc-
ture and staff size of CIEP and rejected this because CIEP's
currently inactive staff expects to be abolished and no senior
Administration official is interested in reviving or leading
this unit.
Appendix C
Page 46 of 50
OFFICE OF TELECOMMUNICATIONS POLICY (OTP)
April 30, 1977
Status
Option
Authorized
Actual
I
II
III
Full-time Permanent
Positions
41
43
0
0
0
Detailees
7
Other
40
Budget Authority
$8.48M
Functions
1. Develop and review national telecommunications policy
(including national security).
2. Prepare for international telecommunication conferences
and negotiations (Statutory).
3. Establish policy for all levels of government regarding
research and development, procurement, projections of
telecommunication resources, systems management, facilities
and services.
4. Allocate and regulate radio spectrum frequency assignments
to Federal agencies of the Government's portion of the
radio spectrum (Statutory).
Background
OTP was created in 1970 with strong congressional support as
a "neutral home" for the functions described above and as a
reference point for access to the President by Congress and
other interested parties on telecommunications policy issues.
The office was "politicized" under the Nixon Administration
and since that time has not had the "clout" or the access it
was originally intended to have. However, the issues have
become more complex and presently require a serious presence
at the highest levels of government. Each specific function
need not have such attention but there are (and will continue
to be) policy issues in telecommunications that will peri-
odically require Presidential attention (e.g., the Bell bill).
Appendix C
Page 47 of 50
Most of the functions currently performed by OTP can be or
are currently being performed outside the EOP. Since its
inception, OTP has made extensive use of staff of the Depart-
ment of Commerce's Office of Telecommunications, particularly
for the frequency management function on a fully reimbursable
basis. This management has increased in scope over the years
and the current reimbursement for FY 1977 from OTP to OT/DOC
represents more than 60 percent of OTP's budget. It also
represents approximately 60-100 full-time professionals and
support staff at OT/DOC that are paid by OTP. A minimal
policy overview staff of 8 permanent full-time positions in
the frequency management area are actually at OTP. There are
also 7 military detailees serving in a variety of professional
capacities ranging from National Security Adviser to Assistant
to the OTP Director.
Unit Description Under The Three Proposed Options
Option I
In this option, OTP would be abolished. A small telecommuni-
cations and information policy staff would be retained
within the Domestic Policy Staff and the role of the Assistant
to the President (Media and Public Affairs) would be redefined
to include information policy and cultural affairs. All other
functions (except the development of Presidential Policy and
resolution of interagency disputes) would be transferred to
Commerce.
This option eliminates OTP as a unit, decreases the EOP
telecommunications budget and staff by 80-90% while (1) in-
creasing presidential access on the highest priority issues
and (2) retaining a neutral home for interagency arbitration.
However, the action could be perceived as a symbolic down-
grading, precluding Congressional testimony by the EOP unit
head, and requiring Commerce to adequately upgrade their
telecommunications unit to facilitate transfer of OTP functions.
This option eliminates the entire staff and budget of OTP.
However, 3 positions and 2 military detailees would be added
to the policy support staff and 3 positions would be trans-
ferred to OMB.
Appendix C
Page 48 of 50
Option II
Same as Option I
Option III
Same as Option I
Other Variations
The study team also considered the following:
- Maintain the current functions of OTP with reduced staff.
This fails to move non-Presidential functions from EOP.
- Transfer all OTP functions to the Commerce Department.
This fails to provide a neutral home for interagency disputes.
- Transfer the frequency allocation function to Commerce
and interagency dispute settlement to OMB and maintain
other functions in a greatly reduced OTP.
We rejected it on the grounds that the remaining OTP work
would not be fully focused on Presidential matters.
- Provisions for a Presidential Assistant for Telecommuni-
cations.
This was rejected because it would increase the number of
Presidential advisors on various substantive issues and would
increase the size of the White House staff.
Appendix C
Page 49 of 50
FEDERAL PROPERTY COUNCIL
April 30, 1977
Status
Option
Authorized Actual
I
II
III
Full-time Permanent
Positions
Inactive,
Detailees
without funds
Other
Budget Authority
Functions
1. Review all Federal real property policies with respect
to their consistency with Government objectives and sub-
mit recommendations and reports to the President as
needed.
2. Resolve disputes among conflicting Federal agency claims
for use of certain Federal properties.
Background
The Federal Property Council was created by Executive Order
in 1973 to foster development of more effective national
policies regarding use of Federal properties. Past effort
was often to resolve conflicting Federal claims for use of
certain Federal properties. Issues raised by GSA and pre-
sented to OMB were then referred back to GSA to try to work
out. When this failed, the Council was used.
The Federal Property Council has been inactive for the past
year and a half. Meanwhile, GSA has accumulated files on
many properties held by agencies that in its view should be
considered for release as excess. From time-to-time, OMB
has urged GSA to move more aggressively with agencies.
When the Federal Property Council became inactive, OMB
wanted to proceed without such a body. White House interest
resulted in an Executive Order issued by President Ford
Appendix C
Page 50 of 50
(January 1977) reconstituting the Council with the Director
of OMB as Chairman. Other designated members were the
Chairmen of CEQ and CEA. This seems to be a matter of lit-
tle political interest. Currently, the Director can review
reports of the GSA Administrator and make recommendations
to the President on his own initiative.
Unit Description Under The Three Proposed Options
Option I
Rescind President Ford's Executive Order and handle matters
of potential Presidential concern by having GSA go to OMB
Director with major issues, and the Director to President as
needed. (No real change.)
Option II
Same as Option I.
Option III
Same as Option I.
Other Variations
We considered the possibility of implementing President Ford's
Executive Order and providing a small staff, but rejected it
because (1) FPC is currently inactive and (2) the functions
can be performed as well elsewhere.
PRESIDENT'S REORGANIZATION PROJECT
Recommendation Memo No. EOP-2
June 29, 1977
ISSUE: White House Office Staffing Levels
Contents
Page
Introduction
1
Background
2
Conclusions
3
Recommendations
4
Present and Proposed Staffing Levels
5
White House Unit Summaries
6
-
1
WHITE HOUSE OFFICE STAFFING LEVELS
INTRODUCTION
The White House Office staff serves the President by providing
(1) close administrative and operations support, (2) policy
and political advice, and (3) capability for undertaking
special projects as required to meet special Presidential
needs. The structure and staffing levels of the White House
Office should reflect the concerns, management style and
work patterns of the President. Therefore, it can have no
optimal shape and size.
The study team's concern is whether the Office is making the
most efficient use of people and resources to serve the
President. We have also attempted to determine which functions
serve this President best by being located in the White
House Office, and which are useful functions that can be
best administered in a non-White House environment.
In this report we discuss each White House unit, and note
those incremental changes in personnel and unit functions that
will assist the President in the more effective management of
his immediate office.
Other studies, incorporated in the overall Executive Office of
the President reorganization report, suggest changes in policy
process management, administrative functions, and structure--
important adjunct decisions to the recommendations made here.
2
BACKGROUND
The White House Office staff has grown substantially over the
years, as indicated by the following summary tabulation:
Fiscal
Full-Time
Detailed
Year
Employees
Employees
Total
1934
45
120
165
1937
45
112
157
1941
62
117
179
1945
48
167
215
1949
220
26
246
1953
262
28
290
1957
364
59
423
1961
342
134
476
1965
294
154
448
1969
314
232
546
1973
496
24
520
1975
533
27
560
1976 (Aug)
474
25
499
Currently, the White House Office has a FY 1977 budget of
$17.2 million and is authorized 485 full time permanent posi-
tions--250 staff (political-policy) and 235 operating office
positions. As of June 7, the number of positions actually
filled were as follows:
Political-
Operating
Policy
Offices
Staff
Staff
Total
Full-Time Employees*
219
242**
461
Detailed Employees
79
21
100
Part-Time Employees
17
---
Total
578
===
These numbers do not include military personnel or employees
of the Executive Protective Service and Interior Department
who are assigned to the White House Complex.
*Includes permanent full-time, temporary extensions and
temporary appointments.
**Includes 16 positions considered "political-policy" by the
previous administration.
3
CONCLUSIONS
Our analysis of each of the White House units suggests that
overall these units are serving the President well and that
there is little need, at this time, for major restructuring.
However, we have found some areas where improvements can be
made in the efficiency of operations, where functions can be
eliminated or performed more effectively elsewhere, and where
staff reductions can be made with the least impact on the
capability immediately available to the President. We believe
that the White House staff can be reduced in size without
jeopardizing its capacity to serve the President and that in
fact there are advantages in having a smaller White House
staff.
A reduction will give the President greater flexibility to add
staff to meet future needs. It will also provide better
control of staff and will eliminate some non-directed, self-
generated work currently being performed. In addition, it will
set an example for other governmental reorganizations, enhance
Cabinet government and fulfill the President's commitment to
the public.
Because the White House Office must be organized to meet the
needs of the President, there are no "correct" staff sizes.
Reasonable arguments can be made for staffing levels different
from those which we have recommended. The EOP project staff
has, however, performed an indepth functional analysis of each
White House unit, applied their best judgment as to the needs
of this President, and developed internally consistent recommenda-
tions that we believe are workable.
4
RECOMMENDATIONS
We recommend that the White House staff be reduced from the
current level to 340 permanent positions.
This represents a 30% reduction from the authorized personnel
ceiling of 485 positions, and yet retains the necessary
elements of a functional, efficient White House.
The political-policy staff size would be reduced to 175.
Detailed discussion of this recommendation follows.
The size of the operations staff would be reduced to 165.
Creation of a central administrative support unit for
the Executive Office of the President will permit this
reduction. A more detailed discussion of this recommen-
dation is presented in the report on the Executive Office
of the President.
Recommendations for reducing the White House Office political-
policy staff by 308 are summarized in the chart on the following
page and are discussed in detail in subsequent sub-sections.
The numbers refer to full-time permanent positions and do not
include detailees and special employees such as consultants.
Because they provide a means of obtaining the flexibility
needed in the White House to deal with unforeseen problems, we
do recommend continued use of detailees and consultants, but
with care so that their numbers do not rise inordinately and
that they do not become permanent substitutes for full-time
White House Office staff.
To this end, we recommend that the White House administrative
unit establish guidelines for use of these personnel cate-
gories and carefully monitor their use throughout the Executive
Office of the President.
Most of the recommendations included in this memorandum can be
implemented by Presidential directive at any time. We suggest
that responsibility for implementing Presidential decisions be
assigned to one senior White House aide and that September 30,
1977 be established as the target deadline for implementing
all changes. The responsible official should take care to
assure that those who lose their White House jobs find suitable
employment elsewhere, consistent with the President's promise
to all government employees, that reductions do not dispro-
portionately affect female and minority staff members, and
that reductions are carefully balanced between professional
and clerical staffs.
5
WHITE HOUSE OFFICE
PRESENT AND PROPOSED STAFFING LEVELS
30% Reduction from
485 Authorized Positions
Proposed
June 77
Transfers Position
Auth.
Page
Staff Level
+ In
-Reduc-
Staff
No.
Unit
Auth.
Actual*
- Out
tions
Level
6
Units with Staff Reductions
6
Counsel (Lipshutz)
11
13
-1
10
7
Political Coord. (Jordan)
11
11
-2
9
8
Policy Coord. (Eizenstat)
10
10
-2
-3
5
8
Cabinet Sec/IGR (Watson)
12
12
-2
10
9
Public Liaison (Costanza)
15
16
-3
12
10
Cong. Liaison (Moore)
26
27
-5
-2
19
11
Press (Powell)
48
46
+2
-6
44
13
First Lady (Hoyt)
23
23
-3
20
14
Appts. Secy (Kraft)
22
22
-3
19
14
Presidential Pers. (King)
18
16
-6
12
16
Units to be Transferred Out of
White House
16
Energy (Schlesinger)
2
2
-2
0
16
Budget & Org. (Harden)
2
2
-2
0
16
Drug Abuse (Bourne)
1
2
-1
0***
16
IOB (Dennin)
1
1
-1
0
18
Units with No Staff Reduction
18
Staff Sec. (Hutcheson)
3
4
3
18
Reorganization (Pettigrew)
2
2
2
19
National Security (Brzezinski)
2
2
2
19
Administration (Carter)
2
2
2
19
Ombudsman (Aragon)
2
2
2
19
D.C. Liaison (Mitchell)
2
2
2
19
Special Projects (Schneiders)
2
2
2
Total Policy-Political Staff
217
219
-11
-31
175
Total Operating Offices
242
242
165**
Unallocated Vacancies
26
-
-
Total Full Time
485
461
340
*Because of fluctuations in staff levels, a given unit may be slightly above or
below this figure as of the submission of this report. Includes permanent and
temporary staff. Does not include detailees or consultants.
**Based on establishment of a centralized EOP administrative unit.
***If the President decides to abolish ODAP as recommended in the EOP report, a health
and drug abuse advisor plus staff of 2 would be placed in the White House Office.
6
White House Unit Summaries
In this section we present our analyses of and recommendations
for each White House unit by three major groupings:
1. Units retaining current functions, but whose staff
levels should be reduced;
2. Units to be transferred out of the White House
Office; and
3.
Units with unchanged staffing levels.
Units with Staff Reductions
Counsel to the President
Authorized Staff: 11
RECOMMENDATIONS: Reduction of 1 position to a staff level
of 10.
We recommend a staff complement for this unit of four attorneys,
four secretaries, and two security assistants. The recommended
reduction would reduce the capability to perform "special
projects" (such as coordinating the task force on Maine-
Massachusetts Indian Land Claims, or drafting proposals for
application of equal employment standards to the White House),
and to coordinate Department of Justice materials. The
remaining capacity would be sufficient to handle legal tasks
pertinent to the President and White House staff, and would
retain some flexibility.
The necessity for legal counsel in the WHO is a recent develop-
ment, primarily related to the post-Watergate level of concern
for exercise of the highest ethical standards by government
officials. Previously, legal counsel had generally been
provided by a very small counsel's office and by the Attorney
General and Department of Justice, or by the numerous attorney-
advisers characteristic of prior modern White Houses.
In the last two decades, there has been an apparent heightened
awareness of legal considerations in policy issues. The
current Counsel's office has accentuated this trend by assuming
particular responsibility for analysis and coordination of
issues deemed to have a significant legal component.
7
This office also provides a special projects capacity for
handling task forces or issue analyses that appear to be of
Presidential significance but have no clear WHO home. The
Counsel also serves as a WHO convener, referee, and arbiter,
apart from his role as the President's lawyer.
This office asserts that coordination of legal issues is of
paramount importance. This is essentially a new role in the
WHO, based upon the apparent assumption that legal expertise
on policy questions must be provided in the White House
itself.
The special projects activity of this office appears redundant
of the operation of the Domestic Council (where substantial
legal expertise is found). The projects are certainly impor-
tant, but often appear to be initiated at the request of
someone other than the President.
We do not question the need for a counsel's office in the
White House. It is not clear that all of the functions
performed by this office are responding to real Presidential
needs.
Accordingly, the mission of this office should be restructured
towards servicing immediate Presidential legal needs: security,
ethics, and conflicts-of-interest work; legal questions perti-
nent to White House operations (Freedom of Information Act,
Title VII, etc.); and intelligence oversight and related
matters.
Assistant to the President (Political Coordination)
Authorized Staff: 11
RECOMMENDATION: Reduction of 2 Positions to a staff of 9.
Also, unit should place more emphasis on
political strategy and political coordination
for input to policy formulation.
This unit provides political advice and insight, unencumbered
by issue-related responsibilities. As currently constituted,
the office maintains political contacts for the President and
provides a general flexibility for coordinating large-scale
policy initiatives, such as the energy program. No optimal
size for the office exists, because its level of effort is
dependent upon the activity directed by the President. Our
perception is, however, that the office could be even more
effective were it in fact to provide political coordination
within the White House. Our study indicates that political
input to the policy process has too often been sought too
late, if at all; this office should be more consistently
included in that process.
8
Assistant to the President (Domestic Affairs and
Policy)
Authorized Staff: 10
RECOMMENDATION: Reduction of 5 positions (transfer 2 to the
Press Office and eliminate 3) to a staff
level of 5.
Three members of the Domestic Policy staff constitute the
"Messages" unit, which writes Presidential Messages to organi-
zations and individuals on special occasions. We recommend
that two of the three positions be transferred to the Press
Office and that one be eliminated.
Additionally, the Domestic Policy Advisor has an in-house
research staff (two positions) that is not effectively used.
The "Research Office" provides reference support regarding the
"Promises Book", prepares briefing notes for Presidential
trips, participates in "special projects", and distributes
reading materials within the White House Office. These are
all tasks for which adequate capacity exists elsewhere in the
White House Office (or Domestic Council staff) or in OMB. We
recommend that the research staff be eliminated.
Though the proposed reduction in staff would mean a loss in
capacity to handle some special projects, we do not believe
this will deleteriously affect the operation of this office.
This Administration has drawn heavily upon the Assistant and
his non-White House Domestic Council staff for formulation of
policy initiatives. If our recommendations for improved
policy process management are adopted, the activities of the
Domestic Council staff that this office supervises may be
significantly redefined.
Assistant to the President (Cabinet and Inter-
governmental Relations)
Authorized Staff: 12
RECOMMENDATION: Reduction of 2 positions to a staff level of
10. Delineate more clearly the role of the
Cabinet Secretary.
This unit performs two missions (1) providing staff assistance
to the Cabinet and (2) coordinating Presidential policy
initiatives to improve the Federal government's delivery of
grants and services to State and local governments. In our
view 2 positions can be eliminated from this office consistent
with these roles.
9
We recommend that the Cabinet Secretariat's mission continue
with emphasis on preparing agenda, recording Cabinet proceedings
and decisions, following up on Presidential directives delivered
during Cabinet meetings, and facilitating Presidential communica-
tion to and from this body. We recommend combining the Cabinet
routing function with the Staff Secretariat's and assigning
Cabinet group staffing for substantive policy issues to either
the Domestic or National Security staff. Cabinet memoranda for
the President would flow first through the staff secretary who
would then forward the submissions to the Cabinet Secretary.
The Cabinet Secretary would then handle the staffing and circu-
lation of such Cabinet memoranda to other Cabinet members as
appropriate.
We also recommend a clearer definition of the roles of OMB and
the Assistant to the President for Intergovernmental Relations.
Clearly, the magnitude of Federal Intergovernmental activities
cannot be managed on a day-to-day basis by a small White House
staff. Instead, the White House unit should retain responsi-
bility for (1) formulating IGR policy; (2) developing IGR
programs for Presidential consideration and (3) providing
broad policy guidance to OMB concerning the resolution of
Federal field problems. OMB would spearhead the operational
implementation of government wide IGR policy, developing and
exercising management systems to monitor progress.
Assistant to the President (Public Liaison)
Authorized Staff: 15
RECOMMENDATION: Reduction of 3 positions, to a staff of 12.
Development of stronger links with other
White House political units.
The functions of this unit have been added to the White House
in the last decade. The office attempts to serve a number of
functions: (1) provision of insight to the President and his
policy staff on the moods and attitudes of interest groups;
(2) outreach to interest groups to seek support and under-
standing for Administration policy; (3) provision to interest
groups and their constituencies of an audience in the White
House; and (4) diversion of time-demanding interest group
pressures from policy formulators to a staff more available
(and willing) to listen.
There is no optimal size for this staff, which can easily
absorb any level of personnel assigned to it. Staff reduction
of three positions will simply compel greater selectivity
regarding which interest groups obtain a White House audience.
10
The unit is most effective at drawing interest group pressures
away from other White House Office personnel, and enhancing
the Administration's image by providing visible Presidential
concern for problems of different constituencies. It has been
less effective than contemplated in garnering support for
Administration policies.
The needs of the President suggest that the unit's mission
should be redefined and be structured towards the first two
listed functions rather than the latter two. Participation in
the policy formulation process will require positive action by
policy staff in having the public liaison staff solicit
interest group viewpoints, and assuring that sufficient atten-
tion is paid to the information gained such that public liaison
is not deemed merely symbolic participation.
If better links are forged with other White House political
units and Congressional Liaison, this unit would become more
effective in seeking support for the Administration. It should
identify those interest groups most likely affected by
particular policies. Such groups should be contacted and
consulted early in the policy process, to defuse potential
opposition and to encourage public expression of sympathetic
views.
Congressional Liaison
Authorized Staff: 26
RECOMMENDATIONS: Reduction of 7 positions (5 through trans-
fer to the Administrative Operations Office
and elimination of 2), to a staff of 19.
Consideration should be given to changing
the focus of the Congressional Relations
staff to improve both political input to
policy formulation and approaches to pro-
moting the Administration's legislative
program. More flexibility should be provided
to detail other agency staff to assist in
specific initiatives.
The magnitude of new policy formulation activity of this
Administration has been at the highest level of any Presidency
since Roosevelt. Many of the policy proposals are controversial.
Common party affiliation between the President and the Congres-
sional majority has not assured consistent policy support as
the Congress has exhibited a high degree of independence. The
provision of courtesy services to Congress and the greater
11
tasks of obtaining Congressional support and intelligence
fully occupy this office that already experiences workload
problems. Hence, this staff could not be substantially reduced
without unacceptable political cost.
The recommended reduction to 19 should be achieved by:
1.
Eliminating one of four support staff serving the
four House Liaison professionals and one adminis-
trative assistant in the Projects Coordination
office. Making these changes will demand greater
operating efficiencies.
2.
Transferring the five member Visitor's Office to the
White House operating staff. This unit is already
overworked and is necessary in an open Presidency
but can be transferred and continue to work efficiently.
Although in the short run it is not possible to reduce the
size of the Congressional Relations Office substantially, it
should be possible to decrease the staff over the long run as
the incumbents become more familiar with their jobs. In this
same vein, we also recommend that agency Congressional rela-
tions staffs be asked to absorb more of the workload of legis-
lative strategy implementation.
Major assistance to this unit could be provided by implementing
a new Congressional Liaison process:
White House personnel not part of this unit who have
contact with Congressional members or staff report such
contacts to this unit; and
O
This unit should draw upon agency Congressional liaison
staffs for major legislative initiatives. In addition,
the unit should draw on OMB for aid in tracking legisla-
tion on a regular basis.
Press Office
Authorized Staff: 48
RECOMMENDATION: Reduction of 4 positions (through elimination
of 6 and transfer in of 2), to a staff of 44.
These recommended changes are:
a.
Elimination of two speech writers and one secretary.
b. Elimination of two news summary personnel.
12
C.
Elimination of one (possibly two) members of the
staff of the Special Advisor for Media and Public
Affairs.
d.
Absorption of two members of the "Messages" unit
staff, now attached to the Domestic Policy Office.
The President is the most visible of all public servants. The
media perception of the President will have an enormous impact
on his ability to govern. Both the permanent "White House
Press Corps" and the more numerous national press demand
frequent and rapid access to White House information. The
President, the Press Secretary, and their chief deputies must
all be accessible to the press frequently and be prepared to
comment upon an almost infinite range of possible topics.
Additionally, preparation of briefing materials, and response
to constant press inquiries are functions of unquestioned
importance, and require a sizable staff.
This staff also assists the President in speechwriting;
serves as a liaison with press and broadcast media when the
President is traveling and for special events; and provides
photographic staff, serving both press and historical-archival
functions.
These functions generally serve the President directly and are
necessary White House Office functions. The suggested reduc-
tion to 44 would not alter primary functions, except as follows:
a.
The Speechwriting unit with excess capacity faces no
major functional loss by eliminating two writers and
one secretary.
b.
The daily newspaper summary provides a glance at too
many periodicals rather than useful summaries of
selected significant periodicals. Reduction of
staff, encouraging a narrower focus with greater
depth on fewer publications, should increase the
effectiveness of this Unit, even in the face of
reduced capability.
C.
If the Office of Telecommunications Policy is dis-
banded, as recommended elsewhere in the EOP report,
the Office of the Special Adviser for this area in
the Press Office could be reduced, since much of its
efforts are currently devoted to "overseeing" OTP.
d.
The Messages unit, now attached to the Domestic
Policy Office, is functionally quite similar to
speechwriting but with a higher technical and lower
political content. Thus, the function may be ade-
quately carried out by two of the staff now involved,
13
under the direction of the Chief Speechwriter,
closely linking two similar functions and eliminating
one position.
The Media Adviser office has proven useful with regard to
media public outreach endeavors, and the pattern of Presidential
telecommunication appearances to date supports the utility of
a specialist in this area. However, the Media Adviser is not
always busy with such work. In addition, he also has a staff
which is far removed from outreach media advice to the President,
dealing instead with OTP. We thus question whether a separate
office in the Press Office is warranted for Media Advice. An
Adviser functioning as part of the Press Office operations
might better serve the President than one operating primarily
from one special project to the next.
Office of the First Lady
Authorized Staff: 23
RECOMMENDATION: Reduction of 3 positions to a staff of 20.
The First Lady's staff mirrors in miniature several components
of the Presidential staff: press, speechwriting, and research
assistance; scheduling, advance and close-support assistance;
and issues advice. The First Lady additionally needs a staff
to handle the ceremonial aspects of State entertainment, and
to assist with the official personal arrangements for the
entire First Family. Our analysis, however, suggest that the
following reductions can be made:
a.
Reduce Press Office staff of First Lady from eight
to six positions, and rely more upon the White House
Press Office. Some of this sub-unit is providing
administrative support to the entire unit. The
balance of this press staff provides work for the
First Lady similar to the White House Press Office,
including: press scheduling; response to press
inquiries; research and speechwriting; press releases;
and advance work.
b.
Reduce the Social Office calligrapher's staff from
four to three. The function of this office is
related to formal entertainment, and its workload is
determined by the amount of entertaining done by the
First Family. Between periods of high-intensity
work, the calligraphy staff works on relatively
routine matters. Better management and time planning
should permit spreading the calligraphic workload,
although peak demand might require contracting out
or, if possible, borrowing calligraphers.
14
A basic consideration regarding this unit is its degree of
autonomy from other White House Office units. The First
Lady's staff could be reduced below 20 by increasing depen-
dence upon White House press, issues, scheduling, advance and
support personnel.
Special Assistant to the President (Appointments,
Scheduling, and Advance)
Authorized Staff: 22
RECOMMENDATION: Reduction of 3 positions, to a staff of 19.
This unit provides immediate personal support to the President;
generally controls access to him and his time; prepares the
Presidential schedule; arranges travel plans; provides secre-
tarial, record-keeping, and archival services; and performs
other activities such as arranging for surrogate speakers for
the President and maintenance of some political contacts.
Three positions should be eliminated: a file assistant; an
administrative assistant; and a scheduling assistant. However,
because of the many and varied close support tasks performed
for the President by this unit, these reductions will have
some costs in the unit's effectivess and responsiveness,
though not significantly impairing its ability to perform its
mission.
Special Assistant to the President (Personnel)
Authorized Staff: 18
RECOMMENDATION: Reduction of 6 positions, to a staff of 12.
Limit responsibilities to Presidential needs.
The full-time 18 person staff is currently augmented by 15
detailees. However, most Presidential appointments have
already been made, allowing the detailees as well as a number
of the permanent staff to be reduced.
At the suggested staffing level, difficulty may be encountered
in responding as effectively to all current demands made upon
the office. Personal responses to all correspondence would
not be feasible, and much of the incoming telephone traffic
would have to be referred to agencies, the Civil Service
Commission, or the White House Comments Office. It will also
be necessary to cut back on utilization of the "skills bank.'
Affirmative action practices now require maintenance of files
to enable identification of qualified minority candidates for
Presidential appointed positions. Even though most jobs have
15
been filled, the file and data banks must be maintained to
service future needs. However, the existence of this capacity
prompts requests for its use in filling non-Presidential
positions. Both of these functions could be transferred to a
centralized EOP administrative unit.
This office should primarily focus upon identifying and recom-
mending candidates for Presidential appointments. We do not
dispute the necessity for providing courtesy services for
certain job referrals, and assisting agencies in identifying
qualified candidates for non-political positions--but they do
not justify substantial staff commitments. It is likely that
the existence of these capabilities encourages demand for
them. A clear statement that "this office fills jobs for the
President" should reduce that demand by emphasizing the limited
role of the office.
16
Units to be Transferred Out of White House
Assistant to the President (Energy)
Authorized Staff: 2
RECOMMENDATION: Transfer the function to the new Energy
Department, eliminating 2 positions.
Establishment of the Energy Department will eliminate the
requirement for this function in the White House Office.
Special Assistant to the President (Budget and
Organization)
Authorized Staff: 2
RECOMMENDATION: Abolish this Office within six months,
realigning workload within Administrative
Operations.
If recommendations presented in the EOP reorganization report
are accepted, the current activities of this unit will be
performed by the White House Administrative Unit.
Special Assistant to the President (Drug Abuse)
Authorized Staff: 1
RECOMMENDATION: Transfer the function and staff to the Office
of Drug Abuse Policy in the EOP.
The Special Assistant for Drug Abuse is, in fact, the head of
the Office of Drug Abuse Policy (ODAP) in the Executive Office
of the President. His organizational placement should reflect
that arrangement. If the President decides to retain ODAP,
the special assistant should be transferred to that unit, retain-
ing his responsibilities for health advice and oversight of the
White House Fellows program.
If the President should decide to abolish ODAP, as we recommend,
the Special Assistant and two staff assistants should remain
in the White House Office.
Intelligence Oversight Board
Authorized Staff: 1
RECOMMENDATION: Transfer IOB as an independent entity to the
EOP.
17
We recommend placing an expanded IOB in the EOP and removing
the staff director from the White House staff. The study
team is aware, however, that the current IOB members feel the
placement of that staff in a separate EOP unit could compro-
mise IOB's mission. If the President wishes to retain the
unit with its current mission and staff size, the unit's one
full-time staff member could remain on the White House
political/professional payroll.
18
Units With No Staff Reductions
Staff Secretary
Authorized Staff: 3
RECOMMENDATION: No change in authorized positions.
Reduction of one temporary staff member should be possible
within 60 days upon the completion of the Nixon materials
custodial work.
This unit serves the essential function of paper-flow control
within the White House Office. It has some excess capacity in
that its peak requirements occur only when the President is
working at the White House.
This unit operates efficiently and should assume the paper-
routing function of the Cabinet Secretariat. The Staff
Secretary should be the initial point of entry for all
Cabinet communications. The Cabinet Secretary would assure
the circulation of and reactions to Cabinet submissions once
forwarded to him by the Staff Secretary. However, if the
President chooses to augment current policy processes with the
study team's recommended Policy Staff Management System,
issues of Presidential importance should reach the Staff
Secretary at the earliest possible point. For this reason,
the study team believes that consolidation of the Cabinet
Secretary circulation would be advantageous. Consolidation
would assure early senior staff awareness of issues, and would
facilitate a better monitoring of paper flows in the policy
formulation process.
Assistant to the President (Reorganization)
Authorized Staff: 2
RECOMMENDATION: No change.
This unit was only recently created and was not included in
this study. It exemplifies placement in the White House of
single-issue units which logically could be located else-
where (e.g., OMB-Reorganization), but are placed in the
White House to provide special emphasis for and during a major
Presidential initiative.
19
Assistant to the President (National Security)
Authorized Staff: 2
RECOMMENDATION: No change.
The need for foreign policy advice has been firmly established
by both custom and current practices. The Adviser's role as
head of the NSC staff insures the Presidential perspective
in the development of policy.
Special Assistant to the President (Administration)
Authorized Staff: 2
RECOMMENDATION: No change.
Special Assistant to the President (Ombudsman)
Authorized Staff: 2
RECOMMENDATION: See below. *
This unit carries out special assignments primarily related
to the poor, and advises the President regarding Hispanic
interest groups and their reactions to Presidential initia-
tives. The work of this unit should be closely linked to
other White House political units to improve overall political
input to policy formulation.
Special Assistant to the President (D.C. Liaison)
Authorized Staff: 2
RECOMMENDATION: See below. *
This unit reports Black American sentiment on Administration
policy and program options, and coordinates DC/Federal/
Congressional relationships.
Director of White House Projects
Authorized Staff: 2
RECOMMENDATION: See below. *
This adviser provides an ad hoc special projects capacity
which is perceived as valuable but not currently well focused.
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*RECOMMENDATION: No change is recommended in the staffing
level of these three offices. We do find, however, that they
constitute a pool of under-utilized, poorly-coordinated
special projects capacity. Such capacity is desirable in the
White House, but is currently scattered in the Counsel's
Office; Domestic Policy Adviser (and D. C. staff) Office;
Cabinet Secretary/IGR Office; Political Coordination Office;
and the three Special Assistant Offices listed directly above.
Thus dispersed, the capacity appears redundant and poorly
directed. It tends to self-generate projects to justify its
own existence.
We recommend that each of these three units be attached to one
of the major WHO units supervised by an Assistant to the
President to insure better accountability and coordination.