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Confidential File, 11/76-1/77
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Confidential File, 11/76-1/77
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Records of the Office of the Staff Secretary
1976 Campaign Transition File
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China
U.S. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations. (12/10/1816 - )
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Confidential File, 11/76-1/77
Folder Citation: Collection: Office of Staff Secretary; Series: 1976 Campaign Transition File;
Folder: Confidential File, 11/76-1/77; Container 1
To See Complete Finding Aid:
http://www.jimmycarterlibrary.gov/library/findingaids/Staff_Secretary.pdf
WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)
FORM OF
DOCUMENT
CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE
DATE
RESTRICTION
Note
Vance to Carter, w/attachments, 4 PP.
n.d.
A
Memo
Watson, et al. to Carter, w/attachments, 45 PP.
Re: USSR
11/10/76
A
Letter
Carter to Mansfield (USS), w/attachments, 61 PP.
Re: China OPENED 6/14/99
11/14/76
of
A
Letter
Owen to Lake, w/attachments, 5 PP.
Re: Foreign Policy Issues
11/16/76
A
Note
Re: Foreign Policy Issues, w/attachment, 24 PP.
[11/16/76]
A
Memo
Valenti to Carter, 5 pp.
Re: Philippines
OPENED 12/6/17
11/29/76
A
Memo
Holbrooke to Carter, 12 pp.
Re: Foreign Policy Issues
[11/30/76]
A
Memo
Eizenstat to Carter, 3 PP. OPENED 12/6/17
Re: Cubs
12/9/76
A
Memo
Re: USSR OPENED 12/6/12
Eizenstat to Vance, 4 PP
12/9/76
A
OPENIED, 12/6/12
Memo
Brzezinski (NSC) to Carter, w/attachments, 5 pp.
1/11/77
A
Memo
Sorenson to Carter, 8 PP OPENCES 12/6/12
Re: VAried National Security Issues
1/13/77
A
FILE LOCATION
Carter Presidential Papers, Staff Offices, Office of STaff Secretary, Pre-Presidential Handwriting
Transition File, Confidential File, 11/76-1/77
Box 1
RESTRICTION CODES
(A) Closed by Executive Order 12356 governing access to national security information.
(B) Closed by statute or by the agency which originated the document.
(C) Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in the donor's deed of gift.
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
NA FORM 1429 (6-85)
PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL
sent To cc: Zbig Ted
Griffin
January 13, 1977
MEMORANDUM FOR: The President-Elect
FROM:
The Director-Designate
of Central Intelligence
It would be useful to obtain at the start of the new
Administration your thinking on the following points, which
are based on my own thinking and inquiries thus far.
I. Short-Range
1. Briefings. As you recall, direct and continuous access
to the President was one of my conditions for accepting
this assignment, and the frequency and certainty of such
access also affect Intelligence Community morale. I
recommend:
A. That the National Security Council adopt the
approach used in the Eisenhower-Kennedy days
of commencing each NSC session with a short
intelligence briefing by the DCI on the
specific topic or topics on that day's agenda
and, if appropriate, the world scene in general;
APPROVE :
COMMENT: puttlomment from this
DISAPPROVE:
B. That, in addition to NSC, ad hoc and emergency
or crisis meetings (as well as telephone calls),
your schedule include a fixed hour and day of the
week for a meeting with me to review: (i) the
most recent and important intelligence develop-
ments and estimates, and (ii) any major policy
decisions or controversies involving the Intelligence
Community. You should decide the length and
frequency of such meetings--I suggest a 30 minute
meeting once a week, with the understanding that
I will call it off if there is nothing sufficiently
DECLASSISED
important to justify it.
Per; Rac Project
APPROVE :
ESDN: NLC- 126-1-1-1-9
COMMENT:
BY a USA ME 11/29/12
DISAPPROVE:
PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL
C.
NOTE: A CIA briefing officer will bring you
your daily report (The President's Daily Brief),
except on those occasions that either you or I
prefer me to do it personally. It should be
understood throughout the Administration that
the daily flow of current foreign intelligence
is to be through the DCI, with other officials
contributing and dissenting as they see fit,
and Zbig adding material from his own office
as appropriate.
2. Personnel.
A.
As the fifth DCI in little more than four years,
I am inheriting an agency that has already
experienced a series of reorganizations, reductions
in force, reshuffling of personnel and other dis-
ruptions, to say nothing of attacks. A period of
calm stability would be desirable. The Deputy DCI,
a Presidential appointee, is a career man of
considerable ability, well regarded throughout
the Community and in Congress. Like the rest of
the other Deputies reporting to me, he is
relatively new on the job, and I recommend that
no change be made in any of these top positions
at this time.
APPROVE :
COMMENT:
DISAPPROVE:
B. I understand your staff has requested pro forma
letters of resignation from each member of the
President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board.
This could be a moderately useful organization for
you, but its present membership badly needs a
wholesale reshuffle to produce a younger, less
ideologically rigid group, including some minorities,
some women, perhaps even some responsible critics
of the intelligence process, with a few carry-overs
from the present Board. I recommend that Zbig,
Hamilton and I be directed by you to provide
promptly a list of suggested new PFIAB members.
APPROVE :
COMMENT:
DISAPPROVE:
2
PERSONAL AND-CONFIDENTIAL
C. NOTE: Adoption of the Peterson Commission
recommendations would be immensely helpful to
me in trying to attract the best minds available
for intelligence analysis and other duties and
particularly in trying to retain those senior
career employees whose compensation has not
for many years reflected either the scope of
their responsibilities (compared to their
subordinates) or the ravages of inflation.
3. Organization and Authorization.
A. The Committee on Foreign Intelligence is a
subcommittee of the NSC established by Executive
Order 11905 (chaired by the DCI and composed in
addition of representatives from Defense and
your National Security Affairs Assistant's office)
to direct the Intelligence Community as a whole
(budgets, priorities, etc.). Although the
Executive Order is not flawless, it was the product
of long study and, more importantly, it is the
foundation of the entire Intelligence Community
structure and precedents and could not be
abolished without creating a chaotic vacuum.
I recommend:
-- that your directive on NSC Committees, in
accordance with Zbig's memorandum of December 30,
1976, make it clear that the new Policy Review
Committee, when chaired by the DCI at your
direction, will be in effect sitting as and
performing the functions of the present CFI
under the Executive Order;
bu + first
APPROVE :
COMMENT: Comment from 56.5
DISAPPROVE:
-- that such Committee, with State Department
representation as well, promptly review the
FY '78 Budget and Program for all national foreign
intelligence activities other than tactical
military intelligence;
APPROVE :
COMMENT:
DISAPPROVE:
3
PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL
-- that the Operations Advisory Group, another
NSC committee created by the same Executive
Order to review clandestine activities, likewise
continue as one incarnation of the new Special
Coordinating Committee, at least until a longer-
range study of appropriate structure can be
undertaken; and
APPROVE :
COMMENT: after Comment for Zbig
DISAPPROVE:
a
-- that such Committee, with Justice and State
Department representation as well, promptly
review all ongoing and proposed covert action
operations and sensitive foreign intelligence
collection activities.
APPROVE :
COMMENT:
DISAPPROVE:
B.
DCI Bush has arranged for his Intelligence Community
Staff, the support for his coordinating role, to be
moved out of the CIA Headquarters in Langley into
D.C. in March, as visible proof of his impartiality
in and concern for that role as distinct from his
CIA role. Congress approved the idea and funds.
I recommend that it proceed.
APPROVE :
COMMENT: don't initiate move
DISAPPROVE:
before detailed discussion withme
C. To provide the written Presidential authorization
desirable, I recommend that you, at the earliest
opportunity:
-- direct me, the Attorney General, and the
appropriate member of your White House staff to
prepare for your signature a letter spelling out
the terms and conditions for any warrantless
electronic surveillance (similar to President
Ford's letter of December 1974); and
APPROVE :
COMMENT: Prepare draft
DISAPPROVE:
with help of Policy group
4
PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL
-- direct Zbig and me to prepare for your
signature a letter to me spelling out, as
previous Presidents have done, the basic roles,
responsibilities and relationships of your DCI.
APPROVE :
COMMENT:
DISAPPROVE:
D. I further recommend that you schedule early in
the year a brief talk or talks to the employees
of CIA and other elements of the Intelligence
Community.
APPROVE :
COMMENT:
DISAPPROVE:
4. Legislation. Only two items are of immediate concern in this
area. I recommend:
A. That you informally urge the House Leadership to
create a Select Committee on Intelligence comparable
to that of the Senate in order to reduce the number
of committees with oversight jurisdiction; and
APPROVE :
COMMENT:
DISAPPROVE:
B. That the appropriate White House aide promptly obtain
a consensus of views from the Attorney General and
me concerning the electronic surveillance legislation
about to be reintroduced.
APPROVED :
COMMENT: Sizenstat
DISAPPROVED:
II. Long-Range
Over a longer period of time, I recommend you approve my
exploration of the following general areas (no final conclusions
are required or recommended at this time):
1. Revisions of Executive Order 11905, including increased CFI
direction of NSA and NRO, and their greater use for political
and economic intelligence.
APPROVE :
COMMENT:
DISAPPROVE:
5
PERSONAL AND-CONFIDENTIAL
2. Formulation of a public Presidential policy statement. on
intelligence, stating openly what a great power must do
and must not do, the extent to which secrecy is required,
and the rationale and nature of permissible covert operations,
etc.
APPROVE :
COMMENT:
DISAPPROVE:
-- This could include an examination of the extent to which
the conclusions of major intelligence estimates, without
disclosing sources and methods, could be made public.
APPROVE :
COMMENT:
DISAPPROVE:
-- It would also include an examination of whether para-
military operation capabilities belong in CIA or Defense.
APPROVE :
COMMENT:
DISAPPROVE:
-- It would also include a review as to whether rough budget
totals for national foreign intelligence activity could be
made public.
APPROVE :
COMMENT:
DISAPPROVE:
3. Reexamination with the Attorney General of all relationships
between or jointly involving our respective shops, including
possible new laws and regulations regarding prosecutions for
espionage and other offenses requiring the use of classified
documents in court; guidelines and regulations on electronic
surveillance; coordination on counter-espionage; and other
matters.
APPROVE :
COMMENT:
DISAPPROVE:
6
PERSONAL AND -CONFIDENTIAL
4. Formulation with Congress of a statutory charter for CIA
and the DCI in accordance with all of the above.
APPROVE :
COMMENT:
DISAPPROVE:
Theodore C. Sorensen
7
FOR COMMCENTER USE ONLY
IMM
CONFIDENTIAL
PRECEDENCE
CLASSIFICATION
DEX
FROM:
Maxie Wells, Plains
DAC 127
GPS
TO:
The Honorable Ted Sorensen
LDX
PAGES Q7
CC: Zbigniew Brzezinski
Griffin Bell
TTY
CITE
"Gouto 35"
INFO:
DTG: 152055 TAN7? 2055 z
)
RELEASED BY:
TOR: 1521257
SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS:
Governor Carter's comments read as follows:
pg.1/1.A. Approve and "but first comment from Zbig"
1.B. Approve
pg.2/2.A. Approve
2.B. Approve
pg.3/3.A. Approve and "but first comment from Zbig"
Approve
pg.4/
Approve and "after comment from Zbig"
instead of " -- that such Committee," should read
" -- that a Committee,"
Approve
3.B. Approve and "don't initiate move before detailed dis-
cussion with me"
3.C. Approve and "prepare draft with help of Policy group"
pg.5/
Approve
3.D. Approve
4.A. Approve
4.B. Approve and "Eizenstat"
II. 1. Approve
pg.6/
2. Approve
Approve
Approve
Approve
3. Approve
4. Approve
WHCA FORM 8, 22 FEB 74
MEMORANDUM
C
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
SECRET (GDS)
January 11, 1977
MEMORANDUM FOR:
THE PRESIDENT-ELECT
FROM:
ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI
из
SUBJECT:
Phone Calls to Foreign Leaders
Here is your schedule of phone calls to foreign leaders:
January 12
Prime Minister Fukuda
8:30 p.m.
January 13
Chancellor Schmidt
12-12:30 p.m.
January 13
Prime Minister Callaghan
12-12:30 p.m.
January 13
President Giscard
1-2:00 p.m.
Here is where we currently stand on preparing the phone calls:
1. Prime Minister Fukuda will be ready to receive the call on
January 12 between 8:30 and 9:00 p.m. Washington time. Fukuda
will have someone (Yamazaki) do a consecutive translation. The
Japanese Embassy has cautioned us that the telephone line might
be tapped (by unidentified persons) so that nothing sensitive should
be mentioned in this conversation.
2. Prime Minister Callaghan will be ready to receive the call
on January 13 between 12 noon and 12:30 p.m. Washington time.
He will receive the call through the 10 Downing Street switchboard.
3. Chancellor Schmidt will be ready to receive the call on
January 13 between 12 noon and 12:30 p.m. Washington time.
Schmidt will not use a translator and will speak in English.
4. President Giscard d'Estaing will receive the call on January
13 between 1:30 and 2:00 p.m. Washington time. Giscard will not use
a translator and will speak in English.
SECRET (GDS)
DECLASCIFIED
Per: Rac Project
ESDN; NLC- 11/29/12
BY.
C
MARA
ME
CONFIDENTIAL
President Giscard d'Estaing
-- Look forward to seeing him in 1977.
-- (If possible) Inform on a confidential basis the broad
outlines of the economic stimulus package being planned.
- - Express appreciation for Giscard's invitation to discuss
the possibility of holding a Western economic summit early in the
first quarter of 1977. Explain that you are not in a position to reply
officially to the invitation before January 20, but that the questions
will be closely studied. Ask whether Giscard plans to sound out
other Western heads of government. Express general hope that
Jenkins as President of the European Commission could be somehow
involved.
- - Ask for Giscard's views on CIEC.
-- - If you wish you might say that you recall his speech of
October 1975 on North-South relations [Brzezinski gave it to you
to read in late 1975]
Mondale
CONF IDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
Chancellor Schmidt
-- Look forward to seeing him in 1977.
-- (If possible) Inform Schmidt on a confidential basis
of the broad outlines of the economic stimulus package being planned.
-- Ask Schmidt how he views the impact of the recent OPEC
oil price increases on the economics of Western Europe -- whether he
favors the economic summit that is being proposed for early in 1977.
-- Tell him you hope to exchange views on East-West relations
and NATO.
Mondele
My visit to Bonn
CONFIDENTIAL
CONEIDENTIAL
Prime Minister Callaghan
-- Look forward to seeing Callaghan after the Inauguration
and would hope to set a date for a meeting in Washington in early
1977.
-- (If possible) Inform Callaghan on a confidential basis of
the broad outlines of the economic stimulus package being planned.
-- Express pleasure at progress made in securing IMF loan
for the UK. Ask whether economic sacrifices Callaghan has asked
of the British people will be accepted by most of them.
- - Express interest in having close consultations with the
British Government on matters of interest to the U.S. and European
Community (EC) during the British presidency of the EC (for six
months from January 1, 1977).
-- Mention that Ivor Richards (British Representative at
the UN) had made useful contact with the incoming administration
on December 22. [Richards gave the reasons for London wanting
to play a greater direct role in the Rhodesian peace process. ]
While not in a position to make a public endorsement of the British
proposal, express understanding for the strategy being advocated
by London.
Mondale
CONFIDENTIAL
CARTER - MONDALE
TRANSITION PLANNING GROUP
P.O. Box 2600
Washington, D.C. Confidential 20013
JC
MEMORANDUM - December 9, 1976
TO:
Secretary of State Designate Cyrus Vance
FROM:
Stu Eizenstat
RE:
Conversation With Vanik
At your request, after our recent telephone conversation,
I am summarizing for you the substance of the conversation
Congressman Vanik had with Ambassador Dobrynin, the substance
of which I have previously communicated to Governor Carter,
and which he in turn asked me to communicate to you.
Governor Carter suggested that you call Congressman Vanik if
you felt it was worthwhile pursuing this, which it seems to
me it is.
Congressman Vanik had dinner and lengthy conversation
thereafter on or about December 2 or 3, 1976. The following
are the elements of that conversation:
1. Congressman Vanik suggested that he would like to see
an end to the impasse brought about on the matter of
East-West trade by the Jackson-Vanik Amendment, which
he sponsored. He suggested to Ambassador Dobrynin that
with the right "climate" on immigration, a President
could recommend under the Jackson-Vanik Amendment
that there be a waiver of its requirements, and that
DECLASSIRED
Per; Rac Project
ESDN; NLC- 1-126-1-2-7
BY
NARA
DATE
11/29/12
-2-
he would like to see a 2-year East-West trade pact
signed if such a proper climate could be established.
Congressman Vanik said that such a climate could be
shown by:
(a) An end to harrassment to those who apply for
emigration visas;
(b) an increase in the rate of emigration;
(c) the Soviet Union should review its requests for
reunification of families and take positive
action;
(d) movement by the Soviet Union, long-term, hard-core
emigration cases.
Ambassador Dobrynin indicated to Congressman Vanik
that he would recommend compliance with all but
sub-paragraph (b), the increase in the rate of emigration,
which he said would be difficult to do because of a drop
in applications. Ambassador Dobrynin said that he would
recommend to the leadership in the Soviet Union that
such an appropriate climate be created. However, he
stated that he was very much against a 2-year trade
agreement since it was putting the Soviet Union on
"probation". He stated that the United States had to
treat the Soviet Union as an equal. He stated that he
had no objection to allowing the agreement to be
written as an open-ended one which could be terminated
at will be either party.
-3-
2. Ambassador Dobrynin told Congressman Vanik he
wanted to form a partnership with the United States
on energy development. He stressed the importance
of the Soviet oil in Siberia and stated that the
Soviet Union would be willing to proceed in much
the same way that American companies proceed in the
Middle East, with sales being made to private
companies.
He stated that credits could be extended to the Soviet
Union to permit energy development with adequate
security being given in the form of the energy
resources themselves. He reminded Congressman Vanik
that there had been no default by the Soviet Union
in its obligations and also indicated that in return
for such a partnership Russia would begin payments on
its Lend-Lease obligations.
3. With regard to SALT, Ambassador Dobrynin stated that
the United States had superiority in MIRV's and in
"nuclear application". Nevertheless, he stated that
Russia was willing to a freeze at current levels
on "practically everything."
-4-
4.
Ambassador Dobrynin told Congressman Vanik that it
would be regrettable if the United States went
ahead with the B-1 program, because the Soviet Union
would then be forced to make a similar move in terms
of a new manned bomber.
5. Ambassador Dobrynin stressed that he hoped the
concentration that the new Administration would have
to give to domestic affairs would not take its
attention away from the matters discussed above.
He stressed that improved East-West trade could help
our domestic economy and reminded Congressman Vanik
that diplomatic successes were more dramatic than
domestic ones and/or easier to obtain in the first
years of an Administration rather than later.
I might add that Governor Carter said you should use your
discretion as to whether to advise Secretary Kissinger of this
conversation.
CC: Governor Carter
CARTER - MONDALE
TRANSITION PLANNING GROUP
Confitured
P.O. Box 2600
Washington, D.C. 20013
Sta-
MEMORANDUM - December 9, 1976
Let handle Vance
TO:
Governor Carter
J
FROM:
Stu Eizenstat Son
RE:
Frank Mankiewicz - Cuban Visit
Frank Mankiewicz came by to see me on December 8, 1976
and on a very confidential basis mentioned the following:
In 1974 and 1975 he had visited Cuba for television
interviews for an American television network. He
was used by Secretary Kissinger to communicate
messages to and from Fidel Castro. This role has
been a continuing one since that time.
Mankiewicz has indicated that Castro wishes to
communicate certain things to you, including the Cuban
attitude on the Hijacking Treaty, as to which they have
given the six month notice of termination, which will
expire around the middle of April.
He has indicated that he wants to negotiate on the
Hijacking Treaty, on an end to the American blockade,
and on payments by Cuba to the United States for
compensation for exappropriated property, as well as on
visits by families which have been split since the
DECLASCINED
Revolution.
Per; Rac Project
ESDN: NLC- 126-1-1-3-6
BY a NARA DATE 11/75/12
-2-
He is also concerned, according to Mr. Mankiewicz,
with the fact that the JFK assassination investigation
may impair the possibility of movement. According to
Mr. Mankiewicz, Castro believes the CIA is attempting
to establish evidence that he had something to do with
Kennedy's murder, which he staunchly denies.
Mr. Mankiewicz has been asked by Playboy Magazine to
do an interview with Mr. Castro and would likely go in
three or four weeks.
If you have any message for Mr. Castro, he would
communicate it. Likewise, he stated that even if you
did not have a message he would see Castro and be glad
to relay a message from him to you, if you had no
objection.
He also mentioned that Castro indicated that Cuba
fomented no insurgency against any Latin American country
with which it had diplomatic relations.
I would appreciate your thoughts on this matter.
CC: Secretary of State Designate Cyrus Vance
IMMEDIATE
CONFIDENTIAL/EEO
FOR COMMCENTER USE ONLY
PRECEDENCE
CLASSIFICATION
DEX
FROM:
Maxie Wells, Plains
DAC 057
GPS
TO:
LDX
PAGES 2
Stuart Eizenstat
TTY
CITE
INFO:
DTG: 1518352
RELEASED BY:
TOR: 1519487 DEC 76
DeB
SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS:
Stu:
JC has also seen CC of your memo to Vance about
the Vanik conversation. I've filed it in my
confidential file.
Maxie
WHCA FORM 8, 22 FEB 74
MOTION PICTURE ASSOCIATION
OF AMERICA, INC.
Confidential
C
1600 EYE STREET, NORTHWEST
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20006
JACK VALENTI
PRESIDENT
November 29, 1976
MEMORANDUM TO: President-elect Jimmy Carter
FROM:
Jack Valenti Januarn
I have just returned from a two week trip to the Far East
(Scuth Korea, Singapore, Japan, Indonesia and the Phillippines).
This confidential memo concerns the Phillippines.
For three days I was the personal guest of President Marcos
in the presidential palace. Mrs. Marcos was in Libya and Europe
and thus, the President and I had unusual opportunity to talk privately
for many hours. I had no film business to conduct; this was simply
the refreshening of an old friendship that began when I was
President Johnson's representative to Marcos' inaugural in December,
1965. At that time I was greatly impressed with Marcos and so
reported to LBJ that I viewed Marcos as the singularly preeminent
Asian leader of the future. From that time forward we have been
friends. He trusts me.
Therefore I want to report to you the sum of what we talked
about -- as well as some of my own views about The Phillippines.
MARCOS' VIEWS:
He believes that Vietnam (and Indochina) is the cause of anxiety
among Asian nations. There is no clear picture yet of what Vietnam
intends to do with the huge cache of arms it recovered from the South.
M-16's have turned up in the Malaysian guerrilla fighting as well as
in the Phillippines.
DECLASSIFIED
Per; Rac Project
ESDN: NLC- 126-1-1-4-5
BY C NA84 DATE 11/29/12
- 2 -
Marcos is worried lest the U.S. misunderstand the Phillippines'
position. He believes the Phillippines must eventually rely on their
own capabilities, at present inadequate, but nonetheless the single
important element in their future.
His policy, publicly stated, and privately strongly held, is that
no foreign troops (here, read U.S. troops) would be allowed to help
him in the event of massive infiltration into the Phillippines from out-
side sources.
Marcos must be ready to meet this threat which he holds to
be real. He is trying diplomatically to neutralize Libya, which has
supplied the Huks for some time now, and Mrs. Marcos' trip to visit
Col. Khadaffi seems to have borne some slight fruit; a conference on
December 16 may spell out some details of how successful this foray
was.
He knows that in any crisis in the Phillippines the U.S. would
not get involved, or surely would be hesitant to do SO. He understands
this and that is why he has stated his policy of no foreign troop help;
that is, he would neither ask for nor accept American personnel to
be involved. But he does need American understanding and help now
while he prepares for whatever the future may hold.
This is why he believes the 1946 MacArthur-type base treaty
must be refurbished. The basic plan is now intact as a result of long
negotiations with Ambassador Bill Sullivan, and needs only the details
to be worked out. Under this plan the military units of the U.S. at
Subic Bay and Clark Field would have all the necessary integrity of
command so they can operate as an integrated unit. If the policy of
the U.S., in the event of a crisis, is to retreat from the Phillippines,
the Marcos military units must be fully prepared to take over.
What is important to Marcos is that not just the Phillippines,
but Southeast Asia be capable of handling problems on their own. If
Japan should re-arm (and Marcos believes this is no more than five
years away) there needs to be a "balance" in the Pacific to keep the
scales from tilting.
- 3 -
Marcos would feel uneasy if the American presence was absent
from this area. The 7th Fleet needs to be visible in the Indian Ocean
and the South China Sea. Nature and politics abhor vacuums and where
one exists, a new force will inhabit it.
In short, Marcos believes the U.S. presence, based in the
Phillippines, is the linchpin of stability in the area else the Asian
Pacific be taken over by maurading wolves.
He muses, plaintively, that the Soviets arm without stint, their
surrogates, but the U.S. with the exception of South Korea and Israel,
does not do SO. He muses about this not in a querulous manner, but
rather sadly.
The time is rapidly approaching when the U.S. must take a
hard-headed attitude. The U.S., he knows, will not get involved in
another Vietnam but he thinks President Carter must have a fresh,
accurate accounting of what is now the situation in Southeast Asia and
the Asian Pacific -- good solid information.
From this information, President Carter would understand why
Marcos is worried about Thailand, Malaysia, and Singapore. He is
anxious that it may appear to the world that the U.S. has a slackening
of interest in Southeast Asia and no stomach for trying to keep that
area stable.
To Marcos, Vietnam is the question mark. He is normalizing
relations with Vietnam and through this channel of communications he
is learning of the arrogance of new, recently-promoted Vietnam leaders.
They brag they have whipped the most powerful military force in the
world and therefrom have designed some large notions of their own
invulnerability.
Marcos has no anxieties about the Peoples Republic of China.
He frets over Vietnam and the Soviet Union.
So it is that the new treaty being negotiated is SO important. He
is very eager to have President Carter understand the treaty, support
and defend it. It is Marcos' understanding that key members of Congress
have already been informed of the essential elements of the treaty and
approve it. The key refurbished element is the tying together of military
assistance, the bases and mutual defense policy under one canopy.
- 4 -
MY OWN VIEWS, for whatever they are worth:
There is what I would call a "liberal Democratic" opposition
to Marcos -- his invocation of martial law, some jailings without
due process, a screen over the press, etc. These give the purists
a case of the shingles. But I just don't know how we conduct our
foreign policy if our allies must all be USA-type democracies. (I
am reminded of Seneca's classic message to Caligula: "No one of
us is without flaw, sire, and the man who declares himself to be
innocent does with reference to a witness and not his own conscience. ¹¹)
Marcos is one of those leaders, one of those few leaders, in
Asia with the intelligence, the courage and a concept of governance that
bears the possibility of real stability in the Phillippine society.
To anyone who had a first hand view of the country a decade ago
(as I did) and then see it today is to find a startling and salutary change.
There is security in the streets and in homes where earlier it was like
the old Wild West with gunslingers everywhere. Manila has become a
beautiful city (I am one of those who believes that beauty of surrounding
is a nourishment for the human spirit). The per capita income is up,
there is increasing housing for the poor, the plight of the dispossessed
has improved materially, plans for a prosperous sturdy Phillippines are
in place and need only a bit of luck to warrant excellent results.
Oh, I am not saying all is "jim dandy". Of course, there is
still corruption in high places but the corruption is surely less than
once it was. And I am not laureling Marcos with a crown of piety.
I am saying that the country is better economically, and is more stable
than it was before he took hold.
If Marcos were to be overthrown -- or abandoned by the U.S.,
the alternatives, I am convinced, would be unruly and unattractive to
the long range best interests of the U.S.
I would hope that you would get to know Marcos, or have someone
you trust and whose judgment you respect, meet face-to-face with Marcos.
What he is doing in the Phillippines is, in my view, distorted and mis-
shapened by a good many news reports in our country. The truth, as does
usually all truth, lie somewhere between the fanatical zealot and the
surly cynic. It is amusing to scan the rhetoric of some of the leftist
- 5 -
Democrats in our country about the Phillippines. They seem to have
forgotten what Carlos Fuentes once wrote: "Revolutions only succeed
in creating a new priviledged class."
There is ample historical evidence for Fuentes' maxim.
CONCLUSION:
I hope you will come to understand Marcos and his concept
of the Asian Pacific as well as what he is achieving in his country. He
is one of a literal handful of large-sized political leaders with all the
heft that the word "leader" implies. There is a scarcity of such men
and women. Indeed the landscape of leadership in Europe, Asia,
Africa, Latin America is mainly painted gray.
NEWS FROM THE USSR
SOVIET EMBASSY, INFORMATION DEPARTMENT
703 18TH STREET, N.W., WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009
TELEPHONE 232-6020
See pp. 6-7
LEONID BREZHNEV'S SPEECH AT THE PLENARY MEETING OF THE
CPSU CENTRAL COMMITTEE
(Excerpts Relating to Some Aspects of the
Party's International Activities)
The Party's International Activities implement the decisions of the
Congress. We have started to translate into life the program of
ggle for peace and international cooperation, for freedom and inde-
the peoples adopted by the congress, at once, without any lengthy
preliminaries.
is always, the Political Bureau of the Central Committee is giving
pr. prity attention to the development of fraternal relations with the socialist
countries. We can say with satisfaction that the past months were marked by
onsiderable successes in the further consolidation of the positions of world
socialism.
The great community of socialist states is growing in strength and is
developing successfully. The 25th Congress of the CPSU gave a high assessment
the raternal cooperation of our countries and parties which I will not repeat.
congresses of a number of fraternal parties in Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia. the
erman Democratic Republic and Mongolia held after the 25th CPSU Congress,
ingresses of the Communists of Hungary, Poland and Cuba held somewhat earlier,
once again the unbreakable ideological unity and political cohesion of
close-knit family. Recently we played host to a party and government delega-
from Mongolia, headed by Comrade Tsedenbal. We held good talks, and signed
of
important agreements. In November we are expecting in the Soviet
a
Polish delegation led by Comrade Gierek. A visit to the Soviet Union by
Ceausescu and our comradely conversations with him facilitated the
development of our friendship with Rumania, with its Communist Party.
The economic cooperation of the socialist countries continues to move
The session this summer of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance
adopted important decisions, in particular on developing long-term programs in
raw materials, power engineering, food, etc. In a word, socialist economic
integration is gaining strength.
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The session was attended this time not only by representatives of Yugo-
slavia, but also of Vietnam, the Korean Democratic People's Republic, Laos and
Angola. This points to the growing prestige of the CMEA, to its expanding ties.
The Political Bureau of the Central Committee constantly maintains
close contacts with the leaders of the fraternal parties of socialist countries.
Apart from useful meetings that took place in the course of the Berlin Conference
of Communist Parties at the end of June, including meetings with comrade Tito,
I had talks, as you know, in the Crimea with comrades Gierek, Husak, Zhivkov,
Ceausescu, Tsedenbal, Honecker and Kadar. These were substantial, truly comrade-
ly, frank conversations on many topical questions of our cooperation and our
joint actions.
On the whole this year's series of Crimean meetings turned out to be
still another stage in developing our fraternal cooperation, in the further
elaboration of our joint positions. The Political Bureau of the CPSU Central
Committee endorsed the work carried out during these meetings. A number of
parties also adopted special decisions rating highly their importance.
In a work, comrades, our splendid community of socialist states is liv-
ing a rich, full-blooded life. This factor is of tremendous importance and our
Leninist Party will do everything in its power to continue this trend in the
future.
Of very great significance is the fact that the reunification of Vietnam
has been completed and it has been proclaimed a socialist republic. The Socialist
Republic of Vietnam now has a population in excess of 50 million. For size of
population it is the third biggest socialist state in the world.
Vietnam, with its great experience of heroic struggle against imperialist
aggression, for freedom and independence, with its exalted revolutionary prestige,
has become today an important factor of peace and progress in Southeast Asia,
indeed in all Asia. We ardently welcome the historic victory of our Vietnamese
friends and wish them new great successes!
The victory of the patriotic forces of Laos, and the leadership of
that country passing to the Marxist-Leninist People's Revolutionary Party, was
another important event. Having taken power into their hands, the working people
of that country started the building of a new life. Last spring's visit to the
USSR by a Laotian party and government delegation and the good comradely talk
which Comrade Suslov and I recently had with the General Secretary of the
fraternal Laotian party Comrade Kaysone Phomvihan, showed the good prospects
of Soviet-Laotian friendship. I think, comrades, that we have every reason to
say that in Laos the family of socialist states has another new member.
The road of independent development has opened up to democratic
Kampuchea too.
As before, question of our relations with the People's Republic of
China stands apart. Complicated political processes are taking place there. It
is still difficult to say what will be the future political course of the PRC.
However, it is already clear today that the foreign policy line Peking pursued
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for one and a half decades has been greatly discredited throughout the world.
As for the Soviet Union, a desire to improve relations with China is
our consistent course. As was stressed at the 25th Congress of the CPSU, in our
relations with China, as with other countries, we adhere firmly to the principles
of equality, respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, non-interference
in each other's internal affairs and non-use of force. In short, we are prepared
to normalize relations with China in line with the principles of peaceful co-
existence. More than that, it was clearly indicated at our congress that we
stand for the restoration of good relations between the USSR and the PRC in line
with the principles of socialist internationalism. I want to emphasize that, in
our opinion, there are no issues in relations between the USSR and the PRC that
could not be resolved in the spirit of good-neighborliness. We will act in this
direction further. The matter will depend on what stand will be taken by the
other side.
As to our relations with Albania, we, as it is known, are prepared to
restore them and do not consider that any objective factors divide us from that
country.
Many events of major political significance have taken place in coun-
tries that have freed themselves from colonial dependence. Mention should be
made first of all of the victory scored by the patriots of Angola over foreign
imperialist interventionists and forces of internal reaction.
The heroic struggle of the Angolan people met with the sympathy and
support of a number of progressive African countries as well as of socialist
countries, including the Soviet Union and Cuba. We gave disinterested support
to the just struggle of Angola's patriots, responded to the request of Angola's
lawful government, and we are proud of this!
Angola's victory became an inspiring incentive for the forces of pro-
gress on the African continent. There has been an intensification of the struggle
of the peoples against such bastions of racism and reaction, such stooges of world
imperialism as South Africa and Rhodesia. The anti-imperialist forces in Africa
feel more confident. We, too, could sense this when playing host in Moscow during
the past several months to a number of high ranking delegations of independent
African countries, of fighters for the freedom and progress of the peoples of that
continent.
As to the recent visit to the Soviet Union by the President of people's
Angola Comrade Neto, it laid a firm groundwork for a further development and
strengthening of friendship between our countries. The conclusion of the treaty
of friendship and cooperation between the USSR and Angola is a new step toward
strengthening the great friendship between the world of socialism and the young
emergent states, a considerable step at that, convincing step! Our ties with the
young African republic of Mozambique are developing fruitfully. New evidence of
this was the visit to the USSR this summer by the President of the republic,
Frelimo Chairman Samora Machel.
I want also to particularly emphasize the great importance of the
latest visit to the USSR this year by the head of government of friendly India
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Madame Indira Gandhi. Our talks with her confirmed again that our friendship
with that great and peace-loving Asian power is strengther.ing and deepening,
that our cooperation is expanding to the great benefit of the peoples of both
countries and universal peace.
Active steps are being taken on our part in support of the just de-
mands of the developing countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America for the re-
structuring of international economic relations on the basis of equality, for
removing all forms of exploitation by capitalist states of weaker partners in
the third world. The interests of socialist and developing countries coincide
in this field, as well as in many other fields.
Of course, in the third world, just as on our planet in general, a
stubborn struggle continues between the forces of progress and the forces of
reaction. This was testified to by the Fifth Conference of Heads of State and
Government of Non-aligned Countries that was held in Colombo in August. The
non-alignment movement has become a noticeable factor of international life, an
important link in the worldwide front of struggle by the peoples against impe-
rialism, colonialism and aggression. The documents on political and economic
problems adopted in Colombo as a result of lengthy and, as it has become known,
sometimes difficult discussions confirmed that on the whole the non-alignment
movement retains a progressive nature.
Comrades, the 25th Congress set the task of concentrating the efforts
of peace-loving states on the liquidation of the remaining hotbeds of war and
first of all on the attainment of a just and lasting settlement in the Middle
East. This task has lately acquired a special burning topicality. The situa-
tion in that area has again worsened as a result of the bloody events in
Lebanon.
If we look at the root of the events we will see that this is a new
attempt by world imperialism, that is the United States and other NATO powers,
to deal a blow at the forces of anti-imperialist revolution in the Middle East,
to preserve and strengthen their positions there. Imperialism has now taken to
provoking internecine conflicts of Arabs against Arabs. The possibilities for
this lie in the increased class stratifica inside Arab countries, in the growth
of socio-political defferences between them.
In Lebanon the forces of internal reaction, armed and encouraged by the
Western powers, supported by Israel and Saudi Arabia, have launched an offensive
against the local national patriotic forces. But first of all their blow is di-
rected against the detachments of the Palestine resistance movement, that is
against an anti-imperialist detachment of the Arab world. Unfortunately, Syria
has found itself drawn into the orbit of military actions.
From the very outset the Soviet Union came out for the ending of the
fratricidal war in Lebanon, for the protection of that country's progressive
forces and Palestinian patriots from rout, for the preservation of the unity
of the State of Lebanon and for frustrating the reactionary plan of splitting
that country.
At the same time we hold the view that it is very important to settle
in a spirit of mutual good will the relations between Palestinian and Lebanese
patriots, on the one hand, and neighboring Syria, on the other. This is necess-
ary for restoring the unity of anti-imperialist forces in the Arab East.
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- 5 -
A conference between the heads of state of Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Syria,
Kuwait and Lebanon and Chairman of the Executive Committee of the Palestine
Liberation Organization Apafat was held recently. An agreement on a ceasefire,
on creating inter-Arab security forces and on normalizing the situation in
Lebanon was achieved.
Judging by everything, this agreement, at least as far as the cease-
fire is concerned, is being observed. We will see how matters develop further.
Our attitude toward an agreement on ending the war in Lebanon is, of
course, positive. We would like to hope that the process of normalizing the
situation there will proceed on a healthy basis, without detriment to the
Lebanese patriotic forces and the Palestine resistance movement.
It seems that much time will yet be needed for a full normalization of
the situation in that area. As to the USSR, we will do everything for the suc-
cess of the peace settlement in Lebanon.
Comrades, we clearly see that the unsettled situation in the Middle
East in general is the real basis of the events in Lebanon. Recently the Soviet
Union came out with a new initiative aimed at the resumption of the Geneva Con-
ference on the Middle East with the participation of all interested sides, includ-
ing the Palestine resistance movement. We proposed a specific agenda for that
conference. It encompasses all problems whose solution would really bring about
the establishment of a lasting peace in the Middle East.
Thereby we consistently keep to our course in respect to the conflict
in the Middle East. Our policy is a principled, class, Marxist-Leninist one,
and it is only such a policy that our country can pursue.
Comrades, the international policy of our party implies first of all
struggle for lasting peace. We see one of the most important tasks in making
full use, and not only in Europe, of the favorable possibilities created by the
holding of the European Conference, by the document on peaceful coexistence and
cooperation of states that was solemnly adopted in Helsinki. In full conformity
with the program approved by the 25th Congress of the party, we are continuing
the work to develop equal and mutually advantageous relations with capitalist
states.
At every stage this work has its specific features. Five or 10 years
ago the task was to create the basis for normal relations of peaceful coexist-
ence with France, the Federal Republic of Germany, the United States, Canada,
Italy, Britain and other capitalist countries, to cleanse these relations of the
main burdens left by the cold war. When this had basically been accomplished,
we advanced further, we began developing ever more extensive cooperation in the
fields of politics, economics, science, technology and culture.
Many useful things in this respect were accomplished in recent months
as well. For instance, agreements have been signed that fully accord with the
spirit and letter of the Final Act adopted in Helsinki such as the ten-year
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- 6 -
agreement with Canada on economic, industrial, scientific and technological
cooperation; agreements on similar subjects with Cyprus and Portugal; the Soviet-
Portuguese agreement on cultural cooperation; agreements with France on prevent-
ing accidental or unsanctioned use of nuclear weapons, on cooperation in the
field of energy, civil aviation and aircraft manufacture, and with Finland in the
field of public health and social security. As you see, things are moving ahead.
The whole world sees that the USSR is advancing along the road of peace and peace-
ful cooperation. And the whole world should know that we will advance further
along this road.
It must be admitted, however, the development of our relations with a
number of states has slowed down lately, and through no fault of ours. This was
caused to a considerable extent by the complex political situation in some coun-
tries, in particular by the election campaigns in the United States and the FRG.
Suffice it to say that matters are actually at a standstill in such an
important question of Soviet-American relations as the drafting of a new long
term agreement on the limitation of offensive strategic weapons, although the
main content of this document was agreed upon at the summit level late in 1974.
Having received our latest proposals on the remaining question as
long ago as March of this year, the American side has not yet answered them. It
has been intimated to us that the reason for this lies in the complexities of
the election situation. We can only regret such an approach to an issue on which
the strengthening of peace and the security of two great nations depends, as
does the general improvement of the situation in the world for years to come.
But on the whole the development of our relations with the United States
SO far retains its positive direction. The treaty on underground nuclear explo-
sions for peaceful purposes was signed recently and mutually advantageous coopera-
tion is underway in many fields of science and technology. Cultural exchanges
are being conducted on an extensive scale. Economic ties, too, are expanding
little by little, even with the existence of obstacles created by discriminatory
trade legislation in the United States. Were it not for these obstacles, our
economic ties would have certainly acquired an obsolutely different scope.
In the course of the election campaign the rival candidates, President
Ford and Mr. Carter, have repeatedly made statements on matters of foreign policy,
on relations with the Soviet Union.
These statements, however, are for the most part of a rather general
and, not infrequently, of a contradictory nature. On the whole, both contenders
appear to be in favor of the further normalization of the international situa-
tion and of developing good relations with the USSR. But one often hears state-
ments of a different sort from them as well: calls for a continued arms race,
for pursuaing a positions of strength policy, for a so-called tough line toward
the Soviet. Union, etc.
Nevertheless, whoever comes to power in Washington after the elections,
it appears that the United States will have to take into consideration the actual
alignment of forces in the world that prompted the American ruling circles, on
making a sober analysis of the situation, to commence in recent years a search
for accords with the socialist world. In any case, one thing must be absolutely
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clear: Our policy of extensively developing relations with the United States,
of lessening the danger of a new world war remains invariable.
11]
Now about relations with the Federal Republic of Germany. Regular
elections to the Bundestag were held there recently. In the course of the
election campaign there was a noticeable increase in the activity of the forces
that attacked the government's "Ostpolitik" from anti-Soviet, hardly concealed
revanchist positions. In that situation we found it necessary to come out with
a statement of our policy in respect of the FRG so that the Soviet Union's posi-
tion would be clear to all.
To emphasize the readiness of both sides to develop good relations
between the USSR and the FRG, we reached an agreement in principle with Chancellor
Schmidt that I would pay another visit to the Federal Republic. A short announce-
ment on this was published.
Although the government coalition lost some ground, its victory in the
elections confirmed, as we see it, that the majority of the FRG's population
seeks peace and the relaxation of tension, the further improvement of relations
with socialist states. This apparently creates conditions for the normal develop-
ment of mutually advantageous relations between the USSR and the FRG. Our posi-
tion is clear: We stand for this.
Our relations with France, including questions of foreign policy, con-
tinue to develop with success, although, of course, by no means do we have common
positions with the leadership of that country in all international matters.
It has not been ruled out that on the invitation of President Giscard
d' Estaing and in accordance with the established practice of exchanging visits,
I will visit France again in the near future. I think this will not only offer
an opportunity to discuss questions of interest to both sides, but also generate
an impulse for new initiatives in the traditionally friendly cooperation of the
two great peoples.
We have attached and continue to attach serious importance to relations
with Japan, our neighbor and one of the major Asian states. We have always con-
sidered as possible and desirable the development of broad and firm relations with
Japan on the principles of mutual respect and reciprocal profit, relations per-
meated with the spirit of good-neighborliness. As you know, we have spoken of
this repeatedly, even at the 25th Party Congress.
The last time I had an opportunity to voice some considerations about
the actual prospects for long-term 10 to 15-year economic cooperation between
our two countries was last August when I conversed in the Crimea with a prestigious
delegation from Japanese business circles, led by the chairman of the federation
of Japan's economic organizations Mr. Doko.
The reaction of the Japanese participants in the talks and subsequent
comments in Japan itself were positive. This confirmed once again the existence
of a solid foundation for developing broad and firm reciprocally advantageous
relations between our two countries. As a matter of fact up to now this was also
confirmed in practice.
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However, we entertain no illusions and know that a complicated struggle
for truly good Soviet-Japanese relations still lies ahead. The actions by the
Japanese authorities during the recent incident with the Soviet plane which made
a landing in Japan were a fresh reminder of this. The facts are known to all.
We have already clearly stated our opinion about these Japanese actions in Soviet
Government statements and in Andrei Gromyko's talk with the Foreign Minister
of Japan. Here I only want to stress that the behavior of the Japanese authori-
ties seriously clouded the general atmosphere of Soviet-Japanese relations. It
sowed doubts among Soviet people as to the sincerity of the statements made in
Tokyo about the desire for good relations with the USSR.
Comrades! We want the peaceful coexistence of states to be not only
bilateral, but to assume an ever wider multilateral character, forming, as it
were, a connecting tissue of lasting peace. It is precisely toward this, in
particular, that the Soviet Union's proposals to hold European congresses on
the problems of transport, energy, environmental protection are directed.
On the whole, the work to implement the Helsinki accords is taking the
form of scores and even hundreds of practical deeds. They may not always be
conspicuous, but this is party and state work of exceptional importance. And we
Soviet people value the efforts of those who work in the same direction. For
the cause of peace, so close to the heart of every Soviet person, is our common
cause.
The so-called confidence-building measures--the practice of giving
prior notification to other countries of forthcoming major military maneuvers
and inviting foreign observers to them, approved on our initiative at the European
conference--played a useful role in creating a calmer atmosphere in Europe.
We also consistently observe those provisions of the Final Act adopted
in Helsinki which concern the expansion of cultural and other ties and contacts
among peoples, the expansion of exchange of information. We proceed from the
fact that in the conditions of relaxation of tension the development of such ties
and contacts is quite natural--of course given the strict observance of the prin-
ciples of mutual respect for the sovereignty and non-interference in the internal
affairs of each other. But to violate these principles in relations with the
Soviet Union, to act counter to the interests of the Soviet people and our
socialist system we--you will have to excuse us, gentlemen--will not allow any-
one to do that.
In this connection one must say that in the conditions of relaxation
of tension ever higher tasks are being set to our ideological work. Our propa-
ganda, both inside the country and abroad, must sensitively respond to the
changes taking place in the world, must be understandable and convincing. The
Central Committee will continue to hold questions of ideological work in the
center of its attention. We shall demand the same of all party bodies and
organizations.
Comrades! There is no task of greater importance in the struggle for
lasting peace today than ending the arms race, unleashed by imperialist powers,
and the transition to disarmament. The fact is that the aggressive circles of
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the capitalist world respond to their defeats in social battles, to the loss of
colonial possessions, to more and more countries abandoning capitalism, to the
successes of world socialism and the growing influence of Communist Parties in
bourgeois states, by feverish military preparations. Military budgets are
swelling, new types of armaments are being created, bases are being built,
military demonstrations are undertaken. Leaning on this "position of strength"
imperialism hopes to retain its capability of ordering other countries and
peoples about, which is disappearing.
Striving to underpin their policy "ideologically," so to speak, the
imperialist inspirers of the arms race stoop to any means and do not particularly
care for elementary logic. When they need new allocations for armaments, they
scare parliamentarians and the public with "superior Soviet power, " but when they
need to show the electorate their concern for defense, they assure them of the
"absolute military superiority of the West."
So far as our defense is concerned, we spend on it exactly as much as
is necessary to assure the Soviet Union's security and the defense, jointly with
the fraternal countries, of the gains of socialism so that potential aggressors
will not be tempted to try and solve in their favor the historical controversy
between the two opposite social systems by force. To also maintain the country's
armed forces at a high level in the future, SO that Soviet soldiers always have
the most up-to-date weaponry, which the imperialists could not ignore such is
our duty to the people that we shall sacredly fulfill!
At the same time we have no greater desire than to switch the assets,
of necessity diverted today from the national economy, toward raising the people's
living standards, toward creative purposes. We are prepared even tomorrow to
start disarmament measures--either big and radical, or, as a beginning only
partial-- on a truly fair, reciprocal basis. As far as we are concerned, we
shall not be found wanting!
Many years ago V. I. Lenin spoke of disarmament as the "ideal of social-
ism." At that time no real prerequisites yet existed for stopping the growth of
militarism, for averting the threat of a world war. Today the situation is dif-
ferent. The forces of socialism and peace exert such an influence that advance
toward solving this problem, which is crucial to all humanity, even though
gradually and in individual sectors, is entering the realm of the possible.
Moreover, there is a slowly growing realization among the ruling quarters of
capitalist states that in this nuclear age to stake on unleashing a new world
holocaust is as futile as it is perilous and criminal.
In recent years the joint efforts of peace-loving forces, with the
most active contribution of our country, succeeded in attaining substantial re-
sults in the matter of reducing the threat of a new nuclear war. Concrete,
binding international treaties and agreements have been concluded on such ques-
tions as the ending of a considerable part of nuclear weapons tests; the taking
of measures against further nuclear proliferation in the world;on the non-
deployment of such weapons in space, on the sea and ocean floor; on the limit-
ing of strategic armaments by the Soviet Union and the United States; on the
prohibiting and eliminating of bacteriological weapons. These are not bad
results at all. They refute the laments of the sceptics who renounce the
struggle for disarmament as hopeless. But what has been achieved needs conso-
lidation and further development in order to effectively put an end to the new
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arms race.
You remember, Comrades, how sharply and as a matter of principle the
question of disarmament was posed at our party's 25th Congress. Following the
Congress, the Political Bureau repeatedly discussed ways of giving a new impetus
to the struggle for this most important matter. It was decided, among other
things, to come forth with a number of concrete proposals at the next session
of the UN General Assembly.
The Soviet Union proposed the conclusion of a world treaty on the
non-use of force in international relations. A substantial description of the
document was given at the session of the UN General Assembly. Here I only wish
to stress that the non-use of force in our draft covers interstate relations
without infringing on the peoples' inalienable right to struggle for their
social and national emancipation. We strictly distinguish between these two
spheres.
The USSR also submitted for the deliberation of the UN an extensive
complex document--a memorandum containing a broad, all-encompassing program of
disarmament measures, most topical at this time.
In short, our country has again come out before the world with a con-
crete program for disarmament. In order to make this program as realistic as
possible, substantial new elements have been included. The views of many states
on a number of questions have been taken into account, certainly, without pre-
judicing the interests of our security. We are also taking a flexible position
in the sense that we are prepared to tackle the implementation of either all
the measures stipulated under the program, or, for a start, only some of them,
moving from one step to another.
Disarmament must become the common cause of all states without excep-
tion. This purpose is served by our proposals to convene a world disarmament
conference or, at first, as a step in this direction, to call a special session
of the UN General Assembly.
The Soviet Union's new initiatives in the UN met with the understanding
and support of many states and the broad peace-loving public. This gladdens us.
It inspires us to make new efforts in the name of lasting peace on Earth!
I want to specially emphasize that the Soviet Union continues to con-
sider the attainment of success at the Vienna talks on reducing armed forces and
armaments in Central Europe one of the most important tasks. We are proposing
concrete solutions there that would lead to a reduction of the military forces
confronting each other in Europe, without damage to any of the sides. We are
prepared to discuss counter-proposals based on the same principles. We are
prepared for a further joint constructive search, but it must be constructive,
honest, not aimed at unilateral advantages, for negotiations with our partners
at any level, including the very highest.
Dear Comrades! If one were to mention the main thing that we suc-
ceeded in attaining in international affairs, one could say with a clear con-
science: As a result of efforts undertaken together with the other socialist
states and with the support of all peace-loving, realistically-minded forces,
(more)
- 11 -
it became possible to push further away the threat of nuclear war, to make peace
more reliable, stronger.
We can all rejoice and take pride in such a result, Comrades! The
winner is all humanity!
In conclusion allow me to briefly dwell on some questions of the
World Communist Movement.
First of all it must be noted that in the course of stubborn class
battles the Communist Parties in a number of capitalist countries achieved
major successes recently. They expanded their mass base, strengthened their
prestige, and their weight in the political life increased.
Active today in three out of the six major capitalist powers--France,
Italy and Japan--are mass Communist Parties which were supported during elections
by more than 20 million people. As a result of the latest elections, the
Communist Party of Italy has won such a position that in fact not a single major
question in the life of that state can be decided without its participation.
In France the alliance of the Communists with the socialists and other
left forces has become a generally recognized weighty factor in that country's
political life. After long decades of fascist terror the Communists of Portugal
not only openly emerged on the political arena but became one of the most active
and influential parties in the country. The Communist Party of Spain, too, is
emerging from the underground and its prestige is growing. The Communist Parties
of India, Finland, Denmark and some Latin American countries enjoy considerable
political weight in their countries.
Thus, as the positions of socialism and the forces of national libera-
tion strengthen in the world, the communist movement is scoring outstanding
successes. Naturally we welcome this from the bottom of our hearts.
But the imperialists react differently. The increasing influence of
Communist Parties in Western Europe caused them alarm. The leaders of the USA
and the THG resorted to such gross pressure and threats against Italy in con-
nection with the Communist Party's electoral success that it caused indignation
in many countries, even among Italian bourgeois politicians. Nor did we in the
USSR conceal our opinion on that scope.
The Berlin Conference of Communist and Workers Parties of Europe, held
last summer, was a significant event of recent times. Its preparation took a
lot of time, the views of 29 parties on a number of important problems had to be
compared in order to reach agreement on the draft of the concluding document.
However, the patient collective work was justified. The conference
passed in the spirit of class solidarity and fraternal interaction of the
Communists of Europe, of joint concern for strengthening peace, security, coopera-
tion and social progress on the continent. It was attended by all European
Communist Parties except the Albanian, and the concluding document was adopted
unanimously.
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- 12 -
The speeches of the participants in the Berlin Conference were per-
meated with the spirit of active struggle for peace and socialism. The docu-
ment it adopted is a concrete program of further struggle for peace, security
and relaxation in Europe. On the whole, as viewed both by friends and our
class adversaries, the Berlin Conference furnished new testimony of the Com-
munists' active role in European life. And we are feeling satisfaction that
the CPSU was able to make its contribution to this great cause.
This, Comrades, is what I wanted to tell you about international affairs.
As you see, the Political Bureau of the Central Committee carries out tireless
work in this field, too, to implement the decisions of the 25th Congress. We
shall continue this work with all our energy in the name of peace and the happi-
ness of the Soviet people, in the name of peace and the progress of all humanity.
Comrades, in concluding my speech I would like to stress that the
realization of the tasks posed by the 25th Congress should be facilitated by all
party organizational and ideological-political work.
It is necessary to further ensure that all Communists, wherever they
work, whatever position or post they occupy, would be examples of exactitude
and discipline, creative attitude to the matter at hand, examples of the state
approach to the solution of tasks, big and small.
The party's line toward all out development of creative initiative by
the Communists of local party, Soviet and economic management bodies, of the
broad masses of the people, is a correct line, and we tangibly feel the benefi-
cial results it yields.
I. Lenin stressed that the plan as an assignment of the socialist
state to workers is a tremendous mobilizing force. The documents which we are
discussing accord with the cardinal interests of workers, collective farmers
and our intelligentsia.
We must ensure that every labor collective, every working man and woman
would know the perspective, have a clear idea of the frontiers that are to be
reached and the tasks that have to be accomplished.
A tremendous, fascinatingly interesting project opens up before the
country, before our party and people in the Tenth Five-Year Plan period. This
project is extremely important. The might, prestige and florishing of our
motherland, the welfare of every family, the welfare and happiness of every
Soviet person depend on how we will work, how we will fulfill the plans we have
mapped out.
There is no doubt that this time again our people, guided by the party
of Lenin, will prove worthy of the high responsibility placed on it by history.
The plans of the party, the tasks set forth by its 25th Congress will
be translated into life!
###
TASS
SEE pp.'6-7 PP.
51
Unofficial translation
MEMORANDUM
OF THE SOVIET UNION ON QUESTIONS OF Achieving
ENDING THE ARMS RACE AND/DISARMAMENT
In new historic conditions where international detente is making itself
felt to an ever greater degree and people everywhere entertain increasing
hopes for the establishment of lasting peace, the Soviet Union, being guided
by the foreign policy programme of the 25th Congress of the CPSU, renews
its appeal to all member states of the United Nations, to all states of the
world to redouble their efforts in solving the problem which is the greatest
in scope and significance in contemporary interstate relations--the problem
of ending the arms race and/disarm ament. achieving
No task confronting mankind today is more urgent. "Today, this objective
is more vital than ever", --declared L.I. Brezhnev, General Secretary of the
Central Committee of the CPSU. "Mankind is tired of sitting upon mountains
of arms, yet the arms race spurred on by aggressive imperialist circles is
becoming more intensive".
A race in arms in the nuclear age is fraught with a far more serious
threat to the life of the peoples than at any time in the past. Modern weapons
are thousands of times more powerful than any of those used in wars of
earlier periods. The destruction of Hiroshima--the first victim of the use of
the nuclear weapons-- lives in the memory of the peoples as a horrible tragedy.
But nowadays states possess such types of these weapons and in such
quantities that could destroy hundreds, even thousands of cities like
Hiroshima. One modern nuclear warhead has the destructive power exceeding
that of all explosives used by states in the Second World War. Yet weapons
of mass destruction continue to develop, absorbing the latest achievements
of the scientific and technological revolution and they are ever growing in
quantity.
It is an utterly false concept which justifies the arms race by alleging
that the "balance of fear" is indeed a safeguard for peace. An official report
of UN experts, world famous scholars, admits with every reason that each
new step in the development of weapons of mass destruction entails a new
and still more ominous degree of uncertainty and increased danger. The arms
race provides security for no one.
- 2 -
Another thing is also obvious. If the arms race is not stopped, it
will inevitably set a barrier to the deepening of political detente in
relations between states. This is why an increasing number of states
recognize the need for supplementing political detente with efforts towards
reducing military confrontation and facilitating disarmament. The states
that participated in the All-European Conference on Security and Fopera-
in Europe
tion unanimously pronounced themselves in favour of such a policy
The arms race is inconsistent with the interests and the will of the
peoples. Only militarists and military-industrial complexes stand to gain
from it. The arms race consumes vital resources of the countries and deprives
the peoples of a considerable and ever growing proportion of wealth created
by their labor. According to the UN data the whole world spends today about
300 billion dollars a year on armaments, i.e. a million dollars every two
minutes. This considerably exceeds the entire national income of the
developing countries of Asia and Africa. In a modern world it costs on the
average sixty time less to educate a child for creative endeavour than to
teach a soldier the ABC) of destruction. And more and more states are being
involved in the arms race
The continued arms race hampers the resolution of urgent problems
common to all mankind--the development of essentially new sources of energy,
extensive exploration and use of the oceans and outer space, prevention of
disastrous changes in the environment, eradication of diseases, hunger and
cultural backwardness. For all this enormous investments are needed and it
is impossible to mobilize sufficient resources without putting an end to the
competition in armaments.
Thus, the problem confronting mankind today is this: either the arms
race is stopped and states proceed to disarmament reducing step by step
the threat of military conflict and releasing more and more material and
intellectual resources for the purposes of economic and social development,
or the gigantic war preparation machine will consume an ever greater amount
of resources vital for people, while the shadow of war catastrophe will loom
larger and larger over the peoples.
For any state desirous of safeguarding the security of its people and
of creating the most favourable opportunities for their advancement along the
path of progress, for any politician conscious of his responsibility for world
developments, for any sensible person there can only be one alternative:
everything must be done to bring about the cessation of the arms race and the
accievement disarmament. This is not a simple task: in working out any measure in the
field of disarmament the states have tortake decisions on matters directly
bearing on their national security, to weigh carefully diverse political,
strategic and military-technological factors. But it is well known that failure
to put an end to the arms race is not due to these difficulties.
- 3 -
The main obstacle is the resistance of imperialist forces. The obstacle
is raised, above all, by monopolistic quarters for which the arms race
provides profits worth thousands of millions. The obstacle is raised by
political parties and groups committed to the cold war policy which would
not abandon their foolhardy designs to resolve by force the historical
confrontation of the two social systems. Also desirous of impeding the
resolution of disarmament problems are those who assert cynically that
mankind's future can most easily be built on radio active ruins, those who )
in pursuit of the narrow objectives of their great-power policy which are
alien to the interests of the peoples, are ready to doom even their own people
to mass annihilation in another world war.
These forces would not stop at any means of deception in attempting
to complicate the question of the cessation of the arms race and to hamper
the peoples' struggle for disarmament. These include shameless slander as
regards the policies of states advocating disarmament and false expatiations
about the lust for power inherent in man and about human rights and
fundamental freedoms, expatiations designed to cover up the most inhuman
and misanthropic thing--the manufacturing of weapons for annihilating people.
There is no doubt and there cannot be any doubt that it is feasible to
overcome the opposition raised by disarmament opponents. The correlation
of forces in international politics does not at all develop in their favour. The
socialist states, whose socio- political nature rules out any kind of interest
in war and armaments, are working resolutely and persistently to bring about
the cessation of the arms race. The non-aligned movement also comes out in
favour of disarmament. Statesmen and politicians of various countries of
the world are becoming more keenly aware of the fact that in the nuclear age
a military conflict is fraught with exceedingly grave consequences and that
the interests of security demand the curbing of the arms race and not its
(practical
further intensification. Public opinion in favour of an early adoption of
effective measures to this effect is becoming more and more pronounced and
determined.
The possibility to solve the disarmament problem has been convincingly
proved by the fact that in recent years certain steps of this kind have, indeed,
been taken. Though these steps are but initial and limited, their importance
is great.
Theyinclude
These are the Soviet-U.S. agreements aimed at preventing nuclear war
and reducing the risk of its accidental outbreak, at the limitation of strategic
arms, as well as the agreement between the Soviet Union and France on the
prevention of an accidental or unauthorized use of nuclear weapons.
They include
such al
These are the measures limiting the nuclear arms race, including the
treaties on the prohibition of nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in
outer space and under water, on the limitation of underground nuclear
- 4 -
weapon tests, the treaties on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, on
the non-emplacement of nuclear weapons in outer space, on celestial
bodies, on the sea-bed and the ocean floor. Talks are under way concerning
a long-term Soviet-U.S. agreement on the limitation of strategic offensive
arms, and their successful completion would be a new major contribution
to the consolidation of international peace and security.
They include
These are the international convention on the prohibition of the develop-
ment and production and the destruction of stockpiles of bacteriological (biolo-
c K
gical) and toxin weapons, which is already in force, and the convention on
the prohibition of military and any other hostile use of environmental modifi-
cation techniques the talks on which/are nearing completion.
they include,
And finally, these-are the efforts made to ease military confrontation
in different parts of the world. In this connection of special importance are,
of course, the negotiations that are now going on regarding the reduction
of armed forces and armaments in Central Europe--the area where the most
powerful groups of the armed forces of NATO and the Warsaw Treaty are
concentrated. Having recently advanced new proposals aimed at moving these
negotiations forward, the participating socialist countries are now expecting
reciprocal steps from their counterparts.
The Soviet Union's proposal to sign a world treaty on the non-use of
force in international relations is now getting broad support. The purpose
of this initiative is to make through joint effort of states the principle of the
non-use of force established in the UN Charter an integral part of the practical
policies of states and an effective law of international life. The use of both
nuclear and conventional weapons should be completely excluded from
relations between states.
Thus, new political and material prerequisites are now taking shape for
more resolute progress towards ending the arms race and towards disarmament.
Such prerequisites did not exist in the past, including the years preceding
World War II and the first postwar decades. They do exist now. The duty
of all states is to make the utmost use of them in the interests of international
peace and security, in the interests of peoples.
The Soviet Union, as before, is prepared to negotiate the most radical
disarmament measures, including general and complete disarmament. Together
with its Warsaw Treaty allies, the Soviet Union is prepared to proceed to
mutual dissolution of the opposing political and military groupings of states
or, to begin with, of their military organizations. If not all are prepared to
get down to the realization of these objectives at once, they should be
reached gradually, step by step. The most essential thing is to move on.
from discussions on ending the arms race to practical steps.
- 5 -
The analysis of the state of the political and strategic situation in
the world, of the trends and prospects of its development, and of material
and technological factors which determine the nature and form of the race
leads to the conclusion that under current conditions the main directions
for coordinated action by states in the field of disarmament are as follows:
1. Cessation of the nuclear arms race, reduction and
subsequent elimination of nuclear weapons
In the situation where nuclear weapons pose the greatest danger to
mankind, complete nuclear disarmament becomes the most important
measure.
The Soviet Union has always favored banning nuclear weapons and
their withdrawal from the arsenals of states. It worked for this when nuclear
weapons had just appeared. At that time their stocks were not large and it
was relatively easier to agree on their prohibition and elimination. Now that
nuclear weapons have grown into a huge complex of types and systems of
means of destruction, diverse in purpose, capacity and ways of delivering
nuclear charges to the target, the problem of eliminating them has become
much more difficult. But it can be solved in the present situation as well.
The first thing to be done for this purpose is to stop the arms race, that
is, to stop manufacturing nuclear weapons, equipping armed forces of states
with them, the development and construction building of new models and types of
such weapons. At the same time or immediately after that reductions in the
stocks of nuclear weapons should commence, with the transfer of nuclear
materials thus released to peaceful sectors of the economy. The ultimate
goal of the reduction should be the complete elimination of all types of
nuclear weapons-- strategic and tactical, offensive and defensive. The
reduction of the stocks of nuclear charges, warheads and bombs should be
carried out along with the reduction of their means of delivery.
Naturally, simultaneously with nuclear disarmament, measures should
be taken for the limitation and reduction of armed forces of states and
armaments of conventional types which also pose no small threat to the
peoples.
It is evident that nuclear disarmament could be achieved only if all
all
some nuclear powers should be moving ahead toward eliminating their nuclear only?
states possessing nuclear weapons take part in it. It is inconceivable that
weapons while other(should be stockpiling and perfecting them. That is why
nuclear powers should participate in nuclear disarmament negotiations. As
for the Soviet Union, it is prepared, as has been already stated by the Soviet
side, to sit down at any time at the negotiating table together with all the
other nuclear powers for a comprehensive discussion of the nuclear disarma-
ment problem in all its scope and for a joint elaboration of concrete ways-of-to
- 6 -
its practical solution. The Soviet Union has no objections to non-nuclear
powers also taking part in such negotiations since all the countries and
all the peoples of the world are interested in nuclear disarmament.
2. Prohibition of nuclear weapon tests
An important issue on the solution of which largely depends the
cessation of the arms race is the prohibition of all nuclear weapon tests.
This problem should be tackled without waiting for the outcome of negotiations
on complete nuclear disarmament.
The prohibition of all nuclear weapon tests will put an end to their
qualitative perfection and prevent the emergence of new types of these
weapons. The Moscow treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere,
in outer space and under water as well as the treaty between the USSR and
the USA on the limitation of underground tests have only partially solved this
problem. Besides, two nuclear powers out of five have not acceded to the
Moscow treaty and one of them, China, still continues to carry out nuclear
test explosions in the atmosphere.
The
Now time has come to bring the task of stopping nuclear weapon tests
to a conclusion. Conditions are quite ripe for that, in particular as a result
of the signing between the USSR and the USA of the treaty on underground
nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes, establishing such a procedure for
carrying out peaceful explosions as will preclude their use for perfecting
nuclear weapons.
As is known, in 1975 the Soviet Union proposed the conclusion of a treaty
on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear weapon'tests, i.e. on the
prohibition of conducting nuclear test explosions in all environments and by
all states. The draft of such a treaty was at the time submitted by the Soviet
Union to the United Nations, and a year has already passed since the General
Assembly pronounced itself in favour of holding concrete negotiations to
reach agreement on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear weaponS
tests. However, due to the negative stand taken by some nuclear powers
such negotiations have not started. It is necessary to begin them promptly.
It is a known fact that the question of stopping underground nuclear tests
was complicated by certain states which artificially exaggerated the problem
of control. It was persistently alleged, in particular, that it was impossible
without on-site inspections to tell natural seismic phenomena (earthquakes)
from similar phenomena caused by underground nuclear explosions, hence
it was impossible to verify compliance by states with their obligations with
regard to the prohibition of underground nuclear weapon tests. Most experts
never accepted this view, believing that national technical means and
international exchange of seismic data were sufficient to verify compliance
- 7 -
with a treaty banning underground nuclear weapon tests. With the development
of technology for detecting and identifying seismic phenomena, this view
now enjoys practically unanimous support among scientists. However,
even now some states suggest the possibility of on-site inspection of actual
circumstances if there is doubt as to compliance with the obligations to stop
underground nuclear tests.
The Soviet Union is convinced that no particular difficulties should arise
in elaborating such a compromise basis for an agreement as would ensure a
voluntary framework for taking decisions relating to on-site ascertaining of
relevant circumstances and, at the same time, impart confidence to all
parties to the treaty that the obligations are complied with. The Soviet Union
stands ready to participate in a search for a universally acceptable under-
standing on this basis.
3. Consolidation of the regime of the non-proliferation
of nuclear weapons
It is absolutely clear that the threat of nuclear war would immeasurably
increase if other states which at present do not possess nuclear weapons were
involved in the process of developing and stockpiling such weapons. It is
not difficult to imagine the consequences brought about by such a turn of
events when the arsenals of parties in conflict in one region or another would
include nuclear weapons as well.
Hence the need to prevent effectively a further spread of nuclear weapons.
In this sense the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, to
which about one hundred states have become parties, has achieved a great
deal. The obligation to renounce proliferation of nuclear weapons is now a
rule of international law.
It should be however taken into account that for the time being not all
nuclear powers are parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear
Weapons. Refusing to become parties to it are also some non-nuclear states
which are capable, in view of their industrial and technological level, of
developing nuclear weapons of their own. Therefore, it is important to strive
for the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons to become genuinely
universal. The Soviet Union supports all the decisions of the United Nations
adopted in this respect.
In the interests of consolidating the regime of the non-proliferation
of nuclear weapons it is also necessary to take actions of another kind. It is
well known that in the process of their operation nuclear power plants produce
and accumulate as a "by-product" a fissionable material--plutonium--which can
be used for manufacturing nuclear weapons. With the development of interna-
tional commercial exchange of nuclear materials, equipment and technology,
- 8 -
possibilities of this kind will increase, including those of the states which
have not assumed obligations under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of
Nuclear Weapons. It is obvious that the states which supply nuclear
materials, equipment and technology bear in this connection special
responsibility. Strict safeguards are needed to prevent international co-
operation in the field of peaceful uses of nuclear energy from becoming
a channel of spreading nuclear weapons. This is not a question of commerce
but a question of policy, a question of international security.
The Soviet Union is also resolutely advocating the need for perfecting
in every possible way the system of control over nuclear installations and
materials exercised by the International Atomic Energy Agency. To this end,
the Soviet Union is ready to CO operate with all interested states.
4. Prohibition and destruction of chemical weapons
Following the conclusion of the convention banning bacteriological
weapons, especially pressing has become the task of completely prohibiting
and eliminating another dangerous category of weapons of mass destruction--
chemical weapons. The use of such weapons as far back as the years of
World War I caused grave sufferings and mass deaths. Since that time
military and chemical technology has made great strides. New types of
chemical weapons threatening people with still more agonizing death have
been developed. Radical improvements have also been made in the means
of delivery of chemical weapons, which can now be used not only in combat
areas, i.e. against the armed forces of the other side, but also against
the civilian population in vital centres of states.
The Soviet Union together with many other countries, has long proposed
agreement
to agree on the prohibition and elimination of all chemical means of warfare.
This problem should be solved radically and by single action, as was the case
with bacteriological weapons. However, the negotiations on this subject,
which have been going on already for several years still fail to offer prospects
for such a comprehensive solution. In this connection the question arises
as to possibility of starting with agreement on the prohibition and
elimination of the most dangerous, lethal types of chemical weapons. The
Soviet Union is ready to seek such a solution as well. A substantial contri-
bution to this end could be the implementation of the Soviet-U.S. accord
on joint initiative to conclude a convention on the most dangerous, lethal
chemical means of warfare.
As regards control over observance of the prohibition of chemical weapons,
it should be based on national means. In this respect there exists a positive
precedent in the convention banning bacteriological weapons. At the same
time the Soviet Union is ready to examine a possibility of using additional
control procedures and, in particular, to discuss methods of verifying the
destruction of stocks of chemical weapons which are to be excluded from the
arsenals of states.
- 9 -
There is no reason and there cannot be any for delay as regards the
question of banning chemical weapons. What is nedded is to show political
will and desire to reach generally acceptable agreement.
5. Prohibition of the development of new types and new
systems of weapons of mass destruction
Scientific and technological progress poses the pressing problem of
preventing the emergence of new types and systems of weapons of mass
destruction. New types of weapons could can appear already in the foreseeable
future and may become commensurate in their destructive capabilities with
nuclear, chemical or bacteriological weapons or even surpass them.
At present there are no limitations whatsoever on the use of science for
such purposes. It means that most unexpected developments may occur at any
time, the consequences of which cannot be foreseen. The danger is great. It
is necessary to find means to avert it.
It was precisely these considerations that the Soviet Union was guided
by when proposing in 1975 to conclude an international agreement which
would prevent the development and manufacture of new types and systems of
weapons of mass destruction. As is known negotiations to this effect are
already under way, which is a positive factor. In the course of the negotiations
it has become desirable to specify the object of the prohibition, i.e. to
define new types and new systems of weapons of mass destruction.
The Soviet Union is ready to propose such an approach which would include
among new types of weapons of mass destruction any types of weapons based
on qualitatively new principles of action--according to the method of use and
the targets to be attacked or the nature of their impact. Take, for example,
ray weapons capable of affecting blood and intracellular plasma; infrasound
weapons designed to damage internal organs and affect human behavior;
genetic weapons the use of which would affect the mechanism of heredity.
If we take into account the fact that science never stops in its advance, it
is not difficult to realize that in the future possibilities may emerge for
the development of even more dangerous types of weapons.
As for new systems of weapons of mass destruction, they should not be
developed either for new types of such weapons or for those types of weapons
which are based on the scientific principles already in use but whose dangerous
characteristics can be further increased as a result of introducing new technical
elements of combat or support means. In this context, aero-space systems
of nuclear weapons on the basis of transport space ships may serve as an
example. The question of the prohibition of the development of new types and
new systems of weapons of mass destruction is an important and timely one;
- 10 -
it embraces an essential aspect of the whole problem of disarmament and
prevention of war. Negotiations on this question should be given top
priority.
6. Reducation of armed forces and conventional armaments
Nuclear and other types of weapons of mass destruction pose, undoubtedly,
the greatest threat to mankind. But can anyone forget the many millions
of human lives lost by mankind as a result of the use of the so-called
conventional armaments? Even since World War II the destructive power of
these armaments has increased many-fold. A modern tank is many times al
more deadly weapon than a tank of the 1940s. The same is true of artillery,
small arms and, of course, aircraft.
The armed conflicts which have taken place in various parts of the
world in recent years have shown how tragic for people are the consequences
of the use of new models of conventional arms and how great is the
destruction of material values caused by them.
Thus life itself sets before states the task of taking feasible measures
to reduce aircraft, artillery, tanks and other modern types of conventional
armaments as well as armed forces equipped with these weapons. Since
the Second World War the Soviet Union has repeatedly come out with concrete
proposals on this score. The Soviet side has proposed specific figures for
ceilings on the strength of armed forces of major states and has expressed
its readiness to conduct negotiations on this matter both within the frame-
work of the programme of general and complete disarmament and as a separate
measure covering major states. These proposals have not been accepted.
And even now the Soviet Union is prepared to conduct negotiations on
reduction of armed forces and armaments. Given the desire for this on the
part of all states which posess powerful armed forces, such negotiations
could lead to positive results and to constructive agreements.
Similarly the Soviet Union believes it desirable that new efforts be made
at an international level to bring about the elimination of all military bases
in foreign territories and the withdrawal of foreign troops from such territories.
In many of its forums the United Nations expressed itself quite definitely
in favour of the solution of this problem both on a global scale and on the
scale of individual continents. However, no progress has been made in
this respect, which cannot but cause concern. The Soviet Union, as before,
is prepared to CÓ: operate actively and constructively in solving this problem.
7. Zones of peace in the Indian Ocean and other regions
In recent years states in various regions of the world have been ever more
insistent in raising the question of putting into effect regional measures of
military detente with particular emphasis on the point that powers which do
- 11 -
not belong to corresponding regions should not build up their armed forces
or establish their military bases there.
Thus, the littoral states of the Indian Ocean express their concern over
the fact that some states which are geographically very remote from the
region are deploying there military bases and increasing their military
presence In regarding such actions as a threat to their independence and
security, these countries advance an idea of turning the Indian Ocean into a
zone of peace. The Soviet Union regards this proposal with understanding.
Obviously, the key question here is to assure that there must be no
foreign military bases in the region of the Indian Ocean, that the bases
which were established there must be dismantled, and the establishment of
new bases must be precluded. As to the Soviet Union, it did not and does
not intend to build military bases in the Indian Ocean.
In solving the question of foreign military bases along these lines, the
Soviet Union would be prepared together with other powers to seek ways
for reducing on a reciprocal basis military activities of non-littoral states
in the Indian Ocean and in the regions directly adjacent to it. Naturally,
measures of this kind must fully take into account generally recognized
rules of international law regarding freedom of navigation on\high seas and
the need for associated business calls at ports of littoral states as well
as for research. This question is of great importance for the Soviet Union
since practically the only sea route navigable all the year round which
connects the European part of the USSR with the Soviet Far East passes
through the Indian Ocean.
a
The littoral states of the Indian Ocean are in favour of holding an
international conference to discuss practical measures to turn the region
into a zone of peace. The Soviet Union would be prepared to consider the
question of its attitude towards the convocation of such a conference in
the light of the above considerations.
The Mediterranean is another region where military tensions, especially
in connection with the Middle East conflict, reached from time to time,
dangerous proportions With a view to reducing the tensions, the Soviet
Union proposed some time ago to the United States to agree on the withdrawal
from the Mediterranean of Soviet and U.S. ships and submarines carrying
nuclear weapons. This proposal is still valid and it is in the interest of
all states whose security in one way or another depends on the situation
in the Mediterranean to work for its implementation.
- 12 -
The problem of military detente is very relevant for the Middle East.
The Soviet Union has repeatedly expressed itself in favour of stopping
the arms race in the Middle East within the framework of a comprehensive
political settlement of the Middle East conflict.
In various regions of the world the states concerned put forward proposals
on the establishment of nuclear-free zones. That reflects their desire for
effective limitation of the proliferation of nuclear weapons and for reduction
of the threat of nuclear war. The Soviet Union supports such proposals.
It is prepared to CO operate in their implementation taking into account,
naturally, the possibilities of a particular region where it is proposed to
establish a nuclear-free zone. It is important that such zones should
actually be free from nuclear weapons and that appropriate agreements
contained no loop holes and were fully consistent with the generally
recognized rules of international law.
8. Reduction of military budgets
One of the promising approaches to stopping the arms race and to
disarmament is the reduction of military budgets of states. The resources thus
released could be channeled for the purposes of economic and social progress
of peoples, for accelerating the rates of economic growth, ensuring
employment, developing new sources of energy, solving the food problem,
combatting diseases and building new schools and higher educational
establishments.
The Soviet Union has repeatedly put forward proposals for the reduction
of military budgets and has taken steps which could serve as an example
in this respect. Several years ago the Soviet side proposed to agree on the
reduction by 10 per cent of the military budgets of states- permanent members
of the UN Security Council and the use of a part of the funds thus saved
to provide assistance to developing countries. This proposal was approved
by the UN General Assembly, but so far it has not been implemented due to
the opposition by those states which have been stubbornly pursuing the
policy of building up military expenditures.
The Soviet Union is prepared to take a flexible position regarding the
specific figure to start the reduction of military budgets. A figure greater
or smaller than 10 per cent could be agreed upon as a first step for 1977.
What is important, however, is that this question should be made as soon
as possible, a subject of businesslike negotiations between the states
concerned, The current continuous growth of military expenditures of many
states can and must be replaced by the practice of their systematic reduc-
tion.
- 13 -
9. Negotiations on questions of stopping the arms race and of
disarmament have been conducted in various forms: on a bilateral basis,
especially where this concerns states possessing the greatest military and
war industrial potential; within a particular group of states directly concerned,
including those on a regional level; within specialized bodies set up for
discussion of the disarmament problem as a whole or of its individual aspects
and made up of states? representing major political groupings and geographi-
cal regions of the world today. Each year the questions of disarmament are
given a prominent place in the work of the UN General Assembly.
On the whole these forms of negotiations and discussions have proved
their usefulness. They will undoubtedly be used in the future as well. At
the same time, the achievement of cardinal changes in the solution of the
disarmament problem, which affects the interests of all states without
exception, requires discussions in an international forum as broad and
authoritative as possible.
Such a forum should first of all be truly global and should represent all
states; secondly, it must provide an opportunity for expert examination,
with due regard for all circumstances and in necessary detail, of the totality
of disarmament questions; thirdly, it must be given the power to take make
effective decisions.
These requirements would be met by the convocation of a World
Disarmament Conference, and the Soviet Union continues to believe that
it must be held.
A special session of the UN General Assembly could become an
appropriate forum for discussing disarmament questions in their full scope,
for determining through joint effort$the ways and means of their solution and
for working out a long-term programme of practical steps. To prevent a
situation where its results would be reduce d to decisions containing
provisions of ageneral nature in favour of disarmament, which already abound
in the UN archives, such a special session of the General Assembly and
its organization must not be of routine nature. This should be a particular
session. It must be prepared, organized and held in such a way as to ensure
a breakthrough in the solution of disarmament problems. Its entire work
should fully reflect the high responsibility of all states of the world and
especially of major powers possessing the most powerful armaments and
armed forces.
Naturally, the convocation of a special session of the UN General
Assembly should not eliminate the question of a World Disarmament
Conference.
- 14 -
The Soviet Union considers the convocation of such a session to be
an interim stage which should by its decisions prepare a broad and radical
review of the disarmament problem at the world conference. Such a session
should not be restrained by strict time limits or the procedure normally
followed at the General Assembly sessions, including special sessions.
X
X
X
Such are the views which the Soviet Union believes necessary to bring
to the attention of all member states of the United Nations and all states
of the world. The Soviet Union expresses the hope that these views,
motivated by concern for peace and the security of nations, by the desire
to contribute to mankind's advance along the road of stopping the arms race
and disarmament, will be carefully considered by all states and will
help achieve practical results in the solution of this historic task
facing mankind.
NEWS AND VIEWS FROM THE USSR
SOVIET EMBASSY, INFORMATION DEPARTMENT
1706 18TH STREET, N.W., WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009
TELEPHONE 232-6020
THE TWENTY-FIFTH CONGRESS OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE SOVIET UNION:
LEONID BREZHNEV ON RELATIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES
Moscow. February 24, 1976. The turn for the better in our relations with the
United States of America, the largest power of the capitalist world, has of
course, been decisive in reducing the danger of another world war and in con-
solidating peace. This has, without question, contributed to the improvement
of the international climate in general, and that of Europe in particular.
Acting in complete accord with the Guidelines set by the Twenty-fourth Congress,
we have devoted very great attention to the objective of improving relations
with the United States.
As a result of the negotiations with U.S. President Nixon in Moscow
and Washington, and later, of the meetings with President Ford in Vladivostok
and Helsinki, an important and fundamental mutual understanding has been reached
between the leaders of the Soviet Union and the United States on the necessity
of developing peaceful equal relations between the two countries. This is
reflected in a whole system of Soviet-U.S. treaties, agreements and other docu-
ments. Cumulatively, they have laid a solid political and juridical foundation
for greater mutually beneficial cooperation between the USSR and USA in line
with the principles of peaceful coexistence. To a certain extent they have
lessened the danger of nuclear war. Precisely in this we see the main result
of the development of Soviet-U.S. relations in the past five years.
There are good prospects for our relations with the United States
in the future as well--to the extent that they will continue to develop on this
jointly created realistic basis when, given the obvious difference between the
class nature of the two states and between their ideology, there is the firm
intention to settle differences and disputes not by force, not by threats or
sabre-rattling, but by peaceful political means.
In recent years our relations with the United States have been deve-
loping in many areas. There is a lively exchange of delegations, including
parliamentary; and cultural exchanges have become more active. Many Soviet-U.S.
(more)
- 2 -
agreements have been concluded envisaging expansion of mutually beneficial
cooperation in a variety of economic, scientific, technical and cultural areas.
Most of them have already come into force and are being put into practice with
obvious benefits for both sides, and, more important still, for the mutual
understanding of the Soviet and U.S. peoples.
The essentially positive development of Soviet-U.S. relations in
recent years is, however, complicated by a number of serious factors. In-
fluential forces in the United States that have no stake either in improving
relations with the Soviet Union or in the relaxation of international tensions
as a whole are trying to impair it. They portray the policy of the Soviet
Union in a false light and refer to an imaginary "Soviet threat" to urge a new
intensification of the arms race in the USA and in NATO. We may recall that
there have also been attempts to interfere in our internal affairs in connec-
tion with the adoption by the U.S. of discriminatory measures in the field of
trade. Naturally, we could not, and will not, suffer that sort of action.
That is not the kind of language one can use with the Soviet Union. By now,
I think, this is clear to all.
It is no secret that some of the difficulties stem from those aspects
of Washington policy which jeopardize the freedom and independence of peoples
and constitute gross interference in their internal affairs on the side of the
forces of oppression and reaction. We have opposed, and will continue to
oppose, such actions. At the same time, I want to emphasize once more that
the Soviet Union is firmly determined to follow the line of further improving
Soviet-U.S. relations in strict accordance with the letter and spirit of the
agreements reached and commitments taken in the interests of both peoples and
peace on earth.
Let me refer specifically to the current Soviet-U.S. negotiations on
further strategic arms limitations. We are holding them in an effort to effec-
tuate the 1974 Vladivostok understanding and to prevent the opening of a new
channel for the arms race, which would nullify everything achieved thus far.
An agreement on this issue would obviously be of very great benefit for the
further development of Soviet-U.S. relations, for greater mutual confidence,
and for the consolidation of world peace.
Since we attach the utmost importance to the whole of this problem,
we have persistently and repeatedly offered to the United States that we not
stop at just limiting the existing types of strategic weapons. We thought it
possible to go farther. Specifically, we suggested coming to terms on banning
the development of new, still more destructive weapons systems, and in particu-
lar, the new Trident submarines carrying ballistic missiles and the new strate-
gic B-1 bombers in the United States and similar systems in the USSR. Deplora-
bly, these proposals were not accepted by the U.S. side.
But we have not withdrawn them; and need we say how beneficial their
implementation would be for mutual confidence. Furthermore, both sides would
be able to save considerable resources and use them for productive purposes
to improve the lives of the people.
(more)
- 3 -
Let me add one more thing. Of late, pronouncements have been proli-
ferating in many countries against any of the powers setting up military bases
in the region of the Indian Ocean. We are in sympathy with these pronounce-
ments. The Soviet Union has never had, nor has now, any intention whatever of
building military bases in the Indian Ocean. And we call on the United States
to take the same stand.
###
Novosti Press Agency
NEWS AND VIEWS FROM THE USSR
SOVIET EMBASSY, INFORMATION DEPARTMENT
1706 18TH STREET, N.W., WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009
TELEPHONE
232-6020
THE TWENTY-FIFTH CONGRESS OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE SOVIET UNION:
LEONID BREZHNEV ON EFFORTS TO PROMOTE DISARMAMENT
Moscow. February 24, 1976. In the report to the Twenty-fifth Congress of the
Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Leonid Brezhnev emphasized that, "Efforts
to end the arms race and to promote disarmament are, and remain--as the Peace
Program requires--one of the main trends in the foreign political activity of
the Central Committee of the CPSU and the Soviet government. 11
Brezhnev said: "Today, this objective is more vital than ever. Man-
kind is tired of sitting upon mountains of arms; yet, the arms race, spurred
on by aggressive imperialist groups, is becoming more intensive.
"The main motive for the arms race given by its advocates is a so-
called Soviet threat. They invoke this motive when they want to drag through
a larger military budget by reducing allocations for social needs, and when new
types of deadly weapons are being developed, and also when they try to justify
NATO's military activity. In fact, of course, there is no Soviet threat either
in the West or in the East. It is all a monstrous lie from beginning to end.
The Soviet Union does not have the slightest intention of attacking anyone. The
Soviet Union does not need war. The Soviet Union does not increase its military
budget, and, far from reducing, is steadily augmenting allocations for improving
the people's well-being. Our country is consistently and staunchly fighting
for peace, and making one concrete proposal after another aimed at Arms reductions
and disarmament.
"The Soviet Communists are proud of having undertaken the difficult but
noble mission of standing in the front ranks of the fighters striving to deliver
the peoples from the danger of the continuing arms race. Our party calls on
all the peoples, all countries, to unite their efforts and end this perilous pro-
cess. General and complete disarmament was, and remains, our ultimate goal in
this field. At the same time, the Soviet Union is doing all it can to achieve
progress along separate sections of the road leading to this goal.
(more)
- 2 -
"An international convention on banning and destroying bacteriological
weapons, based on a project submitted by the Soviet Union and other socialist
countries, was drawn up, signed and has entered into force. In effect, it is
the first real disarmament measure in the history of international relations.
It envisages removal of a whole category of highly dangerous mass annihilation
weapons from the military arsenals of states.
"The sphere of operation of the Treaty on the non-proliferation of
Nuclear Weapons has expanded. Recently, additional large states, including the
Federal Republic of Germany and Italy, have become party to it. Yet further
effective measures to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons are still a most
important objective. The USSR is prepared to cooperate with other states on this
score.
"Let me refer, specifically, to the current Soviet-U.S. negotiations
on further strategic arms limitation. We are holding them in an effort to effec-
tuate the 1974 Vladivostok understanding and to prevent the opening of a new
channel for the arms race, which would nullify everything achieved so far. An
agreement on this issue would obviously be of very great benefit for the further
development of Soviet-U.S. relations, for greater mutual confidence, and for the
consolidation of world peace.
"Since we attach the utmost importance to the whole of this problem, we
have persistently and repeatedly offered to the United States that we not stop
at just limiting the existing types of strategic weapons. We thought it possible
to go farther. Specifically, we suggested coming to terms on banning the develop-
ment of new, still more destructive weapons systems, in particular, the new Trident
submarines carrying ballistic missiles and the new strategic B-1 bombers in the
United States and similar systems in the USSR. Deplorably, these proposals were
not accepted by the U.S. side.
"But we have not withdrawn them; and need we say how beneficial their
implementation would be for mutual confidence. Furthermore, both sides would
be able to save considerable resources and use them for productive purposes for
improving the people's lives.
"Let me add one more thing. Of late, pronouncements have been prolif-
erating in many countries against any of the powers setting up military bases in
the region of the Indian Ocean. We are in sympathy with these pronouncements.
The Soviet Union has never had, nor now has, any intentions whatever of building
military bases in the Indian Ocean. And we call on the United States to take
the same stand.
"Certainly, the time will come when the inevitable association of other
nuclear powers with the process of strategic arms limitation will arise on the
agenda. And those which refuse would assume a grave responsibility before the
peoples.
"On our country's initiative, the U.N. General Assembly has, in recent
years, adopted a number of important resolutions on the questions of restraining
the arms race and banning the development and manufacture of new types of mass
(more)
- 3 -
annihilation weapons and such weapons systems.
"The task is to have these resolutions implemented. Frankly, this is
not easy to achieve, because a number of major states are still obviously reluctant
to end the arms race. The opponents of the relaxation of international tensions
and disarmament still dispose of considerable resources. They are highly active
in different forms and from different angles. Though imperialism's possibilities
for aggressive action are now considerably reduced, its nature has remained the
same. This is why the peace-loving forces must be highly vigilant. Energetic
action and unity of all the forces of peace and goodwill are essential.
"Therefore, special importance is attached to the proposal supported by
the vast majority of U.N. member-countries to convene a world disarmament confer-
ence.
"Political relaxation of tensions needs to be backed up by military
relaxation. The Peace Program advanced a clear aim: to reduce armed forces and
armaments in Central Europe. The Vienna negotiations on this score have already
been going on for more than two years. However, there has been no visible pro-
gress, for only one reason: The NATO countries refuse to give up trying to use
the negotiations to secure unilateral military advantages. For some reason, the
West wants--even demands--concessions prejudicial against the security of the
socialist countries. Yet, we have not noticed any inclination on the part of the
NATO bloc to make similar concessions to the other side.
"Recently, the socialist states submitted new proposals in Vienna in an
effort to get matters off the ground. For a start, we are prepared to accept
a reduction of only Soviet and U.S. troops in the course of this year, while the
strength of the armed forces of the other participants in the negotiations remains
frozen and not subject to reduction until the second stage in 1977-1978. We
have also made perfectly concrete proposals concerning reduction, by both sides,
of the number of tanks, nuclear missile-carrying planes and missile launchers,
along with a definite quantity of nuclear warheads for them.
"our proposals are based on the only realistic approach to preserving
the existing relations of strength in the center of Europe, in substance, one of
equal balance. Their implementation will not prejudice the security of either
side. And it is to be hoped that all this will win the due response of the
Western countries and that it will at last be possible to go from discussion to
actual measures reducing armed forces and armaments.
"The Twenty-fourth Congress set this objective: Renunciation of the
use and threat of force in settling questions in dispute must become the rule in
international relations. Later, this principle was reflected in a number of
treaties concluded by the USSR with other countries. It is contained in the
Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. To make the
danger of war recede still farther and to create favorable conditions for progress
towards disarmament, we now offer to conclude a world treaty on the non-use of
force in international relations. Its participants, naturally including the
nuclear powers, would undertake to refrain from using all types of weapons, in-
cluding nuclear, in settling disputes that may arise between them. The Soviet
Union is prepared to join other states in examining practical steps leading to
the implementation of this proposal."
TASS
SOVIET COMMENTARY ON THE PRESIDENTIAL
CAMPAIGN DEBATES
Soviet public commentary on the US election
debates has shifted from impartial condescension
to impartial exasperation. Moscow evidently felt
that the exchange on foreign affairs could not
pass without a firm rebuttal.
Why the Debates? The Soviet media have been
presenting the debates primarily as an effort by
both sides to combat voter apathy. According to
the commentators, half the electorate might well
stay away from the polls as a result of widespread
disillusionment with the US political and economic
system; of the remainder, one-third are undecided
between the candidates. Furthermore, President
Ford, trailing Governor Carter but narrowing the
gap, allegedly saw in the debates a chance to
prove his suitability for the presidency. Carter
for his part sought to use them to counter charges
of "haziness" and lack of experience.
Philadelphia, September 23. Most Soviet
pundits treated the first debate with marked con-
descension and detached impartiality. Both
American parties, after all, represent the same
class--the bourgeoisie. Thus, while President
Ford and Governor Carter might differ in campaign
tactics--Ford citing optimistic economic forecasts
and Carter repudiating them--neither could possibly
offer realistic answers to the nation's problems:
unemployment, inflation, taxes, housing, energy,
education, and medical services. Walter Cronkite's
quip that "There were no new questions or new solu-
tions" was cited to underscore this point, as were
some of the placards carried by demonstrators out-
side Philadelphia's Walnut Street Theater. The
debate was judged a draw, both candidates proving
adept at pointing out the other's shortcomings.
October 23, 1976
- 2
San Francisco, October 6. The second debate presented
Soviet commentators with more of a problem: how to square
Soviet insistence on the American public's endorsement of
detente with the increasingly anti-detente electioneering
rhetoric in the US. Moscow's explicit approval of both
candidates' commitment to detente and to arms limitation
talks was all but obviated by its accompanying hand-wringing
over the "cold war" overtones of their "contradictory" and
"inconsistent" commitments to negotiate only from a "position
of strength."
Izvestiya observer Vikentiy Matveyev typically blamed
the US military-industrial complex for this turn of rhetoric.
Having lost its bipartisan investments in Reagan and Jackson
("extreme rightwing politicians, in the Republican and Demo-
cratic parties"), it is now allegedly busy extracting
"from the candidates of the two leading parties of
the wealthy U.S. bourgeoisie, hard and fast pledges
concerning the appropriation of large new sums of
money for orders of new arms." (Moscow International
Service, October 10, 1976.)
As yet, however, only a few Soviet commentators have
even implicitly questioned detente's public popularity.
S. Kondrashov recently noted that "Many observers agree that
a wave of chauvinism is sweeping across America once again"
(Izvestiya, October 14, 1976). According to him, Carter's
ditching of his liberal reputation in foreign affairs and
his adoption of Reaganesque stances were testimony "to a
shift in the conservative direction in voters' sentiments"
(Izvestiya, October 9, 1976). Kondrashov laid the blame, of
course, at the feet of "the opponents of the relaxation of
international tension":
"The chauvinist wave did not emerge spontaneously. It
was aroused by the highly intensive psychological manipu-
lation to which the forces of the military-industrial
complex and other opponents of detente have subjected
Americans. Developing energetic activity, particularly
in the present election year, they have again constructed
the gigantic scarecrow of a 'Soviet threat,' dressing it
in numerous outwardly convincing but essentially loaded
statistics about the United States 'lagging behind.
These statistics have emerged one after another from
deep inside the Pentagon and the CIA in the last few
months." (Izvestiya, October 14, 1976.)
3
Besides castigating both candidates for their "ambiguous"
stands on detente, the Soviet media after the second debate
also took both to task for advocating increased armaments
for Israel and for appealing "to a narrow but influential
category of American voters--the Zionists" (Izvestiya,
October 9, 1976). However, President Ford's defense of the
Helsinki agreement and US-Soviet trade was noted approvingly,
as was Governor Carter's attack on US policy in Vietnam,
Cambodia, Chile, Pakistan, and Angola and his condemnation of
the Watergate affair and unlawful CIA activities.
On the other hand, it was more than a week before Moscow
reacted publicly to President Ford's and Governor Carter's
exchanges on the nature of the Soviet Union's relations with
East European countries. Pravda on October 15 finally warned-
both candidates sharply "not to overstep the bounds of the
permissible." The unsigned article asserted that in foreign
affairs even US candidates cannot simply "say and do any-
thing that comes into their heads. It branded a White House
gathering of "emigre rabble" as an "extremely unfriendly"
gesture and charged both Ford and Carter with making state-
ments that have "nothing in common with a serious, stately
approach to international affairs."
The overall Soviet media verdict on the second debate
rated the Pentagon as the real winner and stressed the lack
of real voter enthusiasm. Veteran pundat Valentin Zorin
speculated that, the reason Carter's lead in the polls had
Jold
eroded was that voters had ceased to see any great difference
was
between him and Ford (Moscow Domestic Service, October 8,
1976).
Private Comments. The same Zorin commented privately
benefit
to US officials that Ford's experience and familiarity to
the voters will in the end enable him to edge out Carter.
But while the Soviets themselves lean toward Ford for the
same reasons, according to Zorin, the official line remains
one of strict neutrality and readiness to work with either
a Ford or a Carter administration. As if to document the
otherwis
point, Pravda recently told its readers that even Carter
adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski- "well known for his anti-
The
Sovietism"--endorses a continuation of detente (Pravda,
October 17, 1976).
recombly now
[12/76]
Jimmy Carter
Plains, Georgia 31780
Confidential
To Fames Schlesinger
This is a report pre-
pared for me by a
friend of mine- former
Submariner- who has
done his doctoral work
on The energy problem.
He's available to help
us. not looking for any
job. His phone number
is 404. 549-8259
Simmary
"DETERMINED TO BE AN ADMINISTRATIVE MARKING
CANCELLED PER E.O. 12356, SEC. 1.3 AND
ARCHIVIST'S MEMO OF MARCH 16, 1983"
A PRESIDENTIAL VIEWPOINT: THE ENERGY SITUATION
A Special Report
prepared December 6, 1976
for: James E. Carter,
President-Elect of the United States
by: Howard Bucknell 111
Political Science Department
University of Georgia
FOR COMMCENTER USE ONLY
IMM
CONFIDENTIAL
PRECEDENCE
CLASSIFICATION
DEX
FROM: Maxie Wells, Plains
DAC 067
GPS
TO:
LDX
PAGES 4
Stuart Eizenstat in the
Transition Office
TTY
CITE
INFO:
DTG: 220215Z DEC 76
RELEASED BY: DF
TOR: 2202457
SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS:
Eizenstat ONLY
"DETERMINED TO BE AN ADMINISTRATIVE MARKING
CANCELLED PER E.O. 12356, SEC. 1.3 AND
ARCHIVIST'S MEMO OF MARCH 16, 1983"
WHCA FORM 8, 22 FEB 74
There To Stu- ,dear very of
Sen
Long are / ones almost
- 3 -
all good Use This-
in transportation matters and gets along well with Brock Adams,
J.
the nominee for Secretary of Transportation and the man who will
have many dealings with Long's Subcommittee.
Generally, Long's interests lie in the subjects over which
he has control, namely those within the jurisdiction of the Finance
Committee.
TAX POLICY: Long feels that the tax law is not simply a device
for raising revenue but, more importantly, a tool to be used to deal
with both economic and social problems (for example, tax incentives
for businesses which hire welfare recipients; incentives aimed at
directing investment into troubled industries or underdeveloped
geographical areas; incentives to businesses to spread stock among
their employees.) Probably for this reason, Long has been a prime
target of those so-called tax reformers who view most deductions,
credits, and exclusions for both businesses and individuals as
loopholes. In recent years, Long has been directly responsible
for ending many tax abuses, but he feels that deductions and credits
which serve legitimate social and economic purposes should not
be scuttled unthinkingly. Long has a history of supporting tax
simplification and has introduced his own legislation for this
purpose. However, he found that the complexity of the Code results
mainly from the provisions put in to attain social and economic
goals.
The Chairman also has his own approach for dealing with the
troublesome problem of tax shelters for the wealthy. He believes
that such shelters are devised because of the current confiscatory
maximum 70% tax rate on unearned or passive income (rents, royalties,
dividends, etc.) and that if the maximum rate were lowered to 50%,
much of the incentive for wealthy individuals to resort to "tax
loss" endeavors and other shams would be removed. His proposal
for this purpose was approved by the Finance Committee as an
amendment to the Tax Reform Act of 1976 but was defeated on the
Senate floor.
Additionally, Long is troubled by the impact which current
capital gains tax provisions have on long-term investors, especially
retirees. Whether one holds an asset for one year or fifty, the
tax rate is the same under existing law. His answer is a sliding
scale tax rate based on the number of years which the asset is
held; the longer one has held an asset, the lower the tax rate.
That proposal was also accepted by the Finance Committee but
rejected by the Senate.
PRESERVATION PURPOSES
Finally, Long is convinced that for the purposes of economic
stimulation and job creation, tax reductions should be directed
REPRODUCTION MADE FOR
primarily at the business community. Tax cuts for individuals
are perhaps necessary politically, but on a dollar-for-dollar
basis, business tax reductions accomplish much more and should be
emphasized.
"DETERMINED TO BE AN ADMINISTRATIVE MARKING
CANCELLED PER E.O. 12356, SEC. 1.3 AND
ARCHIVIST'S MEMO OF MARCH 16, 1983"
- 4 -
EMPLOYEE STOCK OWNERSHIP PLANS (ESOPs):
Devised by Louis Kelso several years ago, the ESOP concept
has found a zealous disciple in Russell Long. The Chairman
says that the problem with American capitalism is that there
are not enough capitalists (85% of the nation's wealth is owned
by 15% of the people); if a person does not have a stake in an
economic system, he will be prone to support or be indifferent to
a change in the system. Long sees ESOP as not only the salvation
of capitalism but also the primary means of financing future
business expansion and increasing worker output.
Companies now must rely on profits or bank loans to finance
expansion. Long is pushing legislation encouraging a company to
issue new stock that would be given to an employees' stock ownership
trust which, in turn, would borrow the expansion money. When the
loan is paid off, the stock remains with the employees. A worker's
share would be based on his income and his shares, of course,
would earn dividends for the worker in addition to his company pay.
On retirement, the value of the shares would add to his retirement
income.
The concept of expanded stock ownership is catching on.
Business leaders are seriously exploring employee stock ownership
as a way of generating fresh capital and increasing worker pro-
ductivity. Many businesses have already established ESOPs.
The Joint Economic Committee has endorsed broadened stock
ownership and political figures of all persuasions (from Hubert
Humphrey and Jacob Javits) are drafting ESOP-type legislation.
Even Ronald Reagan has talked of the merits of this approach.
Long has already succeeded in getting tax incentives for
ESOPs written into the Code and will certainly continue his push
for legislation to increase those incentives.
HEALTH: Senator Long was Chairman of the Finance Committee when
the Medicare and Medicaid were enacted and has been distressed
with the waste, inefficiency, abuse, and fraud which exist in these
programs. He supports the so-called Talmadge bill whose purpose
is to reform administrative and reimbursement procedures, consolidate
the bureaucracy, and increase penalties for fraud and abuse under
Medicare and Medicaid. These programs, in Long's view, will provide
the basis for future expansion of the federal government's role
in health care; they will be built upon, not dismantled. Thus,
he favors an incremental approach to national health insurance.
PRESERVATION PURPOSES
His first step would be enactment of his legislation to federalize
Medicaid, require private health insurance policies to meet strict
ELECTROSTATIC REPRODUCTION MADE FOR
federal standards in terms of covered services, and establish a
catastrophic health insurance program for all Americans. He
opposes the Kennedy Health Security Act as too revolutionary and
too expensive. He feels that his plan will accomplish much the
- 5 -
same results in time; expanded coverage could be phased in through
reductions in the threshold amounts which determine when one
qualifies for federal protection.
SOCIAL SECURITY: Senator Long will probably want to address the
rather serious Social Security financing problem which gets
worse each month. Action to increase funding ought to be taken
before the next automatic benefits increase (scheduled for June)
occurs and exacerbates the problem. This financing deficit is a
source of considerable anxiety for the elderly who depend on their
monthly checks.
The question is, of course, how the actuarial deficit is to
be overcome. Long will probably not want to increase Social Security
taxes because it would be counterproductive, offsetting any
economic benefits of the federal income tax cut which has been
proposed. He will probably not want to tap general Treasury
revenues even temporarily because once that precedent is established,
it is hard to resist future uses of general revenues to finance
Social Security. (This would be a substantial departure from the
pay-as-you-go basis of the program.) Long may suggest an approach
which includes the best of both worlds: Increase Social Security
taxes permanently by one-half of one percent but provide for a
temporary federal income tax credit for that FICA increase; when
the temporary income tax credit expires, the permanent Social
Security tax increase remains.
WELFARE: Long is genuinely concerned with the poverty-stricken
and the working poor. Yet his disgust with welfare chiselers,
fathers who will not support their children, and other stereotypical
abusers of the system coupled with his devotion to the work ethic
probably makes his support of a guaranteed minimum income plan
impossible at least at this time. Substantial progress toward
bringing him around to support a comprehensive reform of welfare
could be made if the Administration would accept a statutory
differentiation between the truly unemployable and others who
are able but choose not to work. That is a possible starting
point for discussions.
The States have recently urged that the federal government's
matching share of welfare costs be increased to relieve some of
their fiscal problems. Long probably would not go along because,
in his view, this would lessen their incentive for tight admini-
stration of the program (if the state's share is only 25% as
opposed to 50%, then for every dollar wasted, the state is out
only 25 cents instead of 50 cents.) To provide fiscal relief,
Long would probably favor more federal social services money
which he views as a type of revenue sharing.
ELECTROSTATIC REPRODUCTION MADE FOR
PRECERVATION PARTOSES
- 6 -
PAROCHIAL ISSUES: In every first conversation with every President
he has served with, Senator Long has succeeded in extracting a promise
that Fort Polk, an Army installation near the Texas border, will
not be closed. In recent years, that facility has had its status
elevated from a camp to a fort and the Army now has quite an
investment there.
In September, Senators Long, Johnston, and Inouye wrote
Governor Carter asking that he look into the plight of the
sugar producers. Production costs of sugar cane now run about
14¢ a pound and sugar currently brings only about 11¢ a pound on
the market. Long may now ask for relief in the form of either
increased tariffs on imported sugar, quotas on imported sugar,
or increased price supports for domestic sugar production.
Long recently wrote a letter cosigned by Senator Talmadge
urging that Will E. Leonard (formerly Long's legislative assistant
and now Chairman of the United States International Trade Commission)
be appointed the President's Special Representative for Trade
Negotiations.
Jimmy Carter
Plains, Georgia 31780
11-14-76
To Sen Mike Mansfield
I really appreciate The
Superh report on your
trip to China It has
been Very helpful to me.
and I hope that you
will Continue to let
me have The benefit of
your advice and Counsel
during the Coming months
on our relations with the
the People's Reque the and
on 0 other matters a
you Can reach me
at 912-824- 885(private).
Sincerely,
Jimmy
COPY
APPENDIX
I. Letter of Transmittal
II. Report to the President
III. Meeting, October 7, 1976, with Wang Hai-jung, Vice
Minister of Foreign Affairs
IV. Meeting, October 9, 1976, with Vice Premier Li Hsien-nien
V. Notes on October 10, 1976 Meeting with Feng Kuo-chu,
Vice Chairman of the Shanghai Municipal Revolutionary
Committee
DECLASSIFIED
E.0.12958, Sec.3.6
PER state HVRE RE NLC-98-307
BY 5/5/29 NARS. DATE 5/14/99
October 26, 1976
The President
The White House
Washington, D. C.
Dear Mr. President:
Together with Senator John Glenn and a party of eight others,
I entered the People's Republic of China at Shanghai on September twenty-
first. The group departed from China three weeks later. In this third
visit to the Chinese People's Republic, I criss-crossed the country,
traveling about 9,000 miles by plane, rail, bus, ferry and automobile.
My itinerary led from Shanghai on the*East coast to the Sinkiang Uighur
Autonomous Region whose closed borders extend for hundreds of miles along
the frontiers of the Soviet Union and Outer Mongolia. The week's visit
in Sinkiang was the first of an official U. S. delegation. A warm recep-
tion was encountered from the local inhabitants of thirteen or more
nationalities.
In addition to Sinkiang in the Northwest, I visited cities in
Kiangsu Province, including Wuxi and Nanking, and in the southern province
of Kuangtung, the ancestral place of so many Americans of Chinese origin.
Several days were spent in Peking. Conversations were held there
with Wang Hai-jung, the Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs and Li Hsien-nien,
Vice-Premier of the State Council and other Chinese officials. Your ambas-
sador at the U. S. Liaison Office, Tom Gates, and members of his staff also
provided me with the benefit of their observations.
In my judgment, this visit to the People's Republic served as an
effective expression of the collaboration between the Presidency and the
Senate in the evolution of United States policy with regard to China. I
am happy to have been a part of this process since its outset which goes
back to the Johnson Administration when I made my first attempt to establish
contact with the Peking government.
In retrospect, even as it seemed to me at the time, President
Nixon's initiative in going to Peking in 1972 was a very wise decision in
that it ended a long period of debilitating inertia in United States policy
with regard to China. At best, the lapse of friendly contact between the
two countries for a quarter of a century undoubtedly contributed to great
DECLASSIFIED
E.0.12958, Sec.3.6
PER 5/5/99 state RE NLC-98-307
BY g NARS. DATE 5/14/99
The President
2
October 26, 1976
waste of U. S. resources in the Western Pacific. At worst, it may well have
been a factor in the outbreak of conflict between the Chinese and ourselves
in Korea, not to speak of the tragic U. S. involvement in Vietnam. Looking
ahead, the restoration of full diplomatic contact could take on great sig-
nificance for the welfare of the people of the United States.
It should be noted that almost five years have already passed since
President Nixon's ice-breaking visit to Peking. I would be less than candid
if I did not express the hope, that, henceforth, there will be a more positive
follow-through on the Shanghai Communique. For reasons which are set forth
in this report protracted delay tends to erode the value to this nation's
interest of the Nixon initiative.
With warm personal regards and high esteem, I am,
Respectfully,
fine manafied
CHINA AFTER MAO
Report to the President
on a
Third Mission to the People's Republic of China
by
Senator Mike Mansfield
Majority Leader
United States Senate
1976
DECLASSIFIED
E.0.12958, Sec.3.6
PER BY 5/5/99 State HVRE NLC-98-307
NARS. DATE 5/14/99
CHINA AFTER MAO
I. Introductory
My group arrived in Shanghai at the end of the official mourning
period for Chairman Mao Tse-tung. We entered a China which was far from
recovered from the shock of his death. The entire nation, from Shanghai on
the East Coast to the Uighur Autonomous region of Sinkiang in the distant
reaches of Central Asia was immersed in expressions of grief. It was as though
ve had come to a funeral wake of continental proportions.
The streets were strangely quiet. Ordinary conversations were held
in hushed tones. Chinese officials would fill up at the mention of the name
of "Chairman Mao." Sometimes they wept openly. Although the period of decreed
mourning was over, all entertainment and similar activities continued in sus-
pension.
The black arm-band was the hallmark of grief. Very few persons on
the streets of Shanghai, Manking and other cities were without them. Every-
where, building entrances were hung with black and white crepe balls. Scarcely
a wall was without a splash of Chinese characters paying homage to the leader
of the Chinese revolution. Over and over again, they read: "Chairman Mao you
will live forever in our hearts," "Great and wise teacher, Chairman Mao, will
not be forgotten for 10,000 years." Letters of condolence were posted by
workers and school-children on thousands of bulletin boards. Large portraits
of Mao, draped in black, were to be seen in homes, factories and schools and
on the streets, sometimes surrounded by great banks of flowers. In rural
China scarcely were we ever out of reach of loud-speakers which filled the
air from morning until night with the name of Chairman Mao and a recounting
of his life and thought.
- 2 -
Ten days after our arrival, October 1, the Chinese celebrated the
27th anniversary of the founding of the People's Republic. Although restrained
the celebration served as a catalyst. Thereafter, the grief subsided and the
pre-occupation with worrow changed rapidly. By the time my group left China
on October 12, people were going about their business in a normal fashion.
Word was just beginning to circulate about the elevation of Hua Kuo-feng to
the highest political leadership. It was not until after I left China that
I encountered the first reports concerning some doubt as to the precise nature
of Hua Kuo-feng's designation and rumors of a serious political struggle. As
a possible contribution to clarification of that situation, I recount herewith
as precisely as I can the circumstances which came to my attention during the
final days of my stay in China.
On Saturday morning October 9, I was notified in Peking by a Chinese
escort that the Chinese radio had just announced that:
(1) the Politburo of the Central Committee would be "headed"
by Hua Kno-feng;
(2) Hua Kuo-feng would also "head" the military commission of the
Central Committee;
(3) by order of the Politburo, a memorial hall would be erected
in Peking to preserve the remains of the late Chairman Mao
Tse-tung which would be contained in a crystal sarcophagus,
along the lines used for Lenin in Moscow, so that the Chinese
people might continue to view the Chairman. (This latter
step is alien to traditional Chinese practice but highly
significant, I think, of the determination and desire to
carry on the Mao tradition.)
- 3 -
(4) the Central Committee and other organs had announced
that all of Mao Tse-tung's written works would be
compiled in one set of volumes in due course and that,
immediately, work would be speeded up on bringing out
the 5th volume of the already published selected works
of Chairman Mao.
In some of the wall posters that were put up during the period from
Saturday night to Sunday noon in Peking and from Sunday afternoon to Tuesday
in Shanghai while we were in the two cities, the term "Chairman" was being
sued instead of "Leader" or "Head" to describe Hua Kuo-feng. We had no in-
dication whatsoever in Peking or Shanghai, however, that Chiang Ching, Wang
Hung-wen, Chang Chun-chiao, and Yao Wen-yuan, all from Shanghai, had been
arrested as was subsequently reported abroad. Nor was there any unusual
troop movements in either city or in Canton during our visit to the latter
city just prior to returning to Peking for the last time. There was no
official public announcement that Premier Hua Kuo-feng's selection as Chairman
of the Communist Party had been confirmed by an election of the Central Committee.
It is, I believe, reasonable to assume that the Politburo went into
continuous session after the death of Mao. Indeed, a possible reason for the
prolongation of the mourning period might have been to allow time to make the
necessary decisions on succession and related issues and to subject the matters
mentioned above to official confirmation by the Central Committee. It is my
further belief that speculation, rumors, inunendos and allegations should be
treated with the greatest circumspection and that no hasty judgments should
be arrived at until the facts become clearer.
- 4 -
Having entered that caveat, I would also note that there did not
appear to be any dissatisfaction with Hua Kuo-feng's role during the mourning
period. On the contrary, he was the central figure in the funeral ceremonies
for Chairman Mao and delivered the only eulogy which vas carried by T/V to all
parts of China. While it was by no means a case of "the King is dead, long
live the King," to all outward appearance the continuance of his leadership
established after the fall of Teng Hsiao-ping and while Mao Tse-tung was
still alive, seemed, generally, to be taken for granted.
Whatever the political ramifications, the mourning period did serve
a significant long-range purpose. It provided time for an important message
to be driven home to the Chinese people. The significance of Mao Tse-tung
was indelibly impressed on all of China during the period. Also highlighted
were the Chinese Communist Party and the Central Committee as the vehicles
for the conversion of Mao's thought into continued action for the development
of a socialist China. Whether in Urumchi, in Peking or in the villages of
South China, that message went out over and over again in essentially the
same words. It is doubtful that a household remains anywhere in China which
has not heard 1t repeated many times. Officials of the local Revolutionary
Committees, factories and communes which we visited vied with one another to
affirm and reaffirm the doctrine of Mao and the authority of the Party and
the Central Committee.
Whatever political currents may have been running under the surface,
a month after the death of Mao Tse-tung, China gave every appearance of having
been brought through the transition without major dislocations. The people
had gone back to work on commines and in factories, apparently intent on even
- 5 -
more Herculean efforts to produce and to continue to build a Communist state
through "class struggle." Hua Kuo-feng, as he had before, continued to
operate the bureaucratic structure of the central government. The authority
of that government was not questioned by anyone in my presence. To all out-
ward appearances, the nation was tranquil.
Whatever may emerge from the crucible of Chinese politics would not
cause me to modify a basic conclusion reached on my previous visit to China.
The critical elements which will confront our policy is not who leads China
after Mao. It is that, regardless of who leads, we will be living with a
Maoist state in which the revolutionary content will remain high for a long
time to come. The Chinese in their own way and in their own time will make
political adjustments. As far as the United States is concerned, that respon-
sibility is Chinese not ours and we would be well advised to avoid comments
as to our likes and dislikes and be prepared to accept and deal with whatever
Chinese government rules the state. Mao is gone but Maoism lives on.
II. The Political Situation
Some U. S. observers have tended to project the post-Mao situation
in China in terms of personalities. That tendency is not uncharacteristic of
our traditional approach to China. In an earlier time, when the mass of
Chinese were largely inchoate in a political sense, that was the only way.
The Chinese people, however, have now been politically activated and organized
in China and it does not accord with an accurate understanding of the realities,
in my judgment, to persist in the personification of Chinese politics.
In today's China, one would be hard pressed to find significant names,
let alone someone who could even begin remotely to approach the stature of
. 6 -
Mao Tse-tung. The old leaders of the Chinese revolution whose names and
reputations might have carried special weight with China's people are almost
gone. In one year alone, death has taken three: Chu Teh, Chou En-lai and
Mao Tee-tung. The handful of veterans of the Long March who are still in the
Peking government and the upper reaches of the party hierarchy are beyond
the age of vigorous participation in China's politics. There remain no great
names from which to draw a new personalized leadership.
The suggestion has been advanced that there may be a militarist
successor to Mao. In this concept, a military strong man is seen as emerging
in China's affairs in the pattern of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, perhaps
as part of a reappearance of the war-lordism of an earlier time. The prospects
of a denounement of that kind declined drastically with the death of General
Lin Piao. A war hero, Lin Piao had risen to great heights in party affairs
by seeming to expouse Mao's doctrine with great vigor and by his complete
support of Mao's leadership during the Cultural Revolution of the mid-
sixties. When he was suspected of plotting a coup, however, he sought refuge
in the Soviet Union and was reported killed in a plane crash.
At the present time, public esteem for the military is fixed on
the People's Liberation army, rather than on an individual military leader. The
armed forces themselves are closely integrated with the civilian population;
often, they constitute the almost indistingsishable vanguard of major civilian
undertakings such as the opening of new lands in Sinkiang or the relief of
the Tangshan earthquake.
The PLA is commanded by officers who, in the higher ranks, probably
are all members of the Communist Party who have been deeply indoctrinated
with political theory. They have been taught, not to stay out of politics
- 7 -
but to educate themselves in Leninism, Marxism, and Maoism and to immerse
themselves in the total affairs of the party. The principal leaders are
members of the Central Committee and there is no reason to assume that they
are other than loyal adherents to the Party and amenable to its discipline.
It would be my judgment, therefore, that there is very little
likelihood of a reversion to the ways of Old China either in terms of a
military dictatorship or regional militarism. If any tendency towards
military dominance were to appear, it is likely that it would develop and
be asserted within rather than outside the context of the Communist Party.
It should be borne in mind that all generalizations regarding China
are uncertain. The only near certainty is that Maoism constitutes a powerful
force that permeates the central government, the provinces and the localities
and all economic, cultural and social activities in China. The Maoist in-
doctrinated cadres appear to be, for the most part, dedicated, intense and
self-sacrificing and they constitute the vital political connection between
Peking and the remotest hamlets.
Whatever the succession to Mao, it will not signal the end of
political stress and conflict inside China. From the point of view of this
nation's legitimate concern, it would be well to bear in mind that the party
is destined to be the arena of political struggle for the foresecable future.
Mao's legacy is not only a Maoist state but a powerful Communist Party. The
Combination will not only continue to embrace Chinese society, it is bound
to be of growing significance to the world.
III. The Economic Situation After Mao
The inevitable growth of China's international importance in the
years ahead is foreshadowed by two recent events. Shortly before my arrival
- 8 -
for the third visit, the Chinese placed in orbit another earth satellite
of their own manufacture. A few days later, while in Sinkiang Province, I
was informed of the explosion of a Chinese nuclear device at Lop Nor, probably
not more than two hundred miles away. The radio-active fall-out from that
blast was such as to lead to protests in Japan 3,000 miles away and to the
triggering of measuring devices in the United States. Again, it was a
Chinese technical achievement from start to finish.
These two incidents may have been seen in some quarters as scientific
spectaculars. More likely, they were part of a deliberate plan of economic
development which dates at least from the inception of the first five year
plan in 1965. In the course of a decade most of the complex techniques of
a modern industrial state have already appeared in China. To cite an example,
in a hospital in the Sinkiang Capitol of Urumchi, an opthomological device
was in use, employing a laser for eye-surgery. This device was produced
entirely by Chinese technology in Shanghai. Textile and other light industries
employing thousands of men and women are now to be found in the backward
regions of Sinkiang, Kiangsu and Kwangtung Provinces. Thirty years ago
these places would have presented a picture of human misery and mass idle-
ness and ignorance. We visited new hydro-electric installations and industrial
plants producing 400,000KW capacity generators. None were of the latest
design but all embodied the technology of a modern industrial state. They
were far beyond comparison with old China.
Along the excellent railroads, highways and rivers, the smokestacks
of industry have multiplied markedly in the past four years. New housing
construction is apparent in the cities and rural areas. Passenger automobiles
. 9 -
are still a rarity but Chinese-made trucks and tractors, along with bicycles,
are beginning to clog the roads.
On the commines an intensive highly ingenious and fruitful agri-
culture is being practiced, involving spectacular feats of water control and
even the massive remodeling of land contours. Grains, vegetables, fruits,
cotton and every other manner of crops and live stock are produced in enormous
quantities.
The great stress in the Chinese economy remains on "do-it-yourself,"
an attitude which is present from the smallest units of production to those
of nationwide significance. The present Chinese approach to economic develop-
ment is almost entirely the product of Chinese ingenuity and effort. In this
connection, I would note that I was advised by your Ambassador that the Chinese
have shown no interest in the acquisition of advanced weapons from the United
States. Chinese interest has also faded, apparently, in importing U. S. food-
stuffs and fibers and even complex technology such as off-shore drilling
equipment. To be sure, China may be looking elsewhere for whatever outside
help may be required and there has been an imbalance Sino-U. 8. trade for
several years. These factors may underlie the present disinterest in purchases,
Allowing for such considerations, the fact still remains that there has emerged
in China, a new generation of confident and energetic people whose economy has
already revealed ingenious technological capabilities, from national planning
to vegetable cultivation.
The Chinese are putting together an economic structure that to all
appearances is well suited to meeting their expanding needs. Reasonably
uniform and balanced progress seems to be taking place throughout the nation.
There is no inflation: prices of necessities are virtually unchanged from
- 10 -
my first visit in 1972. Food supplies appear very ample. Clothing is in
better supply and quality than ever before. Housing is being upgraded and
the supply is expanding both in the cities and rural areas. Small comforts
such as clocks and radios are beginning to be provided on a mass basis. The
bicycle has become the universal form of private transportation, with an
occasional motorcycle or scooter starting to make an appearance.
The economic system is based on a high degree of local and regional
initiative, the participation of all available hands in productive work, and
the equitable treatment of all peoples, including women and national minorities
in regard to whatever amenities and opportunities are available. There are
wage and other income differentials but they are within a narrow range and
even these are eyed suspiciously in same political quarters as a vestige of
the old system. Chinese society involves a high degree of mutual concern
which is manifested in efforts to advance health and welfare and to educate
all children.
What is transpiring in China's internal developments then, is much
more profound than would be indicated by the two scientific pryotechnics
which were cited at the outset of this chapter. Rather, the modernization
of China is being pursued on a well-planned basis which brings in all seg-
ments of the populace and all regions of the country. The accent is heavily
on egalitarianism. The result is a massive economic surge, with the entire
population of 800 or 900 million people moving slowly but steadily towards
more adequate living standards.
Individuals have little significance in the economic system which
prevails, although they may ultimately be the gainers. The family is still
a unit of major importance. Most significant, however, is the conglamorate
- 11 -
of groups to which all individuals belong in oneway or another, whether
factory unions or production brigades or teams on the communes, or even
associations of neighborhood women sewing clothing for sale in local stores.
This unique structure involves a nation-wide decentralization into
cores of economic power in which industry is interspersed with agriculture
even in the most remote regions and in which politics and technology are
closely interwoven. Party cadres penetrate every part of China. Their
function is to educate workers and peasants in Mao's principles of serving
the common good and building socialism and to exhort all Chinese to produce
"more, faster and better" to achieve these ends.
Current during the time of my visit vas the slogan "turn grief into
strength." It vas designed to draw productive impetus from the passing of
Chairman Mao and it seemed to be achieving that purpose. This year's crops
are reported in excellent condition. Grain reserves are rising and the
concentration on mechanization of agriculture is becoming increasingly
evident. China's industrial technology is developing apace.
IV. International Aspects
At the time of my visit there vas no suggestion of imminent external
danger to China. The inner borders with the Soviet Union and Outer Mongolia
were described as "quiet." Full diplomatic relations with India had been
restored, thus tending to lift whatever pressures might still be present on
China's southwest border.
With regard to Indo-China, the possibility of a military clash with
the United States disappeared with the end of the Indo-China conflict. As
for Soviet activities in Hanoi if there is Chinese concern, no manifestations
- 12 -
came to my attention. Relations with Laos are good and the Chinese tie with
Cambodia is particularly intimate.
Although the completion of the Treaty of Peace and Friendship has
run into a snag, trade relations with Japan continue to be the most important
segment of China's foreign commerce. While not specifically endorsing U. S.
bases on Japanese soil, the Chinese were at pains to stress that Japan's
prime relationship is with the United States.
There is still caution concerning the possibility of a reappearance
of Japanese militarism. Irritants also have arisen from time to time in Sino-
Japanese relations. A case in point was the gratuitous advice which former
Japanese Foreign Minister Miyazawa offered to me last July to the effect that
the United States should not, in effect, follow the Japanese Formula, but,
rather, remain on Taiwan. so, too, vas the recent Chinese nuclear test while
I was in China. Japanese protests were ignored and another detonation took
place after my departure. At the same time, nevertheless, the attempt to
draw Japan away from the Soviet Union continues to be a basic objective of
Chinese foreign policy.
The Soviet Union is seen as the chief culprit of international
socialism and the greatest external danger to China. The words of denun-
ciation show no signs of abatement and China has dismissed all Soviet over-
tures which might suggest an ideological reconciliation. Indeed, to do
otherwise would be the equivalent of a rejection of Mao Tse-tung.
That is not to say, however, that Sino-Soviet state relations
have worsened. On the contrary, the Chinese appear less anxious than in the
past over the possibilities of Soviet aggression. To be sure, they are not
- 13 -
letting down their guard, as is plainly visible in Sinkiang. The border is
closed along its entire length and the Chinese Red Army is present in great
strength. There are occasional incidents on the central Asian frontier. 1
Soviet agents and spies are seized from time to time on the wrong side of
the border but according to the Chinese there has been no sabotage. Mao's
dicta of "dig the tunnels deep" and "store grain everywhere" are still being
followed closely, not only in Sinkiang but throughout the nation.
Over the past seven or eight years, efforts to resolve Sino-Soviet
border issues have been unsuccessful. Nevertheless, the two countries do
continue to exchange Ambassadors. Rail and air travel between them is
unimpaired. There is trade, although the value has declined drastically
during the past decade and a half.
The fact that the Chinese express less anxiety regarding Soviet
aggression as compared with past years may be due, in part, to growing
confidence in their own capabilities. It may also be attributable to a
Chinese wariness of Western inclinations (sometimes, scarcely concealed) to
place them in the position of counterpoint to the Soviet Union in a military
confrontation. Chinese officials react to such suggestions with a reverse
twist; they point out that the great bulk of Russian forces are stationed
on the Western frontiers of the U.S.S.R. and that Europe is the main objective
of Soviet expansionism. Western Europe is seen as "soft" and it is suggested
that the United States avoid a "Munich" mentality and do something to toughen
the NATO nations.
1/ The last major incident, the Chinese stated, however, occurred in 1969.
- 14 -
As for Asia, the Soviet military threat is described, first, as
directed at the United States, second, at Japan, and last, at China. They
also hold all U. S. agreements with the Soviet Union on arms control as
meaningless at best. We are even faulted for failing to recognize and to
counter Soviet-sponsored activities in Angola, notwithstanding the fact
that China extricated itself from that situation & long time ago.
Interestingly enough, unlike Africa, we are not asked to recognize
a similar danger of Soviet aggression in regard to Korea and to counter it
by keeping our military forces in the southern part of that country. On the
contrary, in Chinese words, "The U. S. would do a hell of a lot of good to
get the United Nations Command out. With your troops there you are in a
passive position. You could be in an active position." It is their view
that the Koreaus can settle their problems of unification by themselves.
What emerges from these sometimes seemingly contradictory positions,
in my judgment, is a portrait of a China which 1s very anxious to avoid
involvement in war. At the same time, the Chinese do not abhor the possi-
bility of a Soviet-U. S. clash but prefer that it not be in the vicinity
of China's borders.
The pattern suggests that Chinese foreign policies stem preponderantly
from national realities rather than ideology. While the government in Peking
might well resent the analogy, their views are not very dissimilar to those
of the prior government. In truth, an historic thread links the policies
which have been followed by Chinese governments in dealing with outside powers
for at least a century.
- 15 -
The most outward-looking aspects of China's foreign policy have
to do with the so-called Third World. That is where the principal cultural
and political links have been forged, where economic ties have been pushed
the most vigorously and where the Chinese have played the role of benefactor.
However, they have rejected the categorization of "leader" of the Third World
as inconsistent with Mao's dictume"never seek hegemony." They remain leery
of any attempt to recast them as a great power, much less a "super-pover."
Whatesmerges, then, from my third visit insofar as China's foreign
affairs are concerned is a portrait of a vigorous, well-unified nation anxious
to avoid war but determined to defend itself on the basis of great size,
population and a unified national consciousness. Its strategy is defensive
even to the point of remunciation of first-usage of nuclear weapons.
V. The Taiwan Question
Insofar as China's foreign policies involve the United States most
directly, they come to focus on Taiwan. As noted, the Chinese have serious
problems with the Soviet Union and those problems or other external con-
siderations could affect the manner of their pursuit of the Taiwan issue.
so, too, could serious prolonged inner political stress. There is nothing
to indicate, however, that their views have changed one whit regarding the
status of the island. It is, in their eyes, a part of Chinese territory--a
province. Peking's position, on this point, of course, is shared by the
Chinese on Taiwan as we recognized in the Shanghai Comminique. The position
has a long historic background. It has persisted for many centuries with only
occasional interruptions during periods of political weakness when control
of the island has been lost by the central Chinese government.
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Peking contends that the principle of one China including Taivan
has been confirmed by the United States in the shanghai Comminique. So far
as I am aware, we have not disputed that contention. There are some in this
country, to be sure, who deprecate the legal force of a Presidential joint
statement. When this view seems to dilute the significance of the Shanghai
Communique, the Chinese react with deep irritation. That is particularly
the case when it leads to new ambiguities in the U. S. position or to sug-
gestions for further delays in implementation. In this connection Chinese
concern centers on observations set forth recently by scholars and academicians
in the United States.
On the Chinese side, the Shanghai Communique is regarded as the
basic rationale of present Sino-U. S. relations. Hence, the continued
positioning of U. S. forces on the island, the existence of diplomatic
relations with the Republic of China and the U. S.-Taivan Defense Treaty
are seen as inconsistent with further progress in rapprochement.
The only "give" in the Chinese position so far as I could discern
has to do with a readiness to acknowledge our economic interests on the
island. Again, as on my previous visit, I gathered the strong impression
that the so-called "Japanese Formula" would be a satisfactory transitional
arrangement. The formula has worked well in regard to Japan and other countries'
which have shifted their diplomatic ties from Taipeh to Peking even as they
maintain quasi-official economic offices on Taiwan.
Such an arrangement, in my judgment, if it were to be made by this
nation might very well be self-sustaining for many years in the sense that it
serves China's interests. A military adventure against Taiwan is the last
thing China needs at a time of internal political transition and continuing
- 17 .
tension with the Soviet Union. Moreover, not unlike Hong Kong which is also
regarded as Chinese, Taiwan could serve as an entrepot of great economic
advantage to China in the event of peaceful unification. Finally, a quasi-
autonomous economic status for Taiwan for a period of years would permit in
due course an easier integration of the economic systems and living standards
of the island and the mainland. Such considerations, it seems to me, might
well tip the balance in Peking's scales against a military campaign in the
event of the severance of U. S. ties with the Taiwan government.
On the other side of the coin, it should be noted that Peking does
not hesitate to state their skepticism of peaceful unification. As one Chinese
put it, "The group of reactionaries in Taiwan would not lay down their butcher
knives of their own accord," and, in Mao's vords, "If you don't use a broom
to sweep the dust it will not go away." In short, the Chinese leaders in
Peking continue to insist on their right to use force in resolving the Taiwan
question. It should be borne in mind, however, that to renounce the use of
force over a part of one's national entity would be to acknowledge the absence
of full sovereignty over that part.
Besides making clear that the Japanese Formula is acceptable, the
Chinese have also stated time and again that they could be "patient" as
the United States worked out arrangements for disengagement from Taiwan.
What they will not do is to compromise their basic position in order to
simplify our task. It is flatly stated that they owe us nothing in regard
to Taiwan.
While patience is still in evidence, clearly there is also irrita-
tion with the delay in carrying out the intent of the Shanghai Communique.
As they point out, the U. S. intervention began 27 years ago even though it
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is scarcely five years since the Nixon visit. It seems to be objectivity
requires recognition of the fact that since the Shanghai Communique, Peking
has not only not presented an overt military menace to Taiwan, it has held
out the olive branch to the Taipeh government. It has released a mumber of
long-held Kuomintang military prisoners. Moreover, notwithstanding the final
disengagement of the United States from Quemoy and Matsu a few months ago,
additional military pressure has not been applied to these off-shore islands,
& step which almost certainly would have to be taken if an assault on Taiwan
were contemplated. Nor have there been any indications of a military build-
up against Taiwan in the confronting mainland province of Fukien.
In this same period we have also seen fit to reduce our forces on
Taiwan from about 10,000 to 2,000. We have not, however, taken any steps in
the direction of terminating the diplomatic relationship. Nor has the supply
of military equipment and technology to Taiwan been curtailed. On the contrary
it has been made explicit that we intend to leave the island with the capa-
bility of "defending" itself and there is some talk that Taiwan may develop
a nuclear capability in the not too distant future.
It is difficult to estimate when if ever China's "patience" may
come to an end over the Taiwan issue. As noted, timing may well relate to
the state of their internal affairs and the relationship with the Soviet
Union. There is no indication, whatsoever, at this time, that they will
reverse the progress toward normalization which has been made to date. Nor
for that matter, is there an indication, either, that they are prepared to move
forward on other aspects of Sino-U. S. relations. On the contrary, they are
straight-forward in stating that Taiwan stands as a block to further development.
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It may be that some grave international or internal development may lead
to alterations in this attitude but such is not now the case.
While no one can predict with certainty the turns of Chinese policy,
the odds would appear to be against a mainland attack on Taivan for many
years. If normalization is not completed, however, there could be a dis-
sipation of whatever impetus still remains from the Nixon initiative. The
Chinese might conclude in time that the Shanghai Communique is unreliable
and that our intentions are not of substance. In that case their principal
associations in the pursuit on international ends are likely to develop with
nations other than the United States in the year ahead.
V. Concluding Summary and Comments.
The inner party conflicts in the aftermath of Mao's death suggest
that there are two political struggles going on in China. One involves
personalities. Who of the post-Long March generation are the inheritors of
the mantle of Chinese leadership? It should be noted in any event, that the
principal candidates are all Marxists and ardent members of the Communist
Party. The clash of personality then, is not a question of party vs. non-
party members; the clash is inside the party; it is communist vs. communist.
The second struggle centers around two major approaches to China's
of
modernization. It is often spoken/in this country as a clash of the "leftist"
and "moderate" approaches. That is somewhat misleading in that both terms
are western in connotation. More descriptive, I think would be ideological
perfectionism vs. technocratic activism.
Again, in simplified terms, ideological perfectionism puts great
stress on the full implementation of Maoism or the final achievement of
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the dictatorship of the workers and peasants. Technocratic activism accents
the development of China into a fully modern state in the shortest possible
time by following a more pragmatic course. Bear in mind that neither approach
excludes the other and both do full obseissance to Mao Tse-tung's thought.
After Mao, personalities can be expected to come and go in Chinese leader-
ship, with none in the foreseeable future wielding his influence. The relative
stress which is given to the one or other approach, however, will influence
the long-range orientation of Chinese society and in due course could affect
the impact which China makes on the rest of the world.
It would be inadvisable to draw hasty conclusions about which of
the Chinese leadership personalities are likely to prove most desirable from
the point of view of this nation's national interests. We would also be
well advised not to jump to any conclusions that one line of Communist
development is more advantageous to the United States than the other.
Each is intent solely on China's welfare and progress and both
reflect the fact that the Chinese people have finally broken the ties with
a decadent past. Except for Taivan and some border areas held by the Soviet
Union, China has ceased to be merely a "geographic expression" and is now
a unified nation. Nationalism, as is comminism, is an authentic and powerful
force. The Chinese may follow either of the approaches delineated above or
continue to alternate between them as in the past. In any case, the end
result is likely to be a powerful collectivized national state. The Chinese
possess the essentil ingredients in terms of food, raw materials and scientific
knowledge and skills which are necessary to build such a state. Relations
with the outside world can affect the pace of progress in China but, in my
judgment, are no longer the vital factor in its achievement.
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Changes are taking place on a very broad scale and at a very rapid
rate in China. Any projection of the future which does not anticipate that
that country is likely to be one of the most powerful elements on the world
scene by no later than the turn of the century are likely to prove very short-
sighted. Indeed, the Chinese may well be understating as a matter of policy,
if not of modesty or inadequate record keeping the rate of growth in their
modern capabilities.
One guide to the rate of China's economic advance is the estimate
of Chou En-lai, one of China's great revolutionary figures and most capable
administrators. In the last report which he made to the National People's
Congress on January 13, 1975, he listed two stages of Chinese development:
"The first stage is to build an independent and relatively comprehensive
industrial and economic system before 1980; the second stage is to accomplish
the comprehensive modernization of agriculture, industry, national defense
and science and technology before the end of the century, so that our national
economy will be advancing in the front ranks of the world."
An international conflict, as noted, could prove catastrophic to
this project. But it would be a rash nation indeed that would seek to
challenge China on its home grounds. It is not simply a matter of a dis-
ciplined and dedicated and trained PLA of several million men. There are
also additional millions of Chinese civilians in the militia who are capable
of carrying on a guerilla warfare infinitely more harassing than that unleashed
against the Japanese in World War II. Also in readiness is a nuclear capa-
bility and missile emplacements throughout China. The cities are honey-
combed with tunnels and grain is being stored in the homes, communes and
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cities. At the same time, China's decentralized economic organization
tends to spread cores of self-reliance throughout the country thus providing
a greater immunity to the disruption of modern warfare than that enjoyed by
any other major nation in the world.
It is in the above context that we should perceive of our relation-
ship with the People's Republic of China. It seems to me of infinitely
greater importance to this nation and to our children and to our children's
children that the United States and China are both generally seeking the
same kind of world in the year 2,000 rather than whether or not our will
prevails in Taiwan or we make a quick sale of some of our military technology
or off-shore oil rigs or obtain access to China's petroleum surpluses.
In specifics, our fundamental national interests in regard to China
as I see them are the following: (1) That in the decades ahead, China be
peacefully inclined towards the United States; (2) That China participate
in building a stable international structure in the Western Pacific and the
world which is less dependent for the maintenance of peace on the presence of
U. S. military forces and massive U. S. military and other expenditures for
security; (3) That the contacts between China and the United States provide
opportunities for mutually beneficial cultural and commercial exchange.
It seems to me that the Taiwan issue stands athwart the path to
these objectives and the responsibility for removing it rests primarily with
us. We are continuing to ride two horses on Taiwan after most of the rest
of the world has long since discontinued the practice. If we are to continue
on this course, we ought at least to be clear in our own minds where it is
expected eventually to lead. To an independent Taiwan? To a Taiwan attached
to Japan or to the United States? If so, a different set of consequences are
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to be anticipated for each of these courses. While I suppose that it would
be possible to devise a rationale of policy for any of those courses, there
can be none for a policy which drifts aimlessly.
In all candor, it would appear that we remain enmeshed in Taiwan
on the basis of past policies and because of developments in our own political
situation since the signing of the Shanghai Communique which have complicated
the difficulties of disengagement. We ought to recognize that the problem
is not likely to became easier with the passing of time but may well become
more difficult. The longer the Taiwan issue remains in limbo, the more
pressure seems to be building for continuing indecision as a substitute for
policy. The more tortured become the proposals for evasion of the issue.
The Chinese, perhaps, can be understanding of our situation in this
respect, but only we can deal with it.
While the Taiwan issue remains in limbo, distortions are being
produced in the international situation in the Western Pacific which, in the
end may create serious difficulties for us. At the same time the possibilities
of cooperative action with the Chinese on a whole range of international
issues are held in abeyance. These possibilities include a settlement of
the Korean question which will permit us to withdraw our forces from the
Asian mainland; new security arrangements for the Western Pacific which would
be far less dependent on the present costly deployment of U. S. forces in
Japan and Okinawa; the reduction of the dangers which arise from all ramifi-
cations of nuclear power; joint actions to restrain excessive reaches of
Soviet power abroad. In my discussions, the Chinese dropped a strong inference
that they were prepared and, eager to seek out such areas of possible Sino-
U. S. cooperation, once the block of the Taiwan issue were removed.
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As I stated at the outset of this Chapter, what is of fundamental
relevance to the United States relations with China 1s neither internal
Communist politics or personalities. What is of major significance to this
nation is the development of a cooperative relationship with the government
of the Chinese people in the search for a durable peace in the Western
Pacific and in the world. Chou En-Lai, when I paid a final visit on him
in a Peking hospital in December 1974, referred to the resumption of Sino-
U. S. relations and said: "The door should never have been closed." It
is partially open now. In my judgment, it needs to be opened fully and
without delay.
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MEETING WITH WANG HAI-JUNG, VICE MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
Thursday, October 7, 1976, 4:10 p.m.
Peking Guest House
PRESENT: Vice Minister Wang Hai-jung
Dr. Chou Pei-yuan, Chinese Academy of Sciences
Tang Wen-sheng (Nancy Tang), Deputy Director, American and
Oceanian Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Senator Mike Mansfield
Mrs. Mike Mansfield
Senator John Glenn
Mrs. Glenn
David Dean, U. S. Liaison Office
Mrs. Dean
Francis R. Valeo, Secretary of the Senate
Norvill Jones, Consultant, Senate Foreign Relations Committee
Charles Gellner, Library of Congress
Salpee Sahagian, Administrative Assistant to Senator Mansfield
Katherine Prosser, Secretary to Senator Glenn
Dr. Thomas Lowe, Physician
Victor H. Dikeos, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State
Vice Minister -- First of all, I would like to extend my welcome
to Senator and Mrs. Mansfield, Senator Glenn and Mrs. Glenn and to all the
American friends seated here this afternoon, on behalf of all my Chinese
colleagues present here.
Senator Mansfield -- We appreciate the welcome that Madame Vice
Minister has given us. We are delighted to see her again after two years
this coming December, and we would like to take this occasion to express,
on behalf of the Glenns, the Mansfields and the whole party, our deepest
condolences and sympathy on the passing of your great leader Chairman Mao
Tse-tung.
Vice Minister -- Thank you.
Senator Mansfield -- We would also like to express our thanks and
appreciation to the shepherds who have been guiding their flock: Madame Kang,
Mr. Fan, Mr. Cheng, Mrs. Ku and Miss Tsung.
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Vice Minister -- You are an old acquaintance of ours, an old friend.
Senator Mansfield -- We appreciate that, and we are delighted to
renew our friendship with the good Doctor when last we met at Peking University.
And it is always a pleasure to see Nancy Tang.
Vice Minister ne You are an old friend of ours and many of the
Chinese friends seated here are also old friends of yours.
Senator Mansfield -- Yes, it is, in a sense, like a homecoming.
Vice Minister -- They call you "Chinese Mike."
Senator Mansfield -- Wait until I see Nancy's father.
Vice Minister -- You have been traveling in Sinkiang and Kwangtung
and I assume that Madame Kang did not make your journey too tiring.
Senator Mansfield -- Well, if she made us tired, she made herself
just as tired and her group as well. But we kept up with her.
Vice Minister -- You are our guests who have traveled a long way to
visit us, and after two years, you have come back to our country once again
and visited Sinkiang as well as Kwangtung. May I know what is your impression
of the trip and the visit?
Senator Mansfield -- We have been very impressed with the progress
which has been made. of course, for us it was our first visit to Sinkiang.
But we found a calm, competent people in that autonomous area and that in-
cluded the nationalities whom we met in number. It reminded some of us, like
Mr. Dikeos and me, of our own state of Montana which is, at best, a developing
state and perhaps in some respects underdeveloped. But the topography and the
people and the products raised, except for peanuts and fruits, were comparable.
We were astounded with the progress of Kwangtung. We saw some areas down there
that we had never been to before and we noted the increase in traffic in Peking,
the general well-being of the people, and the signs of a very good harvest this
year. In other words, progress. You have come a long way towards achieving
stability and economic progress--a long way still to go--and it was a heartening
experience to see how the people received us--how friendly and how courteous
they were--and we think we learned & lot in addition to what we learned before.
Vice Minister -- All of these progresses and achievements have been
scored under the correct leadership of Chairman Mao Tse-tung and by implement-
ing the correct policies and lines formulated by him and as a result of the
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brilliance and guidance of Mao Tse-tung's thought. Of course, what we have
achieved is still not enough and we will have to increase our efforts in the
future. So in the days to come, we will inherit the bequest of Chairman Mao
Tse-tung and continue to carry on the revolutionary course and to continue
to march along the great course charted by Chairman Mao Tse-tung, the revolu-
tionary course, and to win and to strive for even greater progress and achieve-
ments.
The whole party, the whole army and the whole people in our country
were deeply grieved at the death of our leader, Chairman Mao Tse-tung, but we
are determined to turn grief into strength and to respond to the call of the
Central Committee of the Communist Party of China and to turn grief into
strength and to rally more closely around the Central Committee of our party
and march along the revolutionary course charted by Chairman Mao Tse-tung.
Although the Chairman has left us, the brilliant thought which he has left us
will continue to guide us forever and we will resolutely continue to march
along the course charted by him and with our own actions will commemorate our
great leader. When every one of us recollects how we grew up and the earth-
shaking changes that have taken place in our Motherland, which have been brought
about in this socialist revolution, and when we think of the present thriving
scene of our great socialist Motherland, all of us could not but pay tribute
to our great leader, Chairman Mao Tse-tung. There would be no China of today
if there had been no Chairman Mao.
When we recollect the opening of relations between China and the
United States, it is also Chairman Mao who made this brilliant decision.
Senator Mansfield -- We are well aware of that fact. We have seen
the grief and bereavement of the people throughout parts of China in which we
have traveled. This has been a year of tragedy for this great nation with
the passing of Chu Teh, Chou En-lai and Chairman Mao Tse-tung, all veterans
of the Long March. It has been a tragedy because of the earthquake in the
Tangshan area and smaller earthquakes in other areas. But like the Phoenix,
China will rise out of the ashes of this great tragedy and, as you said--and
the people up and down this land have said--will turn grief into strength and
carry on.
And I could point out, if I may, when Mrs. Mansfield and I saw the
late Premier Chou En-lai in December a year ago, he told us at that time that
the person responsible for the initiating of relations between China and the
United States was Chairman Mao who had read an article in the American quarterly,
Foreign Affairs, before Nixon became President and, on the basis of that article,
the initiation of relations was started. I think that is an indication of the
foresight of Chairman Mao and, certainly, he was responsible for the inauguration
of a better relationship, seeking a normalization between our two nations.
Vice Minister -- That is true.
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Senator Mansfield --- Madame Vice Minister, how do you think the
relations between our two countries shape up at the present time?
Vice Minister -- May I know what is your observations and views
of the present status of the relations of our two countries?
Senator Mansfield --- Mine?
Vice Minister -- Yes.
Senator Mansfield ---- I believe that they are progressing, perhaps
not as fast as the People's Republic of China would desire nor as fast as
we would desire. The Shanghai Communique states unequivocably that there are
not two Chinas, but one China. The implementation of the Communique has not
been as fast as some of us would like but progress has been made and progress
will be made--not at the moment because we have an election to decide--but,
hopefully, after that decision has been made, either President Ford, if he
is elected, or Governor Carter, if he is elected, will be able, on the basis
of a four-year term to give the kind of attention and consideration to China-
U. S. relations which has not been possible because of factors which you all
understand: the shortness of the term of President Ford when he succeeded
former President Nixon after his resignation; a political campaign which be-
gan a year ago; and a decision to be made less than 8, month from now on
November 2 as to who will be inaugurated as President on January 20, 1977.
Vice Minister -- On the question of normalization, I would like to
express my view also. In his report to the government at the Fourth National
Peoples Congress, Chou En-lai pointed out in that report that, provided both
parties abide by the principles of the Shanghai Communique, Sino-American re-
lations can be improved and this point was also mentioned by Senator Mansfield
a few minutes ago. On the question of normalization, I would assume that
Senator Mansfield and other American friends sitting here this afternoon are
very clear on what our stand is: that is the Japanese Formula and also the
three principles, namely: the abrogation of the treaty; the withdrawal of
American troops; and the severance of diplomatic relations. Any one principle
missing will not do. It also will not do to undertake any disguised formula.
There is no other alternative. We do not believe in so-called peaceful transi-
tion. As Chairman Mao Tse-tung teaches us, if you do not use a broom to sweep
the dust, the dust will not run away by itself.
The butchers on Taiwan will not lay down their knives of their own
accord. Therefore, we do not believe in a peaceful transition and we base
ourselves on a footing to fight. As to when we shall liberate Taiwan, that
is purely our internal affair and no other country has the right to interfere.
This stand of ours has been made clear to many of our American friends.
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Senator Mansfield -- I would not disagree with what has just been
said as to what China's position is. It has been reiterated time and time
again. It was understood, in large part, at the time that former President
Nixon and the late Premier Chou En-lai signed the Shanghai Communique, and
it vas anticipated then, I am sure, and still is anticipated that when the
joining or rejoining of Taiwan and the PRC takes place that it would be by
peaceful means.
As we all know, there have been ups and downs on the Taiwan question.
As far as troop withdrawal is concerned, there has been a reduction from 10,000
to less than 2,000. As far as the Japanese formula is concerned, that was
stated on several occasions on our last visit in December 1974 but I am sure
you recognize, Madame Vice Minister, that on our part there are a lot of knots
to be untied, that it will take a little time. The Chinese are noted for their
patience and their understanding of practical situations over the centuries
and I am sure that you are aware that it will take a little time to untie or
untangle the knots before we can bring about full normalization. Furthermore,
under our Constitution the untying of those knots lies not with the Congress
but with the President of the United States. President Ford, in Honolulu on
December 8, 1975, last year, stated that his goal was to proceed towards, and
I believe I quote him correctly, "full normalization of our relations with the
People's Republic of China."
Vice Minister -- If this issue is not solved and if it is being pro-
longed, the responsibility is not on the side of China but on the side of the
United States.
Senator Mansfield -- I have indicated that we have a lot of knots to
untie, it will take a little time.
Vice Minister -- I think we are patient enough. It has been more
than 27 years now and we have waited for more than 27 years now.
Senator Mansfield -- That is a long time, but President Nixon did
not visit the PRC until February 1972, less than five years ago, and I think
that factor ought to be taken into consideration as well as the 27 year span.
Vice Minister -- On this issue we feel that it is the United States
who oves us a debt. We do not owe the United States anything.
Senator Mansfield --- I would say that it is up to the United States
to fulfill its part of the Shanghai Communique.
Vice Minister -- We have a saying in China that it is for the doers
to undo the knot.
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Senator Mansfield -- Again, all I can counsel is patience. This is
a difficult year for us as it was for you. I think the Shanghai Communique
was signed in good faith and with good intent on both sides, and I believe
what former President Nixon said and what President Ford said within the past
year about his intentions. It is, of course, the only stumbling block between
our two countries on the road to full normalization of relations. But you
mentioned the Japanese formula, Madame Vice Minister, and under that formula
the Japanese withdrew recognition from Taipei and established relations with
Peking. Under that formila, the Japanese continue to trade with Taiwan and
their trade is larger and more profitable than ever. Under that formula,
you do have an alternative or a subterfuge because the situation on Taiwan
has not changed as far as Japan is concerned but Japan has benefitted tremen-
dously, perhaps not by the formula itself but by circumstances connected with
the transformation. They do have trade organizations established in both
Tokyo and Taipei and it is a subterfugre and the one in Taipei, I believe, is
headed by a former Japanese Ambassador. I think there are former foreign
service people in the Taiwan organization in Tokyo and even the Japanese
formula has its nuances and one has to understand that it has not cut the
Gordian knot completely and there are knots to be untied before that formula
would reach the position which the Chinese want, a clear-cut severance of all
relations between the United States and Taiwan.
Vice Minister -- That is the big question.
Senator Mansfield -- That is the big obstacle which confronts both of
us before full normalization can be achieved. Your position has been clear-cut--
nothing messy about it all the way through. I am sure you recognize the diffi-
culties which I have been trying to outline in brief which confronts us. Are
there any other areas in which there are differences between our two countries
which you think are of significance?
Vice Minister -- As to our principle stand, we have said it time
and again and it is clear to all. There is no other alternative. As to
other difficulties, I would assume that you have to ask President Ford or
Secretary Kissinger. As to our stand on the question of Taiwan, I think
it is clear to all.
Senator Mansfield -- It is clear to all but what I raise is what are
the other differences. I realize that Taiwan is the big one but what are the
other differences?
Vice Minister -- May I know what is your view and what do you think?
Senator Mansfield --- About the differences?
Vice Minister -- Yes.
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Senator Mansfield -- Well, I am asking the questions and then they
are thrown back to me.
Vice Minister -- Will we become football players, passing the ball
back and forth?
Senator Mansfield -- You mean she throws a forward pass or runs
in reverse.
Vice Minister -- Maybe I can play the back--not the forward.
Senator Mansfield -- Well, as long as I am asking my own questions,
I might as well answer them.
Vice Minister -- I feel that under the present state of affairs,
the state of relations between China and the United States can be only what
it is at the present moment.
Senator Mansfield -- In other words, I take it that aside from Taiwan,
they are satisfactory.
Vice Minister -- In the present world, our two countries share many
common points and the world issues--the international issues--are big issues
and Taiwan is only a minor issue.
Senator Mansfield -- In your eyes.
Vice Minister -- In comparison to world issues.
Senator Mansfield -- There are world issues and, of course, China's
position as the leader of the Third World nations is well known, and I believe
this has been brought out in speeches by your leading officials. Chinese
sympathy with the underdeveloped nations is well known.
As far as the question of trade between our two countries, after the
visit of President Nixon the trade was heavy in our favor but that has been
alleviated and less in total. There has been an evening out between exports
and imports.
While we were in Sihkiang, the Chinese exploded another nuclear device
which indicates great progress in that field. We know China's position is not
in favor of the control of nuclear weapons. It has stated that it would not be
the first to use nuclear weapons against any country, I believe, under any cir-
cumstances. China also favors complete disarmament, which could be a contradic-
tion. Our position is in that direction, too, because we do not believe in first
strikes.
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In oil, our oil imports are roughly 50% of our energy needs. But
it is an abnormal and unncessary figure because we waste so much of our
energy in comparison to China. You are self-sufficient in oil. I assume
you have tremendous reserves, particularly on the continental shelf and in
the Pohai Gulf. You have tremendous reserves according to public reports
so that you can not only be a self-sufficient nation in your energy needs,
not especially in oil but in hydropower, coal, etc., but you could be an
oil exporting nation. So many things are in China's favor. But what the
Chinese have been able to do, and this, I think, is most significant, is on
a self-reliant basis. You have developed your own resources to fulfill your
own needs and you have sown your crops and harvested them to fulfill the needs
of your people. You have refused outside help as, for example, at the time of
the Tangshan disaster, and I think that is China's credit. It is a sign of
self-reliance. I wish more countries could be as self-reliant.
Frankly, Madame Wang, I know of no major difference outside of Taiwan.
I do not think President Ford would have written and asked me to undertake this
mission--a copy of his letter was sent to the Chinese Liaison Office in Wash-
ington--nor would there be more exchanges between our scholars and others and
the visits of Members of Congress, both in the House and Senate, unless there
is a desire on behalf of both of our sides to obviate our differences and, in
time, reach a mutual understanding in all areas.
Vice Minister --- Indeed, we belong to the countries of the Third World
but we are not the leader and we do not seek to be the leader. Chairman Mao Tse-
tung teaches us never to seek hegemony and we would have to resolutely act in
accordance with the teachings of Chairman Mao. Independence and self-reliance
is also an instruction by Chairman Mao. Senator, I would like to ask you a
question.
Senator Mansfield -- First, may I say you don't always seek leader-
ship--sometimes it is thrust upon you.
Vice Minister -- You visited Japan lately. May I know what is your
observation on the political scene in Japan and also Japan's foreign policy?
Senator Mansfield --- Japan's foreign policy is tied to the United
States, as you well know, and as long as that tie exists, you won't have a
resurgence of militarism in Japan.
On the domestic side, we are aware of the fact that Prime Minister
Miki is in difficulty with his own party primarily because of his attitude
about exposing the Lockheed scandal as it affects Japanese governmental and
business personalities and concerns. Whether or not Miki will survive be-
cause of the difficulties within the elements of his own party is an open
question but he has the press and the people with him and my personal view
is that he has done a tremendous job under the circumstances.
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As far as Japan is concerned, on the one hand is the fishing rights
on the open seas and on the other hand it is concerned about Soviet naval
strength off the western coast of Japan and off Okinawa. Its strength lies
in its economy. It ranks third among the nations of the world because of its
output. It is undergoing a period of grave inflation and prices are sky high
and there is no control like here, where you have no depression, inflation,
unemployment or recession. Japan is competitive in a capitalistic market,
although I believe she does carry on a sizeable trade with the PRC.
Perhaps Senator Glenn could ask a question or two.
Senator Glenn -- Thank you. I would like to express my personal
appreciation also for all the hospitality extended to us during our visit
in China. We have traveled from east to west, north to east, north to
south and south to north so far on our trip, and I think our two countries
are very similar in that we have large variations in climate, deserts and
very fertile areas. We have seen first hand the Chinese taking a very
practical approach to some of their problems, particularly in agriculture.
The Chinese have a reputation around the world of being very practical people.
Chairman Mao was a very practical man. In some of his teachings, he taught
that major problems should be faced at one time and minor problems at another
time.
To return for just a. moment to Taiwan, it would appear to me that
perhaps the way to look at that is from a standpoint of major problems and
minor problems. I understand the ties of the people and land make this a
very aggravating problem for the PRC. It is a problem that must be resolved
but it is not a threat to mainland China. It is more a thom in the side
which must be resolved at some time. The reason that I term it more a thorn
in the side is because it would seen that we almost have a gun at China's
head with a million Russian troops on China's borders. In this dealing with
the Russians, it seems to me we have a great common concern which should be
uniting our coun tries.
I agree completely that there must be a resolution sometime in the
future of the Taivan problem. But in taking care of the major problem first,
it seems to me that Russia is a major threat to the life of China whereas
Taiwan is not. Would Madame Vice Minister care to comment on that beyond what
has already been said before?
Vice Minister -- It has been stated very explicitly in the Shanghai
Communique that Taiwan is a province of China and is an inalienable part of
China. As to when shall we liberate Taiwan and how we shall liberate it,
that is our own internal affair. Since it is our internal affair, no other
country has a right to interfere. To answer your question of threat by the
Soviet Union, chis is a major threat against China. It is true that the Soviet
Union is a threat to China but its threat is mainly directed against the United
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States. The United States has many areas of interest to defend in all parts
of the world and the Soviet Union is out for world begemony and such a situa-
tion will never change.
I mentioned earlier that Taiwan is a minor issue relative to world
issues. I have also pointed out that under the present world situation, we
share many common points and we have to face in common that rascal. But in
the west and in the United States, there is a thinking of appeasement towards
the Soviet Union which is very dangerous.
Senator Mansfield -- You mean detente?
Vice Minister -- Yes.
Senator Mansfield -- What do you think about U. S. troops being
stationed in South Korea, Okinawa and our bases in the Philippines?
Vice Minister -- It has been our constant stand to oppose the station-
ing of troops or the construction of military bases by any country in a third
country. We do not have a single soldier outside of Chinese territory.
Senator Mansfield -- That is true. What about NATO? Would you like
the United States to withdraw its troops from western Europe?
Vice Minister -- Well, this is your own affair and we have no suggestions
to offer.
Senator Mansfield -- I will not pursue the question further.
Vice Minister -- Shall we call it a day now and in the evening the
host, Professor Chou Pei-yuan, would like to dine with you as an expression
of our friendship for our honored guests.
Senator Mansfield -- We would be delighted.
Vice Minister -- It is very likely that the day after tomorrow one of
our Vice Premiers would like to meet Senator Mansfield and perhaps some of the
others and talk with you. The day after tomorrow, Saturday. Originally we
mentioned that it would be tomorrow but it is on Saturday.
Senator Mansfield - Thank you, Madame Vice Minister. We appreciate
your giving us so much of your time and we hope this colloquy will give a better
understanding of our relations but we certainly understand the circumstances.
Vice Minister -- We do not seek to hide our views.
Senator Mansfield -- On the contrary.
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Vice Minister - I agree that we have differences of opinions.
Our two social systems are different.
Senator Mansfield --- They are very different and the best thing to do
is, as we say, "lay our cards on the table--not up the sleeve."
Vice Minister -- In other words, candid.
Senator Mansfield -- Yes. I am going to make a request of Madame Kang
that the rest of the party be able to see the Great Wall. I will meet with the
Vice Premier but I want the rest of the party to go out. It is one of the most
remarkable wonders of the world.
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MEETING WITH VICE PREMIER LI HSIEN-NIEN
Saturday, COPY October 1976, 3:50 p.m.
Peking
PRESENT: Vice Premier Li Hsien-nien
Wang Hai-jung, Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs
Chou Pei-yuan, Chinese Academy of Sciences
Tang Wen-sheng (Nancy Tang), Deputy Director, American and Oceanian
Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Senator Mike Mansfield
Mrs. Mansfield
Senator John Glenn
Mrs. Glenn
David Dean, U. S. Liaison Office
Mrs. Dean
Francis R. Valeo, Secretary of the Senate
Norvill Jones, Consultant, Senate Foreign Relations Committee
Charles Gellner, Library of Congress
Salpee Sahagian, Administrative Assistant to Senator Mansfield
Katherine Prosser, Secretary to Senator Glenn
Dr. Thomas Lowe, Physician
Victor H. Dikeos, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State
Vice Premier -- Welcome to you and to your friends.
Senator Mansfield -- Thank you very much, Mr. Vice Premier. We are
very pleased to be here and to see the new progress that has been made in China.
Please allow me to express my condolences and those of Mrs. Mansfield, Senator
and Mrs. Glenn and our entire party at the passing of your great leader, Chair-
man Mao.
Vice Premier -- Thank you. Thank you very much. You are an old
friend. How many times have you visited China?
Senator Mansfield -- Three times since Liberation.
Vice Premier -- And before Liberation?
Senator Mansfield -- Three times also.
Vice Premier -- You are an old friend, indeed. Which places have
you visited this time?
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Senator Mansfield -- We have been very fortunate to spend a week in
Sinkiang and we spent a number of days down in Kwangtung. We have come to
Peking three times on this journey. We also went to Nanking and Shanghai, plus
the Great Wall and we will leave from Shanghai.
Vice Premier -- So you only have Tibet left to see.
Senator Mansfield -- And Inner Mongolia.
Vice Premier -- It is easy to reach there. You friend, Dr. Schlesinger
went to Tibet and also to Sinkiang.
Senator Mansfield -- He also went to Kweilin and one day we will have
to make it to Kweichow. Frank Valeo served in Kweichow during the Japanese-
American War. He was a sergeant then.
Vice Premier -- What year was that?
Mr. Valeo -- In 1944-45, towards the close of the Japanese war.
Vice Premier -- We were fighting at that time. Personally, I ceased
fighting after 1949. I did not fight in the Korean War against U. S. imperialists.
Senator Mansfield -- The Vice Premier vas on the Long March too,
wasn't he?
Vice Premier -- Yes. Yes, I fought from 1930 to 1949. That was a
long time or, rather, you might say beginning in 1927.
Senator Mansfield -- We were very much impressed with the tremendous
progress in China since our first visit. We have noticed much mechanization
on the farms, an increase in the number of tractors being used, and many more
trucks. And it seems to me, with the tremendous number of bicycles and the
increase in the number of trucks, that you are even approaching a traffic pro-
blem in Peking.
Vice Premier -- We have made some progress and we have made some success.
They were achieved under the leadership of our great teacher and leader, Chairman
Mao. But still we are not satisfied. Compared with your standards we are still
comparatively backward and, therefore, we term ourselves a socialist developing
country.
Senator Mansfield -- But that is not a proper standard of comparison.
You have to compare with the situation before 1949 to understand what has happened
to this nation.
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Vice Premier -- I agree with you. There is one aspect in which we
are more advanced than you are--that is the size of our population.
Senator Mansfield -- That brings me to the next question. How big
do you estimate the population of China to be?
Vice Premier -- It is impossible to say.
Senator Mansfield -- Well, if it will make you feel any better and I
don't know how they did it, but the Bureau of the Census in the U. S. Department
of Commerce in a recent publication estimates that the population, and I believe
it was 2 or 3 months ago, to be 943,000,000 people. Don't ask me how they
estimated it because I don't know.
Vice Premier -- We say that we have 800,000,000 people but our
Ministry of Commerce says we have 900,000,000 because they always have to
supply goods for the markets and food for the people and they always exaggerate.
We are trying to control the growth of our population.
Senator Mansfield -- Except among the minorities.
Vice Premier -- Yes, that is right. It is not easy. Some people
don't listen, especially in the rural areas. In the cities the people heed
more to our words like, for instance, those seated here heed more to those
words. It is a very troublesome issue and takes a lot of work. It is a
troublesome issue--a problem.
Senator Mansfield -- You have a lot of land which is needed to produce
food for such a large population.
Vice Premier -- In China you know the influence of Confucius on the
people's thinking is still very great. For instance, he had a concept that it
was good for the people to have many children and grandchildren. This is a
concept that must be criticized. But in recent years, the population growth
has been slowing down.
Senator Mansfield -- The Vice Premier is noted for his economic and
financial knowledge. It is my understanding that a new five-year plan has been
projected for China. Could you give us some idea, if my information is correct,
as to what is envisioned in that five-year plan?
Vice Premier -- You are lauding me too highly.
Senator Mansfield -- I don't think SO.
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Vice Premier -- We have drawn up a five-year plan. Our general idea
is to make some economic development of the country under the guidance of
Chairman Mao's revolutionary line and of the basic line of our party, grasp
the class struggle as the key link and move further towards the goal envisioned
in Premier Chou En-lai's report to the Fourth National People's Congress. We
base ourselves on self-reliance and are self-reliant in the main. We fully rely
and give play to the enthusiasm of our working class and the poor and middle
peasants, the working intellectuals and all the masses of our country.
We cannot do like the Soviet Union--that is to go around the world
begging for aid and incurring debts. We don't want to do that. We believe
in self-reliance and the concept of self-reliance is not something new. Dur-
ing the war time the Chairman had already, long ago, advocated self-reliance.
At that time we did not have any ordnance factories. We did not have any large
amounts of money. We relied on the enthusiasm of our people and once that is
aroused, the strength and power of the people know no limits. Of course, that
requires some hard living conditions for our people. We will improve the stan-
dard of living for our people with the development of production. But the
standard of living has not improved so very much. We must balance our budget,
that is the income and spending must be equal, because if it is not in balance
and running in the red, we will have to increase the amount of money and it is
not good to circulate too much money because this will affect the stabilization
of prices. To be more specific, our policy is to organize the economy in order
of priorities of agriculture first and then light industry and then heavy in-
dustry. Agriculture must be developed first because people have to eat. This
is something no one can change and they must have clothes to wear. They also
want some meat. We stress having sufficient food and sufficient quantity of
food to eat. As for the quality of food, we cannot say it is, at the present
time, very high. We stress having sufficient clothing--that is being able to
keep people warm enough. We do not, at present, stress that people be dressed
up so fancy. Some of our comrades, especially some of our women comrades,
could afford to dress up more prettily but they don't seen to want to do SO.
I think that is a good thing. For instance, the ladies sitting here today;
no one said that they have to wear a certain uniform or that they must wear a
certain kind of dress. No one has laid down a certain rule. They like to
dress that way.
Senator Mansfield -- Yes, but they are in style just like we are
in our dress.
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Vice Premier -- Our national economy is a very complicated matter.
You know, of course, ours is planned. Sometimes we commit mistakes and when
we see that we have made mistakes, we correct it. Looking at the general
situation we see that the spirits of the people are high. You have put it
correctly what you said just now. When we make a comparison, we should compare
our progress with that of Chiang Kai-shek's times and the famines we had at that
time when we had several million people dying of hunger every year. We have
been able to eliminate problems of that kind. But we have capitalist elements
in the country.
As for those socialist imperialists, they do not admit they have
bourgeoise elements or a capitalist class. We admit that we have a bourgeoisie
element in our country. There are old bourgeoisie elements and there are new
ones. The Soviet Union says it has no bourgeoisie. As I see it, Brezhnev is
the chief bourgeoisie himself. There are those in the international scene who
are fearful that the relationship between the Soviet Union and China will change
with the passing of Chairman Mao and they seem mortally afraid to see this happen.
We have fundamental differences; in ideology and, especially, on the question of
dictatorship of the proletariat. We have been debating for BO many years because
they have revised the basic principles of Marxism-Leninism. That is why we call
them revisionists.
As for state relations with the Soviet Union, we are willing to main-
tain state relations with them on the basis of the five principles of peaceful
co-existence. When Chairman Mao passed away they tried to send us a message
of condolence from the Central Committee of the CPSU. We rejected it. You
probably know this.
Senator Mansfield -- Yes, it was given wide publicity.
Vice Premier -- We do not agree to be a party in the sending of a
message from a sham communist party to a genuine communist party. The line
we follow in foreign affairs has been laid down by our great leader Chairman
Mao and we will resolutely carry that line on.
Senator Mansfield -- And what about the United States?
Vice Premier -- The Shanghai Communique. Shall we move a step further?
Senator Mansfield -- Yes.
Vice Premier -- That is your business.
Senator Mansfield -- We can discuss it.
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Vice Premier -- Well, I suppose that the discussion would be around
the Taiwan issue and nothing but the Taiwan issue. You also made clear in
the Shanghai Communique that you agree that all Chinese on either side of the
strait agree that there is one China and that one China is the People's Republic
of China. How do you feel on that issue?
Senator Mansfield -- I think the Shanghai Communique vas entered into
in good faith when it was signed by Premier Chou En-lai and President Nixon.
But I think you have to recognize the fact that a number of events, one of them
of extraordinary significance--the Watergate affair, have intervened and have
played a most important part in our domestic situation which, in turn, could be
related to our foreign policy. These events diverted our interest from important
matters in foreign policy to the most important matter affecting our Constitution.
It vas finally settled through the resignation of Nixon and the selection, under
the Constitution, of President Ford by the Congress, not by the will of the people
but under the 25th Amendment of the Constitution of the United States. So it was
perfectly legal and you had a beginning of & new presidential campaign which is
now coming to a close. President Ford has only had a comparatively short time in
office before being engaged in a political campaign which is to be settled on
November 2. When that is decided we will have to wait until January 20, 1977
for the inauguration of either President Ford, who would be elected for the first
time, or of Governor Carter, who would be elected for the first time. Then the
next President will have a four year span during which something can be done.
This is in stark contrast to the last few years when we had the turmoil of the
Watergate affair which shook the United States and the beginning of a campaign
about 12 years ago. I think these factors should be kept in mind.
You will recall that after President Ford visited the People's Republic
of China last year, he stopped off in Honolulu and made a statement in which he
emphasized his goal was the full normalization of relations between our two coun-
tries. I think President Ford has the interests of better relations between our
two countries at heart and if Governor Carter is elected, he will, I believe,
feel the same way. Our policy has been set and it makes no difference whether &
Democrat or a Republican is elected President--that policy will remain.
As I told Madame Vice Foreign Minister a few nights ago, President
Ford would not have asked me to undertake this journey unless he was very in-
terested and, at an appropriate time, could look towards something which could
finalize the Shanghai Communique. A copy of that letter of President Ford to me
was sent to your Ambassador in Washington. I would hope that the Chinese Govern-
ment and the Chinese people would understand these factors which I have tried to
outline briefly and recognize that we have many knots to untie. It is easy to
tie a knot, but not as easly to untie one. I would hope the word "patience"
would be used in really comprehending and understanding the difficulty concerning
normalization of relations between our two countries at this time.
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Vice Premier -- Knots are also easy to untie. It only calls for the
severance of diplomatic relations, the withdrawal of your troops and an end to
the so-called treaty.
Senator Mansfield -- We understand the Japanese Formula but sometimes
knots, over a period of time, become hardened and not easy to be untied. It takes
time.
Vice Premier -- And I may add one point. As to how the People's
Republic of China is to settle the Taiwan issue--by force or by peaceful
means--is our internal affair and we do not want any interference from
foreigners.
Senator Mansfield -- I understand.
Vice Premier - Patience is possible. As far as I know, our views
on this issue were discussed with former President Nixon, President Ford,
Secretary Kissinger and many, many Americans. I think our views are well known.
Senator Mansfield -- Yes, they are very well known.
Vice Premier -- You were talking about patience. We are patient.
We have time enough.
Senator Mansfield --- Mr. Vice Premier, you mentioned your differences
with the Soviet Union based on ideology and one other factor which I cannot re-
call at the moment. There were two, but isn't there another factor to be con-
sidered--the territorial differences between the People's Republic of China
and the Soviet Union?
Vice Premier -- That belongs to the realm of state relations.
Senator Mansfield -- But has nothing been done over the past 7 or 8
years to bring about a settlement of those differences?
Vice Premier --- We have had negotiations on border issues for almost
seven years now and there has not been much progress yet.
Senator Mansfield -- So it still remains & bone of contention.
Vice Premier -- Of course. It is a matter of contention and sometimes
very acute contention.
Senator Mansfield --- May I say, Mr. Vice Premier, that our group is
very much impressed with the attitude of the people in Sinkiang--they were calm,
confident and they gave one who comes in from the outside a feeling that they
were sure of themselves and, in the words of your great leader, Chairman Mao,
were prepared for any eventuality which might occur.
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Vice Premier -- What use is there in worrying day in and day out
whether it is going to rain and if one's mother wants to marry someone else?
What can you do about it? You just have to harden your hearts. That is an
old Chinese saying.
Senator Mansfield -- We were just giving our impression on the part
of the people in that huge area and with such a long border with outside powers.
We want to give you an outsider's viewpoint.
Vice Premier -- According to the Chairman's teaching, we will not
attack if we are not attacked, but if we are attacked, we will certainly
counterattack. Fighting is just such a thing. You have to fight whether
you're afraid or not. In comparison it is best to get some good sleep and
when you are rested, you will fight better when you have more energy. We have
had that experience during the long years of war. At the utmost, you will only
lose a few more people. You probably don't agree on that because you seem to
abhor the notion of seeing people die.
Senator Mansfield -- I don't like it.
Vice Premier -- But if people are going to bully you, invade your
country and turn you into slaves, it is better to die than to live like that.
Senator Mansfield -- I would not disagree on that basis but I look
on people as part of a whole. Of course, when people get out of line, you have
to react.
Vice Premier -- As I see it, some people say the Soviets have one
million troops in our area but it is not only in the area close to our country,
it is along the whole line, the Sino Soviet border, Afghanistan and Turkey as
well. It is & very long line and for them to put troops on such a line and
try to fight such puny forces is not a good idea. The Soviets are out after
three targets in the east. As we see it, you are their first target; the
second is Japan; and the third is China. But their stress is still in Europe.
You may not agree, but I feel that the stress, the main thrust of Soviet 1m-
perialism is in Europe and the Middle East.
Senator Mansfield -- Would you say that the United States was wise
in maintaining 245, military personnel in Western Europe and other foreign
countries?
Vice Premier -- That is your business. It seems that we have a
question here. Europe, we believe, should become stronger. Ways should be
found so that Europe can become stronger. At the present time, they are too
soft and too dispersed. It seems to us that the present state of affairs is
that in which Europe cannot leave the United States nor the United States leave
Europe. That seems to be the present state.
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Senator Mansfield - You know, our most important treaty, NATO, is
with Western Europe. But the Vice Premier is correct. Europeans should do
more in their own defense and I have been advocating that for years. But
they seem loath to do BO and how you get them to do something which is primarily
in their own best interest is a problem which we have not been able to solve.
We have difficulties between Greece and Turkey in the south portion
of NATO. We have difficulties in Italy which 1s subject to high inflation and
a tenuous situation in Portugal on the southwest flank. All of this indicates
that something needs to be done but it must be done by the countries themselves.
We can't do it.
Vice Premier -- It seems you can do something also.
Senator Mansfield - What?
Vice Premier -- You can give some advice.
Senator Mansfield -- We probably have given too much advice to too
many people already. These nations are sovereign and independent and should
make up their own minds and set their own courses.
Vice Premier -- It seems to us that recently more and more people
are changing their minds. For instance, there are some well known European
leading figures who have said in the past that the main thrust of the Soviet
Union was the Far East. Some of them are now beginning to feel that that con-
cept is not correct and that the main thrust is towards Europe. You have Mr.
Sonnenfeldt in the United States, do you not?
Senator Mansfield -- Yes, in the State Department.
Vice Premier -- He seems to have a doctrine.
Senator Mansfield -- No one else seems to support the doctrine but
Mr. Sonnenfeldt.
Vice Premier -- What about Mr. Kissinger?
Senator Mansfield -- I think he sort of backed away from it too.
Mr. Sonnenfeldt has explained his views. It seems that he announced it to a
group of U. S. Ambassadors in Europe some months ago.
Vice Premier -- It seems that he has been criticized.
Senator Mansfield -- Yes, a bit.
Vice Premier -- His is an appeasement policy--a Munich line of thinking.
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Senator Mansfield -- Something like that. There are people who say
that. Getting back to the question of advice--Secretary Kissinger and the
President both tried to give advice to Greece and Turkey. The result is that
Greece thinks we are helping Turkey and Turkey thinks we are helping Greece.
How do you win?
Vice Premier -- Give them some advice and some encouragement.
Senator Mansfield -- We are trying to do that to both of them. It
is a tough situation.
Vice Premier --- What is needed perhaps is a friendly and equal
approach.
Senator Mansfield -- Equality is the key word in relations between
nations, just as 1t should be between people.
Vice Premier -- Between people, maybe not. Do you think capitalists
are friendly to workers? We are not friendly to capitalists.
Senator Mansfield -- We are very friendly to workers in the United
States.
Vice Premier -- That might not be SO.
Senator Mansfield -- Every member of this group have been workers.
I worked in the mines where I met my wife. John Glenn has worked with his
hands in the fields. Every one of us has been a worker. We think our system
is good but not as good as it should be, and you think your system is good but,
perhaps, not as good as it could be. We have differences but they should not
obviate those things that should keep us and hold us together. We are all
people.
Vice Premier -- I agree that we should maintain friendly relations.
I think that is possible. Our social systems are different, yet we still have
much common ground.
Senator Mansfield -- Much.
Vice Premier -- For instance, I think the first and foremost point
between us is that we both must deal with Soviet imperialism-what Chairman
Mao called the polar bear--because it has wild ambition and is trying to expand
everywhere. It is extremely odd that when people speak of Soviet imperialism
there are a number of people who are mortally afraid of it. Actually, if you
analyze it carefully, one finds that since it is an expansionist, imperialist
power, it will, out of necessity, place itself in the position of being the
enemy of the peoples of the world. That is an inherent weakness.
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Senator Mansfield -- We like panda bears.
Vice Premier -- Externally it places itself in the position of an
enemy of the people of the world. Within its country, we see that, of course,
we are not so familiar with the concrete economic situation in the Soviet
Union, but since it is a country in which capitalism has been restored, we
see the relationship between the government and the people of the Soviet Union
has been very tense, especially between the various nationalities. As for its
economy, the striking fact is that they don't seem to have enough to eat. Some-
one has said that they SOW grain in the Soviet Union and reap it in the United
States and Canada.
Senator Mansfield -- They did. They got the best of us. They even
sold us some of the grain we sold them back to us and at higher prices. That
capitalist publication the Wall Street Journal had an article saying that this
was so,
Vice Premier -- Yes, I heard about that. They have wild ambitions
without the strength to meet these ambitions. They are paper tigers. They
are bullies who are weak and fear strength. I have met a number of Japanese
friends and my advice to them is to toughen up a bit. They had a Foreign
Minister, Mr. Miyazawa, Was he the man who talked with you?
Senator Mansfield -- Yes.
Vice Premier -- That was not a good. statement at all.
Senator Mansfield -- It vas his speech, not mine.
Vice Premier --- Yes, I know, but I think the United States should
have good relations with Japan.
Senator Mansfield mem We do.
Vice Premier -- We have said many times that in regard to Japanese
foreign relations, we believe the United States should come first and China
second. That is another point we have in common.
Senator Mansfield --- Yes, it is an excellent observation because we
are tied to Japan through a mutual security treaty. In tying ourselves to
Japan it means their armed forces will not increase and if they do not increase,
they do not create a threat to Asia as Japan did in bygone days, which China
remembers all to vividly.
Vice Premier -- There are those in Japan who want to revive militarism
but circumstances now are different from what they were before.
Senator Mansfield -- Much.
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Vice Premier -- For instance, Japan wants to develop its own defense
forces to defend its own country. We are in favor of that but if they want to
expand abroad, we don't think that is a good thing.
Senator Mansfield -- I doubt that that is their intention.
Vice Premier -- Not at the present time.
Senator Mansfield -- Or in the foreseeable future.
Vice Premier -- As for the future, we will have to wait and see.
Senator Mansfield -- It is a different world. You have not got an
abject China now.
Vice Premier -- Yes, there have been some changes and as for the
general trend of developments in the world, our view--the view that the Chair-
man has held constantly--is that there is great disorder in Heaven and the
situation is excellent. Your Dr. Schlesinger agrees to the first sentence but
not the second.
Senator Mansfield -- Well, he agrees and disagrees as he sees fit.
Vice Premier -- That is completely allowable. The disorder is among
the hegemonists while on the other hand the awareness of the people is rising
day to day and what is not excellent in that? One must not just see the trivial
matters or minor points. Take, for instance, Angola. The Soviet Union pushed
Cuba into Angola to create chaos there.
Senator Mansfield -- True.
Vice Premier -- You seem to be working with the Africans now.
Senator Mansfield -- We are trying to and hope something can be done
before South Africa erupts.
Vice Premier -- Support their independence. The Africans will be
happy about that.
Senator Mansfield -- That is what Kissinger is trying to achieve but he
has many obstacles to overcome.
Vice Premier -- Of course, roads are not arrow straight--sometimes
they are tortuous.
Senator Mansfield -- That is true. As Senator Glenn would indicate,
distance is not always a straight line.
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Vice Premier -- Right. Very right. Anyway, there is one thing in
the world that is hard to change. The Soviet Union wants to expand. And you
have interests in the world you want to protect. This presents conflict.
Senator Mansfield -- We will see.
Vice Premier -- I recall that you have discussed the Western Pacific
and have asked our opinion; that is the issue of your forces there. We believe
that it is always not a very good thing to have forces stationed on foreign soil.
It seems that your situation in the Western Pacific is also a result of the fact
that you have interests there that you want to protect. As to how you are going
to go about that, it is a matter for you to decide.
Senator Mansfield -- Thank you.
Vice Premier -- As for Korea, I should think you could do a hell of
a lot of good to get the U. N. Command out. With your troops there you are in
a passive position. You could be in an active position.
Senator Mansfield -- Would China join with the United States in trying
to bring about a settlement of the Korean empasse through free elections or
otherwise which would bring about the situation which I think China desires?
Vice Premier -- I have not studied that issue very much but our view
is that the Korean issue is for the Korean people to decide for themselves.
Our view is that we think the Korean people should solve the issues themselves
through contact between the two sides and discussions between the two sides.
Senator Mansfield -- I agree.
Vice Premier -- How can we go there and interfere?
Senator Mansfield -- Well, by giving them advice.
Vice Premier -- Our advice would be, first of all, that you should
withdraw your troops and do away with the U. N. Command. Our advice goes to
you first.
Senator Mansfield -- I will pass it on.
Vice Premier -- Of course, this is a discussion between you and me.
Whether you want to pass it on is your decision.
Senator Mansfield -- Well, if I can refer to Mr. Cheng when I say
pass it on, sometimes it means passing the buck, but I'll pass it.
Vice Premier -- Anyway, our discussion here is conversation between old
friends--not for publication.
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Senator Mansfield -- That's true, but when I pass it on, I'll do it
in confidence.
Vice Premier -- I think that our relations should become friendlier
step by step, but sometimes in our newspapers and at the U. N. we fire a few
cannons.
Senator Mansfield -- We hear them.
Vice Premier -- But those cannons are empty. Have you read Mr. Ch'iao's
speech at the U. N.?
Senator Mansfield -- I have, with interest. Mr. Fan made sure that
I got a copy of it.
Vice Premier -- Have you read, also, the message of the Central
Committee of our party, the Standing Committee of the National People's
Congress, the State Council, and the Military Commission to the whole nation,
the whole army and the people of the various nationalities in the country and
the speech made by Premier Hua at the memorial meeting for Chairman Mao?
Senator Mansfield -- Yes. We read it and have a copy as it was
carried in the Peking Review. We would appreciate copies of your other
publications which I have not seen. Can we get copies?
Vice Premier --- That can be done.
Senator Mansfield -- If I may, I would be most happy to send the
Vice Premier copies of the reports on Japan made in July and Southeast Asia
made in August. I think we have some with us.
Vice Premier -- Thank you. If we are to carry on the great cause
of Chairman Mao, it means that our internal and foreign policies will not
change.
Senator Mansfield --- May I say, Mr. Vice Premier, that this has
has been a year of great tragedy with the passing of your great leader,
Chairman Mao, the passing of your great soldier Chu Teh, and the passing
of your great Premier Chou En-lai plus the Tangshan earthquake--all in one
year--a tragic year.
Vice Premier -- These have been great losses. They were all old
comrades of advanced age and had been ill for some time. That was a natural
development and we were unable to stop it. Under the leadership of the Central
Committee led by Premier Hua, we are determined to move forward.
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Senator Mansfield -- I am sure you will.
Vice Premier -- All difficulties can be surmounted. We have confidence
because we have Mao thoughts and Chairman Mao lives forever in our hearts.
Senator Mansfield -- Mr. Vice Premier, could I call on Senator Glenn
to see if he has any comments to make at this time?
Senator Glenn -- Thank you very much. I have been very much impressed
with the breath of the conversation today. Early in the conversation today the
Vice Premier very properly stressed the role of agriculture and food in helping
the people of China get to a self-sufficient position, and I think in all nations
around the world that that must be a first objective. Beyond that, what nations
are able to do will be determined much by the fuel they get. We have had great
resources that have been developed quite widely. Our geologists indicate that
China has a great oil potential here and that will play a key role in China's
development. Would you share your views on the development of fuel which I
think will be a key factor not only in China but in the foreign relations
throughout the countries all over the world and probably for the next generation?
Vice Premier -- We have enough oil to use now. Of course, we still
have to develop it. The principle by which we develop it is self-reliance.
Senator Glenn -- That would be a very major factor in China's relation-
ship with the rest of the world; how their energy resources are developed and how
China wishes to use that in international trade and commerce. Are there plans
at this time to move into that area rapidly?
Vice Premier -- Of course, our objective is to develop these resources
as quickly as possible. As for the international aspects and international oil
relations, our view has always been that this is a question of necessity and
possibility and that is that we are willing to develop friendly contacts under
the condition of self-reliance and according to the principles of necessity and
possibilities.
There are some Third World countries who invite foreign investments
and go in for multi-national corporations in tapping their oil and other re-
sources. We do not intend to develop in that direction.
As for commercial contacts on the basis of equality and in the light
of appropriate relations between necessity and possibility, we are willing to
develop them. But in trade relations between our two countries, at the present
time we are importing more from you than you are importing from us now. We
are not in such a great haste.
Senator Glenn -- Flying over the great distances of China, it is BO
immense that I wonder if China even knows for sure what it actually has in this
area.
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Vice Premier -- Indeed, there are a lot of things I believe we do not
know what we have, but I an sure that we will finally find out.
Senator Glenn -- You have vast resources that have yet to be developed
and could be of tremendous assistance to your people.
Senator Mansfield -- And keep you self-sufficient and self-reliant.
Vice Premier -- We also export a little. For instance, we export a
little oil now.
Senator Glenn -- If the reports we have seen from your geologists and
what our own think of China, I think that situation could very well change within
the next few years. I think China could become a large exporter of energy to
the world.
Vice Premier -- That word "large" that you put before amount is not
very reliable.
Senator Glenn -- I think as we sit here and talk about this, we have
a world-renouned scientist who could give us all we need in the form of Dr.
Chou Pei-yuan.
Senator Mansfield -- Indeed.
When I came over in 1972, your trade the year before just about
balanced. I think the figure was $2.3 billion in exports and $2.1 billion
in imports, and following Nixon's visit, you bought grain, airplanes from
the United States and some technological equipment and some machinery imports
from Japan and the imports increased and the result was that you reached an
imbalance. That imbalance has now been corrected to some extent. Just what
difference do you have on exports and imports on a yuan basis?
Vice Premier -- It is basically balanced.
Senator Mansfield - Is your policy to equalize outflow with inflow?
Vice Premier -- Yes.
Senator Mansfield -- That way you avoid indebtedness.
Vice Premier -- It does not feel good to be in debt. We incurred
debts to the Soviets at one time.
Senator Mansfield -- But you paid them back with interest.
Vice Premier -- Of course.
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Senator Mansfield -- I thought that vas aid.
Vice Premier -- They also said it was selfless. They forced down
the price of our exports to them and raised the price of their exports to us
and termed that selfless.
Senator Mansfield -- And what is the balance of trade between the
People's Republic of China and the Soviet Union today?
Vice Premier -- They are in debt to us now.
Senator Mansfield --- Have they paid you?
Vice Premier -- According to reason it seems they should. Of course,
it is not so very large a debt. The debt we incurred to the Soviet Union was
incurred during the war of Korea against U. S. aggression. When we fought you,
we bought some ammunition from them. On the economic front, we also borrowed.
Senator Mansfield -- You used to have a big trade with the Soviet
Union. Has your trade shifted away from the Soviet Union to other areas?
Vice Premier -- I think 80 to 90 percent of our trade goes to second
and third world countries plus you. The Soviet Union is not very happy about
that.
Senator Mansfield -- We are.
Vice Premier -- When are you leaving?
Senator Mansfield -- Tomorrow morning for Shanghai and then on
Tuesday morning for Hong Kong and the Philippines.
Vice Premier -- You are going to the Philippines?
Senator Mansfield -- Yes.
Vice Premier -- We are on friendly relations with the Philippines.
Senator Mansfield -- The last time we saw the Marcoses, a year ago
I believe, they showed us a film of Mrs. Marcos' visit with the late Chairman
Mao Tse-tung--an excellent film in color and we were quite impressed with it.
From there we will go to Indonesia and from Indonesia to home.
Vice Premier -- So, shall we conclude our discussion here?
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Senator Mansfield -- We are very grateful to the Vice Premier for
receiving us and giving us the benefit of his candid views and answering our
many questions.
Vice Premier -- But it is not for publication to the newspaper.
Senator Mansfield -- We don't meet with newspaper men. But we will
report to the President and make a report to the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee.
Vice Premier -- Because we have spoken to each other very candidly.
Senator Mansfield -- Yes, indeed.
Vice Premier -- Devious talk so devious that others do not understand
you is very tasteless.
Senator Mansfield -- I agree and we are not among those you have in
mind.
Vice Premier -- I am not a diplomat.
Senator Mansfield -- As we told Madame Vice Minister, we are in
excellent hands with Madame Kang and her associates looking after us that
we feel indebted to them and to the Chinese government. They are good.
shepherds.
Vice Premier -- You are a friend and when a friend comes, it is
only correct that we try to be of help.
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Notes of a Pre-dinner Discussion Between Senator Mansfield and Feng Kuo-chu,
Vice Chairman of the Shanghai Municipal Revolutionary Committee
Shanghai, People's Republic of China, October 10, 1976
(The entire American group was present at the discussion, along with a number
of local Chinese officials and the accompanying staff of the People's Institute
of Foreign Affairs.)
The discussion began with an exchange of pleasantries and Feng's
introduction of the local Chinese officials who were present.
Feng then related that the Party Central Committee had agreed to
establish a memorial hall for Mao Tse-tung, to speed up the publication of
the selected works of Chairman Mao, to collect and publish the full works of
Chairman Mao--and, finally, had selected Hua Kuo-feng as Chairman of the
Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party and Chairman of the party's
Military Commission. He went on to say that "we are determined to rally and
support the decision of the Central Committee." He then said that "as far as
foreign affairs are concerned, China will continue to implement the revolutionary
foreign policy as formulated by Chairman Mao."
"Feng said that Senator Mansfield would probably see posters as he
goes along, some paying tribute to Chairman Mao and new ones proclaiming the
Committee's decision about the memorial hall, the publication of Mao's works
and the decision concerning Hua Kuo-feng. He then expressed his belief in the
strength of the Chinese people, saying "the Chinese people will always remain
strong; they can withstand any impact." He said that the working class in
Shanghai have a slogan: "Even if the sky falls down we will shoulder it."
You are, he said, "an old friend; I do hope you believe us."
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Senator Mansfield in reply said that "what has taken place in China
since the revolution has been the regeneration of a people" and that the self-
confidence they now have "has to be seen to be believed." The pace of develop-
ment will quicken, he went on to say, expressing admiration for the self-
reliance shown by the Chinese people in achieving what has been accomplished
to date.
Feng responded, saying: "When a people is poor they will work harder
for change. That is why they strive for change. When they are oppressed, they
strive for revolution. The American people are a good people. Two hundred
years ago your people also underwent such experiences."
(The discussion ended on this note and the group went in to dinner.)
MIKE MANSFIELD
MONTANA
Maxie
United States Senate
Confituation
Office of the Majority Leader
Washington, D.C. 20510
JC
November 4, 1976
Honorable Jimmy Carter
President-Elect
Plains, Georgia
Dear Governor:
It would seem to me that one of the major problems of foreign
policy which will press in on the new Administration is our approach to
relations with China. We may well be required by events in China and
elsewhere in Asia to confront the fact of indecision in these relations
ever since Nixon's visit in 1972.
As you know, I went to China shortly after Mao's death for my
third visit to the People's Republic and spent three weeks traveling
widely through the country. During the visit, I held conversations with
leaders, which were of relevance to the present situation and our policies
with respect thereto. As has long been my practice, when traveling abroad
on official business, I gave the President a confidential report on my
observations and impressions.
Since you will soon be dealing with these matters, I take the
liberty, most respectfully, of transmitting a copy of the report on China
which I gave to President Ford. I trust that you will find it of interest.
With all best personal wishes and warm regards, I am,
Respectfully,
whe manafull
Enclosure
Personal + confidential
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