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GECRET/SENSITIVE
NOFORN/NOCONTRACT/ORCON
--Muslim and Third World solidarity with Iran deters
open support for the US out of concern that such
(support might provoke a domestic backlash.
--US support for Israel and the Camp David peace
process saps Arab goodwill toward the US.
-Arab concern that military moves against Iran
would be a precedent for superpower interven-
tion in the oil states.
The positive factors listed might still constitute
a
basis for accepting a quick, military strike that ends
the crisis by rescuing the hostages. Many Arab leaders
would quietly breathe a sigh of relief that the hostage
drama was over. If mining or bombing attacks did not
achieve this, they might well lead to a protracted mil-
itary confrontation during which support for the US would
erode.
Within any given Arab country, the intensity of
opposition to a US military move would grow as one moves
from the official level to the popular level. The longer
the military action lasts, the more support for the US
will dissipate.
Radical Arab States
Libya would support a call by Iran to use the oil
weapon against the US and might even take some action
unilaterally. Algeria might give rhetorical support but
is less likely to actually comply in the absence of sup-
port from producers other than Libya. Other Arab radicals
including syria and the Palestine Liberation Organization--
who enjoy good relations with Iran--will certainly condemn
the US and urge other Arabs to embargo oil.
Iraq
Although Baghdad has its own serious problems with
Iran, the Iragis would view a US blockade as another dan-
gerous step in superpower meddling in the Gulf. Moreover,
Baghdad would be constrained by fear of unrest among the
Shia--55 percent of Irag's population--who already are
agitating against Irag's anti-Khomeini stand.
Despite these negative attitudes, we would not expect
Iraq to interfere directly with mining or join an oil embargo.
2
-SECRET
Document source description
This document is an April 21, 1980 memorandum regarding the Probable Arab and Soviet Reactions to Possible US Military Moves Against Iran (Mining and Bombing.)
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Document data
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DTO data
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Context sent to Scholar
Document identity
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"ocrText": "GECRET/SENSITIVE\nNOFORN/NOCONTRACT/ORCON\n--Muslim and Third World solidarity with Iran deters\nopen support for the US out of concern that such\n(support might provoke a domestic backlash.\n--US support for Israel and the Camp David peace\nprocess saps Arab goodwill toward the US.\n-Arab concern that military moves against Iran\nwould be a precedent for superpower interven-\ntion in the oil states.\nThe positive factors listed might still constitute\na\nbasis for accepting a quick, military strike that ends\nthe crisis by rescuing the hostages. Many Arab leaders\nwould quietly breathe a sigh of relief that the hostage\ndrama was over. If mining or bombing attacks did not\nachieve this, they might well lead to a protracted mil-\nitary confrontation during which support for the US would\nerode.\nWithin any given Arab country, the intensity of\nopposition to a US military move would grow as one moves\nfrom the official level to the popular level. The longer\nthe military action lasts, the more support for the US\nwill dissipate.\nRadical Arab States\nLibya would support a call by Iran to use the oil\nweapon against the US and might even take some action\nunilaterally. Algeria might give rhetorical support but\nis less likely to actually comply in the absence of sup-\nport from producers other than Libya. Other Arab radicals\nincluding syria and the Palestine Liberation Organization--\nwho enjoy good relations with Iran--will certainly condemn\nthe US and urge other Arabs to embargo oil.\nIraq\nAlthough Baghdad has its own serious problems with\nIran, the Iragis would view a US blockade as another dan-\ngerous step in superpower meddling in the Gulf. Moreover,\nBaghdad would be constrained by fear of unrest among the\nShia--55 percent of Irag's population--who already are\nagitating against Irag's anti-Khomeini stand.\nDespite these negative attitudes, we would not expect\nIraq to interfere directly with mining or join an oil embargo.\n2\n-SECRET"
}