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SECRET
2
II. Power Centers
There are three centers of power on the hostage issue: :
the students, on the compound, Khomeini and his immediate
entourage, and the Revolutionary Council. A fourth center
of influence is the Iranian street people, but we conclude
that they can be manipulated by Khomeini to a very large
extent.
- - The weakest of the three powers is the Revolutionary
Council. The Council, however, is the only group with
which we can hope to conduct a rational dialogue.
-- Our strategy has been to persuade the Revolutionary
Council that the release of the hostages serves Iran's
interests and to rely on the Council to persuade Khomeini
of the same.
-- Although there is debate on the willingness of the
students to alter their position, we believe they will follow
Khomeini's direction. Not to do so will put them in opposition
not only with the leader of the Revolution but with his
millions of followers in Iran's streets. Refusal to heed
Khomeini's direction could quickly become intolerable for
the students unless they were bent on suicide. There is no
indication in their rhetoric that that is the case.
-- Unless direct channels to Khomeini are opened up --
and there seems no prospect' of that -- we must persist in
dealing with the Revolutionary Council while using the media
available to us to soften up the Iranian public for a change
in Iran's policy.
SECRET
Document source description
This document is a December 12, 1979 Department of State-originated assessment of U.S. policy in the Iranian crisis.
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"ocrText": "SECRET\n2\nII. Power Centers\nThere are three centers of power on the hostage issue: :\nthe students, on the compound, Khomeini and his immediate\nentourage, and the Revolutionary Council. A fourth center\nof influence is the Iranian street people, but we conclude\nthat they can be manipulated by Khomeini to a very large\nextent.\n- - The weakest of the three powers is the Revolutionary\nCouncil. The Council, however, is the only group with\nwhich we can hope to conduct a rational dialogue.\n-- Our strategy has been to persuade the Revolutionary\nCouncil that the release of the hostages serves Iran's\ninterests and to rely on the Council to persuade Khomeini\nof the same.\n-- Although there is debate on the willingness of the\nstudents to alter their position, we believe they will follow\nKhomeini's direction. Not to do so will put them in opposition\nnot only with the leader of the Revolution but with his\nmillions of followers in Iran's streets. Refusal to heed\nKhomeini's direction could quickly become intolerable for\nthe students unless they were bent on suicide. There is no\nindication in their rhetoric that that is the case.\n-- Unless direct channels to Khomeini are opened up --\nand there seems no prospect' of that -- we must persist in\ndealing with the Revolutionary Council while using the media\navailable to us to soften up the Iranian public for a change\nin Iran's policy.\nSECRET"
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