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Foreign Policy, (10/76-11/76) [1]
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Records of the Office of the Staff Secretary
1976 Campaign Transition File
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Middle East
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Ribicoff, Abraham Alexander, 1910-1998
International relations
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Foreign Policy, [10/76-1/77] [1]
Folder Citation: Collection: Office of Staff Secretary; Series: 1976 Campaign Transition File;
Folder: Foreign Policy, [10/76-1/77] [1]; Container 2
To See Complete Finding Aid:
http://www.jimmycarterlibrary.gov/library/findingaids/Staff_Secretary.pdf
FOR COMMCENTER USE ONLY
IMM
UNCLAS
PRECEDENCE
CLASSIFICATION
DEX
FROM: DAVID HARON
DAC 076
GPS
LDX
PAGES 5
TO: THE PRESIDENT- ELECT
TTY
CITE
ATTN: JODY POWELL
INFO:
DTG: 3016572 30
TOR: 3017237 C C
RELEASED BY: GE
SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS:
To: PLAINS
TOGOV 86
BEST COPY AVAILABLE
1976 1976 DEC DEC 30 16 57
ELECTROSTATIC REPRODUCTION MADE FOR
WHCA FORM 8, 22 FEB 74 :
PRESERVATION PURPOSES
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
TO GOV 86
December 30, 1976
MEMO FOR: THE PRESIDENT-ELECT
ATTENTION: JODY POWELL
FROM:
DAVID AARON
Attached is a text of the interview with
Brezhnev provided to Tony Lake of the State
Department transition team with great
ceremony by the Charge at the Soviet
Embassy, Mr. Vorontsov.
Note the bottom of page 3 where Brezhnev
expresses support for a U.S. -USSR summit.
presider
ANSWERS BY J.. BREZUNEV
TO THE QUESTIONS OF JOSEPH KINGSBURY SMITH
Joseph Kingsbury Smith, National Edi:
and Vice President and Director of ii
Bearst Corporation, asked Leonid
I. Brezhnev, General Secretary of the
Central Committee of the Communist
Party of the Soviet Union, to answer
some questions. The questions and
the answers follow.
Q:
What message would you like to coñvey to the American
people for the New Year?
A: For the Soviet people the coming year will be a jubilce
year. TL will be the year of the sixtieth anniversary of the
Soviet State, which was born under the star of Lenin's famous
Decree on Peace. And, of course, in the coming year we would
Tike to see new major steps taken to maintain and strengthen
peace, to further enhance peaceful coexistence as the only
reasonable and the only acceptable norm in relation between
states.
History has proved that our two countries, when they
act reasonably and take into account their responsible positions
in the modern world, can make an important contribution to the
cause of peace and the development of mutually advantageous
cooperation.
I am glad to avail myself of this opportunity to convey
to the women and BRAD of America cordial New Year greetings on
behalf of all the peoples of the Soviet Union and on my own
behalf.
Q: What do you consider to be the most important measures of
cooperation the USSR and the USA could take in 1977 to serve the
cause of world peace and 10 strengthen Soviet-American relations
A: I believe that our countries could do a lot in this respect
J. shall only mention what is most important: We are in favour of
the earliest possible completion of the work on a Soviet-America
strategic arms limitation agreement on the basis of the under-
standing reached in Vladivostok in 1974. On our part, there was
is not and will not be any obstacles to this, which is a matter
on concern to all mankind. A Soviet-American agreement would
undoubtodly represent at this time a very important step toward
effectively ending the arms race. The solution of this task is
most directly connected with the main goal of our time - to
prevent a nuclear war, while delaying the agreement, when the
development of even more horrible Types and systems of weapons
continues, is fraught with new threats to peace, international
stability and security. Judging by recent statements of President
elect Carter, the U.S. side is also aware of the urgency of this
matter. Lot us hope that this promises early success.
T have 10 say that we in the Soviet Union are baffled by
the position of certain circles in the West, both in the United
States and in other NATO countries. They behave as if nothing
has happened in recent years, as if nothing has changed and the
world continues 1.0 be in a state of cold war. They instigate
one noiny campaign after another about an allegedly increasing
military threat from the USSR, demanding more and more military
appropriations and intensifying the arms race.
3.
We believe that things should not continue in this way.
Having achieved the relaxation of political tension, we have
also made it possible to deal seriously with cardinal issues
of arms limitation and disarmament. J. would like to reaffirm
most definitely: The Soviet Union does not threaten anybody and
has no intention of attacking anybody. It makes no sense to be
frightened by mythical threats; it is better to discuss in a
businesslike and constructive manner the problems and opportuniti
which exist here. And the continuation of the arms race cannot. be
justified by assertions that arms limitation allegedly carries
a risk 1.0 national security. Today a far greater risk to universa
security lies in inaction, in letting the unrestrained arms race
yo on.
We would like very much 1.0 see the year ot 1977 become a
real turning point in ending the arms race. It: would then surely
find a worthy place in history.
0: Would you welcome the opportunity to confer carly in the
PRESERVATION PURPOSES
ELECTROSTATIC REPRODUCTION MADE FOR
New Year with the new American President at a mutually convenient
location?
A: Experience, including that of Soviet-American relations,
has shown the usefulness and fruitfulness of summit meetings
when each participant strives for a constructive, businesslike
dialogue. That is why we are for the continuation of this
practice. The Liming of the next Soviet-American meeting will
1.
naturally, be determined by mutual agreement and will depend
on progress in appropriate issues.
In conclusion I would like to repeat what has been said
at the Twenty-Fifth Congress of the Communist Party of the
Soviet Union: Our country is firmly determined to follow the
line of further improving Soviet-American relations which is
in the interests of both the American and the Soviet peoples,
as well as in the interests of universal peace.
10
C
ISRAEL: THE CASE FOR
DEFENSIBLE BORDERS
By Yigal Allon
Reprinted From
FOREIGN
AFFAIRS
AN AMERICAN QVARTERLY REVIEW
OCTOBER 1976
ELECTROSTATIC REPRODUCTION MADE FOR
PRESERVATION PURPOSES
ISRAEL: THE CASE FOR
DEFENSIBLE BORDERS
FOREIGN AFFAIRS
AN AMERICAN QUARTERLY REVIEW
By Yigal Allon
IT is impossible to plumb the depths of the Arab-
Israeli conflict, not to speak of formulating proposals
for its solution, if no true understanding exists of the
full significance of its cardinal characteristic-the
OCTOBER 1976
extreme asymmetry of its two sides. This asymmetry
Trilateralism: "Partnership" for What?
Richard H. Ullman
I
is manifest not merely in one or two, but in all, of
A China Policy for the Next Administration
Jerome Alan Cohen
20
its aspects. It is obvious in such objective data as the
Israel: The Case for Defensible Borders
Yigal Allon
38
The Anti-Zionist Resolution
Bernard Lewis
comparison between Arab and Israeli territories (of
54
Energy Strategy: The Road Not Taken?
Amory B. Lovins
65
the Arab League states 8,500,000 square miles; of
Canada: The New Nationalism
Abraham Rotstein
97
Israel, including presently administered areas, about 28,500) ; or
The Race to Control Nuclear Arms
of the relative population statistics (of the Arab League states 134,-
Paul Doty, Albert Carnesale and Michael Nacht
119
000,000; of Israel 3,500,000 citizens) ; not to mention their contrasting
The Cruise Missile: The End of Arms Control?
Alexander R. Vershbow
actual and potential wealth.
133
Southern Africa: A South African View
John Barratt
147
But of primary importance are the subjective asymmetric factors
Inside the Laager: White Power in South Africa
affecting relations between the two sides. In this respect, there is
John de St. Jorre
169
absolute polarization. Whereas the Arab states seek to isolate, strangle
Two HUNDRED YEARS OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY
and erase Israel from the world's map, Israel's aim is simply to live in
The United States and the European Balance Gordon A. Craig
187
The United States and Latin America:
peace and good relations with all its neighbors.
Ending the Hegemonic Presumption Abraham F. Lowenthal
199
These diverse objectives have determined the war aims of both
Recent Books on International Relations
214
sides. It is within this context that we should mention the chain of
Source Material
Janet Rigney
236
terrorist acts that was designed not merely to sow death and destruc-
WILLIAM P. BUNDY
tion in Israel but also to extend the conflict, and thus embroil the
Editor
JAMES CHACE
Arab states in full-scale wars. It is almost superfluous, and certainly
JENNIFER SEYMOUR WHITAKER
Managing Editor
LUCY EDWARDS DESPARD
Associate Editor
tiresome, to quote the legion of statements of Arab leaders that repre-
Book Editor
BARBARA GIBSON SCHWARZ
EVELYN G. MOREL
sent this aim, ranging from the "Palestine Covenant" to current
Assistant to the Editor
Assistant to the Managing Editor
governmental declarations.
DORIS ELIZABETH FOREST
GRACE DARLING GRIFFIN
Associate Publisher
As opposed to this total Arab goal, Israel's war aims have been
Director, Advertising and Promotion
MARY JANE CASSOTTA
SHEILA M. ROSENZWEIG
confined to repelling the offensives of the Arab armies as determined
Staff Assistant
Staff Assistant
by strategic and political circumstances, whether by reactive counter-
Editorial Advisory Board
A. DOAK BARNETT
HARVEY BROOKS
offensives such as those of 1948 and 1973 or by preemptive counter-
JOHN J. MCCLOY
C. FRED BERGSTEN
CARL KAYSEN
HARRY C. MCPHERSON JR.
offensives as those of 1956 and 1967. Military defeats, indeed, cost the
JAMES H. BILLINGTON
WILLIAM L. LANGER
WILLIAM M. ROTH
Vol. 55, No. 1. Copyright 1976, Council on Foreign Relations, Inc. Printed in the U.S.A.
Arab states losses in lives, destruction of equipment, political setbacks,
Yigal Allon has been Israel's Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign
Affairs since 1974, and a member of the Cabinet since 1961. He was Commander
of the Palmach, the striking force of the Haganah before the establishment of the
State, and during the War of Independence he commanded successively Israel army
operations in Eastern Galilee and on the central and southern fronts.
ISRAEL: DEFENSIBLE BORDERS
FOREIGN AFFAIRS
and damage to national prestige-and perhaps even danger to their
It was primarily in order to encourage and strengthen these voices
regimes. However, such defeats have never been, nor ever will be,
and to convert them into a process with momentum that Israel-
a threat to their very existence as sovereign states or to the lives of
with all the considered and inherent dangers-entered into the two
their civilian populations. In contrast, a military defeat of Israel
Disengagement Agreements with Egypt and Syria in 1974, and the
would mean the physical extinction of a large part of its population
subsequent Interim Agreement with Egypt in September 1975. Be-
and the political elimination of the Jewish state. In highly realistic
cause these agreements are double-edged, they may not only be a
and clear terms, therefore, the Arab states can permit themselves a
milestone on the road to a settlement and peace, but also part of a
series of military defeats while Israel cannot afford to lose a single
strategy designed to push Israel to the brink, to weaken it in stages,
war. Nor does this reflect a historical trauma in any sense. To lose a
in preparation for the steps to erase it from the map. Israel hopes
single war is to lose everything, and this is a most real and stark fact.
that the positive side of these agreements will be the valid one, but
As a consequence, as long as the Arab-Israeli conflict is not fully
cannot ignore the possibility of the negative.
resolved, Israel must exploit to the utmost its military potential in all
II
of its components and on a level that serves two objectives-to deter
its enemies from waging war and, failing this, to be sufficient to repel
The polarized asymmetry between the size and intentions of the
the attackers and defeat them with the least cost in casualties for
Arab states and those of Israel, and the extreme contrast in the antic-
Israel. In essence, that Israel today still exists is due only to its success
ipated fate of each side in the event of military defeat, obliges Israel
in maintaining such defensive strength. Without it, Israel would
to maintain constantly that measure of strength enabling it to defend
never have seen the light of day or would already have been elim-
itself in every regional conflict and against any regional combination
inated in the first years of its existence. Such were the Arab intentions,
of strength confronting it, without the help of any foreign army. To
and it was fortunate that the Arab states had not the strength to realize
our deep regret, this is the first imperative facing us, the imperative
them.
to survive. And I would venture to say every other state in our place
Certainly not all the Arab states are cut from the same cloth; nor
would behave exactly as we do.
are their approaches to Israel identical. In the Arab camp there are
There are, of course, many elements constituting the essential
more extreme elements that openly express their intention of destroy-
strength that Israel must maintain, ranging from its social, scientific
ing Israel. And there are other elements and people in the Arab
and economic standards, as well as its idealistic motivation, to the
world who, in the last two or three years, have expressed themselves
quality and quantity of its armaments. A discussion of all of these
toward Israel in less aggressive, and more realistic, terms than in the
elements is not within the compass of this article; my concern here is
none too distant past, particularly when their declarations have been
with one of them-but one essential to them all and without which
directed to the world at large. All things considered, it is in strength-
Israel might well lack the strength to defend itself. I am referring
ening these latter elements to the extent that they become decisive
to the territorial element; to what can be defined as defensible borders
in the Arab world that the best chance lies to achieve compromise and
that Israel must establish in any settlement, as an essential part of
reconciliation between Israel and the Arab states-in short, to achieve
any effective mutual security arrangements and without any desire
a full settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict.
for territorial expansion per se.
In the meantime that day, whenever it comes, is still far distant.
The most cursory glance at a map is sufficient to ascertain how
The antagonisms toward Israel, the desire to see its disappearance,
little the armistice lines of 1949-lines which were never in the first
are deeply rooted in the Arab world, and these are fed by the author-
place recognized as final-could be considered defensible borders.
ities, not merely in speeches and articles but also in school textbooks.
And even the most superficial fingering of the pages of history should
In fact the subject of Israel is the only one that unites the Arab
be enough to demonstrate how attractive these lines have been to the
states today, for they are deeply riven by splits and conflicts. The
Arab states as an encouragement to try their strength again against
elements of realism and peace are represented by a small minority of
us. The truth of the matter is that Resolution 242 of the United Na-
voices in the discordant Arab chorus against Israel. And even these
tions Security Council has already recognized, in its original English
voices are inhibited by negative preconditions.
text, the need to provide Israel with secure and recognized boundaries
FOREIGN AFFAIRS
ISRAEL: DEFENSIBLE BORDERS
-in other words, that changes must be introduced in the old lines of
on the eastern boundary, where the entire width of the coastal plain
varies between 10 and 15 miles, where the main centers of Israel's
the armistice agreements.
It is no coincidence that this resolution does not speak about Israel's
population, including Tel Aviv and its suburbs, are situated, and
withdrawal from all the territories that came under its control in the
where the situation of Jerusalem is especially perilous. Within these
war that was forced upon Israel in June 1967, nor even from the
lines a single successful first strike by the Arab armies would be suf-
territories. In the original text (which was the outcome of long and
ficient to dissect Israel at more than one point, to sever its essential liv-
exhaustive negotiation), Resolution 242 speaks only of withdrawal
ing arteries, and to confront it with dangers that no other state would
from territories. That the meaning was clear was demonstrated by the
be prepared to face. The purpose of defensible borders is thus to cor-
statement of the United States at the time, made by its U.N. Ambassa-
rect this weakness, to provide Israel with the requisite minimal stra-
dor Arthur Goldberg on November 15, 1967, in the Security Council
tegic depth, as well as lines which have topographical strategic sig-
nificance.
discussions that preceded the passage of Resolution 242. He stated
"Historically, there never have been secure or recognized boundaries
Of course I do not wish to overlook the fact that there are some
in the area. Neither the Armistice Lines of 1949, nor the Cease-Fire
who would claim that in an era of modern technological development
Lines of 1967, have answered that description."
such factors are valueless. In a nutshell, their claim is that the ap-
As is known, Israel expressed more than once its willingness to
pearance of ground-to-ground missiles, supersonic fighter-bombers,
withdraw from the cease-fire lines of 1967, within the framework of
and other sophisticated instruments of modern warfare has canceled
a peace agreement. On the other hand, it is clear-even according to
out the importance of strategic depth and topographical barriers.
the Security Council decision-that Israel is not obliged to withdraw
Personally, I do not know of a single state which is willing and ready
to the armistice lines of 1949 that preceded the 1967 war, but to
to give up a convenient borderline for this reason. At any rate, this
revised lines. The question is what borders will provide Israel with
argument is certainly invalid regarding Israel, and within the con-
that essential minimum of security? And without such security it is
text of the Middle East conflict, where the opposite is true. Precisely
difficult to expect to pacify the area and provide a lasting solution
because of dramatic developments in conventional weaponry the
to the conflict within it.
significance of territorial barriers and strategic depth has increased.
If the sole consideration were the purely strategic-military one,
With all the heavy damage that warheads and bombs can inflict,
then possibly the most convenient security borders would have been
they alone cannot be decisive in war, as long as the other side is
those Israel maintained following the Six-Day War, or perhaps those
resolved to fight back. Recent military history demonstrates this only
which it maintains today. There is even a basis for the claim that the
too clearly. The German air "blitz" did not knock England out of
1973 Yom Kippur War-begun as a surprise attack in concert by
World War II, nor did the heavy allied air bombardments bring
the armies of Egypt and Syria-proves that these lines were ideally
Germany to its knees. This happened only when the last bunker in
the best. Had the Yom Kippur War commenced on the 1949 armistice
Berlin fell. Even the massive American air bombardments did not
lines, for example, there can be little doubt that the price Israel
defeat North Vietnam which, in the final analysis, proved to be the
would have had to pay in repelling the aggressors would have been
victor in the war. At least as far as conventional wars are concerned,
unimaginably higher than that paid so painfully in October 1973.
the following basic truth remains: without an attack by ground forces
But we are not merely talking about purely military-strategic matters,
that physically overrun the country involved, no war can be decisive.
to the extent that they ever exist in isolation. Nor are we discussing
This is all the more so in the Middle East where the Arab side is no
the maximum security that borderlines can provide Israel. As stated,
less vulnerable to rocket and aerial bombardment than Israel, a
our preoccupation is only with the essential minimum.
factor that can greatly minimize the use of this kind of weaponry,
One does not have to be a military expert to easily identify the
and will leave to the ground forces the role of really deciding the
critical defects of the armistice lines that existed until June 4, 1967.
issue.
A considerable part of these lines is without any topographical secur-
Since decisive attack still depends on the land forces, the inno-
ity value; and, of no less importance, the lines fail to provide Israel
vations and sophistication in weaponry and organization of ground
with the essential minimum of strategic depth. The gravest problem is
forces that have taken place, therefore, not only fail to weaken the
ISRAEL: DEFENSIBLE BORDERS
FOREIGN AFFAIRS
value of strategic depth and natural barriers but in fact enhance
most critical decisions concerning its fate into the hands of foreigners
their importance. This is even more true given Israel's difficult
who, even as the most loyal friends, would always be foreigners, and
geographic position. Moreover, masses of swift and modern armor,
who, in the last analysis, could be expected to act in accordance with
mechanized infantry, self-propelled artillery, modern engineering
their own changing interests and concerns.
corps, marine and airborne commando units-when assisted by tac-
In such a situation, Israel might well be perceived as a burden
tical airpower-provide ground forces with immense firepower,
rather than an asset to those seeking stability and a settlement in the
great mobility, and hence increased breakthrough potential. Since
Middle East. While credible military guaranties or pacts can fulfill
the Arab armies are busily equipping themselves with all of these
a positive function in a settlement of the Middle East conflict-and I
means to a degree that Israel cannot match, the importance of stra-
do not underestimate this function when, and if, the time comes-
tegic depth becomes still more apparent.
it will have to be a supplementary function to Israel's own strength,
The danger threatening Israel, therefore, is that such reinforce-
to its defensible borders, and in no way a substitute for them!
ment of the Arab ground troops with modern weaponry may well
tempt the Arab states to act so swiftly on the ground that it will be
III
difficult for Israel to inhibit their forces in the first stage, or to regain
Fortunately, the geostrategic conditions that have existed in the
territory in a counterattack. In other words, the Arab states may be
Middle East over the past nine years permit a solution based upon
tempted to hit Israel with a first strike, preventing the latter from
a fair political compromise. This could provide Israel with the min-
hitting back effectively. With such lines as those existing prior to
imal defensible borders that are indispensable without impairing, to
the 1967 war, this would be a concrete and intolerable threat.
any meaningful extent, the basic interests of the other side, including
Another argument presented to counter Israel's claim to defensible
those of the Palestinian community. As with every other compromise,
borders is that Israel should be satisfied with guaranties from a single
so, too, is this one likely to be painful in the short term to both sides.
power or a number of powers to ensure its existence. Without de-
But this compromise will, in the long run, grant advantages that both
tracting from the value of such guaranties, I would not suggest that
sides do not currently possess nor, without it, ever would in the future.
any country make its very existence dependent upon guaranties of any
According to the compromise formula I personally advocate,
kind in this changing world. If the reference is to diplomatic guar-
Israel-within the context of a peace settlement-would give up the
anties only, these are devoid of any real deterrent value; they are
large majority of the areas which fell into its hands in the 1967 war.
lacking in teeth. And should Israel's enemies be tempted to attack it
Israel would do so not because of any lack of historical affinity be-
anew, such guaranties would be of little value in their considerations.
tween the Jewish people and many of these areas. With regard to
Military guaranties, however, can be of some value, but to rely exclu-
Judea and Samaria, for example, historical Jewish affinity is as great
sively upon them would be a critical error. Not only might the effec-
as that for the coastal plain or Galilee. Nonetheless, in order to attain
tiveness of such a military guaranty prove to be short-lived, but the
a no less historically exalted goal, namely that of peace, such a de-
guaranty itself might hand over almost totally to the guarantor the
liberate territorial compromise can be made.
recipient's power of independent action.
For its part, the Arab side would have to concede its claim to
There is scarcely the need to recall the fate of Czechoslovakia after
those strategic security zones which, together with a number of ef-
Munich; it is only too easy to draw up a long list of situations in
fective arrangements to be discussed below, will provide Israel with
which differences can evolve between the guarantor and the recipient
that vital element so lacking in the pre-1967 war lines: a defense
that, in effect, would cancel out the guaranty's inherent value-
posture which would enable the small standing army units of Israel's
even such elementary situations as disagreements over evaluation of
defense force to hold back the invading Arab armies until most of the
intelligence information or changes in public opinion within the
country's reserve citizens army could be mobilized. These security
guarantor state or the position of its government at that time. Were
zones would thus guarantee enough time to organize and launch the
Israel, therefore, to rely on outside guaranties, rather than to main-
counteroffensive needed to defeat any such aggression.
tain a complete ability to defend itself, it would become almost
The armistice lines of 1949 ("the green line") extend along
totally dependent upon the guarantor. In effect, it would pass the
the foothills of the Judean and Samarian mountains and along
FOREIGN AFFAIRS
ISRAEL: DEFENSIBLE BORDERS
the Mediterranean coastal plain-that is, flat territory without any
blockade there against Israeli ships and cargoes constituted a casus
topographical barriers. This leaves central Israel with a narrow
belli in both 1956 and 1967.
area that comprises the Achilles heel of the lines prior to June
A reasonable compromise solution can be found for all these weak-
4, 1967. It serves as a constant temptation to a hostile army
nesses in the current geostrategic and demographic situation existing
in possession of hilly Judea and Samaria to attempt to inflict a
in the Middle East. Without going into details or drawing precise
fatal blow against Israel by severing it in two in one fell swoop.
maps, an activity that must await direct negotiations between the
Moreover, this weakness would permit such an army not only to
parties themselves, in my opinion the solution in principle ought to be
strike at Israel's densest population and industrial centers, but also
along the following general lines.
in effect to paralyze almost all of Israel's airspace with surface-
Both to preserve its Jewish character and to contribute toward a
to-air missiles with which the Arab armies are so abundantly
solution of the Palestinian issue, Israel should not annex an additional
equipped.
and significant Arab population. Therefore the strategic depth and
According to the 1949 lines, Jerusalem was pierced through its
topographical barriers in the central sector, so totally absent in the
heart-the university and the principal hospital on Mount Scopus
lines preceding the 1967 war, cannot be based on moving these lines
were cut off, while access from the coastal plain to Jerusalem was
eastward in a schematic manner, even though this would be logical
restricted to a narrow corridor, threatened on both sides by a pincer
from a purely strategic point of view. Rather, apart from some minor
attack.
tactical border alterations along the western section of "the green
In the northeastern sector, the 1949 line left Syria on the dominat-
line," this same goal can be achieved through absolute Israeli control
ing Golan Heights, controlling the Huleh Valley and the Galilee
over the strategic zone to the east of the dense Arab population,
Basin at their foothills, and including the sources of the Jordan River
concentrated as it is on the crest of the hills and westward. I am re-
and the Sea of Galilee from which Israel draws a vital part of its
ferring to the arid zone that lies between the Jordan River to the
water supply. Moreover, after 1949 Syria not only repeatedly shelled
east, and the eastern chain of the Samarian and Judean mountains
the Israeli villages located at the Golan foothills but also attempted
to the west-from Mt. Gilboa in the north through the Judean des-
to divert the sources of the Jordan and thereby deprive Israel of a
ert, until it joins the Negev desert. The area of this desert zone is
vital source of water. Even more important, the Golan Heights served
only about 700 square miles and it is almost devoid of population.
in past wars as the most convenient base for the Syrian army to make
Thus this type of solution would leave almost all of the Palestinian
swift and major attacks upon Galilee, ultimately aimed at the conquest
Arab population of the West Bank under Arab rule.
of the entire northern part of our country.
Cutting through this zone, which continues from north to south,
According to the 1949 armistice agreements, signed by Israel in
it would be possible to delineate a corridor from west to east under
the naîve belief that they would lead swiftly to peace, Egypt was
Arab sovereignty. This would permit uninterrupted communication
given control of the Gaza Strip. This was a dangerous and needless
along the Jericho-Ramallah axis, between the Arab populated areas
anomaly. Bordering the unpopulated Sinai desert and without any
of the West and East banks of the river. In this manner the only
affinity to Egypt proper, this zone came to serve as a base for large-
realistic solution becomes possible-one that also helps resolve the
scale terrorist raids launched at southern Israel. Should the strip be
problem of Palestinian identity that could then find its expression
returned to Egyptian control it might easily resume its destructive
in a single Jordanian-Palestinian state. (After all, the population of
function. Even worse, it might serve Egypt as a bridgehead for
both banks, East and West, are Palestinian Arabs. The fact is that
an offensive northward and eastward toward the very heart of Israel,
the great majority of Palestinians carry Jordanian passports while
following the historic invasion route from south to north. Another
almost all of Jordan's inhabitants are Palestinians.)
serious defect in the armistice agreements was that it left Israel's
Jerusalem, Israel's capital, which was never the capital of any
southern port entrance at Elath on a tiny strip of shoreline only six
Arab or Muslim state, but was always the capital and center of the
miles long from its border with Egypt to that of Jordan. Moreover,
Jewish people, cannot return to the absurd situation of being parti-
Israel's maritime route to the Red Sea and Indian Ocean passes
tioned. The Holy City and adjacent areas essential for its protection
through the Straits of Tiran at Sharm-el-Sheikh, and the Egyptian
and communications must remain a single, undivided unit under
ISRAEL: DEFENSIBLE BORDERS
FOREIGN AFFAIRS
ring to such areas as those surrounding Abu Aweigila, Kusseima and
Israel's sovereignty. Because of its universal status, however, in that
Kuntilla, which comprise the principal strategic crossroads on the
it is holy to three great religions, as well as the mixed nature of its
main routes from the desert to Beersheba, and to the Elath shore line
inhabitants', a solution for the religious interests connected with it can
which is the gateway to Israel's maritime routes to the Indian Ocean
be found, a religious and not a political solution. For example, special
and the Far East.
status could be granted to the representatives of the various faiths in
An especially sensitive point is that of the area of Sharm-el-Sheikh
the places holy to them, just as it might be possible to base the munic-
at the southern tip of the Sinai Peninsula. Although, from this van-
ipal structure of the city upon subdistricts that take ethnic and
tage point, there is no danger of a massive surprise attack on Israel
religious criteria into account.
proper, a very concrete threat to Israeli freedom of navigation does
While the strategic zone in the central sector is crucial to Israel's
exist. It should be repeated that Egypt has twice imposed blockades
security, so, too, is a zone on the Golan Heights. As past experience
against Israeli ships and cargoes seeking passage through the Straits
has demonstrated, a border not encompassing the Golan Heights
of Tiran. And, in both instances, Israel was compelled to break this
would again invite the easy shelling of the villages below in the
blockade mounted from Sharm-el-Sheikh by capturing the place.
Huleh Valley, the Galilee Basin and eastern Galilee. More im-
In one way or another, unquestionable Israeli control over this corner
portant than the danger of renewed Syrian shelling and sniping at
of the Sinai-and over a land route reaching it- is not only critical
Israeli villagers and fishermen below, which is basically a tactical
to Israeli defense, but also serves to neutralize a focal point that is
question, is that Israel needs an effective defense line on the Golan
liable to set the area on fire once again. Moreover, because of the
Heights for two cardinal strategic reasons: first, to preclude any
threat of blockade to Israeli-bound traffic through the Bab-el-Man-
new Syrian attempts to deny Israel its essential water resources and,
deb Strait, which connects the Red Sea with the Indian Ocean, full
second, to prevent a massive Syrian attack on the whole of Galilee,
Israeli control over Sharm-el-Sheikh might serve as a countervailing
either independently or in coordination with other Arab armies on
deterrent against such blockade attempts.
Israel's other frontiers.
To sum up, there were numerous bitterly deficient points in the
In my view the city of Gaza and its environs, which is heavily
pre-1967 lines, and these proposals encompass minimal correc-
populated by Palestinian Arabs, could comprise a part of the Jor-
tions to them required for an overall peace settlement. The necessity
danian-Palestinian unit which would arise to the east of Israel, and
for these corrections is all the more apparent when it is realized that
serve as that state's Mediterranean port. In this case, it would be
Israel not only faces the military strength of its contiguous neighbors,
necessary to place at the disposal of traffic between Gaza and the
but may also have to face the combined strength of many other Arab
Jordanian-Palestinian state the use of a land route (as distinct from
countries. This has already happened to no small extent in the 1973
a land corridor) similar to that, for example, connecting the United
war, when contingents from Iraq, Libya, Algeria, Saudi Arabia,
States with Alaska. But Israel must continue to control fully the
Morocco, Jordan and other Arab countries participated in the fight-
strategic desert zone from the southern part of the Gaza Strip to
ing, together with the armies of Egypt and Syria. Thus, in a very
the dunes on the eastern approaches of the town of El Arish, which
practical sense, solid defense lines are indispensible to Israel in order
itself would be returned to Egypt. This strategic zone, almost empty
to withstand the attacks of the entire Arab world. In addition, these
of population, would block the historic invasion route along the sea
may well be supported by contingents of so-called volunteers who can
coast which many conquerors have taken over the generations to in-
be sent from certain countries from outside the area that are hostile
vade the land of Israel, and further north.
to Israel.
A number of border adjustments will also be essential to ensure
Let me stress again that defensible borders are vital to Israel not out
security along sensitive areas of the 1949 Armistice line between Israel
of any desire to annex territories per se, not out of a desire for territo-
and Egypt. These must be made in such a manner as to permit full
rial expansion, and not out of any historical and ideological motiva-
Israeli control in a number of sectors of crucial importance to its de-
tion. Israel can compromise on territory but it cannot afford to do so
fense and which lack any value for the security of Egypt. I am refer-
on security. The entire rationale of defensible borders is strategic.
1 From the middle of the nineteenth century Jerusalem has had a Jewish majority. Today,
This is also the only rationale for the selective settlement policy that
the population consists of 260,000 Jews, 84,000 Muslims and 12,000 Christians.
FOREIGN AFFAIRS
ISRAEL: DEFENSIBLE BORDERS
Israel is pursuing, as an integral part of its unique defense system, in
those strategic zones so vital to its security.
tial. Here as elsewhere, the two elements are interwoven: without a
Of course, when the peace for which we strive is achieved, the
security zone, Israel cannot be satisfied with demilitarization alone;
borders will not divide the two peoples but be freely open to them.
without effective demilitarization, Israel cannot be satisfied with
In short, good fences make good neighbors.
just the security zone.
It should be clear from what I have said, that Israel does not hold
IV
most of the territories that fell into its hands in the war, which was
As I have pointed out, border adjustments essential for Israel's se-
imposed on it in 1967, as an end in itself. Despite the paucity of its
territory compared with the vast areas of the Arab countries, and de-
curity, and hence for the long-term stability of the entire area, must
spite the historical, strategic and economic importance of these areas,
also be linked with mutually effective security arrangements de-
Israel would be prepared to concede all that is not absolutely essential
signed to prevent surprise attacks by one side on the other, or at
to its security within the context of an overall peace settlement. It is
least to reduce to a minimum the danger of such attacks. In the geo-
holding most of these territories now only as a means to achieve its
strategic circumstances of the Middle East, to reduce the possibility
foremost goal-peace with all its neighbors.
of surprise offensives is, in fact, to reduce the danger of all offensives.
Peace is not only a Jewish and Zionist value and goal, but an im-
I am referring to such arrangements as the delineation of both totally
perative national interest for Israel, coinciding with the desires of all
and partially demilitarized zones under joint Arab-Israeli control,
peoples and all peaceseeking forces in the world. Because of this,
with or without the participation of a credible international factor;
particular care must be taken regarding the nature of the settlement
or such arrangements as the delineation of parallel early-warning sys-
to be reached: whether it is to be fragile, provisional, and containing
tems like those functioning in the Sinai according to the terms of the
the seeds of a future war; or whether it is to be stable and enduring,
1975 Interim Agreement between Israel and Egypt.
cutting the ground out, to the greatest possible degree, from anyone
I will not enter here into the technical details of such arrange-
intent upon war. But just as peace itself is one of the prime elements
ments, their nature, placement and scope. Not that they are unimpor-
of national security, so, too, is the ability to defend oneself a prime
tant or nonessential; on the contrary, without them, Israel could
guaranty for the maintenance of peace. In view of the marked asym-
not permit itself to make the far-reaching territorial compromises
metry existing between the war aims of those participating in the
which, in my opinion, it should be prepared to make within the con-
Arab-Israeli conflict, and in light of the unstable internal and regional
text of peace agreements with its neighbors. Let me give one ex-
relations among the Arab states, one should be especially careful to
ample, albeit the most important, in order to illustrate this point.
uphold these principles here; this applies even more so to the case of
According to the principles I have already outlined, if Israel were
Israel, for whom the threat of total obliteration is always present.
to forfeit the densely populated heartland of Judea and Samaria,
The strategic security principles outlined here are designed to
it would not be able to forego-under any circumstances-the effec-
achieve such a peace based on compromise-one that will satisfy the
tive demilitarization of these areas. Apart from civilian police to
interests of both sides not merely for so limited a period as three, four,
guarantee internal order, these areas would have to be devoid of of-
or even ten years, but for our children and the children of their chil-
fensive forces and heavy arms. In the same way as any other country,
dren, and beyond. A conflict as complex and prolonged as that be-
Israel would be unable to abandon areas so close to its heartland if
tween the Arab states and Israel can only be solved through such a far-
they were liable once again to become staging areas for full-scale,
sighted approach; any other settlement will only lead to further hos-
limited or guerilla attacks upon its most vital areas.
tilities, with all the concomitant repercussions for the entire world.
In short, Israel cannot permit itself to withdraw from a large part
of the West Bank unless the area from which it withdraws is shorn
V
of all aggressive potential. For this purpose, absolute Israeli con-
Is this not only desirable but also possible? My answer is yes, it is
trol, as proposed above, of a strategic security zone along the Jordan
possible, maybe not today, or tomorrow, or at one time. Of course, if
Basin will not be adequate. Effective demilitarization of the areas
it were possible to achieve this in one fell swoop by an overall agree-
from which the Israel Defense Forces withdraw will also be essen-
ment that would solve the conflict, this would be splendid. And as
FOREIGN AFFAIRS
ISRAEL: DEFENSIBLE BORDERS
far as Israel is concerned, it desires and is ready for such a settlement
expressed intentions of its sponsors. There is no doubt that this French
as soon as possible. It may be very difficult to leap from the hos-
attitude has encouraged even the least extremist of the Arab States to
tility and hatred which the Arab states bear toward Israel to an eΓa of
adopt rigid and uncompromising positions. Outside powers and inter-
reconciliation and friendship. But this transition-a process if not a
national organs should strictly refrain from making their own pro-
solitary act-is possible. It is a process that can lead from the cease-
posals for the solution of the conflict. And if one cannot hope for such
fire situation to an end of hostilities-from violence to nonviolence,
"monasticism" in the coming period on the part of those powers hos-
from nonacceptance to acceptance, and from there to real peace. The
tile to Israel, such as the U.S.S.R.-which is interested in perpetuating
three agreements signed since the 1973 war (two with Egypt and one
the conflict in the region at the expense of the welfare of all the peoples
with Syria) may mark the beginning of the beginning of this process.
living there-one would hope for such behavior on the part of such
All this of course is possible under the appropriate circumstances
friendly powers as the United States, that insist upon the region's
and requisite conditions. The central two are: first, that the realistic
peace for the benefit of all. If we had not had to deal with such pro-
trend become dominant in the Arab camp, i.e., that the Arabs recog-
posals in the past, we would now be nearer to a settlement of the Arab-
nize that Israel is a reality which cannot be obliterated by further
Israeli conflict.
rounds of war, and that they reconcile themselves to Israel's existence
The actual conditions and details of a peace settlement between
by reaching a compromise agreement with it. To this end, Israel must
Israel and the Arab states, and even the next stage toward it, should
have sufficient potential for self-defense to deter the Arab states from
such a transitional stage prove necessary, must be left in the hands of
any additional military adventure; and should they nonetheless be so
the parties themselves. Should the Arab states sit at the negotiating
drawn to such an adventure, Israel's strength must be adequate to
table without any preconditions, with full acceptance of Israel's legit-
repel them with the minimum of damage to itself. Second, that the
imate existence and readiness to make a balanced compromise peace
international community not foster the delusion among the Arab
with it, I believe it will be possible to solve all the basic points of
leaders that it is possible-whether by military means or political
conflict, including a constructive solution of the problem of Pales-
pressure-to force Israel to give up what is essential to its minimum
tinian identity.
security needs. Israel will never yield to such pressure nor will it
I have no doubt that Israel would be ready and willing, on the
accept any attempt to impose a solution. Its readiness to compromise
basis of such a realistic approach, to negotiate a peace settlement with
is not a function of pressure or war but of its desire for peace and of
each of its neighbors, at any time and at any place, within the frame-
Arab readiness to start moving toward that goal.
work of the Geneva Conference or outside it. If these conditions are
The various proposals or plans raised by third parties to the con-
achieved, peace in the Middle East becomes not only a desirable goal
flict only serve the opposite purpose, including that unfortunate Amer-
but a possible one. I will not prophesy when such a turning point will
ican plan that entered history under the name of the "Rogers plan" of
be reached. Very much depends on international circumstances, and
1969, which erred on two main counts: first, by the very fact of its
on the way these are interpreted by the Arab states. However, it is my
presentation to the parties instead of leaving it to them to negotiate
firm belief that this stage is bound to come because there is no realistic
their differences without prior conditions; second, by its total lack of
alternative for the peoples and countries of the region.
any consideration for Israel's security needs. The presentation of
this plan gave rise to expectation in the Arab States that Washington
was about to impose on Israel a scheme favorable to the Arabs and
thereby dealt a damaging blow to the hopes for evolution of realistic
policies in the capitals of the Middle East. It is doubtful if any posi-
tive movement would have been achieved in the Middle East if this
plan had not been shelved in 1970. French policy has played a con-
spicuously negative role since the Six-Day War of 1967 by its openly
pro-Arab bias during the hostilities and by the unfounded interpreta-
tion given by France to Resolution 242 in flat contradiction to the
For Pres-elect for.
carter
good
I
AB NITE MONO-1
94th Congress
2d Session
}
COMMITTEE PRINT
STUDY MISSION TO EUROPE,
NOVEMBER-DECEMBER 1976
A REPORT
BY
SENATOR JACOB K. JAVITS
TO THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
ON HIS
TRIP TO FRANCE, BRITAIN, FEDERAL REPUBLIC
OF GERMANY, BELGIUM, ITALY AND YUGOSLAVIA
NOVEMBER 18-DECEMBER 11, 1976
JANUARY 1977
PRESERVATION PURPOSES
Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations
ELECTROSTATIC REPRODUCTION MADE FOR
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
81-100
WASHINGTON : 1977
AB NITE MONO-2
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
JOHN SPARKMAN, Alabama, Chairman
FRANK CHURCH, Idaho
CLIFFORD P. CASE, New Jersey
CLAIBORNE PELL, Rhode Island
JACOB K. JAVITS, New York
GEORGE S. McGOVERN, South Dakota
JAMES B. PEARSON, Kansas
HUBERT H. HUMPHREY, Minnesota
CHARLES H. PERCY, Illinois
DICK CLARK, Iowa
ROBERT P. GRIFFIN, Michigan
JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR., Delaware
PAT M. HOLT, Chief of Staff
ARTHUR M. KUHL, Chief Clerk
!
(II)
AB NITE MONO-3
NEW ODD PAGE
CONTENTS
=
Page
Letter of transmittal
I. British and Italian Monetary Crises
A. Britain
B. Italy
II. France
III. Federal Republic of Germany
IV. European Community
V. Yugoslavia
AB NITE MONO-4
NEW ODD PAGE
LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL
U.S. SENATE,
Washington, D.C., January 4, 1977.
Hon. JOHN SPARKMAN,
Chairman, Foreign Relations Committee,
U.S. Senate, Washington, D.C.
DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: During the postelection recess, under the
committee's auspices, I visited six countries in Europe, departing
from the United States on November 18 and returning on Decem-
ber 11, 1976. The countries visited were: France, Britain, Federal
Republic of Germany, Belgium, Italy, and Yugoslavia. I was accom-
panied by my executive assistant, Albert A. Lakeland, Jr.
A major focus of my inquiries was directed to the acute economic
crises gripping Britain and Italy, as well as to the broader picture
of the economic health and political vitality of our close partners
joined together in the European Community. In addition, I visited
Yugoslavia for the purpose of acquiring an understanding of and
a feel for the situation in that country, as it is my judgment that
Yugoslavia could become the focus of a serious European crisis
following the departure from the scene of President Tito who is now
84.
The text of my report of my findings is enclosed.
With warm regards,
Sincerely,
JACOB K. JAVITS.
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NEW ODD PAGE
STUDY MISSION TO EUROPE, NOVEMBER-DECEMBER
1976
I. BRITISH AND ITALIAN MONETARY CRISES
(A) Britain: The essence of the United Kingdom Government's
position is that the cooperation of the British trade unlons is necessary
to the success of any Government policies to turn around Britain's
acute monetary, financial and trade crisis and that only the present
Labor government is capable of obtaining the unions' cooperation.
The Government leaders believe that their room for maneuver is
narrowly circumscribed, particularly in view of the ""social contract"
wage constraints which the unions have accepted for the past 2 years,
which in themselves embody a reduced standard of living in real
terms. In the official view, stringent new cutbacks in public spending
and welfare benefits on a scale indicated by purely banking criteria
may well exceed even the Labor government's ability to carry the
unions along.
Officials fear being put in a position of having to destroy the labor
movement in Britain, or of rejecting the terms of the IFM loan and
plunging Britain onto a go-it-alone course involving a virtual abandon-
ment of its NATO contribution and unilateral protectionist measures
which would virtually remove Britain from the European Community
(EC). Moreover, they see any IMF loan terms exceeding what they
could sell to the unions as self-defeating in any event, as either a union
rebellion or a Government rejection would initiate a massive new run
on the pound in international currency markets bringing Britain to
the brink of bankruptcy.
From my extensive conversations with their principal economic:
advisers, it seems that the British Government's plans for meeting-
the current crisis are modeled conceptually on the program devised
in 1968, by then Chancellor of the Exchequer Roy Jenkins, to pulli
Britain back from the threst of international bankruptcy which them
faced Britain on a similar, though not quite SO massive and acute,
scale. An important element in their thinking is the securing of a
"safety net" under the sterling balances in the form of some sort of
international guarantee of convertibility, backed by the United States
and the German Federal Republic.
Foreign governments and individuals hold sterling accounts total-
ing over $9 billion. There is a dispute about how much of this is
actually or potentially "volatile" and thus also disagreement over
the real dimensions of the "overhang" which could exhaust and then
exceed Britain's capacity to meet massive demands for the conversion
of sterling into harder currencies in the event of a new run on the
pound. Nonetheless, there is logic to providing a "safety net" under
the sterling balances as a corollary to an IMF loan as a reinsurance
that the loan will serve its intended purpose and not be dissipated by
a new run on sterling.
Significant amounts of sterling are held in 7-day demand deposit
accounts owned by Arab oil producers. And, one of the big questions
must be why only the United States and the Federal Republic of
Germany are said to be assuming the burden of the safety net, and
why are not these Arab sterling deposit holders properly participating
too.
In addition, under the common agricultural policy (CAP) of the
European Community, due largely to the artificial exchange rate of
the "green pound," Britain is receiving a fund subsidy of almost
$2.5 million per day, a subsidy which will be phased out in due course.
Critics of the United Kingdom Government's policies and plans
for meeting the crisis are unanimous in the view that the Government
is unwilling and unable to take fundamental and long-term measures
which alone can put Britain on a road to lasting solvency and pros-
perity. The harshest crities see the "safety net" scheme as nothing
more than an effort to achieve a United States-Federal Republic of
Germany subsidization of the pound at an artificially high level so
as to permit the Labor Government to continue its massive deficit
spending and public sector expansion policies which cater to its hard
core electoral constituencies.
AB NITE MONO-6
There are two contrasting views about the nature of Britain's
malaise. The Government view is that there is very little that is funda-
mentally wrong with Britain's policies and its economy. This view
holds that Britain is suffering only somewhat more acutely the ail-
ments common to all the western industrial economies caught in the
oil price rise recession, and that correction of current policies at the
margins together with the advent of North Sea oil at the end of the
decade are all that is needed to put Britain back into shape. Indeed,
on this latter point self-sufficiency for the United Kingdom in oil
(saving about 4 billion per annum paid in 1975 for mainly Arab oil),
and possibly even a modest export position, is predicted for the early
1980's.
Recent statistical studies are claimed to show that Britain's basic
economic indicators, including those of rate of investment, levels
of taxation and public expenditure, and plant modernization, are all
within the range of other OECD and EC nations. The big exception
is in the statistics for worker productivity. It is here that Britain
lags markedly behind. For instance, a recent Government sponsored
study showed that in the auto industry, the British worker equipped
with the same tools produces only half as much per shift as his con-
tinental counterparts. Studies show similar results in the chemical
industry and generally across the board in industry. Moreover, there
is great complaint about British industry's record for meeting pro-
duction and delivery deadlines.
Britain's great lag in worker productivity seems, however, as
attributable to often inefficient and even indolent management
mentality as to union featherbedding and a pervasively luddite
mentality among workers. The net result of glaringly low British
industrial productivity, combined with chronic Government deficit
spending, is a precarious national monetary and financial posture
which leaves Britain extremely vulnerable to shifts in world trade
and monetary patterns as it drifts toward the bottom rank in per
capita wealth among EC nations.
In contrast to the "official" view that nothing more than adjust-
ments at the margins is required, the need for a drastic reversal of
direction is widely perceived in business, press, and Conservative
Party circles. Holders of this view plead that Britain not be let off
the hook by the IMF, the United States, and the Federal Republic of
Germany, contending that only outside pressure can induce the
British Government and nation to take the strong medicine required
to make Britain a dynamic society once again.
Under the best of circumstances, Britain's economic balance sheet
is certain to worsen in 1977 before it begins to move into greater
equilibrium in 1978 and beyond. British Government institutions
clearly have the technical competence to carry out the intricate mone-
tary and fiscal measures required to keep Britain from actual default
and international insolvency provided it receives adequate external
assistance and there are no major new disruptions in world trade. The
real question for the United States is how we use our considerable
leverage during this transition period with respect to Britain's economic
policies, including the questionable future of sterling as an interna-
tional reserve currency.
Recommendation.-It is my view that the United States should
throw its weight toward tighter conditions in the course of our
participation in international measures to ward off British monętary
collapse. Obviously there is no point in precipitating a financial
collapse through the imposition of conditions which are clearly
politically impossible for the British Government to accept. However,
I am convinced that the greater measure of friendship to Britain and
the pursuit of long term U.S. interests is to be found in a more strict
attitude.
AB NITE MONO-7
The root of Britain's problems lies deep within its social structure
and attitudes. Decisive changes can be effected mainly by the British
people themselves. But the United States can and should, in my
judgment, use its influence to strengthen those elements in all strata
of British society, but particularly its managerial class (both of labor
and employers) who seek a return to the work ethic in Britain. I
cannot emphasize this last point too much.
(B) Italy.-Italy is caught in the grip of a twin balance-of-payments
and domestic inflation crisis. The reasons for the aggravated nature
of Italy's twin crises are basically political and social rather than
economic. There is enough inherent resiliency in the Italian economy
to permit a rapid turn around if there is an exercise of sufficient
political discipline and determination. Conversely, a return to political
permissiveness and instability could result in Italy's economic collapse
and international default.
One of the immediate causes of Italy's inflation and balance-of-
payments problems is the "wage indexation" scheme which auto-
matically adjusts most union wages to cost-of-living index increases.
In addition, exceptionally large annual wage increases since 1969 have
raised Italy's labor costs to levels which threaten its international
competitiveness, a problem of real seriousness for an economy so
heavily dependent on export trade. Moreover, labor indiscipline and
low productivity have reached acute levels. And, public sector deficit
spending and inefficiency have added considerably to Italy's problem
by aggravating inflation and by shackling Italy's much more efficient
and dynamic private sector.
It is clear that the Andreotti government will require the boost of
external sanctions imposed by the IMF and the United States if it is
to have any hope of succeeding in pushing through the belt-tightening
measures across the board which are required to avert economic
collapse.
The Christian Democratic Party (DC) which has had power in
Italy since 1947 currently governs as a minority government. The
party has been plagued by scandal and factionalism and has been
perceived over the past decade as progressively dissipating its own
moral and political fiber. In a truer sense than ever the next 2 years
will be a historic testing time for the Christian Democrats, as it will
be for its principal rival and antagonist the Communist Party.
The Christian Democrats have promulgated extensive programs
for internal party reform and revitalization. The party elected many
new younger faces to the Parliament in the last election and a conscious
effort is being made to bring a new generation of Christian Democrats
to power. Many Italian and foreign observers are deeply skeptical
of the will and the ability of the Christian Democrats to reform and
revitalize their party. I can amply appreciate the grounds for such
skepticism but I believe it would be a mistake for the United States
to discount totally the capacity of the Christian Democrats to re-
juvenate.
But, to retain even their current shaky mandate to rule, the Chris-
tian Democrats will have to achieve a degree of self-discipline, de-
termination and creativity that has eluded them for many years.
Nonetheless, the road to power for the Italian Communist Party
is far from clear and easy. In the June 1976 parliamentary elections,
the Communists failed to achieve their goal of supplanting the Chris-
tian Democrats as the largest party and they have failed to achieve
a place in a coalition government which they sought.
Presently, the Communists are playing the anomalous role of an
official parliamentary opposition which has agreed to abstain rather
than oppose the minority Christian Democrat Government. In
addition, the Communist Party in Parliament, and the leadership
of the Communist trade unions have joined publicly in supporting
the austerity measures which the Andreotti government has proposed
to meet Italy's economic crisis.
AB NITE MONO-8
Advocacy of economic austerity and worker discipline by the Com-
munists in the present situation reverses 30 years of party rhetoric
and class war agitation. The motivation of the Communists in adopt-
ing this posture of responsibility and patriotism is not one of new-
found idealism. Rather, it is the product of a new strategy to achieve
power. For years, the Italian Communist Party was unable to achieve
much more than about 20 percent of the popular vote, representing
largely its "proletarian" constituency. Its pro-Soviet, Marxist and
class warfare rhetoric scared off the middle class.
To break out of the confines of this limited proletarian electoral
base, the party has adopted a posture designed to attract middle
class: support. Independence from the Soviet Union in foreign affairs
and cooperation with the Christian Democratic Government's
austerity measures in internal affairs has given the Italian Com-
munist Party a new face which it styles as "Euro-Communism".
But, is this just a strategem to attain power? On the available evidence,
I believe we are without as yet any real assurance that any more
than the usual Communist syndrome lies beneath the "Euro-
Communist" posture of the Italian Communist Party.
The present situation poses deep dilemmas, for the Communist
support for the Andreotti austerity program causes dissension and
confusion among the party's union cadres and rank and file, condi-
tioned by decades of confrontational rhetoric.' The gamble being
taken is that the two faces of Euro-Communism-independence from
the Soviet Union and support of the Government's austerity pro-
gram-a masterpiece of ambiguity-will convince potential middle
class supporters that the party is responsible and national. It remains
to be seen how far the Communist Party can stretch toward the
middle classes without eroding seriously its traditional labor base.
Moreover, to a significant degree, the success or failure of the new
Communist electoral strategy depends upon the performance of the
Christian Democrats. If the Christian Democrats succeed in pulling
Italy together and surmounting the economic crisis, even with the
help of the Communists, it is quite likely that a lion's share of the
credit with the Italian voters will be reaped by the Christian Demo-
crats rather than the Communists. On the other hand, if the Commu-
nists give up their posture of cooperation, revert to confrontational
tactics causing instability "and failure of the emergency measures,
thereby forcing new elections, it is possible that all their efforts of
recent years to court the middle classes through reasonableness will be
undone.
AB NITE MONO 9
To at least some degree, therefore, the initiative lies with the
Christian Democrats. If they revert to back stabbing factionalism
and corruption, and make a mess of the emergency, it seems highly
possible that the Communists will surpass them as Italy's largest
party and win a major place in the government of Italy. However,
should the Christian Democrats succeed in managing the crisis
adroitly, including Communist support, the next elections could mark
a resurgence of Christian Democratic predominance. Equally, the
June 1976 elections could prove to have been the high water mark of
the Italian Communist Party, as many of the most astute and capable
members of the Christian Democratic movement predict.
In Italy the belief is widespread even among staunch anti-Commu-
nists that the Italian Communist Party really is different and Italian,
rather than subordinate to the Soviet-led international Communist
bloc. Outsiders tend to be much more skeptical. The degree of real
change or metamorphosis effected by long involvement in electoral
politics, strenuous efforts to prove itself to the middle classes, and
self-conscious advertisement as Euro-Communists can only be tested
if the Communists actually come to power in Italy-and I believe
this is a risk to be avoided and not taken.
In Italy the Socialist Party has never succeeded in establishing
itself as a vital factor. Some observers think that this anomaly has
led the Italian Communist Party into playing at least part of the
role traditionally played in other Western European democracies by
the Social Democratic Parties. Only in Germany does-there seem to
be any serious thought given to the possibility of a pan-European
Socialist effort to strengthen the Italian Socialist Party as a serious
rival to the Communists on the left, as was done successfully in
Portugal. Within Italy the idea seems to be dismissed as unworkable
and undesirable.
The situation in Italy presents the United States with several
alternative policy options. The first option is for the United States
to work-with its allies in Western Europe and Japan-in close
support of the Andreotti government on the assumption that it has
a good chance of surmounting the current economic crisis and that
the Christian Democratic Party has at least some reasonable chance
of rejuvenating itself
On the contrary assumption that Communist accession to power
in Italy is inevitable, at least three options present themselves.
The first is to abstain from aiding Italy in meeting the present crisis
on the rationale that any assistance will merely improve the plum
when plucked by the Communists.
A second option is for the United States to spell out in advance, the
conditions on which the United States would continue collaboration
with an Italian Government having a significant Communist presence,
separating this between military (NATO) and nonmilitary.
A third option is to maintain without further elaboration a posture
that the United States is opposed to Cemmunist participation in
government in Italy. This option is predicated on the assumption
also that such a posture could induce the Communists to seek ways
of enhancing their acceptability in U.S. eyes.
AB NITE MONO - 10
Recommendation.-For the present, I favor this third option. I
believe that the United States-in concert with as much of Western
Europe as possible-must support and work closely with the-Andreotti
government so long as it continues its good faith efforts to do the job
needed. In addition, I believe that we should maintain our posture
of unelaborated opposition to Communist participation in Italy's
Government. I think that such a posture is best calculated to keeping
the threshold high in Italy of resistance to a Communist accession
to power and is best suited also to require the Communists to come
to terms with democratic forces if they do come to power. Also, careful
thought should be given to lateral support from other centrist parties
in democratic countries-even if only moral-on the analogy with
the effect of comparable help in the recent early days to Portugal's
Socialist Party of Premier Soares.
II. FRANCE
The French economy is characterized by the maladies common to
its recession partners-inflation, stagnation, unemployment, and
balance-of-payments problems. Also, it has serious class problems, the
gap between rich and poor being reported as the widest among the
industrial democracies of Western Europe by a recent OECD study.
However, from an economic view point, France's position is not as
acute or precarious as that of Britain or Italy. Its foreign exchange
reserve position and its international credit worthiness if borrowing
becomes necessary are measurably stronger than Britain's or Italy's,
and corrective business cycle swings are expected to further amelio-
rate the economic situation in France in 1977. Also it has a strong
agricultural position in respect of self-sufficiency in food.
Prime Minister Barre, a vigorous and impressive professional
economist, has conceived what is known as the Barre plan for dealing
with France's economic difficulties. In essence, it is an austerity plan
which will restrict public spending, hold down wages and prices, and
place an absolute money ceiling on petroleum imports. The plan is ex-
pected to cut the overall growth rate in France in 1977 to 2 or 3 percent.
It is weighted to stimulate activity in the more efficient private sector
while reining in the less efficient public sector. Negotiations are under
way to try to obtain trade union agreement to the basic thrust of the
Barre plan, especially its objective of restraining wage and:price in-
creases.
In the political field, however, the prospects are worrisome indeed
and uncertainties respecting the political future discourage private
sector investment and expansion, thereby aggravating the economic
situation. The specter which haunts France is that of a Socialist-Com-
munist victory in the 1978 parliamentary elections. Current public
opinion polls, and recent byelection results, signal enhancing chances
of just such a result.
Deep fissures in the anti-Communist camp also seem to be enhanc-
ing the prospects of a 1978 Socialist-Communist coalition victory.
President Giscard d'Estaing's efforts to build a new coalition of the
center-drawing left-of-center strength away from the Socialists and
right-of-center strength away from the Gaullists-seems to be falter-
ing. Former Prime Minister Jacques Chirac appears to be flanking
President Giscard on the right from within the Gaullist movement.
Chirac has recently launched a new political grouping on the right
which some observers feel has Bonapartist overtones. The avowed
purpose of Chirac's new movement is to rally the forces of the right
for an aggressive confrontation with the Socialist-Communist coalition
of the left, in the 1978 elections.
AB NITE MONO - 11
Chirac's "call to colors" on the right is causing problems for some
important elements of President Giscard d'Estaing's program, par-
ticularly his efforts to enact a meaningful capital gains tax and his
efforts to move France closer to the United States and NATO. It is
expected that Chirac's movement will be well funded by French busi-
ness entities which have been marked in advance for nationalization
by the Socialist-Communist alliance.
The strong personal and philosophical rivalry between President
Giscard d'Estaing and former Prime Minister Chirac worries many
anti-Communists in France. Many believe, nonetheless, that their
strong common interest in preventing a Socialist-Communist victory
in 1978 will keep their differences within bounds and induce at least
a minimum amount of cooperation.
France continues to be the most polarized of Western democracies
politically, socially, and economically. President Giscard d'Estaing's
efforts to crack this polarization through a centrist coalition, however
brilliantly conceived, is encountering deeply entrenched social and
economic patterns and habits of thought. Strong Gaullist opposition
to his capital gains tax proposal is a case in point.
The condition of the Socialist-Communist coalition of the left is a
subject of great interest in France and throughout Europe. It is gen-
erally believed that France provides one example of where the Social-
ists have gained at the expense of the Communists through their
coalition. Even strong anti-Communists reluctantly concede that the
French Socialists could succeed in dominating their Communist
partners in a coalition government if they won the 1978 parliamentary
elections.
Nonetheless, the French Socialists are much more doctrinaire than
their British, German, Dutch, or Swedish counterparts and their
advent to power would cause major economic disruption in France
with repercussions for the entire European community and Western
monetary and trading system generally.
In my conversations with President Giscard d'Estaing, Prime
Minister Barre and Foreign Minister Guiringaud, I raised the issue of
sales of nuclear equipment and technology to Third World nations,
emphasizing the very strong feelings of the Congress on this issue. It is
clear from the responses that I received that the French Government
seems ready to make some concessions on this issue. The importance of
the French Cabinet decision of October 11, adopting more stringent
principles for nuclear exports, was stressed. Subsequently, even more
far-reaching restrictions have been announced and since I have re-
turned, the Cabinet has taken steps to end any new agreements for
selling nuclear reprocessing plants.
The French leaders were unanimous in expressing dissatisfaction
with U.S. energy policy. They believe that U.S. indecision and drift
has hurt not only the United States but has weakened the OECD
nations collectively in their dealings with OPEC. Clearly, France, as
well as the other EC nations, looks to the United States for leadership
on the energy issue hich is seen as the principal challenge today
to the viability of the industrial democracies, individually and
collectively.
French receptivity to U.S. leadership in other areas, while not
articulated overtly as in the case of energy, was conveyed unmistak-
ably. This marks a most important change of tone and attitude under
the leadership of President Giscard d'Estaing. It is a marked contrast
from the tone and attitude which prevailed during the davs of De
Gaulle and Pompidou. It should be noted however, that President
Giscard d'Estaing's efforts to edge France into a more cooperative
role in NATO and his support of direct elections to the European
Parliament have encountered Gaullist resistance, under the evangel-
istic leadership of M. Chirac. This opposition may increase to a point
which makes it impossible for the French President to continue to
move in this direction.
AB NITE MONO - 12
Recommendation.-The United States working with our Western
European allies an Japan should evidence by positive actions our
willingness to cooperate with France and our encouragement for
France's greater participation in international activities in which
Gaullist doctrine has been heretofore inhibiting.
III. FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY
Chancellor Schmidt's intellectual dominance of the Federal Re-
public is undiminished by the narrowness of his coalition govern-
ment's victory in the October 1976 election. His principal preoc-
cupation is with the broad economic crises which he sees as threaten-
ing the entire structure of the western trading system. He perceives
Germany's interests and its role through pan European eyes-to such
an extent that he sees the British and Italian crises as almost as
much German problems as problems of Britain and Italy.
Chancellor Schmidt and his colleagues are acutely conscious of the
limitations upon the exercise of the Federal Republic's growing
economic power within the European Community. Because they see
such a direct German interest in the vitality of the Community
partners and in the viability of the Community as a coalescing entity,
there is an almost surprising willingness to spend German resources
for the immediate benefit of other nations and the Community as a
whole. Nonetheless, there is a readily expressed apprehension of a
negative reaction to too much German prosperity and economic
power, even when it takes the form of loans to Italy or subsidization of
Britain's food bill through the Common Agricultural Fund of the
EC.
The growing imbalance within the Community between the Federal
Republic and the other members-especially with France and Britain
being unable to match Germany's economic weight-has created
fear of the evolution of an anti-German coalition to offset the weight
of the Federal Republic as the too powerful member. The German
leadership seems deeply committed to seeking democratic Germany's
future in a progressively coalescing European Community in close
cooperation with the United States rather than in an increasingly
bilateral alliance with the United States. It is for this reason that the
weakness of Germany's European partners and the vulnerability of
the EC movement to the buffets of the current recession are so acutely
painful and worrisome to Chancellor Schmidt and his colleaques.
In a sense they have substituted an interest rationale for the older
post-war guilt complex as the basis for the Federal Republic's ardent
pan-Europeanism.
AB NITE MONO- - 13
Notwithstanding the dedication of the German leadership to pan-
Europeanism, there is a profound perception of Western Europe and
the Federal Republic's community of interest with the United States
and a constant instinct to be in agreement with the United States on
all important economic and security issues. Even its barest form, the
indispensibility of the United States-its troops and its nuclear um-
brella-to the Federal Republic's security remains very high in the
German consciousness. The German nightmare is that the United
States will turn isolationist and the European Community will
disintegrate leaving the Federal Republic exposed to the weight and
the enmity of the Soviet Union.
On European issues one can perceive the palpable tension between
the Federal Republic's impatience to get on quickly with the tension
business of
is perceptible between Germany's willingness to commit its own
European in-
resources to advance the common cause as it sees it, and its realization
that helping too much can create reactions that will retard rather
tegration and
than advance its objectives. Chancellor Schmidt finds his greatest
its realiza-
difficulty in patience with what may often seem the faint-hearted
tion that
economic policies of partner governments in the European Community.
patience is
The domestic political scene in the Federal Republic has been
its best hope
transformed, in ways not vet clear, by the decision of Franz Josepf
Strauss to establish his Bavarian-based Christian Socialist Union
for achieving
(CSU) as a separate parliamentary party from the broader Christian
the future it
Democratic Union (CDU). The motivation, the wisdom and the long-
sees for itself
term ramifications of this surprise move by Herr Strauss are subjects
in a dynamic
of intense speculation and discussion within the Federal Republic.
and unified
Quite contrary predictions are offered as to the effects of the CDU/CSU
divorce. Some observers believe that the breakup will free the CDU
Europe. A
to expand into the center left territory now occupied by the Free
similar
Democratic Party (FDP) causing that party's demise and an end to
tension
its long role as the coalition kingmaker of governments in the Federal
Republic. The corollary to this view is that the CSU will whither and
disappear also with Strauss' eventual retirement from active politics,
leaving the Federal Republic as a truly two-party nation.
A contrary view, however, sees the CDU/CSU-split as the precursor
to an increasing fractionalization of German politics, with the next
move being a split-off of the left wing of the SPD. This school of
thought sees a two-party system as being unnatural to European
parliamentary democracy and something essentially peculiar to the
Anglo-Saxon democracies of Britain and the United States. The
prospect of shifting, multiparty coalition governments in the Federal
Republic is disturbing to those who value the certainty and discipline
of government as highly as do most Germans.
IV. EUROPEAN COMMUNITY
The importance of the European Community was a major refrain
in all of my bilateral discussions in London, Paris, Bonn, and Rome.
In addition, I met with incomeing European Commission President
Roy Jenkins in London, as well as outgoing Commission President
Ortoli and Belgian Prime Minister Tindemans in Brussels, for the
express purpose of discussing the European Community as a Com-
munity, in terms of its importance to the United States and to our
partners and allies in Europe.
The EC is like the proverbial half a glass of water-some see it as
half full, some as half empty. It is clear that the recession of 1974-76
placed a heavy strain on already existing joint economic policies and
institutions of the EC and has delayed the adoption of new ones.
Nonetheless, I found a greater than ever appreciation of the political
importance of the EC in each of the countries I visited, and a deter-
mination to find new ways to strengthen the Community as a unit
despite the roadblocks which are obstructing the path to greater
economic institutional unification at the present time. I was struck by
the disposition among European government leaders to seek ways to
act through the Community whenever possible. The habit if not the
substance of frequent joint consultations on almost the full spectrum
of political and economic issues seems to have taken hold firmly, at
least partly as a result of rather elaborate political consultation
mechanisms that have been established on an ad hoc basis outside
the formal text of the Treaty of Rome.
AB NITE MONO - 14
And, within the United Nations General Assembly a very high
degree of unified action is in the process of being achieved by the
nine members of the EC. This is largely the work of a new unit in the
EC developed by Sir Christopher Soames.
Anomalies remain, however. For instance, the nine take a common
stand in the Geneva multilateral trade negotiations because trade
formally comes within the Commission's jurisdiction, but not in the
IMF because monetary issues do not come within the Commission's
formal jurisdiction.
Individually and collectively the member nations of the EC con-
sider it vital that the U.S. lead in seeking to achieve a harmoniza-
tion of policies on economic and political issues.
The recovery and expansion of the U.S. economy is seen as a pre-
condition for the recovery and expansion of Western Europe's "stag-
flating" economies. There seem no longer to be any lingering sus-
picions that the United States is ambivalent toward the Community,
seeking on the one hand to bolster it while acting on other occasions
to divide and weaken it, as was sometimes charged in the recent past.
A major issue facing the European Community is the question of
expansion. A formal decision has been made to negotiate Greece's
entry into the EC while Portugal and Spain have moved to the
threshold of seeking formal admission. In addition, Turkey is anxious
to match any status and concessions made to Greece. Though Turkey
seems to be not quite ready for the EC at least for the moment, there
is an expectation that negotiations for a closer Turkish alignment. will
ensue. However, given the diversity of Turkey's political and cultural
heritage, questions remain as to the feasibility of its formal incorpora-
tion in a "united Europe".
It is significant to note that the Council of Ministers, in voting to
admit Greece, overrode on political grounds the negative recommenda-
tion concerning Greece's application for admission prepared by the
Commission on economic grounds. It was clear from my discussions
in Brussels and elsewhere that a similar situation may be developing
with respect to Spain's desire to enter the European Community.
The ambivalent view of the EC members respecting the admission
of Greece is illustrative of many of the paradoxes with which our
European allies find themselves confronted, in their slow and painful
groping for a truly European nationhood. A reliable foundation for
political union can only be achieved through meaningful economic
integration-a tedious and slow-paced process. But the slowness and
complexity of economic unification retards the process of political
unification and highlights the political impotence of the European
Community in a world which cries out for a Western European political
"personality".
The energy problem remains uppermost in the minds of the EC
members. The initiative of Secretary of State Kissinger in the IAEA-
the association of major oil consumers-is widely appreciated. I see
a new recognition in Western Europe-especially in France- of its
own relation to the Middle East oil supply situation and Arab-Israel
conflict, a recognition that the ability to play its part has been prej-
udiced by its fear of its own vulnerability to another Middle East oil
embargo and its interest in earning its way back to a more effective
consultative role with the United States. The Federal Republic of
Germany has generally had this view and current developments in-
volving Saudi Arabia and ot her Arab States are brining the issue
forward again.
AB NITE MONO - 15
The attitude of the other industrial democracles-other than in
some cases the Federal Republic of Germany-toward the LDC's
and our own in the United States have tended to diverge. The best
evidence of this is the Lome Agreement made by the EC with 46
States in February, 1975 which dealt with many of the same subjects
on which we could not agree with the LDC's at the Nairobi Conference
of April, 1976. From the U.S. point of view a major effort to harmonize
these policies regarding the LDC's is perhaps as important-if not
more 80 even than on energy.
Recommendation
(1) If European Community relations with the United States are
reasonably harmonious and on the upswing, European Community
relations with Japan-the third leg of the industrial triad-remain
tentative and troubled. This is an area in which the United States
must be particularly alert and adroit in playing a good offices role.
(2) It is most essential to achieve a harmonization of United States,
European Community, Western European and Japanese policies in
respect of relations with the LDC's and on energy questions. The
United States alone is positioned to give the lead required. Nothing
less than the continuing political and economic viability of the
industrial democracies is at stake and only concerted action by the
United States, the European Community and Western Eufope and
Japan offers a hope for a creative response to the challenges posed
to us jointly by the LDC's and by the OPEC oil monopoly.
V. YUGOSLAVIA
I visited Yugoslavia to acquire some familiarity with the problems
and personalities which are likely to surface following Tito's departure.
At 84, President Tito indisputably is in the twilight of his long and
illustrious career. There are grounds for concern that post-Tito
Yugoslavia could become a world crisis center.
The chances of any overt military attack by the Soviet Union
seem unlikely. However, a destabilizing resurgence of ethnic ani-
mosities and nationality separatism could provide rich opportunities
for Soviet political intervention and for subversion and could lead
even to something more serious if it got violent.
Yugoslavia's population encompasses the greatest ethnic and
religious diversity in Europe. A leading academic expert has recently
observed: "A 'Bangladesh' in Europe seems implausible but if it can
occur anywhere, Yugoslavia is one such place, for national hatreds of
an intensity unsurpassed in modern Europe have been submerged
not uprooted."
For a small country, Yugoslavia occupies an extraordinarily
strategic position in Europe geographically and ideologically. The
elimination of Titoism and the reassertion of political dominance over
Yugoslavia-even without overt military action-would provide a
rich harvest indeed for the Soviet Union. It could give the Soviet
Navy unrestricted access to the Adriatic Coast, thereby revolutioniz-
ing the military balance in the Mediterranean and the Near East. It
could enable the Soviet Union to leap-frog Romania and flank Albania.
Indeed an enhanced political presence in Ugoslavia for the U.S.S.R.
could open up the prospect of a base for the naval and air forces of the
U.S.S.R. with a profound effect upon Italy and Greece. Moreover,
reassertion of Soviet control over the Yugoslav League of Communists
could change the nature of the Communist movements in Italy and
Greece.
Histroic Russian pan-Slavism has long regarded Serbia as an
extension of the greater Russian hinterland. The idea has some
analogy to Syria's coucept of Lebanon being part of a greater Syria,
and a Soviet "peace-keeping" role in Yugoslavia analogous to that
assumed by Syria in strife-torn Lebanon might-if there was a con-
flict of nationality in Yugoslaiva-have strong appeal in the Kremlin.
AB NITE MONO - 16
President Tito has established a decentralized federal system in
Yugoslavia in an effort to contain separatist conflicts following his
departure. The "glue" designed to hold the centrifugal ethnic repub-
lics together after Tito is to be supplied by the League of Yugoslav
Communists-that is the Party and by the Army which is believed
to be dominated by "nationalist," Yugoslav-minded leaders.
Economic development is vital to Yugoslavia's future, not only for
its own sake but as an indispensible lubricant to subordinate ethnic
and regional rivalries. At present, per capita annual income varies
from the $2,500 range in Slovenia to the $300 range in the Albanian
region. In pursuit of economic development, Yugoslavia has evolved
a brand of communism which they call "$elf-management" based on
the individual autonomy of state-owned enterprises, profit-seeking and
open competition among such enterprises in domestic and foreign
markets. In addition, Yugoslavia actively seeks private foreign
investment by transnational enterprises from the industrialized
countries. Dow Chemical has recently invested in a major new project.
The Yugoslav leadership downplays speculation concerning possible
Soviet military intervention but has expressed private concerns
respecting the implications of the so-called Sonnenfeldt doctrine
and of President-elect Carter's statement flatly riegating any thought
of U.S. troops in Yugoslavia even in the event of fighting there. Yugo-
slav leaders took the initiative in expressing to me their concerns over
the so-called Sonnenfeldt doctrine as it was interpreted in the East-
ern European press. This interpretation was to the effect that the
United States was giving the U.S.S.R. a free hand as to the political
future of the Eastern European states in Comecon and the Warsaw
Pact. This is, of course, not the case and any such interpretation has
been rejected by the United States but Yugoslavia and how the
United States will regard it is considered an important case in point.
Recommendations
(1) I believe that the United States and NATO have a strong interest
in the continuing independence and national integrity of Yugoslavia.
In this respect, I believe that judicious encouragement should be
given trade and investment opportunities helpful to Yugoslavia's
economic development. Moreover, the United States should encourage
the European Community to maintain a helpful trading and invest-
ment relationship with Yugoslavia. Economic relations could be
decisive in holding Yugoslavia together as a nation in a crunch.
(2) On appropriate occasions, both public and private, I believe
that the President and Secretary of State of the United States should
make clear to the Soviet Union and to the world that the United States
strongly supports Yugoslav independence and national integrity and
will take a most serious view of any outside efforts to compromise
continuance of that independence and national integrity.
EMBASSY OFMOROCCO
WASHINGTON, D.C.
Cylance
PRESS MEMORANDUM
The Embassy of the Kingdom of Morocco presents its compliments
and has the honor to forward the following for your information:
1. A study published by Mr. Mohammad Galal Keshk, well-known
Egyptian writer, who was the first Arab journalist to enter the
Sahara region during the Spanish occupation.
2. An interview granted by His Majesty King Hassan II of Morocco
to Mr. Leon Zitrone, Special Representative of the French
television.
The Embassy of the Kingdom of Morocco hopes that this information
will be of interest.
MOROCCO OF NEWS N EWS
Enclosures
*
WE
SHINGTON
ELECTROSTATIC REPRODUCTION MADE FOR
PRESERVATION PURPOSES
SAHARA: QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS
I - WHAT IS THE WESTERN SAHARA ?
The Western Sahara is an imperialist term, there has never
been a state or an entity with such a name. It refers, per se,
to a relationship with something in the East. For instance, when
the Americans talk about the West , they refer to a region in
the Western part of the United States of America. The Western
Sahara is a western region of the Maghreb. Geographically and
historically, Morocco is the farthest western part of the Arab
homeland on the Atlantic. There has never been a state between
Morocco and the ocean.
If there has been during recent years a political definition
of the so-called Western Sahara, it has been a definition created
by imperialism and brought about by both the European power struggle
to divide Morocco and the Moroccan opposition to imperialist
sectarianism. At one time, Spanish colonies in the Moroccan
Sahara included Tarfaya and Ifni whose true Moroccan character have
never been disputed. These two areas have also in the past been
dominated by Spain which for several years refused to recognize
their being part of Morocco. Eventually compelled by the national
movement and the resolutions of international agencies Spain with-
drew from the territories. There were no problems regarding their
joining their mother-country (Morocco) although UN Resolution 1514
made reference to the wishes of the peoples of Ifni, Tarfaya and
the Western Sahara and to their right to self-determination.
It was unanimously agreed that the peoples of Ifni and Tarfaya
fully exercised their right to self-determination when the two
territories were reunited with their mother-land, Morocco.
Therefore, the Sahara was not a separate issue until after the
restoration of Moroccan sovereignty over Ifni and Tarfaya and when
the discovery of phosphate deposits in the area led General Franco
to separate the region and to establish an entity around the phosphate
mines.
The Spanish authorities governed the region as one unit including
Tarfaya and Ifni. The administrative base was Ifni until 1960 when
Spain turned the area into a Spanish territory represented in the
Cortes.
The Spaniards then, more logical than truthful, invented a new
political entity and called it "panish Sahara. A3 far as the Arabs
are concerned. the Sahara extends from the ocean to the Nile Valley
It is a geographical and not a political term. The Western Sahara
is Moroccan in Morocco and the Western Sahara is Egyptian in Egypt.
II - WHY HAVE MOST COUNTRIES CONSIDERED THAT MOROCCO IS THE RIGHTFUL
CLAIMANT TO THE SAHARA ?
There are many historical, natural and anthropological reasons.
A. As we have mentioned it previously the area was not a
separate entity until Spain claimed it as a Spanish territory. And
according to the decree issued by the International Court. it was
never a no-man's land.
Geographically, the region was part of Morocco: its boundaries
lie in Dara's Valley. It is Moroccan from the anthropological stand
point, Its tribes. ethnic groupings and dialects extend from the
2 /
heartland of Morocco to Nouakchott. Historically, we find that
the greatest ruling dynasty of Morocco came originally from the
heart of the Saharan region, and loroccan history would become
meaningless if great men such as Ben Tashfin and his troops were
looked upon as foreigners or as an army which occupied and colonized
Morocco on behalf of an alien state.
Saharan dynasties have governed Fez Marrakesh and Rabat.
Century-old documents show the Sultan of Morocco referring to
the Moroccan character of the Sahara and the Saharans pledging
allegiance to the Sultan of Morocco such as a letter from Sultan
Moulay Abd Al-Rahman, dated February 2, 1833, which states: The
Sahara is an integral part of our happy kingdom. This was written
130 years before the discovery of phosphate deposits and before
the emergence of many of the states which currently oppose Morocco.
B. Moroccans inside and outside the region have always
believed in the unity of the homeland. The Sahara always supplied
men when the ruling family in the capital found itself in a weak
position. In recent vears, while western powers dominated the
Moroccan homeland, nationalist resistance was widespread. In the
Sahara, Ha'Ul-Ainain and his son Al-Haiba organized a movement
which continued to resist imperialism carrying the banner of the
Sultan of Morocco, supporting him and working under him. This vent
on until the authorities in the capital saw the necessity of accept-
ing the realities of European supremacy. Na'Ul-Ainain and his son
rejected the decision and rebelled against Moroccan authority. They
conquerred Marrakesh on August 15, 1912 and asserted their authority
as the vanguard of a general movement of resistance against the
colonialists. This revolt against the Sultan underlines the cohesive
force of nationalist feelings among Moroccans inside and outside
the region. who viewed it as an internal dispute over the conduct
of foreign policy. The Sultan himself stated: "If I were certain
that Al-Maiba could defeat imperialism, I would abdicate in his
favor".
Ma'Ul-Ainain who established A1-Smarah as the historical and
cultural capital of the Sahara region, gained historical fame
because of his struggle against the French occupation of Morocco.
He is buried in Tiznit (Morocco). Meanwhile, his son had occupied
Marrakesh and proclaimed himself Sultan, pledging to continue the
fight to liberate Morocco from French imperialism. Can any object-
ive observer say that they and their sons are not Saharans i.e.
Moroccans?
C. The division of the country by France and Spain gave rise
to a nationalist movement whose pre-eminent objective was to unify
their homeland by achieving complete political independence.
A review of the history of the nationalist movement in Morocco
will reveal that the return of Sahara to the homeland has always
been one of its principal aims.
On both sides of the artificial border, the victims of the
partition lived in the hope to be one dav re-united. For their own
reasons, the imperialists felt the same way: The French realized
they would not be able to rule Rabat as long as the Saharan nation-
alist movement and A1-Smarah would survive, In 1958, Spain collabor-
ated with Spain to fight the Moroccan Liberation Army and to expel
it, together with the Saharan members of the Nationalist Movement
to Morocco who had just been liberated.
D. Immediately after independence and before the emergence
of certain facts, i.e., the discovery of phosphate deposits which
3 /
some would like to use 10 the reason of the Voroccan claim and
before the emergence of so-called internal conflicts in Morocco
the Moroccan Liberation Army which included a high percentage
of Saharans proceeded to the Sahara liberated it raised the
Moroccan flag over its towns and declared its unity to Morocco
No one thought of describing this liberation as an imperialist
conquest or as an expansion manoeuver.
L. The main purpose of the Moslem Party led by Wald
Al-Baseer, a movement of onposition which is being studied in
depth by th historians of the Saharan separation was to
liberate the area and to rejoin with the Kingdom of Morocco.
Its leaders were avare and vigilant enough to use a very
precise terminology. They said joining and not uniting with
and they said "the kingdom of Morocco and not Morocco
These were the aims which led to the Saharan revolt and to the
death of Al-Baseer in Al-Aiun on June 30 1970.
F. A complete library could be filled with the documents
claims, memoranda, newspapers and statements issued by the
Royal Palace in Morocco and by the Moroccan government parties
and nationalist organizations C ILIA. for the liberation of
Sahara and its unification. It is sufficient to refer to the
speech delivered at A1-Mahmeed on February 26 1958 and to the
immediate response of the Saharan leaders at the March 1958
Conference, when they thanked the King and declared that the
struggle "for the return of the Sahara to the motherland would
go on "under the leadership of the Alayi throne
G. Following the liberation of Tarfaya and Ifni the
Sahara issue became the principal claim of the nationalist move
ment. No other issue of the Third World had aroused such
national unanimity, thus demonstrating the overwhelming sincerity
of the Moroccan people in their determination to liberate and
unify the Sahara. This unanimous support was clearly shown by
the Green March which is considered a unique popular achievement
In any country, it is rare to find the Palace and all political
parties, including the Communist Party, in such complete agreement
over one position, such as in this case over the Sahara, Even
the Algerian opposition leaders noted this concensus through
statements which stressed the need to respect the will of the
people, i.e., to recognize the wishes of 17 million Moroccans
who professed cheir steadfast belief in the Moroccan character
of the Sahara by the most forceful means of expression.
H. Morocco has been for the last twenty years the only
claimant and the only contestant for the independence of the
Sahara. Its claims lest the issue alive all Spanish plans
to annex the region to set un a gatellite regine or to establish
a separate entity with an extremist outlook failed while the
international organizations and neigabouring countries consider
ed orocco as the orincipal concerned party in the Saharan issue.
III - WHY HAS CROCCO TO SHARE THE SABARA "ITH AURITANIA?
When Corocco recognized auritania's independence the
latter introduced its claims to Sanara. The two countries
reached an understanding on the issue with a view to confront
Snain and the other powers seeking to exploit oroccan auritanian
differences to perpetuate the senaration of the Sanara
matever can be said about the circumstances which compel
led Morocco to accept an agreement with Mauritania the Toroccan
atticude cannot be described as a tactical manoeuvre The
two countries' borders had not been determined and the union of
the two territories had been considered a possibility. When
4 /
the two countries chose to e tablish their boundaries they
decided, with justification to define their frontiers
inside a territory upon which both had valid and legal
claims as stated in the decision handed down by the Intern
ation Court.
It is worth mentioning here that the expression
partition of the Sahara between Morocco and Mauritania
was first used at the Arab Summit Conference held in Rabat
in 1974, by President Boumedienne who stated: "I attended
a meeting between the King and the Mauritanian President
they have agreed on a formula to solve the problem of
Sahara - when it is liberated and to determine how it
is to be apportionned. I was present and gave the agreement
all my blessings."
IV - WHY DOES MOROCCO REJECT THE SELF-DETERMINATION APPROACH?
Morocco has not denied the right of the Saharans to
self-determination indeed. while considering that it was
not the only solution it nevertheless supported a refer.
endum subject to two conditions: Spanish withdrawal and
the 'right to vote' of the Saharans exiled in Morocco,
Morocco also asked the International Court's opinion as to
the no-man's-land status of the Sahara. Spain rejected
these conditions and kept imposing a fait accompli on
the region. New forces and factors intervened substantiating
Morocco's belief that the true will of the people could
not be expressed unless outside influences were removed
In this regard, it is interesting to note that those
calling for self-determination were against it when it was
to their advantage. The Polisario Front rejected the
referendum formula, describing as a plot unless it was
held under pre-established rules including the proviso
that independence would be the inevitable outcome. (Article
8 of the Popular Front Program September 1974) An
agreement reached during a secret and lengthy meeting held
on September 9, 1975 between Al-Wali, the Polisario leader
and the Spanish Foreign Minister ignored the right of the
people to self-determination while accepting without
question Al-Vali's dubious credentials as the official
representative of the Saharans empowered to determine their
future on their behalf. Moreover some outside interests
interpreted the self-determination approach as leading only
to independence without regard for the alternative choice:
unification.
During the critical moments preceding the successful
Creen March, the Spanish troops withdrew from some parts
of the region handing them over to the Polisario Front which
then proceeded to set un its own rule of terror disregard-
ing the wish of the people and ignoring the possibility of
holding a referendum.
However, the Moroccan-Mauritanian attitude was based
on the following:
1. the historical and geographical facts which under-
line the unity of the land and the people
2. the wish of the Saharanz, repeatedly expressed
during the last twenty years to be liberated and
united to their motherland.
5 /
3. the presence in Morocco of a majority of Saharan
refugees who, facing a difficult choice, opted for
several years of exile and deprivation,
4. the decision of the leader of the Saharan Assembly
(Jama'a) who sided with Morocco and stated the wish
of the Assembly to be re-united with the motherland.
Chief of the most important tribe, he was a senior
officer in the Liberation Army which freed and
unified the Sahara in 1957. and was regarded as the
official spokesman of the Saharans by the Spanish
authorities and the international organizations
5. the resolution approving the Spanish-oroccan -
Mauritanian agreement adopted by the overwhelming
majority of the Assembly members (61 for 19 against)
It must be noted that those who voted to reject the
agreement did not necessarily oppose the return of
Sahara to Morocco and Mauritania:
6. The return to their country of several members of
the Assembly who had been deported to Algeria and
their stated approval of the agreement
7. the friendly reception afforded the Green March
whose progress was reportedly without incident. More-
over, King Hassan's representative, Al-Sayed Ahmad
Ben Soudah entered the region accompanied only by
civilians and rejected the Spanish offers of protect
ion. He insisted on attending the Friday religious
services without a guard, and the enthusfastic
welcome he received unprecedented in the history
of the Sahara, was broadcast live and recorded for
posterity.
8. All the incidents which followed the Spanish with-
drawal are the work of a particular group and its
foreign supporters. They indicate that the group
has no connection with the people of Sahara
unable to carry out any effective operation on
Saharan territory, it had to resort on a raid on
Nouakchott the Mauritanian capital. As it claims
to be a liberation movement one would expect their
activities to be greater inside the region and among
the people. The revolutionary fish does not swim
away from its own waters to invade the territory of
others.
9. A11 those now in favor of self-determination had
asked Spain to exercise its right as the effective
power in the area. It is only logical that they
accept a solution already approved by the Spanish
authorities.
10. The attitude of Morocco towards the right to self -
determination is based international and revolution-
ary interpretations of the principle: it should
never mean the division of territorial integrity
or the disintegration of the nations of the Third
World authorizing particular regions to secede
because a) they disapprove of the rulers in power
b) they are eager to carry out a social experiment
c) they wish to monopolize the wealth of the region
or d) they are complying with the wishes of an out-
side power.
6 /
11. Third World public oninion severely condemned the
"self-determination movement in Katanga. Tshombe
the hero of the Katanga "liberation was orrested
during the Conference of Non-Aligned Countries
and emprisonned until his death in Algeria of all
places. His death signaled the end of the separatist
movement in the Congolese region. The same fate
befell the self-determination plots in Biafra, in
Southern Sudan, in Northern Iraq and in Vestern
Sahara.
The right to self-determination is the right of free
choice: secession or unification. It is the right of the
people to achieve their territorial unity. and to extend
their domination over the whole of their homeland. The
United Nations Organization has nas determined that it
could be achieved through: a) the creation of an independent
state, b) free union with an independent state or c)
confederacy with an independent state.
The UN Declaration of Human Rights defines the right
to self-determination as the freedom of a people to decide
their political status, to manage their economy and to
achieve their political and economic development.
Undoubtedly, the situation that prevails in the region
is most conducive to the achievement of a full political
and economic development which could not be accomplished
in an entity lacking infrastructure and devoid of any of the
basic ordinary human elements essential to development.
V - HAS MOROCCO IGNORED THE ORGANIZATION OF AFRICAN UNITY
RESOLUTION REGARDING RESPECT OF COLONIAL FRONTIERS?
Morocco knows very well the contents of all the resol-
utions adopted by the Organization, since it was on Moroccan
territory and under the sponsorship of King "ohammed V that
the DAU was created. As regards the respect of colonial
frontiers, orocco's position is based upon two supporting
facts:
1. The nations of the Third World which have been the
victims of colonialist partition should not always cling
to the principle of colonial frontiers. Nationalist
movements in the colonies were often based on the rejection
of such frontiers. Whenever it has been possible to eradic
ate artificial Lorders and to return to natural and national
frontiers. the interests of the people have been protected
and peace has been guaranteed. Unen return to national
frontiers proved difficult colonial frontiers were accepted
as the viable, and not the Ideal solution.
2. Morocco believes that the supporters of the principle
of colonial frontiers are using hypocritical and specious
arguments or the borders of Sahara are the result of the
adrid Agreement bet een Soain Morocco and "auritania This
reflects exactly the border situation that prevails in
Algeria.
VI - UNY DOES MOROCCO OBJECT TO RAISING THE ISSUE BEFORE
THE INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS?
orocco feels that the international organizations can
no longer intervene in the matter. The United Nations are
7 /
required to uphold any peaceful settlement of a dispute
involving member-states who had initially raised the issue
before the organization. The Sahara is a case in point.
The parties of the dispute came to an agreement and so
notified the United Nations. The latter should therefore
accept the decision of the concerned parties and close
the file.
Organizations interested in liberation movements and
advocating anti-colonialist policies should consider that
the problem has been solved since the colonial power is
no longer occupying the territory which has been returned
to its rightful owners: Morocco and Mauritania, both
members of these organizations.
Morocco considers that the existence of these organ-
izations might indeed be threatened if they condescend to
sanction secessionist movements - misrepresenting themselves
as liberation movements - engaged in struggles against
member-states. These organizations would find themselves
in the awkward position of approving imperialism and liber-
liberation movements at the same time.
Morocco is anxious to point out to the Third World
the possible consequences of a policy which might lead to
the destruction of territorial unity and to member-states
supporting secessionist movements working against fellow -
members.
Indeed, it is through the destruction of territorial
unity and the encouragement of secessionist movements that
imperialism penetrated the Third World.
VII - IS THE PRESENCE OF SAHARAN REFUGEES IN ALGERIA AND THE
EXISTENCE OF THE POLISARIO FRONT AN INDICATION OF THE
COUNTRY'S ASPIRATIONS TO INDEPENDENCE?
The right of the refugees to determine their future
status has at last been recognized. This was the aim pursued
by Morocco on behalf of the refugees who fled the Spanish
occupation or were exiled by the Spanish authorities.
Morocco and Mauritania believe that the Saharan refugees
whose quantitative importance has been' exaggerated are being
used by elements hostile to both countries. Even the
Spanish authorities who could have used an inflated figure
to justify establishing a separate state estimate the total
population at about 70.000. while Morocco and Mauritania
estimate the of: refugces at approximately 35.000.
This differs widely from the publicized number of hundreds
of thousands refugees and supports the Moroccan claim' that
they are not only Saharans. but Algerians as well as refugees
from other countries who are being assembled for political
purposes of which they are unaware.
In this connection we would like to refer to the state-
ment issued by the Polisario Movement outside Algeria which
accuses the Algerian authorities of assassinating the leader
of the Movement head of the so-called government of Sahara
because he opposed Algerian policies. If such has been the
fate of the head of their government one can speculate
about the opportunities of self-expression granted to the
refugees and the extent to which they can exercise their
right to self-determination.
/
8 /
Morocco and Mauritania believe that the liberation
movements acted wisely when they refused to recognize the
Polisario which they saw as a faction sponsored and support
ed by the Spanish authorities hoping that the region would
secede. Such an attitude on the part of a liberation
movement is against the true spirit of all revolutionary
traditions. From the very beginning, the Polisario Front
has been contributing to regional and international
conflicts. It has no popular roots and without exception
its leaders are Horoccans or Mauritanians who exercised
their right by standing in parliamentary elections in
Morocco or entered the Mauritanian diplomatic service and
subsequently and for very personal reasons left the service
of their respective governments to further the ends of
the colonialist regime in the region.
VIII - WHAT ARE THE FORCES SUPPORTING THE SECESSION OF THE
SAHARA?
a. Imperialist powers seeking the partition of the
African states to create entities lacking independent
raisons dêtre et thus submissive to outside protection.
b. Anti-Arab imperialist powers seeking to divide
the Arab homaland to establish small entities to hinder
Arab unity. to squander Arab energies in inter-Arab
conflicts and to punish Morocco for its stand at the
Islamic Summit Conference and during the October War.
C. World capitalism seeking to perpetuate imperialist
plunder of rav materials by preventing the establishment of
strong blocs of developing nations which could control
prices of such materials. Such powers do not relish the
propect of Morocco gaining control of (0% of the phosphate
world exports for such a control would give the Arabs and
the Third World nations a much Letter Dargaining position.
It also onens the door to the processing of phosphates in
an Arab land. On the other hand, if a mini-state depends
wholly on the assistance of world capitalism to export its
phosphate, it vill constitute a Trojan horse which can
be used to frustrate any attempt to resist imperialist
plunder.
It is also in the interest of world capitalism to set
up a mini phosphate state whose apparently high revenues
would be deposited in international banks or squandered in wa
wasteful consumption instead of being used to develop the
countries of the Maghreb.
a. The:world powers engaged in a cold var and looking
for new spheres of influence. They are trying to create
trouble spots to market and test their weaponry they
are also seeking to destroy the independent stance of African
nations to control them, to frustrate their attempts to
reach their goals and to initiate disagreements and conflicts
between Africans.
EMBASSY OF MOROCCO
WASHINGTON D.C.
INTERVIEU
granted by His Majesty King Hassan II of Morocco to Vr. Leon Zitrone
French Television Special Representative. --
QUESTION:
Morocco is soon going to hold elections. Could you explain
briefly the role of the Special Council whose members are the nine
General Secretaries of the political parties?
ANSWER:
Instead of creating a separate group, I Wished it had been possible
to include the Secretaries of the political parties among the members
of the Cabinet - as Ministers of State without nortfolio for instance;
they could have helped to shape Government policies by discussing
with me and my Government issues of general interest instead of
limiting themselves to matters purely related to the elections
Circumstances prevented such a policy at the time but it was
paramount to associate all political parties to the various phases
of the electoral process in order to avoid any dispute or any doubt
on the fairness of the popular expression of opinion. this led me
to set up a committee which would include besides the Prime Minister
the Ministers of Interior, Justice and Information. This taskforce
has the responsibility to keep me informed of the development of
the operations and of any past or present irregularities.
As I clearly pointed out in my letter addressed to the official
representatives of the political parties this does not preclude in
any way the use of all ordinary legal channels under the provisions
of the Constitution.
QUESTION:
What do these elections represent?
ANSWER:
As far as I am concerned, the elections will give me first of
all an excellent opportunity to detect young qualified individuals
and to promote the replacement of the governmental management staff
If the elections develop as anticipated and if the successful
candidates work hard and discharge to the best of their abilities
the responsibles duties they must perform under the Communal Charter
ve will witness, within two or three years. the emergence of young
men well able to fill high positions in the government as Ministers
Ambassadors, high executives and senior administrators.
As you know, power consumes mentally as well as physically.
Unlike a poet's fantasies the creative imagination needs now and
then infusions of fresh blood. We cannot keep on using the same
people and the same administrators. I hope then that the elections
will help to bring to the forefront those Moroccans who will have
to serve their country during the next decades.
The Sahara
QUESTION:
Everyone thought that the issue - since ve refer to it as the
Western Sahara issue - was settled, it now seems to crop up again
here and there. Why and, in your view who has an interest in
bringing up the subject?
ANSWER:
The Sahara issue is not the only matter being talked about
at this time.
Every year and on every occasion, some embittered souls trv to
dig up old dusty records even those problems that have already been
settled factually or legally.
As far as I am concerned, the matter is closed. It could be
argued, I suppose, that the two resolutions included a self determ-
ination process which so far has not been officially undertsken.. I
will reply to those who take me to task on this point: you have
never given us a clear field to hold such a process and I challenge
anyone to let us create the necessary conditions to hold a refer-
endum. But I know the Algerians will not want a public expression
of opinion and will do nothing to facilitate such a vote for the
simple reason that it would favor Morocco and would, once and for
all, close the last door still opened to them. As I want to avoid
an influx of voters coming from Chad, Mali or Algeria, I will hold
a plebiscite if Spain hands us the list of the 75.000 Sahravis
entered on their electoral rolls for the vote on the self-determ-
ination issue.
There will be a vote as soon as the so-called Polisario Front
controlled by Algeria gives me enough peace and quiet to hold it in
an orderly manner. My good friend Ould Daddah, President of the
Republic of Mauritania and I have agreed not to shy away from such
a public expression of opinion, but ve insist on the maximum
conditions of objectivity. However I feel sure that our Algerian
neighbours will not permit such conditions to prevail.
Phosphates
QUESTION:
In the field of economic development Morocco seems prepared to
offer to the developing countries of the Third World the opportunity
to buy phosphate on credit. I have been given to understand that
you initiated this program.
ANSWER:
Yes, such was the Moroccan plan when the aftermath of the 1973
October War brought about the first shortage of raw materials which
surprised, I would even say shocked the richest and most developed
countries of the world. It was unfortunate that the Moroccan
proposal was not fully understood because the example could have
been followed by other countries not only for phosphates, but also
for oil, iron and all other raw materials. Since our phosphate
deposits are practically inexhaustible and that nowadays money is
not everything, credits extended for phosphate purchases would have
in fact enabled us to set up an exchange system. Right now,
/
3 /
exchanges are more important than banknotes if of course the-
exchanges are not limited to those products which affect the
current economic situation.
This year for instance we are going to exchange wood but three
years from now we might need something else, this snows that
Morocco should not confine itself to a rigid system of exchange.
We had proposed the credit plan to help developing countries in
need of phosphates but lacking the funds to pay for it because of
its high price in the hope of being repaid at thedend of the credit
period by getting other needed. raw materials in exchange.
QUESTION:
One last question. Is Morocco doing well?
ANSWER:
One can never say that a country is not doing well. One can
say that things are in poor shape in a country. but one cannot say
when referring to legitimate countries such as yours since you are
French, or mine that the nation is in Door health. I only mention
France and Morocco but the history books are full of examples.
France and Morocco are like those toys with different heads fat
bellies and leaded feet. No matter how much they are punched, they
immediately stand up again. I would even say that when these
countries need anti-bodies to renew their vigor they generate them
and need no help from the outside world.
I can say my country is doing well. It could do better. But
I know that sometimes it is wise to leave well alone. Let us be
content with a steady and patriotic pace. The nationalist spirit
must not be thrown to the four winds. The patriotic pressure of
the machine as represented by Morocco should be stabilized at a
normal cruising speed. No xenophobia no excess. No euphoria
provoked by too much contentment or too much laxity, but enough
patriotic feeling to keep the machine going at a steady rate. thus
Morocco will keep on doing well.