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    "contentType": "document",
    "title": "Foreign Policy, (12/76-1/77) [2]",
    "citationUrl": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/148853",
    "collections": [
        "Records of the Office of the Staff Secretary",
        "1976 Campaign Transition File"
    ],
    "subjects": [
        "Iraq",
        "Blumenthal, Michael.",
        "Bourne, Peter G., 1939-",
        "International finance",
        "International relations"
    ],
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    "ocrText": "Foreign Policy, [10/76-1/77] [3]\nFolder Citation: Collection: Office of Staff Secretary; Series: 1976 Campaign Transition File;\nFolder: Foreign Policy, [10/76-1/77] [3]; Container 2\nTo See Complete Finding Aid:\nhttp://www.jimmycarterlibrary.gov/library/findingaids/Staff_Secretary.pdf\nWITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)\nFORM OF\nCORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE\nDATE\nRESTRICTION\nDOCUMENT\nMemo\nAaron (NSC) to Schneider, w/attachments, 11 pp.\nRe: Sen. Percy's visit to OPEC countries\n12/1/76\nA\nMemo\nJasinowski to Pres. Carter, w/attachments, 5 PP.\nRe: Simon report on East-West trade\n12/2/76\nA\nMemo\nBourne to Pres. Carter, w/attachments, 8 pp.\nRe: Iraq Suitzed sersion opened 1/11/93\n12/2/76\nA\nMemo\nBourne to Pres. Carter, 4 PP.\nRe: Britain\n12/2/76\nA\nMemo\nEizenstat to Pres. Carter, 1 P.\nRe: Frank Mankiewicz\n12/16/76\nA\nFILE LOCATION\nCarter Presidential Papers, Staff Offices, Office of Staff Secretary, Transition File\nForeign Policy, [12/76-1/77, n.d.] Box 2\nRESTRICTION CODES\n(A) Closed by Executive Order 12356 governing access to national security information\n(B) Closed by statute or by the agency which originated the document.\n(C) Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in the donor's deed of gift.\nNATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION\nNA FORM 1429 (6-85)\nCARTER - MONDALE\nTRANSITION PLANNING GROUP\nP.O. Box 2600\nWashington, D.C. 20013\nDecember 2, 1976\nMEMORANDUM TO: President-elect Jimmy Carter\nFROM: Peter Bourne P.B.\nIn connection with the attached memos, I wanted to\nmake it clear that I, in no way, suggested that I was\nrepresenting you and was only responding to their re-\nquests to talk to me in the most informal way. I also\nstressed that you would not be taking office until\nJanuary 20th, and that you had no intention of involv-\ning yourself in the foreign affair's of the United\nStates, prior to that date. I did talk to Zbig\nBrzezinski before I left and followed his suggestions\nand guidance in what I did.\nTo Cy Vance to\non meet drugs Dr / alcohol- into One many of\nI'd like for Bourne you Expert\nHas entreplaces. & most\nJ.C.\nElectrostatic Copy Made\nfor Preservation Purposes\nCARTER - MONDALE\nTRANSITION PLANNING GROUP\nP.O. Box 2600\nWashington. D.C. 20013\nDecember 1, 1976\nMEMORANDUM TO: President-elect Jimmy Carter\nFROM: Peter Bourne\nP.B.\nSUBJECT: Iraq\nThe meeting I attended last week in Iraq was sponsored\nby the Pan Arab Organization for Social Defense and the\nInternational Council on Alcohol and the Addictions. It's\npurpose was partly to discuss alcohol and drug problems in\nthe Arab world but more broadly the problems of social de-\nvelopment in that area. It was attended by about 50 repre-\nsentatives from all of the Arab nations, mostly people at\nthe undersecretary and assistant secretary level in depart-\nments of health or internal affairs (security). I had the\nopportunity to talk informally to most of these people about\nyour desire for friendship with all of the nations of the\nmiddle-east and also about your concern for health and\nprograms relating to human welfare and Social development.\nThe conference dealt very little with either drugs or alco-\nhol and the chief of each delegation in general used the\nmeeting to make a purely political statement. There does,\nhowever, seem to be a genuine concern in several of the\nArab countries to use their new found oil wealth to improve\nthe social welfare of their people with the development of\na variety of health and other related projects.\nI made a brief trip to the cities of Kerbala and Najaf\nin the southern part of the country close to the Saudi\nArabian border. This is desert area which in general is\nextremely poor, and with a significant nomadic population.\nI had planned also to go to Kurdistan in the northern part\nof Iraq to look at the re-settlement program for the Kurds.\nBut even though the Iraqi government was willing to let me\ngo, it became impossible to include it in my schedule.\nI met with several key people including, Marshall Wiley\nthe U. S. charges d'affaires who, because we do not have\ndiplomatic relations with Iraq is largely isolated, having\nvery little direct contact with their senior officials, Dr.\nRiyadh Ibrahim, Minister of Health, who was formerly chief\nSANITIZED\nE.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4\nPER RE MR-NLC-92-\nBY Dr NARS. DATE 1/11/93\nPage 2\nMemo To: President-elect Jimmy Carter\nFrom: Peter Bourne\nSubject: Iraq\nDecember 1, 1976\nof Family Planning for Iraq, Ambassador John Graham the\nBritish Ambassador who provided me an interesting third\nperspective on U.S. - Iraqi relations and Dr. Sa'duan\nHammadi, the Foreign Minister.\nI spent about an hour with Dr. Hammadi who has a\nPh.D., in Economics from the University of Wisconsin,\nand believe that I was the first American in sometime\nto talk with him directly. Initially he was somewhat\ncold and formal, but by the end he had warmed up and\nwas quite friendly and open on a number of issues.\nHis greatest interest was in you personally, and he\nwas particularly eager to discuss the large black vote\nthat you received in the election, your interest in\nhealth and social programs, the fact that you were not\na captive of big business or any other special interest\ngroup and that you were in many ways an outsider from\nthe traditional political system. He was especially\ninterested in the fact that Miss Lillian had been in\nIndia with the Peace Corp-something he did not previ-\nously know. In the course of our conversation he dis-\ncussed several specific points.\n-The Iraqi government, he said has no a priori posi-\ntion as far as the Carter Administration is concern-\ned. He talked about what he saw as past problems\nwith the United States since diplomatic relations\nwere severed in 1967, and also concerns that he had\nabout strong pro-Israel statements particularly re-\nlating to the Arab boycott that you had made during\nthe election campaign. He went out of his way then\nto say that the past was the past, and the Iraqi\ngovernment was concerned only with the future. In\nthis context he suggested that they had an interest\nin possibility of normalizing relations. He implied,\nthough, that some visible shift in U.S. policy in\nthe middle-east would be a pre-condition as far as\nthey were concerned. I did not get the feeling,\nhowever, that he expected any significant change in\nour obvious obligations to Israel. He cited to me\nthe example of the French who while they were in\nAlgeria were hated throughout the Arab world but\nwho now because of a dramatic change in their policies\nsince they withdrew from that country are now res-\npected and liked throughout much of the Arab world.\nPage 3\nMemo To: President-elect Jimmy Carter\nFrom: Peter Bourne\nSubject: Iraq\nDecember 1, 1976\n-The Iraqis have consistently been the most vehement-\nly anti-Israel of the Arab nations and have been the\nstrongest advocates of the Arab boycott. They first\nbelieve that it is a legitimate political tool, and\nsecondly, perhaps more important, that it is an important\nweapon for them with which to shame the other Arab\nnations with whom their relationships are not terribly\ngood. They would like to embarrass the other Arab\nnations over the issue of not being Arab enough at a\ntime when they seem to be moving towards a settlement\nin the middle-east, which Iraq currently does not\nsupport. While the Iraqis accept our opposition\nto the boycott there is one element that Hammadi raised\nwhich he says is particularly offensive both as far as\nIraq and other Arab nations are concerned. They really\nresent the implication that the boycott is racially\nmotivated. They compare it to our boycott of Cuba,\nand say that we are not imposing that boycott because\nthe American people are racially prejudiced against\nCubans. Similarly they reject the notion that they\nare racially prejudiced against Israel. I don't know\nhow a softening of your statements on that particular\nline would be perceived by Israel but it would go a\nlong way to mollifying the Arabs.\n-The Iraqis are particularly angry about our past\nsupport to the Kurds. Apparently Kissinger did arrange\nto give arms to the Shah of Iran specifically so that\nthey could be passed on to the Kurds, firing up the\nKurdish independence movement against Iraq on the Iran -\nIraq border. He apparently did it as a way of deliber-\nately weakening Iraq because of their extreme anti-\nIsrael position, because it was a favor to the Shah\nand perhaps because he felt they were coming ta strong-\nly under Soviet influence. Hammadi says that he once\nconfronted Kissinger with the fact that he was arming\nthe Kurds and thereby interfering with the internal\naffairs of Iraq, and he claims that Kissinger told him\nstraight out that it was because he, Kissinger, thought\nthe Iraqis were moving too close to the Soviets. Events\nhave changed dramatically since that time. The Kurds\nhave been largely neutralized militarily, partly be-\ncause of a very vigorous military counter attack by the\nIraqi army, and also because Iran and the Shah eventual-\nly double-crossed them in a rather complex series of\nPage 4\nMemo To: President-elect Jimmy Carter\nFrom: Peter Bourne\nSubject: Iraq\nDecember 1, 1976\nevents. Since the defeat of the Kurdish independence\nmovement the Iraqis have moved generously, and with-\nout vindictiveness tc incorporate them into the\npolitical mainstream of Iraqi life, building schools,\nroads, and providing other services in the Kurdish\npart of the country along their northeast frontier.\nHammadi told me that he understood that under our\nsystem we were obliged to give political asylum to\nthe Kurdish rebel leader Barzani, who is now in the\nU. S. trying to get support from various radical\ngroups, and that he did not hold this against the\nUnited States. However he was quite adamant in\nsaying that they resented the past support for the\nKurds as representing American interference in the\ninternal affairs of Iraq, and was insistent that we\ndo nothing in the future to re-stimulate the Kurdish\nmovement. At Wiley's suggestionI assured him that\nit was inconceivable that a Carter Administration\nwould have any reason to again encourage the Kurds\nto re-start their insurrection. The Kurds are tough\nmountain people with a romantic image and they have\nstrong appeal among certain groups in the United\nStates. However there appears to be absolutely no\njustification at this stage for supporting any\nfurther their claims for the establishment of a\nindependent Kurdish state. Attempts have been made\nto do this for fifty years and they have all failed.\nFinally, there now seems to be a resolution of the\nKurdish problem, and all but the most extremist\nKurdish leaders seem resigned to the gradual incorpo-\nration of their people into the political mainstream\nof the countries in the area.\n-I did not speak directly to Hammadi about Soviet\ninfluence or Soviet arms sales, although we did touch\non it obliquely. One of the most striking features\nabout Iraq and the Iraqi government is the fierce\nsense of hard won independence that they have, and\nit seems that they are as fearful of Soviet domination\nas they are domination by anyone else. Much of their\nextremism is, I believe, a desire to not be seen as just\nanother Arab country without a separate identity,\nHammadi said however, \"it is not easy for a small\ncountry to be independent, and sometimes big countries\nthink they are preserving our independences when they\nare not. I also had the feeling that he felt that\nPage 5\nMemo To: President-elect Jimmy Carter\nFrom: Peter Bourne\nSubject: Iraq\nDecember 1, 1976\nin several instances recently, actions by the Iraqi\ngovernment were interpreted in the west as being\nthe result of Soviet pressure and Soviet domination\nwhen in fact they were not, or at least they were\ninadvertently allowed to be perceived that way by\nthe Iraqis. There have been recent reports in the\nEconomist, and through other western sources of an\narms deal between Iraq and the Soviet Union in which\nIraq was to provide several military bases for Soviet\nuse. All of the sources that I talked to in Iraq\nincluding both Charges Wiley, and the British Ambassa-\ndor convinced me that there is no truth to these\nrumors. The Iraqis do buy arms from the Soviets,\nbut there is no evidence that they are providing\nSoviet bases. In addition they have recently asked\nthe British government to provide a bid for a large\nnumber of new tanks that they want, suggesting perhaps,\nthat they are willing to buy from the west rather than\nthe Soviet Union. Hammadi particularly resented\nKissinger's apparently consistent insinuation repeat-\ned by Ford on one of the debates that the Iraq govern-\nment, that prides itself so much on its independence\nfrom everyBody, was subject to easy pressure from the\nSoviet Union, or was under their sphere of influence.\n-Hammadi also specifically said to me \"Iraq needs no\neconomic aid from the United States\". Due to their\noil revenues they are now economically self-support-\ning, and take great pride in this fact, even though\nthey are not rich compared to other oil producers.\nThey do accept multi-lateral aid through organiza-\ntions such as the World Health Organization, but\napparently do not wish to become directly involved\nwith the United States. On the other hand they\ncontinue to be very eager to stimulate economic ties\nwith us particularly through regular commercial\ninterchanges.\nTo summarize, Iraq is run by a tough independent mind-\ned regime which is essentially a police state and extremely\naggressive. (They kept a secret police guard with me at\nall times and I was never out of their sight. Even when I\nhad lunch with the British Ambassador at his residence he\nwas so fearful that his own house was bugged that he would\nonly talk to me about sensitive issues in his yard.) I\nPage 6\nMemo To: President-elect Jimmy Carter\nFrom: Peter Bourne\nSubject: Iraq\nDecember 1, 1976\nbelieve however that they are running the country relative-\n1y well. It is economically stable and one sees evidences\nof construction and the implementation of a wide range of\nsocial programs throughout the country. Their independence\nfrom all other nations is extremely important to them and\nI don't believe their involvement with the Soviet Union is\nof the scope Kissinger has suggested. In fact, I was\nparticular reminded of blacks in the United States, and had\nthe feeling that the overwhelming drive that the Iraqis have,\nafter having been under the domination of foreign governments\nfor several hundred years, \"Is to be somebody\", on the inter-\nnational scene.\nThey have made almost a fetish out of their being more\nArab than any of the other Arab countries, of being the\nmost anti-Israel, and of being the most resistent to any\nmiddle-east settlement. I had the impression, however, that\nthere is a certain amount of realism developing now in their\nthinking and that although they gave me the standard anti-\nIsrael rehetoric, that they recognize that some kind of\nsettlement is inevitable and that they are likely to be left\nout completely. They have suffered a serious defeat in\nLebanon both in terms of prestige by backing the PLO, and\neven in direct military terms by sending approximately\n4,000 \"Volunteers\" to fight along side the PLO against the\nSyrians. The Iraqis are not closely aligned with any of the\nother Arab countries, and they are more on the outside now,\nthan they have been even previously. They can create an\nembarrassment through heavily pushing the Arab boycott, and\nthey can make a settlement on the middle east problem more\ndifficult, but they probably can no longer completely ob-\nstruct such a settlement. Also to some extent if a settle-\nment is inevitable it suddenly becomes very much in their\ninterest to be at the bargaining table, and not to be left\ncompletely out in the cold when the final settlement is\nreached.\ntold me that he thought that\nwe could well effect a complete middle east settlement\ntotally ignoring Iraq, and that they just don't have the\ninfluence to block it anymore. The only thing that really\nmatters in the middle east at this point is a settlement,\nand everything else is secondary to that. The U. S. charges,\nwho obviously has a more personal vested interest in our\nfuture there, feels that we should work actively for improve-\nment of relations and perhaps a re-establishment of formal\nPage 7\nMemo To: President-elect Jimmy Carter\nFrom: Peter Bourne\nSubject: Iraq\nDecember 1, 1976\ndiplomatic ties. He points out that the Iraqis have a\nplanned 35 billion dollar development program projected\nfor the next five years and American business should have\na chance to have access to a significant piece of that\nmoney.\nI really agree that Iraq is of rather trival con-\nsequence in the overall middle east picture. However I\nfeel that the potential exists for significantly improving\nour relations with them by rather minimal gestures on our\npart. Statements on the following issues would be read\nvery positively by them, 1) mention of their effort to\nincorporate all people of Iraq into the mainstream of Iraqi\npolitics would be read as positive endorsement of their\nprogram with the Kurds, and discouragement of the Kurdish\nindependence movement, 2) some statement alluding to Iraq's\nstrong effort to remain independent even when under pressure\nfrom other nations would be read as a change in the Ford-\nKissinger statement about being under Soviet domination.\n3) if appropriate to talk about the boycott in political\nterms rather than implying that it is basically a racist\nact would be an extremely positive move in their eyes.\nI plan to maintain on a personal basis, my relationship\nwith the key people that I met while I was in Iraq, particu-\nlarly the Minister of Health Dr. Ibrahim, and I hope that\nthis will help to lend some sense of particular friendship\ntowards them. Although I am aware that in terms of other\npriorities it is hardly worth expending much energy on\nIraq, I do believe that a significant change in their\nattitude towards us, particularly the eventual re-establish-\nment of formal diplomatic relations, would lend enormous\ncredence especially among the \"non-aligned\" nations to\nyour campaign statements about paying more attention to the\nlittle countries, and particularly those who are not mili-\ntarily powerful, especially if this can be done without\ncompromising any of our other commitments.\nPriority\nFOR COMMCENTER USE ONLY\nmm\nUNCLAS\nPRECEDENCE\nCLASSIFICATION\nDEX\nFROM:\nMaxie Wells, Plains\nDAC 079\nGPS\nTO:\nLDX\nPAGES /\nStuart Eizenstat in the\nTransition Group, HEW\nTTY\nCITE\nINFO:\nDTG: 2417552 DEC 74\nRELEASED BY:\nTOR: 2418027 DEC 74\nSPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS:\nO.O.B.\nWHCA FORM 8, 22 FEB 74\nIMM.\nLINCLAS\nFOR COMMCENTER USE ONLY\nPRECEDENCE\nCLASSIFICATION\nDEX\nFROM: ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI\nDAC 103\nGPS\nLDX\nPAGES /\nTO: PRESIDENT ELECT CARTER\nTTY\nCITE\nVICE PRESIDENT ELECT MONDALE\nINFO:\nDTG: $72019ZJAN 77\nRELEASED BY: Coo\nTOR: 0720247 JAN \"\nSPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS:\n/TOGOV 111//\n1977 JAN 7 20 19\nWHICA FORM 8, 22 FEB 74\nMEMORANDUM\nNATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL\nTO GOV 111\nJanuary 7, 1977\nDELIVER ON RECEIPT TO POND HOUSE\nMEMORANDUM FOR:\nTHE PRESIDENT-ELECT\nTHE VICE PRESIDENT-ELECT\nATTENTION:\nJODY POWELL\nFROM:\nZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI\nSUBJECT:\nProposed Statement on Vice Presidential Trip\nI suggest that Governor Carter make a statement along the following\nlines:\nI have asked Senator Mondale on my behalf to pay a visit\nto our allies in Europe and Japan to seek their views on the\npossibility of an economic summit and on other international\nquestions. I have in mind that this fact finding mission would\ntake place in the first week after the Inauguration. We\nhave informed the governments of France, Great Britain,\nWest Germany, Japan and the European Community of our\ndesire to hold these consultations with them and will be\nworking out the details over the next two weeks.\nMy purpose is to get firsthand views from our allies on\ninternational economic issues and on political and security\nissues as an input to my own initial decisions in these areas.\nIt is my hope that these visits will begin the process of\nclose collaboration on all the matters of common concern.\nOF\nDEPARTMENT THE 1789 TREASURY\nTHE\nOFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY\nWASHINGTON, D.C. 20220\nDecember 23, 1976\nMEMORANDUM FOR: PRESIDENT-ELECT CARTER\nFROM:\nW. Michael Blumenthal\nSUBJECT: The Advisability of a Near Term Economic Summit Meeting\nThe last thing you need is more reading material but I've\ntried to keep this brief, and I think the subject is timely.\nThere will be considerable pressure from foreign leaders\nfor a near term economic summit meeting. French President Giscard\nalready has called for it publicly, and others will do SO. It\nmakes sense, then, to consider the new Administration's position\ntowards the advisability of such a meeting and how it might be\napproached.\nThis memorandum summarizes my preliminary recommendations\nto you on this subject. I discussed these views at breakfast\ntoday with Messrs. Lance, Schultze and Burns, and they generally\nconcur in them. I haven't discussed them with Cy Vance but\nintend to do so next week at Sea Island.\nMy overall conclusions can be summarized as follows:\n1. That we indicate general sympathy for a summit meeting;\n2. That we reach and disclose our domestic economic decisions\nbeforehand;\n3. That we allow enough time for Cy Vance and me to consult\nwith our foreign counterparts, concerning the agenda and\ndecisions which should be reached at this meeting.\n4. That we not commit, therefore, to a specific date, or one\nthat is too early--late spring or early summer might\nbe the eventuality.\nGenerally, such a summit meeting will be necessary and\nwould benefit both the U.S. and our major, industrialized allies.\nYou would meet foreign leaders, get a first-hand exposure to\ncertain international economic problems, and get a chance to\nREPRODUCTION MADE FOR\nPURPOSES\n- 2 -\npromote closer cooperation in economic policy-making among\nthese key nations. Specifically, the meeting would address\na collective approach to worldwide economic recovery, financial\nassistance to several crisis-ridden industrialized nations,\nthe need to thwart protectionist trends and move ahead in 1977\nwith serious, multilateral trade negotiations, and\na strategy towards the economic demands of the developing\nnations.\nIt is important, however, that we allow sufficient time\nto set goals and otherwise prepare ourselves very carefully\nfor this summit meeting. I suggest, therefore, that your\nEconomic Policy Board (or its successor) begin deliberations\nimmediately after the inauguration concerning the approach to\nsuch a meeting. In addition, Vance and I should begin preparatory\ndiscussions with our counterparts.\nTwo factors argue for this deliberate approach. First,\nour own 1977 economic stimulus policies should be formulated\nand presented to Congress and the general public well before\nthis meeting. We then will be on record with a coherent,\nstimulus policy which asserts leadership and implicitly calls\non our economically stronger allies to follow. In addition, your\nkey economic advisers first must study these international economic\nproblems in depth and determine your Administration's\nstructure for international economic policy-making.\nAfter these two tasks have been completed, the U.S. can\nset its goals for a summit meeting, assess its likely outcomes,\nand propose a specific agenda within this context. Without\nsuch careful preparation, an economic summit might result in\npoor, or no decisions, which, in turn, would have damaging\neffects on our efforts to assert needed, world leadership and\nto promote economic confidence.\nOF\nDEPARTMENT THE 1789 TREASURY\nTHE\nOFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY\nC\nWASHINGTON, D.C. 20220\nMEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT-ELECT\nSUBJECT: Your Telephone Call to Chancellor Schmidt\nArthur Burns telephoned me last night upon his return\nfrom Switzerland where he participated in the negotiations\non the UK's sterling balances problem.\nHe told me that Chancellor Schmidt had asked to see\nhim urgently. Burns therefore stopped off in Bonn and\nthe Chancellor requested that Burns communicate to me, for\ntransmission to you, the following points which he would\nlike to discuss in his telephone conversation with you:\n1. The Economic Summit - when should it take place?\nWhat kind of preparatory steps are required? The\ndesirability of a prior meeting of finance ministers.\n2. The policies that should be taken by the strong\nindustrial countries to restore economic confidence\nin the world.\n3. A plan to be worked out for the simultaneous\nannouncement by various countries re implementation\nof policies in relation to the above.\n4. The point that whatever fiscal measures are taken\nby individual countries should be financed through\ncapital markets rather than through central banks.\n5. The need to strive for an understanding between the\ndeveloped countries on the one hand, and the less\ndeveloped countries on the other. In particular,\nwhat should be, and what should not be done to bring\nthis about.\nMhe\nW. Michael Blumenthal\nSecretary of Treasury-Designate\nCC Cyrus Vance\nZbigniew Brzezinski"
}